The Middle East Journal

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IDDLE EAST INSTITUTE ■ VOLUME 49 NUMBER 1 ■ WINTER 1995

CUK-H06144-17-KP2098

The Middle East Journal

K.P 2098

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Editor's Note

DR. Eric Hooglund, who had edited the *Journal* since 1992, left that job in late September 1994 and I was called in to substitute for him, beginning in mid-October, until a new editor could be hired. That process was completed with the appointment of Dr. Mary-Jane Deeb to the post in January 1995.

While we have missed Eric's editing skills and his wide range of academic contacts in and knowledge of the field of Middle East studies, I believe you will find Mary-Jane a worthy successor. She holds a Ph.D. from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University and is a well-known North African specialist who has published numerous articles and two books. She has taught at The American University and Georgetown University, and served as a social studies book review editor for the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* from 1989–94.

We also have a new book review editor, Dr. Sana Abed-Kotob, who succeeded Dr. Steven Glazer in that job in late November 1994. Sana holds a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, and has also begun the process of academic writing and publishing, which is the lifeblood of the academic world. Her specialties are international relations, international political economy, and international law.

Meantime, I have supervised the preparation of this issue of the *Journal*, the contents of which had largely been accepted for publication by Eric. The first article, a very gloomy piece titled "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," written under the pseudonym Cassandra, is likely to be contentious. We can visualize readers quarreling with its conclusions, but feel the author's observations should be brought to their attention. As the caveat on the facing page states, the opinions expressed in our pages are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the *Journal* or the Middle East Institute.

We do not, as a matter of policy, accept pseudonymous articles, but have made an exception in this case because the author has legitimate grounds for fearing retribution.

Readers will recall that Cassandra's fate was to have the gift of prophecy, but never to be believed.

The next article, by Zachary Karabell of Harvard University, is a study of US policy toward Iraq in the period leading up to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and for two years thereafter. While much of the information in this article has been published, it is here assembled in a concise and coherent form, and the author also gives us explanatory insights from former senior officials. Together they make this the clearest picture to date of the development of that policy.

The third article, by Ziya Oniş of Boğaziçi University, deals with the question of Turkey's role in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East in the wake of the Cold War. Turkey's strategic significance has changed and its possibilities have changed as well. Should it be pursuing pan-Turkism in Central Asia? Should it continue its efforts to become part of the European Union? Should it take an active role in Middle East political and economic questions? You will have to read the article to find out.

We then have two strictly economic articles. The first, by Ishac Diwan and Lyn Squire of the World Bank, examines the question of how Middle Eastern states are to finance their expenditures and the role of external financial institutions in helping them to do so. Where is the money going to come from? Further reform, both in terms of stabilization and structural adjustment, is required in most countries of the area if they are to attract external, private investment and improve productivity.

The second article, by Massoud Karshenas of the University of London and M. Hashem Pesaran of Cambridge University, discusses Iran's economy. How well has the 1990 economic reform worked and what has it meant for "reconstruction," i.e., correction of the excesses of the Khomeini era? They conclude that the success of any development strategy within a mixed-economy framework requires an adequate and stable legal and political environment before rational decision making can materialize. The implication is that such an environment does not yet exist in present-day Iran.

Richard B. Parker

THE IMPENDING CRISIS IN EGYPT

Cassandra

FOR Egypt to have severe political, social, and economic problems is nothing new. Those it is facing today are particularly acute, however, and the government is not dealing with them effectively. Instead of allowing increased opportunities for political participation to alleviate political pressure caused by economic austerity, the government of President Husni Mubarak is seeking to contain most manifestations of political autonomy, and the state's capacity for such containment is being sorely tested. If, ultimately, its containment capability proves to be inadequate, the Egyptian state will be more or less alone in confronting a revolutionary crisis. None of Egypt's allies, including the United States, is prepared or equipped to assist.

Economic and political correlates of potential systemic collapse are evident. First is a severe and protracted recession following a boom, a cyclical pattern often associated with political destabilization. The vast majority of Egyptians increasingly are suffering from relative deprivation, as the gap between their expectations and the reality of their living conditions widens. Relative deprivation often translates into political discontent, as the examples of Iran and Algeria have demonstrated.[1] A second indicator of serious trouble is the inappropriate governmental response to economic challenges. Although economic reform achieved considerable gains in stabilizing the macroeconomy following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it has not been extended to the vital areas of institutionalization of the regulatory environment and privatization. In fact, the most difficult aspect of economic reform—structural adjustment—has yet to commence. The Egyptian economy is suspended between a rigid monetarism, on the one hand, and an inefficient state capitalism on the other. As a consequence, growth of the private sector continues to be retarded by a regulatory environment attuned to defending the interests of the public sector.

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[1] On the relationship between relative deprivation and the propensity to rebel, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

Third, political reform has not been successful Instead of seeking to broaden its base of political support, the regime has resisted trying new ideas and bringing fresh recruits into the political elite It has chosen to stand firm, betting that the state apparatus alone—without any support from civil society—is strong enough to eradicate any insurrection Yet, sclerosis in channels of elite recruitment has produced a gerontocratic, unrepresentative elite

A fourth and related development is the loss of legitimacy that has accompanied the growing political isolation of the regime Intellectuals appear to have deserted it, a development which, in other settings, has been a harbinger of revolution None of the major political tendencies—Nasserist, Communist, free marketeer, liberal democratic, or Islamist—considers the regime to be representative of its views or sympathetic to its interests While Mubarak disposes of the state power he inherited from Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, he can neither claim the legacy of either man, nor claim to be the progenitor of a new "ism " Many high-ranking officials complain uncharacteristically about the lack of leadership[2] Rumors of corruption among high officials, including the office of the president, contribute to widespread disillusionment Egypt seems to be in a state of "disequilibration," whereby the regime is not believed to share the ideas, aspirations, and values of society[3]

A fifth correlate of political breakdown is the presence of an armed insurgency Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Islamic militancy took the form of intermittent violent acts Since 1992, however, sporadic terrorism has grown into an insurrection that has affected directly the lives of thousands of Egyptians While the insurgents seem incapable of constituting an alternative government, they may succeed in destabilizing the incumbent one

Sixth, the bedrock of the regime—the military and security services—shows signs of being fractured The military is divided vertically and horizontally, i e , within the officer corps and between officers and enlisted men The security services are reportedly riven by internal disputes and worn down as a result of the extended campaign against Islamic activists, and there are questions about whether the 420,000 to 440,000-man army and the somewhat larger domestic security forces can be relied upon, in a condition of *extremis*, to defend the status quo or to secure the future

Finally, the external patron of the regime, the United States, is so preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli peace process, that it is neglecting to monitor domestic developments in Egypt Yet, even if the United States were sufficiently alert to Egypt's mounting problems, it has little capability to preserve Mubarak or to engineer a smooth and bloodless succession In sum, in the absence of meaningful economic and political reforms, the

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[2] Even cabinet ministers are reported to have privately expressed such sentiments, as related in interviews with members of the Egyptian political elite, April and May 1994

[3] On disequilibrated social systems as a harbinger of revolution, see Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* 2d ed (Palo Alto, CA Stanford University Press, 1982), pp 61–90

Mubarak regime may collapse, opening the door to a military takeover or to an even more dramatic political change similar to what happened in Iran during 1978–79

RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

Per capita income in Egypt climbed steadily from the inception of the Nasser era in 1952 until the June 1967 War It then rose rapidly from the onset of the oil boom in 1974 until oil revenues began to recede in the mid-1980s, at which time per capita income commenced a steady decline[4] The rising expectations engendered by Nasser's rhetoric, the oil boom, American largesse, and Sadat's *infitah* (economic opening) policies, have been followed by bitter disappointment This disappointment is aggravated further by a paradox that has come to characterize the post-1991 Gulf War Egyptian economy macroeconomic performance has improved dramatically, but microeconomic performance has deteriorated sharply Unfortunately for the government, it is performance at the microeconomic level that shapes individuals' perceptions While economists are persuaded by data on balance of payments, levels of indebtedness, budget deficits, and other macroeconomic indicators, such data mean little to ordinary people concerned about the scarcity of jobs, low wages, high prices, and inadequate profits

The relative success at the macro level is due to a huge infusion of aid following the Gulf war and to the accompanying stabilization package agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May 1991 This aid reduced the 1990 foreign debt of $50 billion to $26 billion by 1994 Fiscal reform has reduced the budget deficit from 20 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 to around 3 percent in 1993 Over that same period, inflation has fallen from 25 percent to less than 10 percent Egypt's foreign currency reserves have risen dramatically, from $2 7 billion in 1990 to almost $12 billion in 1993[5]

Success in economic stabilization has been bought at great cost to growth and equity Real GDP growth slowed from 2 5 to 3 percent per annum during the period 1989–91, to 0 4 percent in 1992–93 Economists have estimated that growth will rise only slightly, to 1 percent, in 1993–94[6] Since the population has been growing at a rate exceeding 2 percent per annum, the net effect on per capita GDP has been negative Whereas per capita GDP was $680 in 1986, it had fallen to less than $600 by 1993[7] Meanwhile, private investment has been inadequate to replace reduced government spending Between 1974 and 1993, total private investment was only $2 3 billion, which in proportion to GDP is extremely low by Third World and Arab state standards[8] Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP has declined steadily since 1988.[9] Rather than adopt measures to stimulate the economy, the government's 1993–94 budget called for total spending to rise by only 5 percent, so that "public consumption will remain depressed as the government intends to meet its targets for a reduction in the budget deficit."[10]

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[4] For GNP per capita during these years, see relevant *World Development Reports*, published annually for the World Bank, Washington, DC

[5] *Egypt Country Report*, First Quarter, 1994 (London Economist Intelligence Unit, 11 February 1994), pp 7–8

[6] *Egypt Country Report*, Fourth Quarter, 1993 (London Economist Intelligence Unit, 8 November 1993), p 7

[7] The World Bank, *World Development Report, 1993* (Washington, DC, 1993), p 238

[8] William E Schmidt, "A Deluge of Foreign Assistance Fails to Revive Egypt's Stricken Economy," *New York Times*, 17 October 1993 D Weigel, "Foreign Direct Investment The Role of Joint Ventures and

The two most important, politically relevant consequences of budgetary austerity and inadequate private investment are growing unemployment and disparity of income between the rich and the poor. Since the unemployed constitute "a great proportion of those condemned for perpetrating terrorist acts," some amelioration of joblessness would appear to be a precondition for reducing political violence.[11] Yet, unemployment is steadily rising, reaching up to 17 percent by 1993, according to official figures, and over 20 percent by most other estimates.[12] The 1994 level of unemployment was between 1.5 and 2 million, and disguised unemployment in government departments and public-sector companies was extensive.

This unemployment problem cannot be resolved in the absence of a dramatic upturn in the economic growth rate, for which a major increase in private investment is a prerequisite. Private-sector employment opportunities are essential because both government and expatriate work—the source of 90 percent of new jobs between 1976 and 1986—have constricted.[13] Between 1987 and 1991, when the economy was more robust, a total of one million jobs was created, but that number represented only 50 percent of the jobs then required to accommodate all new entrants to the labor force.[14] While the government's current five-year plan has set a target of creating 400,000 new jobs annually, in actuality 700,000 jobs are needed to provide work for 500,000 new entrants each year and to reduce unemployment and underemployment. This number of new jobs would require an annual growth rate of 7–8 percent.[15]

Government job-creation programs have been inadequate. The 1993–94 budget allocated LE2.2 billion (LE1.00 equals approximately US$0.30) for job-creation schemes. During the 1980s, LE41,000 was the average capital requirement for the creation of each new job in companies operating under law 43, the private investment law, that inaugurated the infitah in 1974.[16] Assuming that job-creation costs have remained constant, the 1993–94 budget allocation is sufficient to create only 50,000 new jobs, barely adequate to provide employment for 10 percent of new entrants to the labor force.

Investment Authorities," in Said El-Naggar, *Investment Policies in the Arab Countries* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1990), pp. 70–88.

[9] *Trends in Developing Economies, 1993* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993), p. 158.

[10] *Egypt: Country Report*, First Quarter, 1994, p. 7.

[11] Said El-Naggar, "Politics and Economic Reform in Egypt" (Paper presented to the nineteenth annual symposium of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 7–8 April 1994).

[12] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[13] Heba Handoussa, "The Burden of Public Sector Employment and Remuneration: A Case Study of Egypt" (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1989).

[14] "Grappling with Rising Unemployment," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 17–23 March 1994.

[15] El-Naggar, "Politics and Economic Reform in Egypt," pp. 6–7.

[16] For this figure, see Heba Handoussa, "Egypt's Investment Strategy, Policies and Performance since the Infitah," in Said El-Naggar, ed., *Investment Policies in the Arab Countries*, p. 143.

Increasing inequality and rising poverty closely track the growth of unemployment Government spending priorities contribute to these interrelated phenomena The 1993–94 budget, for example, calls for a 5 percent rise in total spending, but for a 19 percent increase in military expenditures Expenditures on food subsidies, which have been identified as the single most important contributor to equity in Egypt, are to be reduced [17] Salaries and wages, which amounted to 50 percent of GDP in 1970, had fallen to less than a third of GDP by the early 1990s, as yields from profits and investments rose proportionately [18] Average real earnings of government employees by 1991 were 50 percent of their 1973 value, and real wages for workers in all sectors have declined steadily since 1985 [19] The incidence of poverty and malnutrition, which fell steadily from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, has risen in the 1990s [20] By 1993, between 75 and 80 percent of the population had average monthly family incomes at or below $50 [21] Egypt was one of four countries listed in 1994 by the United Nations Development Program's annual Human Development Report as being "now in danger of joining the world's list of failed states because of wide income gaps between sections of their populations "[22]

Concerned by these developments and their political implications, the World Bank has channeled more than $600 million in donor funds to Egypt in order to create a Social Fund The purpose of the Social Fund is to serve as a safety net for Egypt's poor and unemployed, particularly those forced into such conditions as a result of privatization of public-sector companies The Social Fund is not large enough, however, to deal with problems of such magnitude, and has fallen victim to dissension within the cabinet, which has been unable to agree upon appropriate job-creation schemes

While the economic wisdom of deflationary policies is debatable, their political consequences are manifest Some jobless youths have joined a low-intensity civil insurrection against the government, many are alienated Underlying both active opposition and despondency is perceived relative deprivation—relative in comparison to Egyptians' memories of earlier periods, relative in comparison to better-off fellow citizens, and relative to non-Egyptians The perception that the government is insufficiently sensitive to the plight of the jobless, and unable or unwilling to do much about underlying causes of unemployment, contributes to the widening gap between ruler and ruled

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[17] Bent Hansen, *Egypt and Turkey The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1991), pp 226–28

[18] Fawzy Mansour, "The Egyptian Economy Restructuring or Destructuring?" (n p , n d), p 5

[19] *Al-Ahram Weekly*, "Grappling with Rising Unemployment "

[20] Alan Richards, "Economic Policy and Egyptian Security Dilatory Reform vs Making a Break for the Market" (n p , April 1994), p 11

[21] The World Bank, *Trends in Developing Economies, 1993*, p 156

[22] Paul Lewis, "UN Lists Four Nations at Risk Because of Wide Income Gaps," *New York Times*, 2 June 1994

INAPPROPRIATE ECONOMIC POLICY

Egypt's economic problems are manifest in the disjunction between stabilization and structural adjustment—between macro and microeconomic policy. Reforms necessary to facilitate broadly based economic growth, including privatization, trade liberalization, and the creation of an appropriate regulatory environment within the context of accountable institutions following transparent practices, have proceeded slowly at best. Few of the more than 300 state-owned enterprises targeted for privatization have been sold to private investors. Public-sector holding companies have secured the right to retain proceeds from the sales of those companies they control. The consequence of this measure is to perpetuate the dominance of the public sector, which will sell off unprofitable enterprises and invest the proceeds in other undertakings. About half of the overall GDP, and two-thirds of non-agricultural GDP, are produced in the public sector. The primary beneficiaries of this sector are the approximately 5,000 comparatively wealthy Egyptians who comprise the senior management and members of the executive boards of the state-owned enterprises, in addition to the technocrat-politicians with whom they share economic rents.[23]

The government is not progressing toward creating a regulatory environment conducive to investment and growth. The absence of transparency—or clear and open procedures—throughout the administration is indicated by the manner in which economic data are treated. Ministers release statistics on a selective, rather than on a comprehensive, routine basis. Those data that are released invariably demonstrate how well a particular ministry or the national economy is performing and are unreliable.[24] Since the mid-1980s, for example, the Egyptian government has reported a rate of economic growth approximately double that estimated by the World Bank or other independent sources.[25] Egyptian economists who need authoritative statistics seek them, not from their own national bank, but from the World Bank or the US embassy in Cairo.[26]

A further indication of Egypt's reluctance to adopt an effective, market-oriented strategy of private sector-dominated, export-led growth, is its lack of a "change team." In comparing the rate and extent of structural adjustment in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey, John Waterbury has noted the importance of such a team of economic technocrats, insulated from political pressures by powerful political patrons.[27] Although Egypt has a few prominent and well-qualified economists who publicly articulate the need for a thoroughgoing structural adjustment, they do not comprise a team and have not been backed by a political patron.

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[23] This figure is provided by Milad Hanna, "Nationalisation to Privatisation and Back," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 2–8 September 1993.

[24] For a recent attack on the reliability of data released by the minister of tourism, see 'Abd al-Jawwad 'Ali, "Hadith fi Majlis al-Sha'b" (Discussion in the People's Assembly), *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, 17 January 1994.

[25] Hansen, *Egypt and Turkey*, pp. 489–90.

[26] Interview with the chairman of an Egyptian bank, April 1994.

[27] John Waterbury, *Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL RESPONSE

The thrust of governmental policy since 1990 has been to restrict political participation. Most of the opposition boycotted the 1990 parliamentary elections in protest against an electoral law that favored the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), and in protest against supervision of the elections by the ministry of interior. As a result, over 90 percent of the members of the current parliament represent the NDP.

The absence of competitive party politics in parliament has accentuated the importance of professional syndicates. Their politicized nature, and the fact that they hold comparatively free and fair elections for board members and officers, has made these syndicates ideal battlegrounds for contending forces seeking to demonstrate their strength and to broaden their appeal. Islamists have expanded their electoral presence progressively in these syndicates, dominating the most prestigious of them by 1992, including the syndicates of the commercial graduates, dentists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, and pharmacists. In February 1993, the government, alarmed by the growing influence of the Islamist movement within professional syndicates, enacted the Law to Guarantee Democracy within the Professional Syndicates. This law requires a minimum voter turnout of 50 percent of the members in professional syndicate elections, or, failing this, 33 percent in a second round. If these electoral thresholds are not met, voting results are voided and syndicates fall under the supervision of a panel of government-appointed judges. The NDP-dominated parliament passed the law despite a sustained campaign against it by the syndicates, including demonstrations attended by as many as 15,000 professionals.[28]

Constriction of political space has been accomplished in further ways. For example, the Emergency Law, initially decreed by Mubarak in the wake of Sadat's 1981 assassination, was extended by parliament for an additional three years in April 1994, with only 12 dissenting votes cast. The ministry of social affairs has been applying, with increased rigor, the restrictive provisions of the Nasserist-era Law 32 of 1964 that legalizes the ministry's control of voluntary associations.[29] Journalists have been the target of increasingly severe crackdowns. In April 1994, for example, the state security police arrested journalists who had written articles on corruption and the Islamist insurrection in the opposition newspapers *al-Sha'b* and *al-Wafd*. A journalist at *al-Wafd* claimed to have been beaten up when arrested.[30]

In October 1993, the government amended the Journalists Syndicate law to divide journalists into three categories. Promotion to a higher category or transfer to another post in the same organization was made contingent on authorization by a committee named by the Journalists Syndicate, which is government dominated. Journalists critical of this measure—1,000 demonstrated against the proposed legislation when it was introduced in parliament—contend that it permits the government to muzzle journalists on the ostensible grounds that they are not qualified. The law also made employees of the ministry of information, who far outnumber professional journalists, members of the Journalists Syndicate, thereby making it easier for the government to manipulate elections and to prevent the syndicate from falling under the control of Islamists, or independent secularists.[31]

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[28] On this law and reactions to it, see reports in *al-Hayat*, 15, 17, and 22 February 1993.

[29] On this law and unsuccessful efforts to amend or nullify it, see Amir Salim, *Difa'an 'an Haqq wa Hurriyyat Takwin al-Gam'iyyat* (In Defense of the Right and Freedom to Form Associations) (Cairo: Center for Legal Studies and Information on Human Rights, 1991).

[30] *Al-Wafd*, 13 April 1994. This act, along with the arrests themselves, were condemned by *al-Ahram* editor Salama Ahmad Salama, who drew parallels between these events and the "night visitors" of the Nasser era. See his column in *al-Ahram*, 14 April 1994.

The government's aversion to autonomous political participation also is illustrated by its sponsorship of legislation, in March 1994, to terminate the century-old practice of villages electing their mayors and deputy mayors. Not even Nasser had meddled with this vestige of democracy. For the Mubarak regime to have done so suggests that it is anxious about rural political instability. It has reason to be. In the 1992 local government elections, Islamists won a few seats for the first time since local councils had become elected bodies during the Nasser era. In June 1992, parliament passed legislation that raised rents for agricultural land and abolished the provision of the 1952 agrarian reform law that guaranteed agricultural tenants security of tenure on rented land. Millions of peasants (if family members are included) may be affected negatively by these measures, either through dramatic rental increases, eviction, or forced purchase of land from the absentee owner at market prices.[32] Another potential contributing factor to rural political unrest was the cancellation of the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Local Development project, which was the largest such project USAID had ever undertaken. It funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars into rural Egypt, largely through provincial and district notables, the backbone of the NDP's rural presence.[33]

The effect of changes to the landlord-tenant law and cancellation of the USAID project has been to impose additional hardships on peasants, while stripping patronage resources away from rural notables, thus reducing their networks of peasant clienteles. Mindful of the Algerian experience in which Islamists first gained control of villages and towns through the ballot box, and fearful of the implications of these recent measures that have antagonized peasants while simultaneously eroding government-associated rural patronage networks, the regime has opted to appoint mayors, thereby converting them into employees of the ministry of interior. They will, therefore, lose much of their legitimacy, further eroding already tenuous support for the government among the rural poor, who comprise the overwhelming majority of the village-dwelling population [34]

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[31] For a report on the legislation and journalists' responses to it, see *al-Wafd*, 21 October 1993. For systematic descriptions of syndicate activities and laws governing them, see Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *al-Taqrir al-Istratiji al-Arabi* (Arab Strategic Report), published annually by al-Ahram Publishing, Cairo.

[32] Robert Springborg mistakenly implied that the government, for political reasons, would be unable to amend the 1952 law. See his "State-Society Relations in Egypt: The Debate over Owner-Tenant Relations," *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 232–49. For a review of the consequences of amending the law, see Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Class, State and the Reversal of Egypt's Agrarian Reform," *Middle East Report* 184 (September-October 1993), pp. 20–3.

[33] For a description and analysis of this project, see Hanan Hamdy Radwan, "Democratization in Rural Egypt: A Study of the Village Local Popular Council," *Cairo Papers in Social Science*, 17, 1 (Spring, 1994).

The one governmental initiative that held out promise of expanding political participation was *al-Hiwar al-Qawmi*, or National Dialogue, which Mubarak called for in his acceptance speech before parliament in October 1993 The National Dialogue was intended to serve as a forum within which the government and the legal opposition could take up political reform First scheduled to be held before the end of 1993, the Dialogue was postponed repeatedly until it was finally convened in early July 1994 In the event, it was stillborn, because the government forbade the Muslim Brotherhood or any other Islamist organization to participate, while the leading secular opposition political party, the Wafd, boycotted the proceedings Resolutions that were passed took the form of recommendations to the president, which have yet to be acted upon

As the political space available to the opposition has decreased, circulation within the governing elite has virtually ceased The government of Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi, first appointed in 1987, is the longest serving government since the first modern cabinet was formed in 1914 Excluding the interior portfolio, which Mubarak has changed about every two years—largely because of the unstable domestic political scene and the pressure this puts on that ministry—the cabinet turnover rate is at its lowest point in Egypt's modern history Several ministers have held their portfolios for more than a decade, and five of them have been in the government longer than the prime minister Excluding three younger (i e , the average age is approximately 60) recruits to the cabinet in 1993, the average age of the cabinet is over 65 [35]

Finally, the insurgency has provided both cause and justification for wholesale violation of human rights, ranging from detention without charge or trial, to torture, the killing of suspects under interrogation, and the brutalization of entire villages and urban quarters by the security police [36] An antiterrorism law has been adopted that, among other things, legalizes trials of suspected terrorists in military courts, from which there is no appeal Those courts handed down 50 death sentences in the 15 months ending in April 1994 In one case alone, nine suspects were sentenced to death for attempting to kill Prime Minister Sidqi Amnesty International reported in November 1993, that of the 39 death sentences handed down by military courts by that time, virtually all the defendants had been subjected to torture to force them to sign confessions [37] In mid-March 1994, two suspects accused of seeking to plant a bomb at the Sidi Barrani military airfield in order to blow up the president, were tried secretly and executed by firing squad, even before news of the attempt was made public[38]

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[34] This and other criticisms of legislation amending the 1952 agrarian reform law were made by various opposition spokespersons See *al-Ahram*, 30 March 1994, and Fikri El-Gazzar, "Beheading Democracy in Villages," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 31 March-6 April 1994

[35] For commentary on the negative consequences for the Sidqi government of its low turnover rate, see Adil Hamuda's column in *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 10 May 1993

[36] For a review of Middle East Watch's October 1993 testimony before a US congressional committee on human rights violations in Egypt, and for the Egyptian government's response, see *Mideast Mirror*, 22 October 1993, pp 26–32

[37] Cited in *Mideast Mirror*, 11 November 1993, p 15

The regime's answer to its travails has been to curtail freedom of expression, restrict opportunities for political participation, and intimidate those who oppose the government By failing to differentiate between the democratic opposition and antidemocratic insurgents, the government is converting reformers into revolutionaries, supporters into bystanders Facing a political problem rooted in economic difficulties, the government continues to pursue economic policies that further stimulate political discontent, while bottling up that discontent rather than seeking to vent it

DELEGITIMATION

Arab governments in the Maghreb and Mashriq have sought legitimacy in two main ways. by projecting a vision of the future, generating popular support for that vision, and convincing the public that the regime can attain it, or by introducing reforms from above Mubarak's Egypt does not seem to possess the structural or personal prerequisites for either approach The state neither has the resources to convince citizens to subscribe to its ostensible vision, nor can it provide tangible proofs that it could realize its goals In fact, Mubarak has told those with whom he deals that he disdains grandiose visions and schemes, claiming that he is a practical man, a problem solver[39] The cost of the failure to communicate a political vision seems to be the loss of popular support. Egyptians made sacrifices under Nasser and Sadat for reasons that were explained to them Most people believed the sacrifices were necessary; current sacrifices, however, seem to be without purpose, and therefore are resented

The principal alternative legitimation strategy pursued by Arab governments has been one of limited political reform, a major component of which typically has been for the government to seek to rise above the fray, much in the manner of King Hussein of Jordan or King Hassan of Morocco These monarchs distance themselves from day-to-day politics They delegate enough power and permit sufficient relaxation of the political system for a political class to emerge That class debates low-level policy (i e , excluding national security and foreign policy issues) and assumes some responsibility for it, thereby acting as shock absorber for the ruler and reinforcing his and the regime's legitimacy as the protector of the national interest

Mubarak has not allowed a political class to emerge in Egypt. He is involved personally in all aspects of decision making The restrictions on political participation hinder the emergence of representatives who can negotiate agreements on behalf of constituencies All of Mubarak's cabinets have been comprised of technocrats, none of whom could claim to represent a nongovernmental constituency, or to have an extragovernmental base of political power Since the population is aware that the government cannot be changed by peaceful means, the secular political opposition, which lacks force to change the government, is perceived as marginal

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[38] Reuter dispatch cited in *Mideast Mirror*, 17 March 1994, pp 18–19

[39] Interviews with members of the Egyptian political elite, April-May 1994

The legitimacy of the president himself has been undermined by rumors of corruption Since the outbreak of the Islamist insurrection in the spring of 1992, important figures close to the president have been mired in revelations of corrupt behavior For example, the previous Minister of Interior, 'Abd al-Halim Musa, was accused in January 1994 by his predecessor, Zaki Badr, of running a private security firm with public funds, bribing journalists, stealing foreign assistance monies, and committing various smaller transgressions[40] Zakariya Azmi, chief of the Presidential Bureau and a member of the People's Assembly, was alleged by an opposition newspaper to be the partner of a notorious multi-millionaire developer accused of depriving the state treasury of LE100 million and of financing and running Azmi's election campaign[41] While public tales of corruption and moral turpitude have been politically damaging, they are less destructive than rumors surrounding the president's family, especially rumors about commissions paid to his son and other relatives Cabinet ministers are rumored to be disgruntled because lucrative commissions, which they had come to expect as a bonus of the job, are being diverted to the president's office[42] The point of these rumors is that they cast doubt on Mubarak's principal virtue—that he is honest Since his legitimacy rested not on his ability to articulate a vision, but on his managerial competence and personal integrity, he is facing an Islamist insurgency with inadequate personal legitimacy and insufficient political support

ISLAMIST INSURGENCY

The Islamist insurrection has greatly exacerbated Egypt's economic problems Income from tourism fell by one-third, or some $1 billion, from 1992 to 1993, and continued to stagnate in 1994[43] Since tourism has, over the past two decades, created more jobs than any other sector of the economy—employing more than one million and indirectly as many as five million Egyptians by 1992—disruption to that industry has had profound consequences for employment and income distribution

About 86 percent of the casualties resulting from civil disorder in the 41 years up to 1993 occurred during the Mubarak era, 92 percent of which occurred in the four years 1990–93, the bloodiest period of civil strife this century The total of those killed and wounded in 1993 (1,106) was about three-and-a-half times that of 1992 (322) The death toll resulting from political violence rose from 139 in 1991 and 1992, to 207 in 1993, and to 225 in the first ten months of 1994[44] The number of Islamist activists arrested leapt from some 3,600 in 1992 to over 17,000 in 1993[45] Comparative casualty rates also suggest the growing potency of the insurrection and indiscriminate responses by security forces In 1992, Islamist activists suffered twice the number of casualties as security forces (122 vs 61) In 1993, however, more policemen were killed (120) than insurgents (111) The number of civilian bystanders killed by crossfire in 1992 and 1993 exceeded that of either police or insurgents[46]

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[40] This story was on the front pages of *al-Gumhuriyya*, *al-Akhbar*, and *al-Wafd*, on 3 February 1994

[41] *Al-Sha'b* ran articles on this connection on 11, 14, and 21 January 1994

[42] Interviews with members of the Egyptian political elite, April, May, and October 1994 See also, Jim Hoagland, "Cozy with Gadhafi," *Washington Post*, 3 November 1994

[43] *Egypt Country Report*, Third Quarter, 1994 (London Economist Intelligence Unit, 28 July 1994), p 27

[44] *Annual Report of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights*, cited in *al-Ahram Weekly*, 8–14 December 1994

Of the 104 persons killed in shootouts in the first six months of 1994, a period in which security forces seemed gradually to be gaining the upper hand, 54 were alleged Islamic militants, 39 were policemen, 10 were bystanders, and one was a German tourist[47] Islamic insurrectionists have pursued a campaign of assassinations that has resulted in the deaths of a former speaker of parliament, a leading secular intellectual, four police generals—including the undercover general in command of antiterrorist security forces—and scores of lower-ranking intelligence and security officials They have narrowly missed killing the ministers of information and interior, the prime minister, and Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt's Nobel Prize-winning author Although the intensity of violence tapered off in the spring and summer of 1994, with only nine deaths occurring in the April-June period, a string of attacks on foreigners and Egyptian security personnel commenced again in September In the last quarter of 1994, Islamists engaged security forces in a series of skirmishes and small-scale battles in various villages, towns, and cities of the provinces of Asyut, Aswan, and Minya, and Islamist-related political violence resulted in 46 deaths in December, the third highest monthly total since 1992

The qualitative change from a sporadic and limited terrorist campaign to a widespread, low-level insurgency being countered by large numbers of security personnel, is due, in part, to the changing social profile of the activists themselves Compared to the 1970s, militants in the 1990s tend to be younger, less well educated, poorer, and more likely to reside in rural areas, shantytowns on urban outskirts, or urban slums The average age of militants arrested and charged for acts of violence dropped from 27 years in the 1970s, to 21 years by 1990 Of the seven militants executed for attacks on tourists in 1993, three were below the age of 20 Whereas 80 percent of Islamist activists arrested in the 1970s were college students or graduates, by the 1990s they comprised only 20 percent Those militants who had attended elite faculties, such as medicine or engineering, dropped from one-half of those arrested to 11 percent in the same time period[48] In sum, the Islamist movement has become further radicalized and intensified because it increasingly reflects the interests of the lower classes, rather than those of the middle and upper-middle classes Those youths most negatively affected by Egypt's faltering economy are the ones most likely to be Islamist insurgents

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[45] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Governance and Structural Adjustment The Egyptian Case" (Paper presented to the Governance and Successful Adjustment Conference at the World Bank, Washington, DC, 9–11 November 1994), p 40

[46] *Al-mujtama' al-madani wa al-tahawwul al-dimuqrati fi al-watan al-arabi al-taqrir al-sanawi* (Civil Society and the Democratic Transition in Arab Countries) (Cairo Ibn Khaldun Center, 1994), pp 419–22

[47] R Clemente Holder, "Egyptian Human Rights Leader Calls for Moderation," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (September/October 1994), p 62

[48] Ibrahim, "Governance and Structural Adjustment," p 42

Militant Islamists comprise not just small organizations capable of intermittent acts of violence, but, in fact, constitute an insurgency in which they, rather than the government, have controlled for extended periods the sociopolitical space within which they operate Urban-fringe shantytowns in Lower Egypt and villages and provincial capitals in Upper Egypt constitute the battlegrounds on which Islamic militants and security forces vie for dominance These so-called haphazard communities (shantytowns) in the governorates of Alexandria, Cairo, Giza, Port Said, and Suez, which house 16 percent of the overall population and 35 percent of Cairo's population, have "become hotbeds of terrorism," according to the NDP deputy for Nasr City[49]

One such shantytown is Western Munira, which borders Imbaba, a suburb across the Nile from Cairo's wealthy island suburb of Zamalek Western Munira is bereft of public services and home to an active Islamist organization that virtually ran it for several years, until December 1992, when 12,000 government troops, backed by scores of armored vehicles, battled with militants for three weeks to gain control[50] Similar confrontations have occurred in other slum areas and in Upper Egypt In December 1993, for example, Asyut became a battleground in the wake of a shootout that left three police officers, two policemen, and four militants dead[51]

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

The government's tactics are not counter-terrorism, but counterinsurgency warfare This warfare directly engages the security forces Ultimately, it may draw in the military, or force it to consider assuming a direct political role Having almost a million men in total, divided more or less equally between military and security forces, these organizations are too large to be sustained adequately by available resources, even with annual US assistance in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) of $1·3 billion—almost 39 percent of worldwide US security assistance monies FMF funds are devoted exclusively to military procurement, other expenditures on the military, including salaries and associated personnel expenses, come from the general budget Although the military's share of that budget has remained high during the Mubarak era, and is proportionately larger than it was during the last two years of the Sadat era, total funds available have been insufficient to prevent deterioration in pay and living conditions for officers and enlisted men While officers still are privileged in comparison to civil servants, they, too, suffer from relative deprivation Many officers' wives, for example, must work in order to cover the expenses of the private schooling necessary for their children to compete successfully for entrance to prestigious university faculties and to the military college[52]

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[49] Gamal Essam El-Din, "Debate Puts Slums on the Map," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 5–11 May 1994

[50] On these events, see *al-Mussawar*, 1 January 1993, pp 18, 20–1

[51] The Minister of Interior, Hassan al-Alfi, dispatched Major General Nassar Zaher and a detachment of 1,000 extra police troops to the city to reinforce several thousand troops of the province's security forces All roads leading into and out of Asyut were sealed off, numerous shootouts occurred, and hundreds of arrests were made Ahmed Moussa, "Police Conduct Massive Dragnet in Assiut," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 23–29 December 1993

[52] Interview with a former military attaché, May 1994

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Pay and conditions for officers and enlisted men in the security services are below those for equivalent military ranks Conditions are especially inferior for the enlisted men in the 325,000-member Central Security Force, whose low living standards and harsh treatment by officers and the government caused key units stationed in Cairo to rebel in 1986 Three divisions of regular army troops—approximately one-quarter of the army—backed up by airforce helicopters, were required to put down that rebellion The state, which already is spending a high portion of the budget on security, simply lacks the resources to sustain total military and security forces of one million men, which is 6–7 percent of the working-age population

Conscripts into the Central Security Force typically are poor, uneducated peasants, unable to meet the army's higher education and health requirements In the 1990s, the army has been taking 14 percent of the 580,000 young men who reach draft age every year [53] It rejects illiterates, while men who can attend university typically avoid military service Consequently, the median draftee is now drawn from the same lower- and lower-middle-class social strata that have been the primary recruitment base for the Islamist movement

The social chasm that separates enlisted men from officers may underlie a growing political chasm based on the divide between secularism and Islam. Scores of enlisted men have been arrested for their participation in radical underground groups, including those involved in the 1981 assassination of Sadat and the attempted assassination of Mubarak in 1994

The government has attempted to ensure the loyalty and obedience of officers, in part, through material rewards of dubious legality Opportunities for commissions through procurement—the most lucrative area—are systematically rotated so that the wealth is spread among a reasonable number of the members of the general officer corps [54] Military attaché positions in London, Paris, and Washington are the top plums, and, hence, are typically rotated on a biannual basis, about twice the turnover rate for equivalent foreign ministry positions The military is, understandably, enormously sensitive about this issue When, in November 1993, the opposition newspaper *al-Sha'b* published a summary report of a *Wall Street Journal* article about investigations by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Congress into US companies' payment to Egyptian officers of commissions varying in amounts from $582,000 to $2 7 million, the Mubarak government arrested a leader of the Socialist Labor Party that publishes the paper No independent Egyptian investigation of these charges was undertaken [55]

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[53] Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, 1993* (Washington, DC The Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), pp 114–15

[54] Since 1972, parliament has regularly passed legislation that authorizes the president to "issue law-decrees concerning armament allocations and other allocations for the armed forces " This provides the president with unrestricted powers (that he can then delegate) to purchase military goods from foreign countries without parliamentary or other forms of governmental oversight Article 108 of the 1971 Constitution states that the president should be vested with such authority only in exceptional cases, and that the president must submit to the parliament reports on agreements reached in this manner No such report has ever been received in parliament In defense of the renewal of this authority for three years in May 1994, Gamal al-Sayid, a former minister of military production and currently an NDP member of parliament, declared, "We all know that Mubarak is an honest man and worthy of trust " The vote in favor of the legislation was 380 to 11 Cited in "Arms Mandate Renewed," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 12–18 May 1994

The second major conduit of resources from the state to the officer corps is through economic enterprises under the military's control In 1990, military industries produced about LE1 billion worth of military products, and LE622 million of civil commodities The military's agricultural enterprises produced over 12,000 tons of meat and almost 11,000 tons of dairy products Over 60 percent of military consumables (uniforms, food, footwear, etc) are produced by military enterprises [56] All of these economic activities are off budget and unsupervised by any civilian authority Executive, managerial, and board positions on military enterprises provide hundreds of employment opportunities for retired officers The huge amount of funds in circulation, with inadequate accounting supervision, virtually guarantees "leakage" into private pockets The government seeks to ensure the loyalty of the officer corps through these more or less illicit rewards that are provided to those who go along with the system, and especially to those who attach themselves to powerful patrons within it This modus operandi undoubtedly offends and alienates some officers, especially younger ones who have not been rewarded yet and whose values may be at variance with those of their seniors

Military patrons compete with one another, a factor that introduces factionalism into the general officer corps The continuing saga of former minister of defense, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, reflects the general problem of maintaining military cohesion Abu Ghazala built a sprawling patronage network that, in combination with his charisma and connections in Washington, made him a serious political threat to Mubarak Despite his abrupt removal from the cabinet in 1989, Abu Ghazala continues to maintain the loyalty of many retired officers, whom he had placed in the military economy Those officers, in turn, have friends and allies among serving officers [57]

In order to counter the lingering threat of Abu Ghazala, Mubarak promoted General Hussein Tantawi, first to chief of staff, then to minister of defense, and finally to field marshal—only the fourth time in the history of the Egyptian army that the title of field marshal has been bestowed Mubarak's intent was to build up Tantawi as a counterbalance to Abu Ghazala by downgrading the latter's field marshal title through conferring the same honorific on a relatively undistinguished general Although Tantawi has support in the military, rumors that he owes his rapid promotions to the fact that he organized the security detachment around the presidential retreat in Ismailiyya have been unhelpful to his reputation in military circles [58]

The existence of competitive patronage networks within the officer corps, combined with the lingering influence of Abu Ghazala, as well as Tantawi's limited popularity, have placed the higher circles of the general officer corps in a state of unease In the event of the death or incapacitation of the president, factionalism within the high command could be a serious problem Since the post of vice-president is vacant and no civilian has a sufficient political base within the state or civil society from which to make a claim for succession, the obvious successor is the minister of defense Whether the high command would endorse Tantawi's nomination, or would divide on the issue, probably would be determined by the immediate circumstances surrounding succession For the vital question of presidential succession to be so relatively open, and the military backstop even to be in question, suggests the political fragility of the system [59]

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[55] The article appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, 5 November 1993, and was cited in *al-Sha'b*, 19 November 1993

[56] Figures provided by a Pentagon official

[57] Interview with a former military attaché, May 1994

[58] Ibid This is rumored to be the residence of President Mubarak's recently married second wife

Command of the security forces also is affected by competition over patronage and by disagreements over counterinsurgency strategy [60] It is also possible that Islamist insurgents have succeeded in penetrating the highest ranks of the security forces The assassination in 1994 of Major General Ra'uf Khayrat, a twenty-year undercover veteran of the feared and semi-autonomous State Security Agency, *Mabahith Amin al-Dawla*, may have depended on information to which only high-ranking officers in that agency would have had access

Islamist penetration within the ranks of the security forces is most advanced in the South (Upper Egypt) The unreliability of southern troops has caused the ministry of interior increasingly to rely upon Cairo-based recruits to maintain security in Upper Egypt While this reduces problems associated with relying upon local recruits, it alienates southerners, who resent what they perceive as a foreign army of occupation in their midst [61]

THE US RESPONSE

Although the United States is concerned about Egypt's political situation, it is preoccupied with other matters Moreover, because of the very nature of the bilateral relationship, a decisive US response in the event of a crisis is unlikely Faced with a choice of supporting a destabilized and weakened incumbent regime, a military takeover, or reaching an accommodation with an Islamist-dominated opposition, Washington would, in those circumstances, find it hard to act, as it did when confronted with similar choices for Iran in late 1978

The Clinton Administration is aware, at least at some levels, that the Mubarak government is in trouble Not long after key Egypt-related appointments were made in the

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[59] A recent incident points to the sensitivity of relations between the military and the presidency In June 1993, Brigadier General Murad Disuqi was placed under investigation for "revealing military secrets" for comments he made to a *Wall Street Journal* correspondent He is quoted in the 14 June 1993 issue of that paper as saying that "the government's stupidity is the talk of the officers' clubs I deeply doubt the military will shoot the people for the sake of such an unpopular government " Cited in Carlyle Murphy, "Egypt Said to Question Two Critics," *Washington Post*, 22 June 1993

[60] As Minister of Interior Hassan al-Alfi was embarking on a draconian crackdown on Islamists, for example, former Minister Hassan Abu Basha, who Islamists tried to assassinate, said that "We must initiate a dialogue with the terrorists, even if they are killers " Abu Basha's comments appeared in *al-Wafd* and were reprinted in *al-Ahram Weekly*, 31 March-6 April 1994

[61] This interpretation of southern attitudes is based on discussions with academics teaching at Upper Egyptian universities For a more detailed account of southern Egyptian attitudes, see Mamoun Fandy, "Egypt's Islamic Group Regional Revenge?" *Middle East Journal* 48, no 4 (Autumn 1994), pp 607–25

Department of State and other relevant agencies, a quiet review of Egypt's political situation commenced[62] The *Sunday Times* of London exaggerated the importance of this review when it reported that a National Intelligence Estimate, which "represents the collective wisdom of all American intelligence agencies," was in the process of being drafted According to the newspaper, this estimate would suggest "that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists will continue to make gains across Egypt, leading to the eventual collapse of the Mubarak government"[63] Cairo immediately sought clarification from Washington as to whether such an estimate did in fact exist, and was assured by Washington that it did not[64] However, even if the *Sunday Times* sensationalized the findings of the interagency review, it did confirm that the US foreign policy bureaucracy was taking a reasonably close look at Egypt's security situation

Egypt's problems, however, are overshadowed by the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations The lens through which Washington views Egypt is designed to reveal what Egypt can contribute to the peace process, leaving in less clear focus purely national issues and challenges US officials, including staff of the embassy in Cairo, whose capacities in other circumstances would be devoted to monitoring internal developments, have been assigned roles relevant to the peace process Consequently, they have been providing comparatively little intelligence and analysis for Washington, which, in any case, has been distracted by the larger goal[65]

Despite having provided $35 billion in foreign assistance to Egypt since 1975—of which about half has been to the military—despite having fought the Gulf war shoulder to shoulder with Egyptian troops, and despite having cooperated extensively to bring the Palestinians to the peace table, the United States possesses remarkably few Egyptian assets in the form of dedicated, reliable, and powerful supporters Cairo has sought to restrict US influence in the Egyptian military as much as possible The leading proponent of a closer alliance with the United States, Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, was sacked and discredited Since his service as military attaché in Washington in the late 1970s, that post has ceased to be a stepping stone to an illustrious career in the Egyptian military Indeed, the position appears to have been downgraded purposely by the Egyptian government, so as to send the message that US connections are a liability rather than an asset for a career in the military Hundreds of young Egyptian officers have been trained at US military installations, yet almost all are still too young to occupy positions of command Their careers have not been fast tracked If anything, US-trained officers have been subjected to a form of loyalty testing, whereby they are expected to remain silent when commanded by less competent, less well trained senior officers[66]

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[62] Interview with analyst consulted as part of that review, December 1993

[63] James Adams, "Mubarak at Grave Risk of Being Overthrown by March of Islam," *The Sunday Times*, 20 February 1994 See also, Marie Colvin, "Gun Law Spreads as 'Bearded Ones' Target Mubarak," *The Sunday Times*, 27 February 1994

[64] Interviews with various US and Egyptian government officials, Washington, DC, February-May 1994

[65] These observations were made to the author by relevant personnel of the Department of State, winter and spring, 1994

[66] Interview with a former military attaché, May 1994

The Egyptian military has not been made over into a modern, highly mobile, technologically sophisticated fighting force led by US-trained officers. About half the army's equipment is still East bloc in origin. Aging T-55 tanks remain in operation. The high command, which Mubarak has reshuffled frequently, is in the hands of those influenced by Soviet methods and training. This anachronism in the command structure may be due, in part, to the desire of the political leadership to block potential expansion of US influence within the officer corps. While such influence has been restricted, the failure to promote US-trained officers into high command positions has entailed a cost to military capability and professionalism. Whether it has succeeded in ensuring loyalty in a time of crisis remains to be seen.

Virtually all the opposition parties are anti-American, to a greater or lesser extent. Those, such as the Wafd or the Liberals, whose ideology might predispose them to be pro-American, have become increasingly suspicious of the United States because its support for the authoritarian government has continued, while Washington has done little, if anything, to persuade Mubarak to expand the political space within which the opposition operates.

Within the public sector and the government itself, the younger generation of US-trained professionals has suffered the same fate as its US-trained military colleagues. Not only have the careers of these professionals not been fast tracked, but, in many cases, they have been sidetracked if they have tried to buck the seniority and old-boy systems within which they must operate. While some of the resistance to the US-trained younger generation is due to cultural and personal factors, some of it may also be due to the desire on the part of the political leadership to prevent US influence from pervading the public sector and governmental administration. At the cabinet level, Mubarak has drawn upon French- rather than US-educated technocrats, perhaps in order to lessen US influence at that level. The key players in cabinet-level politics have not been US-oriented and trained individuals, but Egyptian-educated apparatchiks or Francophile technocrats. In sum, there is neither a US-oriented "third force" of educated, moderate, secular political activists, nor a cadre of US-trained government officials, who could become significant assets in a time of political crisis.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The United States can do relatively little to affect the course of events in Egypt. A major crisis can be avoided, however, if the government of Egypt adopts certain economic and political measures. At the economic level, Egypt should synchronize its macro and microeconomic policies. The government should slow, even temporarily reverse, some of its stabilization measures, or it should speed up structural adjustment in order to create real jobs over the medium and long term. At the political level, any of a number of measures would relieve some of the pressure: appointing new faces to the cabinet and the NDP leadership, nominating a vice-president to reduce current anxiety levels caused by the vacancy of that key post, holding a true National Dialogue, assigning to the judiciary the responsibility for election supervision, granting parliament greater authority to participate in the budgetary process, stopping flagrant abuses, including corruption, within the highest circles of the elite, terminating the systematic use of torture by the security forces and their brutalization of innocent civilian bystanders, and ending censorship, which serves no useful purpose because the news circulates anyway

None of these steps requires a fundamental change in the regime, and none would result in a fundamental alteration of the status quo, at least immediately Some combination of them would, over time, definitely improve the prospects for stability and even for gradual pluralization of the political process In the absence of any such action, a political crisis of significant magnitude is likely to occur When it does, it may come to US attention too late for Washington even to attempt a salvage operation, the success of which, in any case, would be uncertain, since the United States has so few resources with which to affect the course of events in Egypt

BACKFIRE: US POLICY TOWARD IRAQ, 1988—2 AUGUST 1990

Zachary Karabell

WITH the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the spring of 1988, the United States was confronted with a new strategic balance in the Persian Gulf Iraq had replaced Iran as the military power in the region [1] As President Ronald Reagan's final term drew to a close, the US government was still undecided about how it would deal with Iraq and President Saddam Hussein By the spring of 1989, President George Bush's administration decided on a policy of constructive engagement with Iraq in the hopes that such a policy would lead to Saddam Hussein's moderation

By April of 1990, however, it became apparent that the policy had failed At that time, the Bush administration decided to suspend the agricultural credit program, which had provided Iraq with approximately $1 billion of credit per year to purchase US commodities Many in the administration, however, continued to hope for constructive engagement, and until the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the US government remained publicly supportive of Hussein

In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, questions were raised about Bush's policy toward Iraq prior to August 1990 Most of these focused on allegations involving illegal loans underwritten by the Atlanta branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex), chairman of the House Banking Committee, pursued the trail of Iraqi weapons procurement and claimed that the Bush

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[1] Testimony of Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CENTCOM) H Norman Schwarzkopf on "Department of Defense Appropriations for 1990, Part 2" before the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations, 7 February 1989, pp 283–376

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administration had covertly armed Iraq in direct contravention to stated policy[2] These allegations were echoed by William Safire in the *New York Times*, by Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas in the *Los Angeles Times*, and by Alan Friedman in the *Financial Times*, among others[3]

Much of what has been written on the Iraq policy before the Kuwait crisis has rested on a tenuous documentary foundation,[4] and the documentary record provides only circumstantial evidence that improprieties of the type alleged by Gonzalez occurred As the record shows, however, and as this article will endeavor to prove, the policy of constructive engagement was ill-conceived and was based on a series of questionable assumptions Furthermore, when it became clear in the spring of 1990 that Hussein was becoming even less moderate, the Bush administration continued to cling to hopes of rapprochement The article also will show that, contrary to the claims of Bush administration officials,[5] there were alternative policies, and these might have yielded better results in the long run

US policy toward Iraq was developed in the context of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) The Reagan administration, with its antipathy toward the fundamentalist regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, began to tilt toward Iraq after 1982, when it appeared that Iran might be winning[6] Full diplomatic relations were restored with Iraq in 1984, and Iraq was given Export-Import Bank development loans and credits guaranteed by the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) The US tilt toward Iraq also entailed support for the conservative Gulf states, which were Iraq's primary financial backers, and in 1987, the US navy began escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf

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[2] See, for example, floor statements by Henry Gonzalez in 102–1 *Congressional Record* (Cong Rec), H1111-1116 (daily ed 21 Feb 1991), ibid , (daily ed 25 April 1991), ibid , H2762–2765 (daily ed 2 May 1991), 102–2 *Cong Rec* , H206–215 (daily ed 3 Feb 1992), ibid , H513–521 (daily ed 24 Feb 1992), ibid , H858–870 (daily ed 2 March 1992), ibid , H1107–1112 (daily ed 9 March 1992), ibid , H1681–1685 (daily ed 24 March 1992), ibid , H2005–2014 (daily ed 30 March 1992), ibid , H6237–6242 (daily ed 9 July 1992), ibid , H6338–6346 (daily ed 21 July 1992), ibid , H6696–6704 (daily ed 27 July 1992), ibid , H7871–7883 (daily ed 10 Aug 1992), ibid , H8820–8829 (daily ed 21 Sept 1992), 103–1 *Cong Rec* , H132–142 (daily ed 21 Jan 1993), ibid , H320–327 (daily ed 2 Feb 1993) Many of the documents used in this article come from the *Congressional Record*, others were obtained directly from the House Banking Committee and the National Security Archives, Washington, DC In 1995, the National Security Archives will publish a document set on US policy toward Iraq Many of the documents cited in this article will be available in that set

[3] See, for example, William Safire, "Crimes of Iraqgate," *New York Times*, 18 May 1992, "Digging Deeper in Iraqgate," ibid , 6 July 1992, "Is the Fix In?," ibid , 9 September 1993, "Bush on Iraqgate," ibid , 8 October 1992 See, also, Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush Secret Effort Helped Iraq Build Its War Machine," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 February 1992, "Bush Had Long History of Support For Iraq Aid," ibid , 24 February 1992, "US Loans Indirectly Financed Iraq Military," ibid , 25 February 1992, "Bush Exercised Hands-On Role in Iraq Aid Effort," ibid , 27 April 1992 In addition to his stories in the *Financial Times*, see Alan Friedman, "BNL Hell An Iraqgate Primer," *New Republic*, 9 November 1992

[4] A thoroughly documented exception is Bruce Jentleson, *With Friends Like These Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990* (New York W W Norton, 1994)

[5] See Brent Scowcroft (National Security Advisor), "No Cover-Up or Scandal in US Policy in Iraq," *Boston Globe*, 31 May 1992, Scowcroft, "We Didn't Coddle Saddam," *Washington Post*, 10 October 1992

[6] Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush* (New York William Morrow and Co , 1993), George P Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph My Years as Secretary of State* (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), Mansour Farhang, "US Policy Toward the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed , *The United States and the Middle East A Search for New Perspectives* (New York State University of New York Press, 1993), Efraim Karsh, ed , *The Iran-Iraq War Impact and Implications* (New York St Martin's Press, 1989) See, also, author's interviews with former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard W Murphy (New York, 21 May 1993), and with former Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of State Zalmay Khalilzad (telephone conversation, June 1993)

Some in the Reagan administration were skeptical of Hussein,[7] and though policy dictated support, this support varied in intensity, depending on the ebb and flow of the battlefield When Iraq seemed to be losing the war in 1982 and 1986–87, the administration tilted more heavily toward Iraq When Hussein appeared to be winning, US ardor cooled off and aid levels decreased [8] Indeed, throughout the war, there was sufficient distrust of both Iraq and Iran that the prevailing sentiment in Washington seemed to be "a plague on both of their houses "[9]

Nonetheless, hostility toward Iran, shared by both Washington and the United States' allies in the Gulf—Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—demanded that Hussein emerge from the war with his regime intact In the face of a widespread public and congressional outcry against Hussein's regime, the Reagan administration was hard pressed at times to justify its friendship with Iraq In the spring of 1988, in the latest of a series of campaigns to suppress the Kurds in northern Iraq, Hussein apparently authorized the use of poison gas on a number of villages The pictures of gassed villagers at Halabja appalled and angered the US public, and Congress responded by calling for sanctions against Iraq [10]

Both Reagan and Bush fought congressional attempts to impose sanctions against Iraq, and for similar reasons The Reagan administration did not believe that sanctions would be good policy Although the administration had considered a variety of options, including the recall of the US ambassador,[11] it decided that any punitive measures would hurt more than they would help Regardless of Hussein's brutality, he was perceived as the only person standing between Khomeini and the Middle East In response to the outcry over Halabja, Hussein promised that such actions would not be repeated, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Richard Murphy expressed the belief that sanctions would be ineffective

> Our condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons [CW] against the Kurdish insurgency has shaken the fragile US-Iraqi relationship and been heavily criticized in the Arab world We need to move quickly to ensure that our action is seen as anti-CW, not anti-Iraq or pro-Iran The US-Iraqi relationship is important to our long-term political and economic objectives in the Gulf and beyond Iraq emerges from the war as a major economic and military

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[7] Teicher and Teicher, *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm* Also, author's interview with Khalilzad

[8] Author's interview with Richard Murphy

[9] Author's interview with Robert Gates (deputy national security advisor, 1989–90), 28 May 1993, Washington, DC

[10] Iraqi human rights abuses, documented both by Amnesty International and by congressional reports on human rights, had led to repeated calls for sanctions against Iraq throughout the 1980s

[11] Confidential Department of State Memorandum from [source not identified] to Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) Allen Holmes, 22 June 1988

> power We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive in terms of our ability to influence the Iraqis[12]

In October 1988, Murphy reiterated these points during a congressional hearing "Sanctions would not be productive We are prepared to impose sanctions on Iraq if it violates its assurances [not to use chemical weapons in the future], and we will do so "[13]

In this stated opposition to sanctions, Murphy articulated the basis of the policy of constructive engagement that was followed by the Bush administration[14] At the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the State Department, and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in particular, believed that Hussein had become more moderate as a result of the war He had softened his opposition to the moderate Palestinians, and he no longer rejected the leadership of Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) He had apparently ended his relationship with the radical Palestinian factions, and he appeared to endorse a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict In addition, during the war, Hussein had drawn closer to the moderate Arab states—Jordan, Kuwait Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf emirates The State Department also noted, with satisfaction, that the war had weakened Saddam's ties with the Soviet Union, and that Iraqi purchases of European weapons and US grain had drawn Hussein closer to the West. In its assessment of Hussein, the Reagan administration was influenced by what other Arab governments were reporting Many of Iraq's neighbors believed that Hussein had become more moderate and that he would not return to his former ways[15]

Thus, many in Washington were hopeful of a close relationship between the United States and Iraq, bound by ties of common interest In comparison with a malevolent Iran, Hussein did not look so bad, and in order to contain Iran and enhance regional stability, the administration intended to encourage Hussein's continued moderation. If sanctions were adopted, Hussein would be lost as a regional ally, and the United States would sacrifice whatever leverage it had to influence Iraq[16] Using a combination of diplomacy and increased contact, both economic and political, the Reagan team believed that Hussein could become like Syria's president Hafiz al-Asad—a quasi-totalitarian leader within his borders—who could nevertheless act reasonably and predictably in foreign affairs [17] It was this approach that George Bush inherited, and it was this approach that he adopted

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[12] State Department Action Memorandum, 19 September 1988, Richard Murphy to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost Secret, declassified 1 June 1992

[13] See Murphy's testimony on "Developments in the Middle East, Oct 1988" before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 13 October 1988, pp 1–99 For a good analysis of the resistance to sanctions, see Jentleson, *With Friends Like These*, pp 74–94

[14] The term "constructive engagement" is not adopted lightly It is a direct quote from Robert Gates to the author (interview) and from other administration officials whom the author interviewed but who wished to go unnamed

[15] Assistant Secretary of State-Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Morton Abramowitz to Michael Armacost, "Iraq's Foreign Policy Deeper into the Mainstream," 3 March 1988 See, also, author's interviews with Robert Gates, Richard W Murphy, and Zalmay Khalilzad

[16] For a fuller articulation of this rationale, see the testimony of John H Kelly, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State on "Developments in the Middle East, Feb 1990" before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1990, pp 1–155

Bush was sworn into office one day after the US ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, was instructed by the State Department to stress concern over Iraq's biological weapons program [18] The issue of chemical and biological weapons would remain an irritant to improved US-Iraqi relations, although by early 1990, it was overshadowed by the greater problem of Hussein's nuclear weapons program As National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft later wrote, from the beginning, the Bush administration was determined to thwart congressional pressure for sanctions

> Our purpose, broadly understood and supported at the time, was to convince the Iraqis that moderate international and domestic behavior would be rewarded To give Saddam incentives to moderate his behavior, the Bush administration authorized $1 billion in credit guarantees—not loans or cash—to US exporters selling grain to Iraq [19]

Scowcroft failed to mention that the Export-Import Bank advanced $200 million in development loan credits, in spite of its own reports in early 1989 that Iraq faced a severe debt crisis that oil revenues could not rectify [20]

On 2 October 1989, the National Security Council (NSC) issued National Security Directive (NSD) 26, which summarized US policy toward the Persian Gulf in the following manner

> Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security The United States remains committed to defending its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate, through the use of US military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own
>
> Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East The United States should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq At the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions Any breach by Iraq of [international] safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response Human rights considerations should continue to be an important element in our policy toward Iraq In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating with the Middle East peace process
>
> We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy Also, as a means of developing access to and

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[17] Author's interviews with Richard Murphy (New York, 21 May 1993) and State Department official (Washington, DC, 25 May 1993)

[18] Secretary of State George P Shultz to Ambassador April Glaspie (19 January 1989) Secret State #017113, declassified 1 July 1992

[19] Scowcroft, "We Didn't Coddle Saddam"

[20] See Export-Import Bank of the United States, Country Risk Analysis Division, "Country Review Iraq" (18 April 1989) Prepared pursuant to a 24 April 1989 interagency review meeting on Iraq According to the report, in 1989 Iraq owed nearly $27 billion to Western creditors In addition, it owed another $50 billion to the Gulf states, including $10 billion to Kuwait, for a debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio of 65 percent

> influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance [21]

The NSD represented the consensus of the policy community as of the summer of 1989 According to the participants at the time, there was little or no controversy surrounding Iraq As one senior administration official put it

> The basic outline of policy was stand by your friends in the Gulf, and use limited economic tools to encourage Hussein to be more moderate The concern over Iranian fundamentalism was a given Everybody knew Hussein's reputation, and no one thought he was a potential member of the Kiwanis Club But could he become a better member of the region? It was worth exploring the possibility, and we didn't have a lot to lose [22]

With the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf may have receded in importance, but Iraq had emerged from the war as the regional power, thanks in no small measure to US support It was assumed that both Iran and Iraq would, for the foreseeable future, be consumed with rebuilding their economies after the devastation of the war [23] While many in the Bush administration believed that Hussein had begun to moderate his behavior and that he was easier to deal with than Iran, easier did not mean easy, and a carrot-and-stick approach was adopted In NSD-26, the carrot was economic inducements and trade, and the stick was the continued pressure on Hussein to end his unconventional weapons programs and to clean up his human rights record At best, it was hoped that the inducements would lead Hussein to greater moderation to the point where he would support the United States throughout the region, especially in Lebanon and in the Arab-Israeli talks However, senior officials were skeptical about the chances of success for the policy of constructive engagement As Robert Gates, the deputy national security advisor, put it

> There was no illusion about Hussein so the question was, do you think there is any chance of reining this guy in, and do you do so with incentives, trade, etc And so, policy was in some way a continuation of Reagan But the general attitude was that this was an approach you had to try, to try to get him to mend his ways, but no one was particularly optimistic that it would succeed or that Hussein would change his spots [24]

The development of the Iraq policy in 1989 must be placed in both a regional and an international context In June 1989, as the national security bureaucracy was drafting NSD-26, official Washington was riveted on both Tiananmen Square and the deterioration of communism in Eastern Europe By the fall, events in Berlin and Czechoslovakia dominated the foreign policy agenda Regionally, Iraq policy was, as NSD-26 hints, developed in relation to the Middle East as a whole Secretary of State James Baker was working to jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and he believed that a moderate Hussein could be instrumental in forcing the Palestinians to the negotiating table[25] Hussein's formation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)—composed of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen—was seen as a sign of Hussein's willingness to work with the United States' allies[26] In addition, the United States hoped that Hussein would be useful in resolving the civil war in Lebanon It was no secret that Hussein supported Lebanese general Michel Aoun against the Syrians, and it was thought that Iraq would balance Syria during the negotiations in Saudi Arabia that led to the Taif accords in October 1989[27]

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[21] National Security Directive 26, "US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," 2 October 1989 Reprinted in Alan Friedman, *Spiders Web The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (New York Bantam, 1993), pp 320–22

[22] Author's interview with senior administration official (Washington, DC, 27 May 1993)

[23] Author's interviews with Robert Gates (Washington, DC, 28 May 1993), Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry Rowen (telephone conversation, June 1993), and Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (Washington, DC, 8 October 1993), as well as other administration officials These individuals also described the National Intelligence Estimate of September 1989 (still classified) as echoing the conclusion that both Iraq and Iran would be concerned in the near future with internal rebuilding

[24] Author's interview with Gates

To the surprise and dismay of the administration, it was not allowed to proceed with its Iraq policy quietly, out of the public spotlight On 4 August 1989, US federal agents raided the Atlanta branch of the BNL and seized thousands of documents Coming in the midst of the US savings and loan scandal, the seizure made instant news, and it was soon revealed that BNL-Atlanta had loaned over $4 billion to Iraq over the previous five years, of which more than $1 billion was underwritten by the CCC program[28] By late September, BNL had become a major media event. It was widely speculated that CCC-guaranteed loans had been used illegally by Iraq to purchase weapons and weapons-related technology, and that BNL-Atlanta had loaned funds underwritten by the CCC that it knew would be used for Iraqi weapons procurement[29] The media blitz on BNL led naturally to greater media attention to Iraq and to the Bush administration's policy toward Hussein

As the public outcry over BNL intensified and speculation abounded, the Departments of State, Treasury, and Agriculture learned from the Justice Department that the BNL affair might have political repercussions By early October, all concerned departments had begun internal reviews of policy toward Iraq[30] The State Department suspected that CCC credits might have been used to fund weapons programs,[31] and it concluded that, in addition to the BNL fraud, some Iraqi officials had also engaged in illegal kickbacks and pricing schemes involving the CCC program

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[25] Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991 Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1993), p 22, Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm* (New York Routledge, 1992), chap 2

[26] Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, p 22

[27] Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, p 30 For Hussein's support of Aoun, see "Iraq, Syria Increase Tensions Lebanon Blockaded to Keep Arms Out," *Washington Post*, 9 July 1989 For the Taif accords, see "Lebanese Legislators Hold Talks in Saudi Arabia," *New York Times*, 1 October 1989, and "Lebanese Peace Talks Stall Over Syrians," *New York Times*, 8 October 1989

[28] State Department Memorandum from [source not identified] (11 October 1989) for the Secretary, "CCC credits for Iraq " Confidential In *Cong Rec* (2 March 1992)

[29] Articles appeared regularly throughout September 1989 in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Financial Times*, as well as other major newspapers See, for example, "Firm's Bid to Export Machine to Iraq under Italian Bank Credit is Studied," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 September 1989, in which unnamed US officials were said to have expressed concern about the connections between Iraqi nuclear weapons programs and BNL loans

[30] State Department Memorandum for the Secretary, "CCC Credits for Iraq "

[31] State Information Memorandum (22 September 1989), John H Kelly to Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Reginald Bartholemew Secret #8921839

In spite of these reservations, when James Baker met with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz on 6 October, he assured Aziz that the United States desired better relations with Iraq, and that he hoped that the BNL affair was nothing but a temporary setback Baker expressed concerns over proliferation, but qualified the reservations, saying that "they are worldwide concerns " Baker also noted that "the administration never supported sanctions on Iraq and that he had personally so testified " The Secretary added that "congressional actions were limited to Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the war Our position continues to be that we need to look forward, not backward "[32]

Less than a week after this meeting, a State Department memo for James Baker came to the following conclusions

> Given the apparent problems with the Iraq CCC program, it would seem wise to proceed with caution and prudence We should not jump to conclusions before all the facts are known, nor should we continue with business as usual The USDA [Department of Agriculture], acting against the advice of the Fed [Federal Reserve] and Treasury, but with the support of other NAC [National Advisory Council][33] members (including State), recently approved a "first tranche" of $400 million in FY 1990-CCC credits for Iraq They have told the Iraqis that approval of additional credits will depend on the outcome of the ongoing investigations into the BNA [sic] scandal and charges of corruption in the operation of the CCC program In the meantime, the situation should be kept under close policy review because the stakes are big We need export markets, and Iraq is a potential market, and as the war-induced imports are replaced by commercial purchases, this market will undoubtedly increase in the next decade [34]

This document introduces another element of administration policy, one that was decidedly underplayed after the invasion of Kuwait Iraq represented a significant market for US agricultural products, and was in fact the ninth largest customer for US agricultural commodities [35] Throughout 1989 and into 1990, both USDA and the agriculture lobby in Congress were opposed to sanctions and to severance of the CCC program on the basis of trade Both of these currents, trade[36] and regional balance of power, were embodied in NSD-26, but the latter has received considerably more focus

With its stake in the CCC program, USDA naturally was alarmed at the possible ramifications of BNL "USDA expectations are that the investigation could blow the roof off the CCC "[37] In spite of its concerns, however, USDA believed that the costs of jettisoning the CCC program far outweighed any benefits

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[32] SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad State #327801 (6 October 1989) Secret In *Cong Rec* (2 March 1992)

[33] The National Advisory Council (NAC) is an interagency policy group that oversees foreign loan programs such as Export-Import and CCC It is chaired by the secretary of the treasury and consists of representatives from other concerned agencies Its meetings are usually attended by representatives at the assistant secretary level

[34] State Department Memorandum to Secretary of State, "CCC Credits for Iraq "

[35] John H Kelly and Department of State Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer to James Baker, 26 October 1989 State Action Memorandum #8924995 In *Cong Rec* (2 March 1992)

[36] NSD-26 reads "We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy "

> Without being able to produce clear evidence of wrongdoing on their side to them the Iraqis will clearly see a cutoff of the credit program as an insult by the US government [The CCC] program cannot be seen by the Iraqi side outside the context of the overall US-Iraqi political relationship The US relationship with this most powerful of Arab states, both militarily and in terms of its oil reserves, has been carefully nurtured during the years of the Iran-Iraq war, and, more particularly, during the ten months since the ceasefire The GSM [CCC] program, as the Ambassador's personal cables have emphasized, played a key role in this rapprochement The Ambassador's cables have stressed the threats to the overall political relationship that a cutoff in the program would pose.[38]

In addition, the report emphasized that the domestic risks of terminating the program were prohibitive US producers of wheat, wood, and particularly rice would strenuously object to any curtailment of the program Agriculture, therefore, recommended going ahead with the proposed $1 billion in CCC credits, to be allocated in two separate tranches, with the second tranche dependent on the result of the BNL investigation

The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve objected to continued loans on the basis of Iraq's credit record and debt burden, but they saw no legal basis for terminating CCC Treasury was also unwilling to overrule Agriculture

> Agriculture argues that the risks of not proceeding are certain, but the risks of proceeding are uncertain Given Agriculture's expertise and State's backing, it is difficult to question Agriculture's view Under the circumstances, we seem to have no choice but to indicate our concerns, encourage USDA to improve program controls, and allow the program to go forward [39]

State's backing came from Baker himself in a 26 October 1989 action memo that he approved

> In view of the evidence available, State believes that, to wall off a FY90 CCC program from the BNL investigation, it is sufficient to exact Iraq's promise to cooperate in the investigation into past practices Offering a program of up to $1 billion would strengthen relations with Iraq, in line with NSD-26, and help US exporters [Recommend] That you telephone Clayton Yeutter [secretary of agriculture] to urge that we go forward with a CCC program, with safeguards and to be made available in tranches, that go up to the full $1 billion [40]

A National Advisory Council meeting was scheduled for 8 November in order to resolve the interagency dispute The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) joined Treasury and the Federal Reserve in objecting to continuing the CCC program because of concerns over bad Iraqi credit and potential scandal, and OMB tried to force the decision to a level higher than the NAC, perhaps to the Cabinet.[41] OMB objections went unheeded, however, and a decision was made by the NAC on 8 November 1989 to continue with the $1 billion program. State clearly had the deciding voice, and its rationale reflected the line that had been developed over the previous weeks:

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[37] Memorandum of conversation, USDA, 13 October 1989 Frank Lemay (special assistant to the under secretary of state for economic affairs) and others Confidential In *Cong Rec* (30 March 1992)

[38] USDA Draft Report for NAC, 5 November 1989

[39] Treasury Department overview pursuant to an NAC meeting, October 1989

[40] State Action Memorandum #8924995 26 October 1989 In *Cong Rec* (2 March 1992)

> A State representative believed that the [CCC] program in Iraq was crucial to the US bilateral relationship with Iraq. . . . He noted that Iraq was key to the achievement of our objectives in the Middle East, the Gulf, and Lebanon. To abruptly terminate the GSM program in Iraq would, he said, clearly run counter to the President's intention [in NSD-26] and would, furthermore, cause a deterioration in our relationship with the Iraqis. . . . Finally, he stated that, despite possible future revelations, overwhelming foreign policy considerations led him to urge support of the proposal.[42]

Thus, it was decided to proceed with the $1 billion program in two tranches, the second $500 million of credit to be forwarded in early 1990, provided that the BNL investigation uncovered no wrongdoing at the highest levels of the Iraqi government.

There is nothing in the content or tone of these documents to suggest that there was any issue other than whether to continue the CCC program. The only objections specifically mentioned were Iraq's creditworthiness, the role of Iraqi officials in the BNL scandal, and the allegations of illegal practices in the implementation of the CCC program (i.e., kickbacks, overpricing, and such). The main arguments in favor of continuation were trade and policy objectives in the region. As NSD-26 and the other documents demonstrate, Iraq was becoming a pillar of US policy in the Gulf, a bulwark against Iran, and a possible ally of US interests in the Arab-Israeli dialogue, Lebanon, and the Taif accords. The documents also suggest that the policy of continued engagement articulated by State and Agriculture was deemed of greater importance than the credit issues and possible illegalities articulated by Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and Justice.

The limited documentation available and interviews with the participants, however, give no indication that the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime was at issue, nor were many concerns voiced about Hussein's bid for military hegemony in the region through an aggressive conventional and unconventional weapons program.[43] Although NSD-26 discussed Iraq's human rights abuses and possible proliferation of illegal weapons, these issues appear to be almost entirely absent from the deliberation on whether to continue with the loan program. In particular, there was no mention of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. It was no secret within the administration that Iraq sought to evade nuclear non-proliferation controls and was trying to find suppliers of the desired technology outside the United States.[44] It was also known that Iraq was attempting to evade the

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[41] John H. Kelly through Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard McCormack to Acting Secretary (6 November 1989). State Action Memorandum #8925802.

[42] NAC Deputies Meeting, 8 November 1989. Confidential notes. In *Cong. Rec.* (2 March 1992).

[43] For the best documentation of this pursuit, see Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

[44] See, for example, a memorandum prepared by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, "SNEC Cases of Interest," 21 November 1989, printed in the *Cong. Rec.* (21 July 1992); State #46278 to Embassies Bern, Bonn, the Hague, London, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, "Possible

Commerce Department's dual-use export controls and thereby obtain items, such as specialized furnaces and machine tools, which could be used, respectively, for ballistic missiles and weapons factories To aid Hussein, there were a number of Iraqi front companies operating in the United States, the most important of which was Matrix-Churchill [45]

There is no evidence that these issues were factored into the decision to continue with the loan program Many of Iraq's weapons programs were not illegal, and a heavily armed Iraq was, to some extent, consistent with the role the Bush administration expected Hussein to play in the region In addition, there was no hard proof that Iraq was using profits indirectly garnered from CCC credits to purchase weapons Money, however, is fungible, and US officials certainly were aware that, at best, Hussein was using the money that Iraq saved as a result of CCC guarantees to buy weapons from other countries

After the flurry of activity among US agencies in the fall of 1989, concern over Iraq lessened In the meantime, the BNL investigation crept along and became ever more complicated In late February 1990, the issue of CCC credits moved to the fore once again, as Iraq had nearly exhausted the first $500 million tranche Agriculture Under Secretary Richard Crowder was scheduled to meet with Ambassador Glaspie on 15 March 1990, and a briefing memorandum reviewing the CCC program was prepared for Crowder

> Iraq is a major market for US agricultural products and our largest market for rice The US will only retain these markets by supporting them under the GSM-102 [CCC] program for the next few years Iraq, in the long term, is likely to be a major player in the Middle East, with oil reserves second only to Saudi Arabia, a good population base, and a strong military Politically, Iraq has strategic importance as a bulwark against Iran Possible indictments for violation of the CCC regulations growing out of the BNL investigation could have a serious impact on the overall program If this occurred, there would be considerable adverse Congressional reaction and press coverage In the worst-case scenario, investigators would find a direct link to financing Iraqi military expenditures, particularly the Condor Missile [46]

Until March, it appeared that there would be little trouble in extending the second tranche Agriculture supported it with reservations, and State remained fully committed to the program on political grounds A series of events occurred in March and early April, however, that cast into doubt the future of the CCC program and continued US intimacy with Saddam Hussein

On 10 March 1990, British journalist Farzad Bazoft was condemned to death by an Iraqi court on charges of spying Despite pleas for clemency, Saddam Hussein sanctioned the sentence, and Bazoft was executed on 15 March Less than two weeks later, British customs officials at Heathrow airport in London seized a shipment of US-made nuclear

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Iraqi Missile and Nuclear-related Procurement," February 1990, printed in the *Cong Rec* (27 July 1992), and Timmerman, *The Death Lobby*

[45] Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Iraq-Italy Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal," 6 November 1989, reprinted in the *Cong Rec* (2 Feb 1993)

[46] USDA, Foreign Agriculture Service, Briefing Memo for Under Secretary Richard Crowder for meeting with Ambassador April Glaspie, 15 March 1990 Enclosed memo of 23 February 1990, discussing the pros and cons of announcing additional coverage under Iraq's GSM-102 [CCC] Export Credit Guarantee Program

triggers bound for Iraq Both of these events resulted in extensive negative press coverage of Iraq, including editorials in major US newspapers commenting unfavorably on Hussein's regime, and an entire segment of ABC's Nightline focusing on Iraq's police state[47]

Saddam Hussein became convinced that this backlash against Iraq was being orchestrated by the US government A 15 February Voice of America (VOA) broadcast and the 21 February release of the State Department's human rights report on Iraq had already made Hussein suspicious that Washington was turning against him The VOA broadcast condemned secret police in numerous countries, including Iraq, and it was interpreted by Hussein as an official US censure[48] In late February, the State Department, not wishing to alienate Hussein, instructed Ambassador Glaspie to apologize for any offense and to disavow any official connection to the VOA censure[49] Glaspie wrote to Tariq Aziz that "it is absolutely not United States policy to question the legitimacy of the government of Iraq, nor to interfere in any way with the domestic concerns of the Iraqi people and government"[50] Saddam may have been temporarily placated, but the flurry of criticism in the Western media less than a month later must have confirmed his paranoia It is likely that as Hussein tolerated no free press in Iraq, he could not believe that such a thing existed elsewhere, and he therefore interpreted criticism from the US media as criticism from the Bush administration[51]

One indication of Hussein's defensiveness was his now infamous speech of 2 April 1990 In it, he justified recent Iraqi behavior and the execution of Bazoft He claimed that the Western powers and the United States, in particular, had been trying to sell him enriched uranium for years, and now, after the seizure of nuclear triggers, they were trying to frame him for the crime of developing a nuclear weapon (which he denied Iraq was trying to obtain) He also criticized US hypocrisy in condemning him for Bazoft's death, while not inquiring too closely into the murder of Dr Gerald Bull, who was assassinated in Brussels at the end of March and who had links to Iraq's nuclear program and to what later would be called the "super-gun" Finally, Hussein made a threat that pushed entirely the wrong buttons in the United States he threatened that if Israel attempted to repeat its 1981 attack on Iraq—when it bombed Iraq's Osiraq reactor—then "by God, we will make fire eat up half of Israel if it tries [to strike] against Iraq"[52]

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[47] See, for example, "Denying Pleas, Iraq Hangs British-Based Reporter," *New York Times*, 16 March 1990, "US Indicts Five in Iraqi Smuggling Plot," *Washington Post*, 30 March 1990, and ABC News, Nightline, 15 March 1990

[48] Dan Oberdorfer, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," *Washington Post Magazine*, 17 March 1991, p 22, Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, pp 31–2, and Jentleson, *With Friends Like These*, pp 146–50

[49] For a good account of this episode, see Elaine Sciolino, *The Outlaw State Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis* (New York John Wiley and Sons, 1991), pp 174–75

[50] Quoted in Oberdorfer, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," p 22

[51] This argument was advanced by Assistant Secretary of State-Bureau of Intelligence and Research Douglas Mulholland See Mulholland to Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt, "Iraq's Threat Against Israel" State Information Memo, 6 April 1990

[52] Partial text of speech in "Iraq Warns of Using Poison Gas," *Washington Post*, 3 April 1990 Full text in FBIS, "Iraq President [Hussein] Warns Israel, Criticizes US," FBIS-NES-90-06-4, 3 April 1990, pp 32–6

Reflecting on the situation at the end of the first week in April, Douglas Mulholland, head of State's Intelligence and Research Bureau, made the following comment

> Despite the bluster, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's 2 April speech illustrates a real and abiding fear that Israel (with US and UK backing) is planning another strike against Iraq While the media has focused primarily on his claims of "dual chemical" capabilities, Saddam did not directly threaten Israel with a first-strike chemical attack Recent incidents, coupled with a lack of understanding of the West (especially the press), have exacerbated Saddam Hussein's traditional paranoia [53]

Mulholland's analysis notwithstanding, the events of March and early April caused concern even among Saddam's supporters in Washington As one senior administration official commented

> By early spring 1990, we realized that the policy of constructive engagement wasn't having the desired effect A PCC [Policy Co-ordinating Committee] meeting was held [in late March], unstructured and inconclusive, questioning the policy, but there was no clear consensus One factor was that our friends in the region were saying we got this guy under control, we can work with him This weighed in our policy Also, from an operational perspective, you needed the region on board and you didn't want to make Hussein a martyr by attacking him unilaterally The question by April was whether you keep the relationship open or shut it down There was some pressure from the Hill with the Berman Bill, and some publicity, which forced us to think about Iraq We all agreed that we didn't like the way Saddam was acting The question was tactical Were you more likely to maintain leverage and influence through continued, limited contact, or through severing it The administration believed tactically in keeping things open [54]

After Saddam's speech on 2 April, the administration was criticized by Israel and Israel's numerous supporters in Washington for having supported Hussein in the past [55] Coincidental with Saddam's speech, on 1 April, Agriculture Under Secretary Crowder drafted a provisional press announcement that Agriculture was intending to suspend the second tranche of CCC credits for FY90 because of improprieties uncovered in the internal investigation of CCC administration The situation deteriorated even further when, on 10 April, British customs officials made another seizure of material bound for Iraq, this time of components that apparently were destined to form part of the Iraqi "super-gun," designed by the assassinated Gerald Bull

In public, however, the Bush administration remained firmly committed to encouraging Iraqi moderation through continued relations On 11 April, four Republican senators, led by Robert Dole of Kansas and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, plus one

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[53] Mulholland to Kimmitt, "Iraq's Threat Against Israel "

[54] Author's interview with senior administration official (Washington, DC, 27 May 1993)

[55] The Israeli foreign ministry released a statement on 2 April 1990 stating "It is high time for the civilized world to act in unity and to see that Saddam Hussein will not have the possibility to pursue his irresponsible designs " Quoted in the *Washington Post*, 3 April 1990 For a sampling of the media's attacks on the Bush administration for not clamping down on Hussein after his threat against Israel, see "Iraq's Murderous Threats," *New York Times*, 3 April 1990, "Public Enemy No 1," *Newsweek*, 9 April 1990, pp 26–8, "Britain Catches Iraq Again with a Gun?," *Newsweek*, 23 April 1990, p 45, "Stumbling toward Armageddon?,"*Time*, 9 April 1990, pp 30–1, and "Iraq Expelling US Diplomat in Retaliation," *Washington Post*, 10 April 1990

Democrat, Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, met with Saddam Hussein in Mosul. Dole, representing Kansas and its grain interests, claimed to speak for George Bush when he assured Hussein that the administration was not opposed to Iraq. "Please allow me to say," Dole said, "that only twelve hours earlier President Bush assured me that he wanted better relations, and that the US government wants better relations with Iraq."[56] Senator Simpson added that Hussein was suffering because the United States had a "haughty and pampered press."[57]

Echoing these sentiments, Assistant Secretary John H. Kelly, in his testimony before the House on 26 April, stated that

> Policy toward Iraq has been to attempt to develop gradually a mutually beneficial relationship with Iraq in order to strengthen positive trends in Iraq's foreign and domestic policies. Recent developments, taken together, are serious. While we do not rule out appropriate responses to recent actions by the government of Iraq, we are not prepared to see economic and trade sanctions legislation imposed at this point. Instead, we believe that Iraq has clearly received the important message of unanimous US government concern over its recent actions, and we are hopeful that the government of Iraq will move quickly to bring US-Iraq relations to a more positive level. Iraq is an important and difficult country which will have a significant influence on the political and economic landscape of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. If Iraq plays an increasingly responsible role and cooperates with international efforts to control proliferation and improve its human rights record, the US-Iraq relationship will improve with benefits to both countries.[58]

Privately, within the administration, the State Department began what can only be described as damage control. Crowder and Agriculture's general counsel met with State's under secretary Richard McCormack on 5 April, and McCormack asked that the word "suspended" not be used in any press release discussing the future of the CCC program.[59] At a PCC meeting on 12 April, Kelly announced that NSD-26 should be the basis for future action. Iraq, therefore, should be advanced the full $1 billion in FY90-CCC credits, as well as $200 million in short-term Export-Import Bank credits. In addition, there should be increased personal contacts with Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials, in order to stress to the Iraqi government the importance of moderation. Richard Haass, the national security council member in charge of Iraq, reminded the committee of the other aspect of NSD-26, namely, concern for Iraqi human rights abuses and the need to involve Iraq in the overall Middle East peace process. Haass also warned against various agencies making their own policy decisions on Iraq and stressed the need for a coordinated policy. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Edward Gnehm mentioned that Bush's position continued to be that it was better to discuss issues with Hussein rather than try to isolate him through sanctions or punitive economic measures [60]

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[56] Sciolino, *The Outlaw State*, pp. 175–76, and Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, pp. 36–7.

[57] Sciolino, *The Outlaw State*, and Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*.

[58] Kelly also remarked that sanctions would worsen the US trade imbalance with Iraq, and that without the cooperation of other industrialized countries, sanctions would simply hurt US exporters without damaging Hussein. See his testimony on "US-Iraqi Relations, April 26, 1990" before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pp. 1–47.

[59] USDA General Counsel. Memorandum from Alan Charles Raul, general counsel, re Iraq, 5 April 1990. In *Cong. Rec.* (9 July 1990).

In fairness, administration officials did express concern about Hussein Ambassador Glaspie reported from Baghdad that she met with Iraqi under secretary Nizar Hamdoon on 2 April, and that she "stressed the serious problem which now exists between our two governments This does not mean, however, that there is an effort to get Iraq "[61] Haass's comments at the 12 April meeting have already been noted Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt went even further and recommended suspension of CCC credits in order to send a strong signal of displeasure to Hussein [62] Nonetheless, the prevailing attitude, judging by the memos and meetings in April and May, was not one of concern over Iraqi violations but, rather, concern about how to contain the public-relations damage caused by Iraqi actions and how to salvage US-Iraqi relations and Bush's policy

There continued to be differences between the agencies on how to proceed An NSC deputies' meeting was convened on 16 April to go over the issues, and Kelly wrote a summary

> Recent Iraqi actions—especially the London smuggling arrests and Saddam's threats against Israel—have virtually eliminated political support for efforts to build useful relations with Iraq Some agencies, such as Commerce, have moved to curtail activities involving Iraq without interagency consultation Critics of this relationship see this as an opportunity to cripple it for the foreseeable future In order to regain control of policy toward Iraq, we need to establish a political framework that provides a strong response to irresponsible Iraqi actions in the near term, and lays down some longer-term markers for gradually rebuilding the relationship When the president briefed Senator Dole on Iraq he emphasized that Iraq remains an important country On the one hand, we need to respond effectively to several recent Iraqi actions and Saddam's threats On the other hand, we need to preserve our ability to deal with the Iraqis in the longer term CCC is our largest single program with Iraq and is of great concern to the Iraqi government In the current atmosphere, there is no possibility that the second $500 million tranche for FY90 will be released However, we want to ensure that the program itself survives [63]

Although Kelly was definite that the second tranche would not be extended, there remained considerable resistance within State to curtailing the CCC credits Not only Glaspie, but a number of others were absolutely opposed on policy grounds to any cut-off [64] The administration was facing pressure in Congress to impose sanctions, and the Berman Bill, which would have terminated many of the guaranteed loan programs, enjoyed wide support In addition, Saddam Hussein's actions, indeed, had aggravated the Bush administration In order not to be seen by Congress as currying favor with Saddam, the administration had to show some sign of displeasure, and the CCC second tranche was the easiest punitive measure

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[60] Notes of 12 April 1990 PCC meeting on Iraq See also, Treasury Department notes of 12 April meeting

[61] Glaspie to SecState, 3[?] April 1990, Baghdad telegram #01888 Secret-Exdis, declassified 1 July 1992

[62] Robert Kimmitt note to Secretary of State, 17 April 1990

[63] John H Kelly to Robert Kimmitt, "NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq April 16, 1990 in White House Situation Room " No date

[64] Glaspie to SecState, 18 May 1990 Baghdad telegram #02907 Secret

Withholding the second tranche was not a measure that Bush took easily He was adverse to using the "food weapon,"[65] and was clearly sensitive to the political ramifications of withholding the $500 million Brent Scowcroft tried to delay as long as possible the official suspension of the program, and called Clayton Yeutter, on 18 May, requesting that Agriculture, in its review of CCC, not put out a press release saying that the program was going to be terminated [66] Richard Haass travelled to Baghdad to impress on Hussein the seriousness of the current impasse He told the Iraqi foreign minister that the future of the US-Iraqi relationship lay in Iraq's hands With Congress pushing sanctions, Haass claimed that the Iraqis were giving the administration little help in resisting Iraq's opponents within the United States [67]

After the 16 April NSC deputies' meeting, an options paper was prepared by State for Scowcroft, in which the pros and cons of various aspects of the relationship were discussed The paper held that "suspension of CCC at this point would be a strong political statement " On the question of curtailment of the modest but long-standing intelligence relationship with Iraq, it concluded that, "Intelligence exchanges still provide Iraq with limited information on Iranian military activity that would be missed Ending this contact would close off our very limited access to this important segment of the Iraqi establishment " The paper also raised the possibility of normalizing relations with Iran, but dismissed the idea as one that "would send paranoia-meters in Baghdad off the end of the scale It would raise basic questions about our policy in the Gulf and the region as a whole that would have to be addressed here "[68]

In the end, the CCC program was too much of a liability to warrant its continuation A final decision was made at the 29 May deputies' committee meeting chaired by Robert Gates The decision was made without much fanfare, and it represented a definite low point in US-Iraqi relations Still, the manner in which the decision had been made ensured that the blow would be softened By delaying the decision and minimizing its publicity, the administration cushioned the impact Scowcroft's successful efforts to prevent Agriculture from making the suspension public in the form of a press release meant that many outside the administration were not even aware that such a decision had been made In fact, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussed Iraq in mid-June, it castigated the administration for not ending the CCC program, and did so in a way that suggested that it was not aware that the program had already been suspended [69]

Nonetheless, by late June, US-Iraqi relations had definitely deteriorated With the suspension of CCC, the primary foundation of US-Iraqi relations and the cornerstone of constructive engagement was removed Diplomatic correspondence took on a more anti-Iraq tone, and at the end of June, the State Department was even considering putting Iraq back on the terrorism list[70] Although NSD-26 remained the formal basis for Iraq policy, the Bush administration had clearly decided that any further public, overt manifestations of support at that time would have unpleasant repercussions, both domestically and in foreign policy

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[65] Author's interview with Robert Gates Also, State Department Memo for Brent Scowcroft, "Options Paper on Iraq," 16 May 1990 Secret In *Cong Rec* (9 March 1992)

[66] Treasury Department notes In *Cong Rec* (9 July 1992)

[67] Paul Gigot, "A Great American Screw-Up The US and Iraq, 1980–1990," *The National Interest* (Winter 1990–91), p 9

[68] State Department Memo for Brent Scowcroft, "Options Paper on Iraq "

[69] USDA David Hoverdale (legislative affairs) to USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Administrator, "Senate Foreign Relations Hearing on Iraq," 19 June 1990

The controversy surrounding April Glaspie's 25 July meeting with Saddam Hussein has been discussed at length since then Although Glaspie had warned Hussein that anything other than a peaceful settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute was unacceptable, and had reason to believe that her warning had been taken seriously, her 25 July telegram does not give one the impression that the warning was stressed or delivered in a particularly forceful manner According to her telegram, she emphasized repeatedly that Bush desired Iraq's friendship, and she noted that the United States did not take a position on the border dispute between the two countries—an ongoing problem that was perceived by the United States as a strictly bilateral issue between the two states The Iraqis portrayed Glaspie's comments as evincing a lack of interest in their aggressive designs on Kuwait, and Western commentators accused Glaspie of having flashed a green light for the invasion[71] The fact remains, however, that Glaspie did no more than repeat the policy line that had been established by Baker on 19 July[72] According to Baker's circular

> A central principle in international relations is that disputes should be settled by peaceful means, not through intimidation and threats of the use of force The United States takes no position on the substance of the bilateral issues concerning Iraq and Kuwait However, US policy is unchanged We remain committed to ensuring the free flow of oil from the Gulf and supporting the sovereignty and the integrity of the Gulf states We also remain committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and longstanding ties[73]

On 24 July, State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler said much the same publicly and added that the United States had no defense treaties with Kuwait[74] Although the documents cited above indicate that Glaspie was an active proponent of closer relations with Hussein, on 25 July she repeated US policy as per Baker's instructions of 19 July[75] Glaspie may have influenced policy, but she was not its primary architect

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[70] SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, "Iraq and Terrorism," 27 June 1990 State #208957 Secret, declassified 1 June 1992

[71] See Glaspie testimony on "US-Iraqi Relations, March 21, 1991" before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21 March 1991, pp 2–61 See also, Baghdad #4627 (Glaspie to State), "Ambassador's Meeting with Saddam," 25 July 1990 For the Iraqi transcript of this meeting, see Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent, *Secret Dossier The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War* (New York Viking Penguin, 1991), pp 46–63 The transcript of the meeting released by the Iraqis in the fall of 1990 was not markedly different from Glaspie's account of the meeting in the 25 July telegram

[72] For a stringent critique of Glaspie's conduct, see Robert Kaplan, *The Arabists The Romance of an American Elite* (New York The Free Press, 1993)

[73] State #235637, "Iraqi Letter to Arab League Threatening Kuwait," 19 July 1990

[74] Oberdorfer, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," p 39, and U S News and World Report, *Triumph Without Victory* (New York Time Books, 1993), p 24

[75] Baghdad #4627, "Ambassador's Meeting with Saddam"

The media focus on the 25 July meeting, culminating in Glaspie's tumultuous appearance before the House in the spring of 1991,[76] has been misleading As Robert Gates noted, "The idea that Saddam Hussein goes into a meeting with April Glaspie, because if she doesn't tell him that we're going to send 500,000 troops to the middle of the desert if he moves in Kuwait, he leaves the meeting and says 'God darn it, now I can do it,' well, that is simply ludicrous "[77] Barring an ironclad threat to oppose Hussein by force, there was little Glaspie could have done or said that would have made a difference And given the disinclination of the Bush White House to confront Hussein, there was little chance that Glaspie would have been instructed to take a hard line In fact, three days after the meeting, when it appeared that Iraq and Kuwait might settle their dispute with the help of the Saudis, the NSC drew up a note, which Bush signed and sent to Hussein It read in part

> I was pleased to learn of the agreement between Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations in Jeddah to find a peaceful solution to the current tensions between you The United States and Iraq both have a strong interest in preserving the peace and stability of the Middle East For this reason, we believe that differences are best resolved by peaceful means and not by threats involving military force or conflict I also welcome your statement that Iraq desires friendship rather than confrontation with the United States Let me reassure you, as my ambassador, Senator Dole, and others have done, that my administration continues to desire better relations with Iraq We will also continue to support our friends in the region, with whom we have had long-standing ties We see no necessary inconsistency between these two objectives As you know, we still have certain fundamental concerns about certain Iraqi policies and activities, and we will continue to raise these concerns with you, in a spirit of friendship and candor Both our governments must maintain open channels of communication to avoid misunderstandings and in order to build a more durable foundation for improving our relations [78]

The documents noted in this article demonstrate much that has previously been claimed but not substantiated First, until the very day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration pursued a policy of constructive engagement toward Iraq, even though it had few hopes that such a policy would work It pursued this policy in the face of overwhelming evidence that Iraq was violating human rights, using and producing chemical weapons, producing biological weapons, violating nuclear non-proliferation agreements, evading US export controls with the help of Iraqi front companies operating in the United States, utilizing illegal BNL loans for weapons procurement, and mismanaging and misusing CCC and Export-Import credits Nonetheless, administration officials pursued engagement, in spite of their own skepticism that Hussein could be moderated [79]

Second, the Bush administration reluctantly pulled back from tightening relations with Iraq, primarily because of domestic pressure to do so, emanating both from Congress and the press Only when continued support for Iraq became a domestic liability were steps taken to send strong signs of displeasure Third, until the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, the policy enunciated in NSD-26 remained in effect[80] In short, until Hussein invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration was committed to Iraq as a vital link in US strategy in the Middle East

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[76] Glaspie testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 21 March 1991

[77] Author's interview with Robert Gates

[78] State #247900, "President Bush's response to Saddam Hussein's Message," 28 July 1990 Also reprinted in "Pentagon Objected to Bush's Prewar Message to Iraq," *New York Times*, 25 October 1992

[79] Jentleson offers several reasons why constructive engagement simply could not have succeeded with Saddam Hussein Jentleson, *With Friends Like These*, pp 183ff

The US policy of constructive engagement failed to moderate Hussein, and even without Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it could be judged a failure Hussein began to confront the United States in early 1990 his problems were intractable, his credit situation desperate, and in the first six months of 1990, he became less moderate than he had been during the preceding year and a half While there may be no causal relationship between the increasing immoderation of Hussein and the Bush administration's constructive engagement, that policy failed

It is always easier to criticize in retrospect than to suggest viable alternatives In his 1992 editorials justifying the policy,[81] Scowcroft pointed out that any confrontation with Iraq would not have had the support of the allies of the United States in the region, nor would export controls have done more than hurt US exporters Given that the policy of constructive engagement failed, however, Scowcroft's defense is less persuasive The supposed signs of Hussein's moderation at the end of 1988 could easily have been discarded as rhetorical. his human rights record had not improved, he had promised not to use chemical weapons again, but his arsenal remained significant, there were no signs that he intended to honor the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and his aid for General Aoun in Lebanon created chaos, not stability Furthermore, given the apparent pessimism that engagement would work, it might have been better to have pursued an alternative policy

There were at least two alternatives containment/confrontation or non-engagement The unwillingness of the other Arab states to confront Hussein probably meant that the former was untenable A policy of non-engagement would have been practical, however, and might have yielded a number of satisfactory results It would have been appealing on moral grounds by taking a stand on the various atrocities committed by Hussein's regime It also would have been useful on pragmatic or realistic grounds By not engaging Hussein, the United States would have kept its hands clean, thereby avoiding the risk of entanglement This entanglement created severe complications for the Bush administration after Hussein invaded Kuwait The media and critics of the administration seized on pre-war policy, and Bush had to contend with legitimate allegations that his administration had been complicit in Saddam's military buildup and, hence, in part, responsible for the 1990–91 crisis

A policy of non-engagement would have meant denying Iraq CCC credits and Export-Import loans; it would have meant enforcing US restrictions on the export of dual-use technologies, it would have meant repeated reminders of Iraq's dismal human rights record in the United Nations and elsewhere, it would have meant a quiet campaign to convince the allies of the United States that Hussein was potentially dangerous But it would have stopped short of confronting Saddam or threatening him with international reprisals The loss of the Iraqi agricultural market would have annoyed some in the United States and hurt farmers in several states The loss of Iraqi dual-use purchases would have angered certain US companies, but the economic impact would have been minimal Handled with tact, non-engagement would not have unduly alarmed the Arab allies of the United States Unlike containment, the point of non-engagement would have been to avoid any taint of association in the event of future confrontation If and when Hussein invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration would have been able to approach the crisis without the Achilles heel of having engaged Hussein before the war

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[80] See Bush's message of friendship to Hussein, "Pentagon Objected to Bush's Prewar Message to Iraq" See, also, John H Kelly's testimony on "Developments in the Middle East, July 1990" before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 31 July 1990, pp 1–83

[81] Scowcroft, "No Cover-Up or Scandal in US Policy in Iraq", and Scowcroft, "We Didn't Coddle Saddam"

As one administration official commented about US policy toward Iraq before 2 August 1990, "This was a 'C+' policy, not an 'A' policy "[82] At any given time, there may be several "C+" policies being pursued by the foreign policy bureaucracy, but in the absence of a crisis, that rarely becomes apparent Even without the Kuwait crisis, however, a mediocre policy toward Iraq was dangerous Iraq and the Persian Gulf were, and are, volatile regions with a valuable resource. Granting that the events in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China in 1989 naturally overshadowed Iraq in importance, greater attention could have been paid to Iraq and the Gulf

In the end, Iraq policy backfired, not simply because Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait It backfired because there was insufficient attention paid to the nature of Hussein's regime It backfired because fear of the long-term fundamentalist threat posed by Iran largely obscured the short-term threat posed by Saddam Hussein And it backfired because a policy of constructive engagement was pursued with few hopes and fewer indications that it could work A policy of non-engagement would not have prevented the invasion of Kuwait It would have kept the United States, however, free of the taint of association with Hussein, an association that was problematic on both moral and pragmatic grounds Gates, Scowcroft, Murphy, and others have defended themselves by claiming that the alternatives were untenable [83] The alternatives, in fact, were difficult, and choosing non-engagement or confrontation would have entailed effort and risk, but these would have been more defensible than a mediocre policy that was neither moral nor realistic

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[82] Interview with author, 15 October 1993

[83] Author s interviews See, also, Scowcroft, "No Cover-Up or Scandal in US Policy in Iraq", and Scowcroft, "We Didn't Coddle Saddam "

TURKEY IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA: IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY

Ziya Öniş

THE drastic changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the past few years provide important opportunities for Turkey in terms of defining its role and identity in the emerging international system at the close of the century. Relations with northern neighbors as well as the Central Asian republics will increasingly assume critical importance both as an avenue for trade expansion and economic development and also in terms of overcoming Turkey's isolation and insecurity over the coming years. In this context, full membership in the European Union is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for achieving rapid economic development, nor a condition for accomplishing the "Western" ideal of a secular and advanced form of democracy. Moreover, given its loose ties to the Arab world, Turkey should refrain from playing the role of an active regional power in the Middle East. The objective, instead, ought to be to set an example in terms of economic performance, secularization, and democracy.

A central hypothesis of this article is that Turkey should look simultaneously to the East and the West in defining its identity in the novel global context that is emerging as the end of the twentieth century approaches. From a purely economic point of view, the rational strategy would be to optimize the benefits of geographic location by developing close relations with all the major blocs that Turkey interacts with, without necessarily developing a complete economic and political union with any particular bloc. In any case, economic considerations alone cannot constitute a viable criterion for membership in a broader economic and political union. Turkey should come to terms with the fact that its heritage draws from both the East and the West. Turkey should also come to terms with

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MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ■ VOLUME 49, NO. 1, WINTER 1995

the fact that Islam constitutes an important component of its cultural heritage The emergence of the new Central Asian republics, which share with Turkey a common linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage, confirms that Turkey possesses a broader identity that extends beyond a purely European one This broader identity should be considered an asset rather than a weakness or disadvantage The challenge is to acknowledge and accept this identity as we approach the twenty-first century

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EASTERN BLOC FUNDAMENTAL IMPLICATIONS

The chain of events starting with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and his steps toward nuclear disarmament in the mid-1980s, leading at an amazing pace to the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the communist system by the beginning of the 1990s, and culminating in the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself, contain profound implications for Turkey's economic prospects, domestic politics, and geostrategic role The initial reaction of the Turkish policymakers to the decline in East-West tensions was apprehension The drastic changes involved implied the downgrading of the geostrategic importance that Turkey had enjoyed during the Cold War as an integral component of the NATO alliance, with a corresponding decline in the likelihood of its becoming a full member of the European Union The immediate implications seemed to be increased isolation and insecurity in return for long-term economic benefits, which, themselves, appeared to be highly uncertain

Yet, in retrospect, a closer investigation reveals that the benefits and opportunities provided by the process that was introduced by *glasnost* and *perestroika* outweigh by a tremendous margin the short-sighted considerations identified above From a Turkish point of view, three key sets of changes deserve particular emphasis

First, at a purely economic level, the reform process, in the direction of integrating both the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe into the world economy, has generated enormous long-term trade and investment opportunities Second, the elimination of the Soviet security threat and the collapse of communism as an alternative socioeconomic system had important repercussions on Turkey's domestic polity The prospects for further democratization at home were enhanced significantly by the elimination of sharp ideological conflicts and the gradual convergence of the principal political parties in terms of their programs and policies In particular, the traditional divide between the right-of-center conservative parties and left-of-center social democratic parties over economic issues concerning the proper domains of the state and the market appears to have diminished considerably The third and most recent phenomenon associated with the collapse of the Eastern bloc concerns the emergence of the Central Asian republics These new nations, without necessarily contemplating full economic or political union, to some extent look to Turkey as a model to emulate, given their common cultural and religious heritage With the qualification that the depth or intensity of Turkey's relations with each individual republic will vary considerably, this particular factor is likely to become a crucial force and a major source of growing self-confidence as Turkey seeks to define a new identity and role in the emerging international system of the post–Cold War era

From a broader perspective, the interesting question to consider is what sort of international system is likely to emerge in the post–Cold War era and which group of countries is most likely to achieve major breakthroughs or experience drastic shifts in relative position in the novel context, the contours of which are presently being defined The hypothesis pursued here is that the axis of conflict will steadily shift from an East-West to a North-South cleavage Furthermore, nationalism and religion are likely to emerge as central forces in this new order, as substitute mechanisms to fill the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the communist vision Parallel to the emergence of the North-South cleavage, one would expect the contest between secularism and religious radicalism increasingly to occupy a central stage

It is interesting to observe that Turkey holds a special place in the emerging international context because it is on the very borderline between "North versus South" and "secularism versus religious radicalism " It is a country that is trying to make the decisive shift from semideveloped to industrialized status, thereby graduating from the South to the North At the same time, it is a country that represents a unique version of a secular state approximating a Western-style democracy In this context, Turkey is likely to attract greater attention and support from the "North" as an alternative model to Islamic radicalism for the Arab Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world, provided that Turkey is able to combine rapid economic development with further democratization Whether Turkey claims the potential to emerge as a model for the South is an issue deserving exploration

Moving to the geostrategic plane, a key characteristic of the new international order is a system now dominated by a single superpower, the United States Although other major economic powers, such as the leading European nations and Japan, are taking steps toward augmenting their own military and security capabilities, these steps are unlikely to pose an immediate challenge to the emerging global security structure in which the United States will continue to exercise a pivotal role The interesting question to pose in this context concerns the role of middle-range powers in a system dominated by a single superpower It has been argued that the middle-range powers are likely to find much greater space to maneuver and are likely to experience an extension of their influence in the post–Cold War era, in strong contrast to the comparatively fixed and minor roles assigned to them during the bipolar rivalry of the pre–Cold War era[1]

This broad expectation seems to be confirmed in the Turkish case Turkey has steadily been abandoning the passive neutrality that dominated its foreign policy approach throughout the republican era and is emerging as a regional actor The decisive shift in Turkey's foreign policy effectively began with the Gulf crisis of August 1990 Since mid-1990, one can detect several instances where Turkey has actively pursued a strategy extending beyond its own borders, undertaking the role of a "regional stabilizer" or

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[1] Particularly relevant in this context is Mohammed Ayoob, "India in South Asia The Quest for Regional Predominance," *World Policy Journal* 7, no 1 (Winter 1989–1990), pp 107–33

"arbiter" as part of its own security interests Indeed, it is interesting to observe that this "regional stabilizer" role has not been confined to the Middle East A similar ambition is evident in Turkish policy on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the Caucasus region Turkey has been providing active diplomatic support for Azerbaijan in the dispute over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Similarly, the key role played by Turkey in initiating the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme represents yet another attempt to diversify its external relations by regional initiatives designed to advance its own economic and security objectives

What is important to emphasize, however, is that the emerging world order contains inherent dangers and threats as well as unexpected opportunities These dangers are most likely to materialize in the Middle East, which may emerge as a focal point of conflicts in the post–Cold War era, given the combination of autocratic regimes in the area and the heavy dependence of the North on its oil resources Thus, Turkey, in its desire to play an active role as a regional arbiter, may involve itself in broader conflicts, with devastating repercussions for its own economy and security While such danger is more likely to originate in the Middle East, it is clearly not confined to that region The dismantling of the Soviet Union has produced a security vacuum that already has resulted in a number of local conflicts both within and between the newly independent republics, of which the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is an early example Turkey, in attempting to play a regional role beyond its northern border, may find itself in an awkward position amidst such local or regional conflicts

The key message that follows from this discussion is that it is perfectly legitimate for Turkey to develop and consolidate its own "model " It is also perfectly legitimate for Turkey to strengthen its economic and security ties with neighboring countries in the hope that these ties may help to stabilize the region overall Any grand ambition to play an active regional leadership role, however, particularly in the Middle East, may prove disastrous for Turkey's own security

Turkey, therefore, should resist the temptation to play such a leadership role, which would overextend it economically and undermine the very model it wants to develop What is also crucial to realize is that the situation in which Turkey found itself in the late 1970s and early 1980s is fundamentally different from its position in the early 1990s When Turkey experienced its biggest economic crisis of the republican era at the end of the 1970s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), came to its rescue Large inflows of capital provided at concessional rates of interest were crucial for the early success of the structural adjustment program and swift recovery from the crisis of the early 1980s [2]

Yet, the magnitude of the capital flows that accompanied the structural adjustment program of 1980 was not itself an exogenous variable The scale of the capital inflows was clearly a function of Turkey's geostrategic position One also ought to remember that its geostrategic significance to the Western alliance reached its post–World War II peak due to two key developments that occurred during Turkey's debt crisis the Iranian revolution, which, among other things, removed a key layer of the Western security structure against Soviet expansionism, and the Soviet move into Afghanistan in late 1979, which immediately revived old fears regarding Soviet designs on South Asia and the Middle East Western concerns were further heightened by the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Iran as a potentially destabilizing force in the rest of the Muslim world.

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[2] On the importance of capital inflows and the role of international institutions in Turkey's structural adjustment process, see Colin Kirkpatrick and Ziya Oniş, "Turkey," in Paul Mosley, Jean Harrigan, and John Toye, eds , *Aid and Power The World Bank and Policy Based Lending*, vol 2 (London Routledge, 1991), pp 1–29

Clearly, the coincidence of these events helped to maximize Turkey's importance to the West and provided justification for significant help in dealing with the acute economic crisis of the late 1970s Yet, if Turkey were to experience another crisis due to domestic mismanagement, external shocks, or a combination of both, it would be highly unrealistic to expect the West to come to the rescue in the emerging context of the post–Cold War era This leads to another key conclusion geography may provide important opportunities for a country Opportunities afforded by the collapse of the Eastern bloc, for instance, may be transformed ultimately into success for Turkey, depending on its ability to manage its economy in a democratic environment Consider the cases of Japan and South Korea, two major success stories of the postwar era One can argue that geopolitics and close relations with the United States during the Cold War provided key advantages to these two nations and, hence, indirectly contributed to their rapid growth

Yet, it would be naive to attribute Japanese or South Korean success primarily to geopolitical variables. Their unique domestic structures were vital to their success[3] The ability of the second generation of newly-industrializing countries, like Turkey, to exploit the advantages provided by their external environment depends significantly on their ability to reproduce institutions and economic management at home, conducive to economic expansion and consolidation of democracy at the same time The nature of these institutions and the model of economic management lie beyond the scope of this essay What is crucial, however, is that while the new international environment provides advantages and opportunities, this exploitation is neither self-evident nor automatic Turkey's internal dynamics will ultimately determine whether the new opportunities will be translated into a decisive breakthrough in economic performance and political development

THE WESTERNIZATION IDEAL VERSUS FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Westernization ideal has been the guiding principle of the Turkish Republic from its inception in 1923 Kemal Ataturk and his followers clearly visualized a secular,

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[3] On the importance of the state, in particular, and the domestic political and institutional structures in Japanese and South Korean development, see Frederic Deyo, ed , *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 1987)

Western-style, mixed economy and democratic polity[4] The basic preference of becoming an integral part of the West was strengthened in the postwar period by the Cold War and the Soviet threat The key step in this direction involved membership in NATO during the early 1950s and the parallel development of a close relationship with the United States[5] The natural next step seemed to be membership in the European Economic Community (EC) The decisive step in this direction came with the Ankara Agreement of 1963, whereby Turkey gained associate-member status Full membership is scheduled for 1995, by which time a series of necessary conditions will have to be satisfied[6]

The understanding on the Turkish side, from the outset, was that associate membership was not desirable in itself but a temporary stage in the transition to full membership Turkey formally applied for full membership in the EC in 1987, eight years prior to the current scheduled date What was remarkable at that time was the degree of consensus achieved within Turkey concerning the desirability of EC membership Parties of the left and the right, excluding only a small minority of Islamic radicals, appeared to be firmly united on the issue of EC membership No other single issue seemed to generate such widespread consent Not surprisingly, therefore, the decision of the European Community, now the European Union (EU), to defer Turkey's membership for an indefinite period was greeted by both the Turkish elite and the public at large with deep disappointment and resentment The intense emotions that the membership question generates suggest that a sober and critical assessment of Turkey's complex relationship with the EU is long overdue The issue needs to be approached from two angles First, is full membership feasible? Second, is full membership necessary, in the sense that Turkey's desired economic, political, and geostrategic objectives cannot be achieved through an alternative set of arrangements?

Considering the issue of feasibility, Turkey's membership in the EU has never been a strong possibility at any point in recent history Several structural factors are at work that explain why membership has so far been deferred and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future Probably the most important constraints are economic, Turkey's levels of industrialization and economic development are significantly below the Western European average Similarly, Turkey's inflation and unemployment figures compare unfavorably with even the least-advanced EU members

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[4] On the ideology of the Turkish elite during the early years of the Republic, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2d ed , (New York Oxford University Press, 1968)

[5] On the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in the postwar era, see Mehmet Gonlubol et al , *Olaylarla Turk Dış Politikası* (The Turkish Foreign Policy with Specific Illustrations), 7th ed (Ankara Alkım Kitabevi Yayınları, 1989), and Dankwart A Rustow, *Turkey America's Forgotten Ally* (New York Council on Foreign Relations, 1988) For analyses of the alleged recent shift in Turkey's foreign policy behavior from passive neutrality to policy activism, see Kemal Kirişçi, "The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior," Boğaziçi University Research Paper, ISS'POLS 92–1 (Istanbul, 1992), and Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Gulf Crisis Adventures or Dynamics?," in Clement H Dodd, ed , *Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects* (London Eothen Press, 1992), pp 70–8

[6] Turkey's relationship with the European Union has generated an extensive body of literature See, in particular, Canan Balkır and Allan M Williams, eds , *Turkey and Europe* (London and New York Pinter Publishers, 1993), Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton, eds , *Turkey and the European Community* (Opladen, Germany Leske and Budrich, 1990), Mehmet Ali Birand, *Turkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası, 1959–1990* (Turkey's Common Market Adventure, 1959–1990) (Istanbul Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), Ozay Mehmet, "The Turkish-EEC Relations An Assessment of Risks and Benefits" (Paper presented at the annual conference of the Middle East Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, November 1989), Gulten Kazgan, *Studies in Economic Development* (Istanbul University of Istanbul Publication, 1991), and John Redmond, *The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?* (Aldershot, England Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993)

It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the EU countries will contemplate full membership for Turkey until the development gap has been significantly narrowed It is also unlikely that a major narrowing of the gap will occur within a decade or two, even if Turkey is able to sustain a high rate of economic growth Yet another consideration relates to Turkey's size Turkey's population is much the same as the combined populations of the three late entrants to the EU Greece, Portugal, and Spain[7] Given Turkey's level of development and population size, free labor mobility constitutes a very sensitive issue from the perspective of the Union, and probably constitutes the single most important barrier to Turkey's graduation to full membership

What is also relevant in this context is not only the size of the population but its rapid growth and composition With its high birth rate, Turkey has a very different age structure than Europe, with a very high proportion of young people ready to enter the labor market European concerns are with mass immigration as well as the disproportionate demands that Turkish membership, given Turkey's very different stage of development, would place on the EU's regional funds and budgetary resources The degree of budgetary transfers needed to bring Turkey up to the level of an average member of the EU would create a tremendous burden on the EU's finances Such considerations are likely to prove decisive in resisting Turkey's attempts to gain full membership Also relevant is the presence of powerful sectional interests in the EU, such as farmers, who are likely to be threatened by Turkish exports and are, therefore, likely to vote against full membership

Apart from economic considerations, it should be remembered that the EU is ultimately a political project What the EU's founders desired was an eventual political union among states that shared similar cultures, ideals, and institutions It is also important to emphasize that EU members are states with predominantly Christian populations Would they view Turkey, with a predominantly Islamic population in spite of its secular character, with suspicion? This depends on many factors Current acts of violence against Turks in Germany, however, are an indication that tensions are not entirely economic

In any case, the collapse of the Eastern bloc has added a completely new dimension to the debates concerning the future of the EU and the possibilities facing individual states in conjunction with full membership Several Eastern European countries have emerged as serious applicants for full EU membership A country such as Hungary, for example, now stands a better chance of obtaining membership than Turkey, given Hungary's geographical proximity, higher level of industrial development, much smaller population, and common cultural and religious heritage Moreover, it remains that the average

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[7] According to census figures, the populations of Spain, Portugal, and Greece were estimated as 38 9 million, 10 3 million, and 10 million respectively, compared with Turkey's population of 58 million For a detailed comparison of the economic structure and performance of Turkey with respect to the three late entrants, see Allan M Williams, "Turkey The Mediterranean Context," in Balkır and Williams, *Turkey and Europe*, pp 45–65

European identifies him- or herself much more readily with the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe than with Turkey.

With the list of candidates rapidly growing, fundamental questions are raised concerning the future of the EU. Will the trend be toward further tightening or expanding the Union? The decisive steps taken at Maastricht in December 1991 were clearly in the direction of further tightening, involving closer and closer economic and political ties between the twelve countries that, at the time, comprised the European Community. Since then, some former members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)—namely, Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—have been admitted as full members. While new members may be added in the future, the EU is likely to continue excluding rather than including more members.[8] What we are likely to witness over the next decade is a vision of a broader Europe consisting of several layers involving a core group and a set of peripheral countries. A number of Eastern European countries, such as Romania and Poland as well as Turkey, are likely to find themselves on the periphery of the broad European project, as longer-term associate members of the Union.

Clearly, one can identify the more immediate, short-term constraints on Turkey's graduation to full membership, including the Greek veto over Cyprus and Turkey's human and minority rights records.[9] The suggestion that resolution of these problems would guarantee EU membership, however, rests on faulty analysis. Given the long-term structural factors earlier identified, to single out, for example, the Cyprus issue as a key obstacle to Turkey's admittance as full member is a mistake. Similarly, further democratization and an improved human rights record are central objectives in their own right. To argue, however, that further democratization in Turkey will automatically secure full membership envisions yet another simplistic scenario.

Turkey's relations with the EU have hitherto been based on a zero-sum strategy, with membership in the Union conceived as an all-or-nothing proposition. By now there must be a realization that full membership constitutes a remote possibility in the foreseeable future. This single-minded concern with full membership has, perhaps, limited Turkey's strategic gains, in conjunction with a number of key economic issues, by exploiting the advantages and pushing the limits of associate membership.

Furthermore, the recent wave of democratization in Turkey provides important grounds for optimism that a Western-style secular state and democracy can be achieved through the inner dynamics of Turkish society alone. Hence, the frequently proposed thesis that full membership in the EU is a necessary external condition for the achievement of an advanced form of democracy, plus a necessary guarantee of human rights, is misleading, since it tends to underestimate the potential for democratic development that exists within Turkish society at large. Europe can still be identified as a reference point, but to share common ideals does not necessarily entail full economic and political union with the European Community.

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[8] Norway has since rejected membership in the EU. On the implications of the Maastricht Treaty, see Emile Noel, "Reflections on the Maastricht Treaty," *Government and Opposition* (January 1992), pp. 148–57. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the European Economic Community during the course of the 1980s, see Jeffrey Harrop, *The Political Economy of Integration in the European Community* (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1989).

[9] For an interesting statement of the official community position regarding the short-run and long-run constraints on full membership, see Michael Condrowics, "The European Community and Turkey: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards," in Dodd, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 9–26. For a useful account of Turco-Greek relations over the course of the past decade and the implications of Greece's position in conjunction to Turkey's relations with the EU, see Suha Bolukbaşı, "The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects," in Dodd, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 27–54.

Turning to the economic plane, it is important to remember that the European Union is Turkey's principal trading partner. More than 50 percent of Turkey's trade is conducted with the EU. Furthermore, EU markets are more stable and represent more rigorous standards of competition than those of the Middle East, Turkey's second major trading partner, where markets tend to be more volatile. It is therefore imperative that Turkey should strive to expand its trade and investment links with the Union by trying to exploit the terms of its associate membership. Hence, the recognition that full membership in the EU is unlikely in the foreseeable future does not imply, as some suggest, turning one's back on the West and accepting the less rigorous standards of the East.[10]

The free trade agreement with the EU, likely to go into effect beginning in 1997, and the agreement with the EFTA countries, concluded in 1992, represent important steps in the direction of expanding Turkey's trade links with Western Europe. These agreements not only are likely to boost Turkey's traditional exports of agricultural commodities, manufactured foodstuffs, and textiles, but also will encourage the diversification of its manufactured exports. A free trade agreement, however, falls significantly short of what Turkey should be able to extract from associate membership, given, in exchange, the advantage of its large internal market. In addition to a free trade agreement, Turkey should pursue a package consisting of the following: partial access to Community funds and subsidies, selective protection of certain key growth sectors, access to education, training, and research opportunities, plus technological collaboration agreements, and limited labor mobility.

If such additional conditions are realized, then associate membership could be regarded as an opportunity rather than a constraint. Given Turkey's geographical position, the sensible or optimal strategy seems to be to develop trade relations in several directions under relatively loose regional arrangements, rather than to commit single-mindedly to any one direction. In public discussions concerning Turkey's external economic relations, it is frequently assumed that simultaneous participation in several spheres is perfectly feasible—full membership in the European Union and the Black Sea Economic Union, and free trade agreements with the United States and other regional partners. This assumption is clearly not justified since, in practice, full membership in any club excludes other options. For example, if a country is a full member of the EU, its relations with non-member countries are no longer independently determined. The country needs to comply with the EU's common industrial, agricultural, and trade policies vis-á-vis the third parties. Hence, expanding relations in several directions through loose agreements with several "clubs" or regional arrangements is probably more conducive to Turkey's economic interests than a strategy dictated by the interests of the larger community

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[10] For a false dichotomy suggesting that Turkey's expanding relations with the East will lead to a turning away from the West, thus leading to a slower growth in economic standards and level of competitiveness, see the special issue of the *Economist*, "Survey on Turkey," 14 December 1991.

On a broader level are questions concerning Turkey's own sovereignty and identity In fact, sovereignty and the relative rights and powers of the individual nation-state within the European Union are likely to emerge as issues of contention as the Union undergoes a process of constricting, with power and decision making increasingly transferred from the respective capitals to Brussels In the Turkish case, problems of sovereignty and identity are even more central, although they seem hardly to be on the public agenda at present The following questions are likely to gain relevance in the Turkish case Does Turkey want to accept the status of a peripheral European economy or society, as opposed to a sovereign nation, drawing its values from both the East and the West and expanding its external economic and political relations in several directions? Does acceptance of high standards of economic and democratic development necessarily imply that Turkey should be interested in copying Western institutions, policies, and practices, and be expected to abandon attempts to develop its own "model" or "synthesis," combining Western, Turkish, and Islamic values?

BEYOND THE NORTHERN BORDER THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION SCHEME AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

The collapse of the Eastern bloc has created an historic opportunity for Turkey to develop its economic and cultural ties with its northern and eastern neighbors in a region spanning the area from the Balkans to the Central Asian republics The opening up of this area provides a crucial outlet for Turkey to overcome its perennial sense of isolation and dependence left over from the slippery triangular pattern of the Cold War, when Turkey, peripheral to the European Community and a distant associate of the Arab Middle East, had relied heavily on the United States The opportunity now exists for Turkey to develop its relations with a region on an equal partnership basis Turkey's northern neighbors are likely to become focal points of external relations over the course of the next decade and beyond Two key dimensions associated with this process of growing interaction with the northern neighbors deserve particular emphasis the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme (BSEC) and the emergence of independent republics in the former Soviet Central Asia

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme, whose recent origins only extend back to 1990, represents a bold step in the direction of regional economic cooperation and development [11] Turkey, from the beginning, has been the key factor in formulating the original idea and organizing the steps toward subsequent implementation The climax in the evolution of the BSEC was reached on 24 June 1992, when ten member-countries signed the first formal agreement, committing themselves to participation in the Black Sea Economic Union The countries involved included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine

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[11] For preliminary assessments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme, see Çelik Kurdoğlu, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation An Overview" (Paper presented at the Project Link Fall Meeting at the State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, September 1992), TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), *Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Bolgesi Ekonomik Bir Değerlendirme* (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region An Economic Analysis) (Istanbul TUSIAD Publication, 1993), and Oktay Özuye, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 3, no 3 (1992), pp 48–54

The interesting feature of the BSEC is that it is a much looser agreement than the European Union. The latter is designed to achieve complete economic and political union among its full members, with power and decision making effectively transferred from the national governments to a supranational agency If the BSEC does, indeed, prove to be a success, the more flexible pattern of regional integration and cooperation may emerge as an alternative model to the EU which other developing countries may follow Probably the most ambitious objective of the project is to create a free-trade area and to facilitate free-factor mobility in a region with some 400 million inhabitants Another key feature concerns the formation of a regional bank, which would be a major source of development finance for investment projects and regional joint ventures Only firms from the member countries would be eligible for bank credits Furthermore, the project envisages close cooperation between the member countries in selected areas, including transportation, telecommunications, energy, and environmental protection The BSEC is conceived as a process of step-by-step integration The flexibility of the arrangement rests on the fact that individual countries are allowed considerable room to develop bilateral or multilateral relationships among themselves as well as with non-member countries The agreement is formed in such a way that it does not constitute a mutually exclusive alternative to EU membership.

The economic value of the BSEC project from Turkey's point of view is more than simply the opening up of a formerly closed or semiclosed market of more than 350 million people There exists a natural complementarity between the economic structures of Turkey and some of the key members of the Black Sea Economic Union, e g , Russia, which likely will contribute to a very rapid expansion of trade and investment in the future The natural complementarity stems from Turkey's strong consumer goods industries and a dynamic construction sector, with a proven record in the Middle East and North Africa Yet, it is short of key raw materials and energy resources Hence, exports of consumer goods and construction services, in return for raw materials and energy resources, could be the natural way for trade to develop between Turkey and some of the key members of the region during the course of the present decade

A similar pattern is also likely to emerge in Turkey's trade relations with the Central Asian republics Indeed, there is already rapid expansion of trade and economic interaction along these lines, as is currently evident in buoyant construction activity underway by Turkish firms in the former Soviet Republics

Similarly, Russia has become a major source of energy supply for Turkey, resulting from the natural gas agreement concluded with the Soviet Union in 1984, which went into effect in 1987, at a time when trade was organized on a barter basis Given the basic complementarities noted, Russia, in particular, may become a major trading partner of Turkey over time, if not in the immediate future Furthermore, there exist other sources of complementarity that are likely to improve the prospects for economic cooperation Turkey is well ahead of the former communist countries in terms of its level of private entrepreneurial development as well as the degree and depth of the transition from a state-dominated to a market-oriented economy Yet, it is also probably far behind some of these countries in terms of scientific and technological infrastructure as well as the quality and quantity of trained manpower

Hitherto, the focus has been on the economic benefits to be derived from the BSEC project It is important to recognize, however, that the project embodies a wider geostrategic value in terms of stabilizing a region particularly prone to bilateral conflicts, given the power vacuum created by the dismantling of the Soviet Union Hence, the BSEC ought to be conceived not simply as a project for economic cooperation, but also as a regional security arrangement that could also serve as a model in its own right, if the experiment proves successful

The discussion so far has proceeded on an optimistic note For a balanced treatment, however, it is important to emphasize that a number of key constraints, both economic and political, need to be overcome before the economic and geostrategic potential of the Black Sea Economic Union can be realized On a purely economic level, the fundamental constraint seems to be the shortage of finances A strong contrast with the EU may be discerned in this regard The European Union's massive regional funds provide an important mechanism for achieving integration and equality among the member states Members of the BSEC are all capital-scarce countries looking for outside financial assistance There is no country that is in a position to play a pivotal role in supplying capital, thereby providing the initial impetus to the project Whether the project will be able to act as a magnet for foreign investment by non-members, either on an individual basis or through joint ventures with firms from the member countries, remains to be seen At the moment, the outcome appears to be highly uncertain

Another key economic constraint follows from the fact that many of the countries included in the group are in the early stages of their transition to market-oriented economies Furthermore, the countries concerned are confronted with tremendous problems of short-term stabilization in an effort to engineer the transition from a totally state-regulated system to a market-oriented system Given these constraints, it is highly unlikely that the full benefits of the BSEC will materialize over a short period of time The economic problems involved, however, should not be overemphasized The countries involved, given the depth of their economic development, the quality of their technological infrastructure and labor force, plus raw material and energy reserves, embody enormous long-term economic potential, once the problems of transition are overcome

Turning to the political sphere, an important constraint follows from the fact that many of the countries participating in the BSEC project have highly unstable domestic polities The majority find themselves at a considerable distance from establishing Western-style democratic institutions and practices Another key obstacle is that a number of the participants in the project find themselves in bilateral conflicts Three key examples of such conflicts are those between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan, and between

Georgia and Russia over their border and the Abkhazia issue. Yet, the constraints posed by these bilateral conflicts may be exaggerated. The project itself could provide a powerful impetus for regional cooperation to help resolve these bilateral tensions. The fact that the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Greece enthusiastically took part in signing the key agreement marking the initiation of the project in Istanbul in June 1992 provides a clear testimony to the fact that the incentives for cooperation and conflict resolution are greater than some pessimistic analysts believe.

In addition to the BSEC, another major development of the post-1990 era concerns the emergence of the former Soviet Central Asia as a key component of Turkey's external relations. The Central Asian republics include the four Turkic republics of Azerbaijan, Krgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, with a combined population of 56 million—nearly the same as the present-day population of Turkey. Common linguistic and cultural ties have led, since 1991, to the development of close relations between Turkey and the Turkic republics. The dramatic significance of the emergence of the Turkic republics is that they have helped Turkey to overcome its cultural isolation—an isolation that stems from being neither Arab nor fully European. Turkey, at least, has been able to find a group of countries to which it can relate both culturally and economically. Thus, close relations are likely to develop between Turkey and the Turkic republics through the 1990s.

This is not to imply, however, that "pan-Turkism"—the idea that the Turkic people inhabit the region from Turkey to the border of China—must develop. Their common interest, itself, will become an important cultural force that eventually will unite the countries involved into a common Turkic bloc. Pan-Turkism as an ideology is unlikely to flourish. Turkey has no interest or ambitions in advancing the ideology of "pan-Turkism." Similarly, the Turkic republics, having recently liberated themselves from the Soviet empire and enjoying the fruits of independence, are unlikely to allow themselves to become, once again, minor partners in a broader union. In fact, the interesting development in Central Asia concerns not "pan-Turkism," but the flowering of Islam as an important sociocultural force in the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of communism.[12] Given the increasing significance of Islam in such societies, Turkey has an opportunity to present itself as a model of secular democracy in direct competition with the Iranian or even the Saudi Arabian versions of Islamic radicalism.

THE PROBLEMATIC REGION: RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF CRISIS

The Middle East is likely to constitute the most troublesome region for Turkey's international relations over the coming years. The region has been very important for

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[12] For evidence in support of this proposition, see James Rupert, "Dateline Tashkent: Post-Soviet Central Asia," *Foreign Policy*, no. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 1754–95. On "Pan-Turkism," see Gareth Winrow, "Turkey and the Former Soviet Central Asia: National and Ethnic Identity," *Central Asian Survey* 2, no. 3 (1992), pp. 101–11. For a preliminary assessment of Turkey's relations with Central Asia, see Turkkaya Ataov, "Turkey's Expanding Relations with the CIS and Eastern Europe," in Dodd, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 88–117.

Turkey in economic terms throughout the 1980s. Middle Eastern and North African markets were instrumental in Turkey's export boom in the early 1980s, at a time when the OECD countries were experiencing a major recession. Turkey clearly benefitted from its central position during the Iran-Iraq war. The region remains the principal source of Turkey's oil imports and also a focal point of Turkish construction activity. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that Turkish trade in the Middle East has been declining steadily over the past few years. For example, Islamic countries had accounted for 47.9 percent of Turkish exports in 1982. By 1991, the share had declined to 20.1 percent. A similar pattern is confirmed in the case of imports. In 1982 Turkish imports from the Islamic Middle East and North Africa had accounted for 43.0 percent of total imports. By 1991, the share had dropped to 15.1 percent.[13] Hence, the long-term pattern seems to be a steady relative shift in Turkey's trade links toward the OECD countries and its northern neighbors, including the countries of Eastern Europe. The decline of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after 1986, the sanctions against Iraq, formerly a major trading partner, and the overall political instability of the region appear to have contributed to the change in direction of Turkey's trade links.

In spite of these relative shifts, in absolute terms the region will continue to be a crucial component of Turkey's economic relations, given Turkey's heavy dependence on imported oil. Moreover, economic relations with Iraq are bound to be regenerated in the not-too-distant future. A common religion clearly renders the Middle East special from the Turkish point of view. Apart from standard economic ties and a common Islamic heritage, there exist two interrelated geostrategic concerns that tie Turkey irreversibly to the fortunes of the region—water and the Kurds—both of which increasingly have brought Turkey to the verge of conflict with its two southern neighbors, Iraq and Syria.[14]

These two problems are connected in the following sense. Turkey, in recent years, has been in the process of initiating the massive South East Anatolian project, popularly known in Turkey as the GAP project (Guney Doğu Anadolu Projesi). GAP embodies a series of dams, of which the recently completed Ataturk Dam is the largest. The central objective of the project is to boost agricultural production and economic activity in the rural southeast region, with the ultimate goal of fully integrating the Kurdish minority in Turkey—a high percentage of which resides in this region—into the national economy. Turkey controls key water resources involving the river valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the sources of which rise in Turkey. These two rivers are also the main supplies of water for Turkey's southern neighbors. Hence, Syria and Iraq view GAP with some apprehension, assuming that it would divert water away from their territory to the southeastern region of Turkey. Turkey's response to these misgivings has been the "peace water initiative," originally proposed in the mid-1980s by then Prime Minister Turgut

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[13] Data are drawn from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics Publication, *Haziran 1992'de Turkiye Ekonomisi. Istatistik ve Yorumlar* (The Turkish Economy in June 1992. Statistics and Interpretations) (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1992).

[14] For a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's relationship with the Middle East, see Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991). Also relevant in this context are the series of articles in Erol Manisali, ed., *Turkey's Place in the Middle East* (Istanbul: Middle East Business and Banking Publication, 1989).

Ozal, which involves the construction of pipelines between the water-abundant region of eastern Turkey and the potential recipient countries in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in general More specifically, the pipeline scheme involves the exploitation of two of Turkey's medium-sized rivers, the Ceyhan and the Seyhan, which both originate in central-eastern Anatolia and flow into the eastern Mediterranean near the Syrian border Whether the peace water initiative is economically viable, and whether it would constitute an effective substitute for the GAP project, remains to be demonstrated So far, the countries involved have been rather unreceptive to the initiative Given Turkey's interests in developing the GAP project, water, which is a strategic resource for Turkey, is likely to continue to be a major source of regional conflict In fact, with water in short supply overall in the Middle East, the political economy of water will likely become as crucial to the future of the region as the political economy of oil [15]

In recent years, Turkey increasingly has pursued an active strategy in the Middle East, starting with attempts to regulate water resources for its own national objectives, and culminating in the closure of the oil pipeline and the freezing of trade relations with Iraq, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 Turkey's strong position on the pipeline issue has been accompanied by considerable economic loss and few economic benefits [16] Nonetheless, Turkey has demonstrated to the West and the rest of the world that with its synthesis of secular Islam and a Western-style democracy, it is likely to set a model and play a stabilizing role in a region, most of which, with the notable exception of Israel, has so far proved to be immune to meaningful forms of democracy In retrospect, the strong stance adopted by Turkey during the Gulf crisis has augmented its long-term geostrategic importance from the point of view of the Western alliance

If one accepts that the Middle East is likely to emerge as a focal point of local and international conflicts over the coming years, the natural corollary of this proposition is that trying to play the role of a regional leader in the Middle East—meaning direct attempts to influence the outcome of intra-Arab conflicts—embodies serious dangers for Turkey's national security Considering its strategic interests in the water issue and the Kurdish problem, Turkey's involvement in the region, particularly in conjunction with its two southern neighbors, Iraq and Syria, is unavoidable Yet, any attempt to play the role of a regional power beyond these concerns is likely to constitute a misguided strategy and to draw Turkey into the midst of regional conflict Turkey could play a far more constructive role and indirectly contribute to the process of democratization in the Middle East by setting an example of rapid development in the context of a secular and democratic state Neutrality toward intra-Arab conflicts is likely to constitute the most appropriate strategy in the future

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[15] The political economy of water resources and water conflict in the Middle East has started to generate an extensive literature See, in particular, Joyce Starr, "Water Wars" *Foreign Policy* 82 (Spring 1991), pp 17–36, and Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* For a major study on GAP, see John F Kolars and William A Mitchell, *The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project* (Carbondale Southern Illinois University Press, 1991)

[16] On the implications of the Gulf war, see Sabri Sayari, "Turkey The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis" *Middle East Journal* 46, no 1 (Winter 1991), pp 9–21, Douglas T Starr, "Redefining Turkey's Role in European Security" (Paper presented at a conference sponsored by Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, November 21–22, 1991), and William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," *International Affairs* (Spring 1992), pp 679–93

THE RELEVANCE OF THE TURKISH MODEL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Turkey's claim to be a model rests firmly on secularism in the context of a democratic polity In several other respects, Turkey has the potential to serve as a model This potential, however, has yet to be realized An important feature of this model is the vision of a mixed economy in which the state plays a leading role in the early stages of industrialization, but gradually recedes into the background in the later stages of development when private enterprise, which itself has been closely nurtured by the state, moves into the forefront and assumes the leadership role in the development process Yet another striking characteristic involves a strong commitment to parliamentary democracy Following the transition from the soft-authoritarian, single-party regime of the early years of the Republic, since 1950, multiparty democracy has constituted the norm Over the past forty years, Turkey has achieved rates of Gross National Product (GNP) growth of 5 to 6 percent on average, among the highest outside of the East Asian region, essentially in the framework of democratic institutions [17] The coexistence of rapid industrialization with a democratic setting is certainly a rare occurrence among middle-income nations A serious qualification is called for, however, in the sense that Turkish democracy has been inherently unstable Three military interventions have taken place—in 1960, 1971, and 1980—leading in each case to the widespread suspension of democratic rights and institutions Admittedly, compared to many Latin American examples, military rule has been relatively brief Moreover, the underlying motive in each case has been to "re-equilibrate" democracy, as opposed to a desire to assume power for its own sake and on a longer-term basis as a legitimate alternative to civilian rule Finally, a striking aspect more recently associated with the Turkish model concerns the relatively smooth transition from a heavily regulated and state-dominated economy under import-substitution strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, to an outward-oriented market economy in the 1980s, following the implementation of a comparatively successful neo-liberal structural adjustment program, notably in its early stages Furthermore, the transition has been accompanied by a process of redemocratization since 1983 [18] Hence, Turkey has a legitimate claim to be a model for the former Eastern bloc countries, which desperately are trying to make a similar transition to a market-oriented system and to more democratic forms of governance, a decade or so later than Turkey

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[17] On the broad economic and political history of contemporary Turkey, see William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London Croom Helm, 1981) See, also, Henri J Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1990), Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey* (London Verso Press, 1987), and Ziya Oniş and James Riedel, *Economic Crises and Long-term Growth in Turkey* (Washington, DC World Bank Publication, 1993)

[18] On the performance of the democratic regime in Turkey and the problems of the post-1983 transition, see Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey Crises, Interpretations and Re-equilibrations," in Larry Diamond et al, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, vol Asia (Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp 187–229, and Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, "Democracy in Turkey Problems and Prospects," in Guillermo O'Donnell et al, *Transitions from the Authoritarian Rule Experiences in Southern Europe* (Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp 165–86 On Islam and secularism in Turkey, see Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds, *State, Democracy and Military Turkey in the 1980s* (New York Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp 116–33, and Ali Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands Turkey in Comparative Perspective," *International Social Science Journal*, no 128 (1991), pp 344–60

Although possessing the potential to be a model in several different respects, Turkey is in a transitional stage and, as yet, is considerably short of realizing its full potential Both in terms of economic structure and performance as well as the performance of its democratic regime, Turkey falls considerably short of the standards of the Western industrial democracies, which it regards as exemplary Yet, in both respects, there exist signs that Turkey is on the verge of a major breakthrough

In considering the future of the democratic regime, a critical turning point involved the general elections of October 1991, which brought to power a coalition of the center-right True Path Party (DYP) and the left-of-center Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) In the past, Turkey's experience with coalition governments has been, on the whole, disastrous During the 1970s, a series of unstable coalition governments failed to control escalating violence and economic disintegration, leading eventually to the military intervention of September 1980 The mood following the general elections of 1991 appeared to be radically different from the confrontational mood of the 1970s The fact that a center-right and a social democratic party could reach a consensus on a common program is, itself, an indication that Turkish democracy has reached a new stage of depth and maturity unlike any other stage in its recent history Moreover, the DYP-SHP coalition government, under the premiership of Suleyman Demirel, has come forward with a radical democratization program designed to eliminate a number of antidemocratic clauses associated with the Constitution of 1982 that had been introduced by the military government prior to the retransition to parliamentary government in November 1983 If the new democratization agenda is fully implemented, then the claim might really be advanced that Turkish democracy has graduated from a restricted or regulated form of parliamentary democracy to a Western-style advanced democracy, with widespread respect for fundamental civil rights and liberties

Even a fundamentally optimistic appraisal concerning the future of democracy in Turkey should inquire into whether forces exist that could destabilize the system in the future The era of periodic military interventions appears to be over Yet, there are forces that could play a destabilizing role and, therefore, deserve serious attention These include the possibility of prolonged economic stagnation or slow economic growth, the potential threat posed by Islamic radicalism, and internal violence associated with ethnic separatist movements

First, consider the possibility of a prolonged economic slowdown If such a crisis were to materialize, it would clearly erode the current mood of national consensus and might create an atmosphere of confrontation often associated with the coalition government of the 1970s Given its broad mandate, which had been strengthened further by the by-elections of June 1992, the government ought to have undertaken radical steps in the direction of increasing tax revenues, reducing chronic fiscal deficits, and restructuring, reforming, and, in part, privatizing the large public enterprise sector In retrospect, it is perhaps not totally surprising that the new coalition government, elected for its populist agenda, has been unable for a long time to undertake the drastic stabilization measures needed to curb the chronic rates of inflation and serious macroeconomic disequilibria that have been mounting in the Turkish economy since the mid-1980s As a result there was a major financial crisis in the early months of 1994 and a renewed encounter with the IMF The financial crisis and the subsequent attempts to stabilize the economy have generated sharp losses in output and employment The real growth in GNP for 1994 is expected to emerge as negative, compared to an average rate of 6 0 percent established during the 1990–93 period "Populist cycles," associated with intense distributional pressures, have caused major dislocations in the Turkish economy in the past, and such populist cycles need to be controlled if serious damage to the central objectives of rapid economic expansion and further democratization are to be avoided [19]

A second possible long-term threat concerns Islamic fundamentalism from within, with external support from countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia This threat may seem remote, given that secular Islam has been firmly established in Turkey Nonetheless, it would be wrong to dismiss it altogether, since Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (RP), campaigning essentially on an Islamic radicalist platform, won over 16 percent of the national vote in the general elections of 1991 and has claimed nearly 60 seats in the parliament While this might seem to be a low figure overall, it compares quite favorably with the 20 percent vote that the Social Democrats, the minor partner in the coalition, gained in the general elections Moreover, it is worth remembering that the DYP, the major coalition partner, managed to attract only 27 percent of the vote The Welfare Party participated in the general elections as a coalition of Islamic fundamentalists with other extreme nationalist or right-wing groups Yet, it was clear by the end of 1991 that a strong 10 to 12 percent of the electorate voted along radical Islamic lines

More recently, however, the RP recorded a striking improvement in its electoral performance In the municipal elections of March 1994, the RP, no longer in coalition with extreme nationalists, claimed 18 percent of the national vote and emerged as the third major contender in the country, well ahead of the Social Democrats Even more striking was the fact that the RP established itself as the leading party in the major cities, such as Istanbul and Ankara, and, rather surprisingly, won the elections in these and some other major metropolitan centers A simplistic approach might suggest that the RP, with a share of 18 percent of the national vote, still constitutes an insignificant minority However, the striking improvement in the electoral fortunes of the RP during the first half of the 1990s demonstrates that it is clearly a considerable force and that its overall impact may increase if rapid and equitable economic development, plus an improvement in the living standards of the poorest strata in society, fail to materialize during the course of the decade It is not a paradox that the RP has been capitalizing on the divisions among the social democratic parties and is emerging as an alternative to the parties of the center-left, a fact that clearly illustrates the strong link between high-income inequality in the context of rapid industrialization and the rising fortunes of the RP in recent years

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[19] The performance of the Turkish economy under neo-liberal reforms has been discussed extensively For a good collection of essays, see Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, eds , *The Political Economy of Turkey Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability* (London MacMillan, 1990) See also, Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekon, eds , *The Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization* (Bethlehem, PA Lehigh University Press, 1992) On the financial crisis of 1994, see Gulten Kazgan, *Yeni Ekonomik Duzende Turkiye'nin Yeri* (Turkey's Position in the New International Economic Order) (Istanbul Altın Kitaplar Yayınları, 1994)

Finally, the third and possibly the most immediate threat to Turkish democracy revolves around the issue of ethnic violence Turkey must certainly resolve its ethnic problems if it wishes to present itself as a model to either Central Asia or the Middle East, since these multiracial regions are also in need of solutions to their own minority problems The Kurdish issue can be resolved within the unitary Turkish state if it is approached from two basic perspectives first, as a regional problem, and second, as a problem of human rights A major difficulty in this respect has been the significant delay and neglect by the Turkish state in responding to the problems of the southeastern region of Turkey, where a large Kurdish minority resides Posing the problem in part as a regional one draws attention to the economic dimensions of the issue The massive GAP project clearly constitutes a major response to the problem of rehabilitating the region and bringing it up to the economic standards of the rest of the country Given the long gestation period of the project, however, one cannot rely solely upon it A massive investment effort by both the public and private sectors is necessary to regenerate and revitalize the region economically If such revitalization occurs within the next few years, one of the key sources of discontent among the local population will be eliminated, but economic transformation alone is insufficient to tackle the problem The issue must also be treated on human rights grounds and must be conceived as part of the overall project of consolidating and strengthening Turkish democracy. The issue has come out into the open and, for the first time, is being subjected to broad public debate Through a combination of radical improvements in economic standards and widespread extensions of human rights, Turkey can successfully integrate its minority population into its national fabric Moreover, success in this sphere will indeed determine the strength of Turkey's claim to be a regional model worthy of serious consideration by its northern industrial neighbors

Economically speaking, what are the prospects that Turkey will emerge as a model? Turkey clearly has a dynamic economy During the course of the 1980s, it has steadily been transformed from a heavily regulated, heavily protected, and virtually autarkic economy, to an economy increasingly open to external competition Export growth has been particularly striking As a result of this rapid export growth, the share of exports in GNP has expanded from 3 percent in 1980 to 15 percent, on average, by the late 1980s The share of manufactured exports also increased dramatically over the course of the past decade, from 36 percent in 1980 to 80 percent in the late 1980s Furthermore, major breakthroughs have been achieved in the fields of transportation and telecommunications

In spite of these considerable achievements, Turkey essentially still has a semi-industrial economy Many of the structural problems that one tends to associate with such economies are present in Turkey, including chronic inflation, a highly unequal distribution of income and wealth, a massive and problematic public enterprise sector, heavy unemployment and underemployment, regional imbalances, and inadequate investment in manufacturing, education, and research and development These are problems that

Turkey's economic reforms of the past few years have been unable to resolve substantially. A full appraisal of Turkey's economic problems and potential is beyond the scope of this essay. What is important to emphasize in this context is that economic success is crucial to the future of the "Turkish Model." Economic success will not be automatic but will require some fundamental restructuring of the existing economic arrangements, notably, a redefinition of the role of the state in the economy, if rapid economic expansion is to be generated and sustained over the course of the next decade.

TURKEY'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA: TOWARD A SYNTHESIS

To provide a comprehensive, all-embracing assessment of each individual aspect of Turkey's evolving external relations in the post–Cold War era is not an objective here. Naturally, Turkey's relations with Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East deserve serious and separate investigation. Turkey's relationship with Central Asia, in particular, is complex and ought to become the subject of future scholarly analysis.

Looking beyond the initial rhetoric and emotional reactions generated during the immediate post-Soviet era, Central Asia reveals enormous differences between the individual republics in terms of ethnic composition, culture, and religion. For example, the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are clearly not Turkic republics. In Kazakhstan, the largest of the six republics, more than half of the population speak non-Turkic, primarily Slavic languages. In the smallest country, Tajikistan, over 80 percent of the people speak Tajik, a dialect of Persian. Furthermore, the "Islamic" label might easily be overemphasized and ought to be seriously qualified. All of the Central Asian republics have secular governments, and all have large, religiously agnostic populations. Again, in Kazakhstan only one-third of the people claim an Islamic heritage.

These observations suggest that Turkey's ability to develop relations with the individual republics will vary considerably from one to another. Hence, it is highly misleading to merge the six republics into a composite whole when considering Turkey's external relations in the post–Cold War era. It is clear that Turkey's role in Central Asia will be more modest than originally anticipated and that Turkey will face stiff competition both from Russia and Iran for influence over the region. In addition, a number of key themes in Turkey's foreign policy in the coming years have not received any attention. These include bilateral relations with Iran, Iraq, and Israel, relations with the Organization of Islamic States, and finally, Turkey's concern with the Balkans, most notably, the Bosnian crisis.

With these serious qualifications in mind, this paper has attempted to demonstrate the intricate interdependence of four key elements: Turkey's relations with Europe, its relations with its northern neighbors, its relations with the Middle East, and its domestic performance measured in terms of economic development, democratic strengthening, and secularism. A systematic consideration of the complex interdependence among these key elements leads to the following inferences concerning Turkey's prospects in the post–Cold War setting.

Turkey may be able to maximize the benefits of its location by developing relatively loose regional arrangements with all three blocs under consideration, and success in developing relations with a particular bloc will enhance the prospects of success vis-á-vis the remaining blocs. Overcommitment in any particular direction, however, embodies inherent dangers. While it is perfectly legitimate for Turkey to develop its cultural and economic links with Central Asia or the Middle East, any attempt to move beyond this modest goal and pursue grand ambitions of regional power would prove costly. Not only would it overextend Turkey's limited budgetary resources, but it also would undermine its evolving economic model.

More immediately, the post–Cold War context has reduced Turkey's chances for full membership in the EU by a considerable margin. On the other hand, new opportunities have opened up in the post–Cold War years that have helped to expand Turkey's geostrategic and economic importance from a longer-term perspective. It is crucial for Turkey to take advantage of the opportunities provided by a major growth pole, such as post-1992 Europe, and to establish beneficial terms for this linkage. For example, a pure customs-union-type arrangement with the EU would be a poor bargain for Turkey, not only because of the importance of its large internal market, but also because of the growing significance of its links with the Black Sea region, Central Asia, and the Middle East, all of which provide important avenues for joint ventures between Turkish and European firms. Likewise, the BSEC might also have repercussions in terms of defining the bargaining potential of Turkey with respect to third parties, notably, the EU.

Clearly, the synergy between internal and external factors in the novel external environment is influencing the pattern of domestic politics, the major example being the increasing convergence among the principal political parties in their approach to the economy. More significantly, however, the ability to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the novel external environment will depend heavily on domestic forces, notably, the quality of economic management and the extent of democratization. In this respect, successful exploitation of the potential offered by the post–Cold War international environment is not inevitable but depends crucially on the degree of success achieved in the domestic arena.

PRIVATE ASSETS AND PUBLIC DEBTS: EXTERNAL FINANCE IN A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST

Ishac Diwan and Lyn Squire

As peace and stability slowly but steadily return to the Middle East, the first set of fundamentals for resuming regional growth—a stable trading environment and a secure investment climate—will gradually fall into place. The remaining elements are domestic reform and adequate external financing. The former has received considerable attention in the literature, both generally and in the specific context of the Middle East. The latter has not, but there is need for a radical rethinking of the role of external finance in the future development of the region. This article examines the levels and types of financial flows to and from the Middle East in order to assess their past contribution to investment and growth, and explores the need for a new approach to external finance. The focus is on the group of countries (or entities) in the Middle East that can expect to benefit economically from current efforts to bring peace to the region: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza (which we group together and for convenience call "the Mashriq"), and Israel. These countries also have similar characteristics with respect to international finance: they are net debtors to the rest of the world, they receive large amounts of official assistance, and/or they rely on large unrequited transfers and worker remittances to equilibrate their balance of payments.

During the period 1970–90, net inflows of capital *averaged* 16 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) in the Mashriq and 14 percent in Israel.[1] These are very high flows by international standards. Indeed, for several countries, capital flows were a more important source of foreign exchange in the late 1970s than exports of goods and services

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[1] Capital inflows are defined here as the balance of goods and non-factor services. From the financing side, a range of positive and negative financial flows—foreign direct investment, remittances, grants, loans, unilateral transfers, debt servicing, and reserve accumulation—combine to fill the gap.

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As such, they had a proportionately large effect on the evolution of these economies, especially on the expansion of the public sector, and have marked deeply their current state of operation By 1990, capital flows—while still large in some countries by international standards—had shrunk to about 8 percent of GNP in the region Since 1991, official capital flows have risen to offset the effects of the 1991 Gulf War, but this rise is likely to be short lived

An exclusive focus on flows, however, misses vital information on stocks—the outstanding *stock of debt*, on the one hand, and the *accumulation of capital abroad*, on the other For the region as a whole, these stocks are estimated respectively at about 80 and 120 percent of regional GNP in 1991 These are large ratios by international standards In Latin America, for example, the ratio of debt and capital abroad to GNP stood at half and one-third of these levels, respectively [2] These past legacies offer both an exciting prospect and a difficult challenge The prospect lies in the possibility of fueling a private sector-led strategy of economic development by attracting capital back to the region The challenge lies in the debt overhang Besides the burden that the debt imposes on current resources, the weight of public debt is deterring private investors—both domestic and foreign—and delaying the return of past capital outflows

In assessing future prospects, therefore, it is important to consider any need for exceptional measures of debt relief as countries move to more market-oriented paths of development Indeed, as in Latin America, debt relief has become a crucial component of ongoing reform programs Most debts in the Middle East, however, are bilateral This means that the Brady Initiative does not hold much promise [3] The model lies instead with the conditional debt reduction granted by the Paris Club to Egypt in 1990–91, which set a new precedent for linking reduction to reform.[4] An alternative approach—an increase in grants sufficient to offset the outflows related to debt payments—can achieve the same aim and has been pursued in Israel

EXTERNAL FINANCE, INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH

Net financial inflows into the region have been large on average but variable over time Table 1 summarizes regional experience With one exception—in the West Bank and Gaza, where inflows remained high throughout the period—the region experienced a pronounced pattern of boom and bust capital inflows peaked in the period 1975–79 and were at their lowest during the 1990s Although the magnitude and timing of the swings in capital inflows varied among countries, all experienced a shift amounting to more than 10 percent of GNP in the upswing, the downswing, or both

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[2] See Ishac Diwan and Lyn Squire, "Economic and Social Developments in the Middle East and North Africa," *Middle East and North Africa Working Paper Series* 2 (Washington, DC The World Bank, 1992)

[3] The Brady Plan was initiated in 1989 by the then Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, to deal with commercial debt through market-based debt reduction via buybacks or interest support

[4] The Paris Club is a forum in which credit issued, guaranteed, or insured by creditor governments is rescheduled

TABLE 1
Net Capital Inflows[a] as a Share of GNP (percent)

Country	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990	1991	1992
Egypt	7.85	18.80	16.95	15.42	13.28	7.39	11.48
Jordan	28.40	45.74	44.70	26.55	34.04	24.81	30.48
Lebanon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	62.62	68.11
West Bank and Gaza	30.60	33.03	37.27	34.45	30.69	41.42	34.22
Syria	3.37	15.11	14.16	5.35	−10.00	−0.71	3.93
Mashriq[b]	8.54	20.37	19.47	15.16	9.86	7.98	10.41
Israel	18.80	18.01	12.30	6.84	6.30	9.63	10.65
Region	12.47	19.54	16.97	11.76	8.04	8.87	10.53

Source: International Monetary Fund, *IMF Balance of Payments* (Washington, DC, various years); World Bank, *World Debt Tables I & II* (Washington, DC, various years); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and Central Bank of Israel, *Abstract of Israel* (various years).

a. Negative of the balance of goods and non-factor services.

b. Does not include Lebanon.

This general pattern in capital inflows—a significant increase in the mid-1970s, stagnation in the early 1980s, and a sharp fall in the 1990s—is reflected in the region's economic performance. Investment followed a similar pattern (Figure 1). In the Mashriq, investment increased by more than 10 percent of GNP. Indeed, the rise in investment was often larger than the rise in foreign savings, implying that domestic savings also rose. This was especially true in Egypt, a country in which the state played an important role in industrialization. In response to the increased scarcity of foreign exchange in the second half of the 1980s, countries adjusted mainly by cutting investment, by about 7 percent of GNP in the Mashriq and about 9 percent in Israel. In the Mashriq, the fall in investment was larger than the shortfall in foreign savings in some countries (i.e., domestic savings fell), especially in Egypt (the same country in which the initial boom in inflows was magnified by an increase in domestic savings), but smaller in others.

As might be expected, this same pattern is evident in the growth rate of domestic production, but with an even sharper decline in the late 1980s, suggesting a decrease in the quality as well as the quantity of investment. With increases in total investment averaging about 15 percent in the Mashriq, one could have expected significant improvements in growth rates. On average, however, this was not realized and the region as a whole experienced only a modest change in the growth rate (Figure 2). This outcome reflects the offsetting forces of widely different experiences in individual countries. Egypt and Jordan, for example, registered extraordinary increases in growth, whereas Syria's growth rate fell despite the significant increase in investment. Israel's growth rate also fell, as did investment.

While the upswing may have produced less growth than might have been expected, the decline in investment in the second half of the 1980s led inexorably to a deteriorating economic performance that assumed crisis proportions in some countries. Compared with

Figure 1
Net Inflows and Investments, 1970-89



Source World Bank, *World Debt Tables* (Washington, DC, 1970–89)

the second half of the 1970s, annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates declined by about 7 percent in the Mashriq Indeed, during the late 1980s, overall GDP declined in Jordan, GDP per capita declined in Syria, and GDP per capita grew by only 1 percent in Egypt This decline in economic performance was unusually severe, more so than might have been expected from the fall in investment (Figure 2)

The deterioration in the quality of investment can be gauged by comparing the incremental capital to output ratios (ICORs) over time (Table 2) These ratios typically deteriorated in the late 1970s when capital inflows peaked This is understandable, since the rise in investment probably hit decreasing returns It is more worrisome when the productivity of capital falls at the same time that the availability of capital is reduced This situation happened during the mid-1980s in most countries[5]

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[5] In Syria, the ICOR fell in the late 1980s as oil production expanded

Figure 2
Investment and Growth in the Mashriq, 1970-89



Source World Bank, *World Tables* (Washington, DC, 1970–89)

One factor underlying both the strong link between financial inflows and investment and the weak link between investment and growth is a particular attribute of the inflows that has not yet been discussed—their composition During the boom of the 1970s, much of the increase in financial inflows accrued to the public sector in the form of grants and loans (Table 3) At the peak of the boom in the period 1975–79, all the net inflow accrued to the public sector in the Mashriq and 90 percent of it accrued to the public sector in Israel In the case of the Mashriq, this inflow reflects the major economic event of the period—the increase in the price of oil—and the consequent flow of Arab assistance The extraordinary increase in oil revenues—Arab oil producers exported $213 billion worth of oil in 1980—benefited the Mashriq in the form of increased aid budgets In Israel, the

TABLE 2
Incremental Capital to Output Ratio (percent)

Country	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89
Egypt	2 83	2 55	3 66	7 01
Jordan	6 47	4 79	−7 81	−13 26
West Bank and Gaza	1 52	3 66	4 22	5 85
Syria		4 21	9 57	5 65
Mashriq[a]	2 72	3 09	6 25	7 56
Israel	4 31	6 55	6 96	4 24
Region	3 65	4 00	6 47	5 89

Source World Bank, *World Tables* (Washington, DC, various years), Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and Central Bank of Israel, *Abstract of Israel* (various years)
a Does not include Lebanon

boom had started earlier, and the 1970s actually recorded a slight decline in capital inflows as a share of GDP, but the absolute amount remained constant at about $1 5 billion per year These flows came mostly from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and accrued mainly to the public sector Over the whole period 1970–91, the accumulated financing received by the public sectors of the countries studied here, netted out of principal repayment on loans, adds up to approximately $175 billion To give a sense of magnitude, this amount is approximately one-half of the amount of the debt accumulated by Latin America during the same period

The inflow of foreign exchange enabled these countries to finance their preferred strategy of development—one dominated by the public sector As a result, neither loans nor investments were subjected to the market test that governs private-sector lending and investment This became an increasingly costly problem as investment moved into areas where a market test is likely to be of most value Furthermore, policies were adopted to protect and nurture the growing public sector These policies inhibited the growth of private entrepreneurship in favor of a structure of production dominated by the public sector They also shunned the use of markets and encouraged government control, leading to highly protected trade regimes The inflow of foreign exchange thus enabled countries to pursue investments and policies that, in turn, account for the disappointing growth performance

During the downswing, countries cut public investment and adopted an initial set of policy responses that reduced productivity The shortfall in financing skewed public expenditures and gave rise to distortionary forms of taxation The inability to raise revenue significantly or to adjust costly and non-targeted consumer subsidies and unusually high military expenditures led to steep reductions in public investment[6] In several countries,

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[6] For a fascinating account of the difficulties encountered in trying to cut expenditures and increase revenues in Egypt, see Yahya Sadowski, *Political Vegetables* (Washington, DC Brookings Institution, 1991)

TABLE 3

Composition of Capital Flows 1970–89

($ Billions)

Region	Period	Total Net Transfer	of which Public	of which Private
Mashriq[a]	1970–74	4.50	4.05	0.45
	1975–79	19.11	20.03	−0.93
	1980–84	34.08	30.65	3.42
	1985–89	25.94	22.57	3.77
Israel	1970–74	6.7	2.2	4.4
	1975–79	7.2	6.2	1.0
	1980–84	−0.5	−3.4	2.8
	1985–89	5.6	1.5	4.0

Source: International Monetary Fund, *IMF Balance of Payments* (Washington, DC, various years), World Bank, *World Debt Tables I & II* (Washington, DC, various years), and Central Bank of Israel, *Abstract of Israel* (various years).

a Egypt, Jordan, Syria.

the public wage bill initially soared as governments sought to increase their hiring in order to offset the rising unemployment in the rest of the economy. With public investment budgets slashed, labor productivity in the public sector collapsed.[7] Monetization of the fiscal deficit also led to episodes of high inflation (Egypt, and especially Israel and Lebanon) and to the development of parallel markets when price controls were instituted in order to repress inflation (Egypt and Syria).[8] Inventories, especially of imported goods, remained high in order to hedge against inflation and against the risk of devaluation or sudden trade restrictions. On the external front, the tightening financing constraints and the inability to raise exports in the short run led to increased import restrictions. As a consequence, private investment also declined (as a share of GDP) because investors believed the combination of risk and return moved against investment in domestic production and in favor of investment abroad.[9]

Thus, the interaction between the composition of financial inflows and the swings in those flows are important *determinants* of past growth performance in the Middle East. The policies and the growth performance of the region, however, also *explain* the composition of net financial inflows in one important respect—the small share of net inflows to the private sector The oil boom brought with it an increase in worker remittances In the Mashriq, remittances increased from an annual average of $0 2 billion during 1970–74 to an average of $4 4 billion during 1980–89, but these accrued to the private sector The remittances were offset, especially in Egypt, by an equal rise in capital flight, usually a private-sector phenomenon (Table 4)[10] Thus, in the case of the Mashriq, the composition of net financial flows was simultaneously an important determinant of the region's performance during the 1970s and 1980s (through its financing of the public sector) and a consequence of that performance (because of its impact on capital flight)

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[7] For an analysis of the Egyptian case, see Heba Handoussa, "The Role of the State: The Case of Egypt" (Paper presented at the Conference of the Initiative to Encourage Economic Research in the Middle East and North Africa, Cairo, June 1993).

[8] In the cases of Lebanon and Israel, see respectively, Samir Makdisi, "Political Conflict and Economic Performance in Lebanon: 1975–1987," in Banque du Liban, *Bulletin Trimestriel* (1987), pp. 33–4, and Michael Bruno and Leora Meridor, "The Costly Transition from Stabilization to Sustainable Growth: Israel's Case," *Bank of Israel Discussion Paper Series* (1990).

[9] In general, there is some evidence indicating that the share of private investment in total investment increased, although much of it occurred in the informal economy, where it could escape increased taxation. See Nawfal N. Umari, "The Public Sector in the Middle East and North Africa" (Paper presented at the Conference of the Initiative to Encourage Economic Research in the Middle East and North Africa, Cairo, June 1993).

In sum, the benefits of the substantial inflow of foreign exchange that accrued to the region's public sector, especially in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, must be set against three costs (1) the relatively low productivity of the investment that was financed by these inflows, (2) the difficulty in adjusting to their reduction, and (3) the significant loss of private capital amounting to approximately US$70 billion during this period It is difficult to say whether a different strategy would have led to a different outcome, but the analysis suggests that for the future, it is at least worth considering the merits and feasibility of a shift in the balance of external financing in favor of greater reliance on the private sector One other factor—the uncertain prospects for future financing for the public sector—lends support to this view

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

For several reasons, the availability of external financing for the region's public sector is likely to be more constrained in the 1990s than it had been in the boom years of the 1970s Assistance from Arab, OECD, and multilateral sources will be limited, and with the conclusion of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Eastern bloc has ceased to be a source of assistance and instead competes with the Middle East for the limited quantities of international assistance[11] Although Arab assistance increased during 1990, when $4 billion was disbursed (as opposed to less than $1 billion in 1989), prospects for future transfers were mixed Aid to Jordan and the Palestinians was reduced substantially after the 1991 Gulf War More fundamentally, relatively low oil prices, the fall in reserves related to the cost of the war, and rising domestic expenditures make it unlikely that Arab aid will increase dramatically in the near future

Similarly, the OECD countries are facing the dual problem of difficult domestic fiscal situations and extraordinary demands for exceptional assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe A group of OECD donor states has pledged over $2 billion for reconstruction programs in the West Bank and Gaza over the period 1993–98 In spite of

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[10] Capital flight is estimated by the residual method capital flight equals external borrowing plus foreign direct investment minus the sum of the current account deficit and the increase in reserves Ishac Diwan, Lyn Squire, and John Underwood, "External Finance in the Middle East Trends and Prospects," Economic Research Forum, Working Paper no 9402 (Cairo, 1994)

[11] This last point alone amounts to a significant change in circumstances—at its peak in 1993, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) provided the region with $2 5 billion a year

TABLE 4

Net Private Transfers in the Mashriq[a] *1970–89*

($ Billions)

Period	Total Private Net Inflows	of which Worker Remittances[b]	Other Inflows[c]	Capital Outflows
1970–74	0.45	0.82	−0.03	−0.34
1975–79	−0.93	9.73	1.60	−12.26
1980–84	3.42	21.59	2.76	−20.93
1985–89	3.77	21.93	5.43	−23.59

Source: International Monetary Fund, *IMF Balance of Payments* (Washington, DC, various years), World Bank, *World Debt Tables* (Washington, DC, various years).

[a] Egypt, Jordan, Syria.

[b] Includes net private transfer.

[c] Foreign direct investment and nonguaranteed medium- and long-term debt.

promises to the contrary, this aid is likely to further constrain assistance to other countries of the region. The region also cannot rely in the future on multilateral institutions for increasing levels of net flows. In some cases, because of the large volume of lending in recent years, multilateral institutions have reached exposure levels that limit new lending. In others, such as the Arab multilateral institutions, new lending is limited because of capital constraints. As far as multilateral concessional lending to the region is concerned, two factors are likely to hold it down. First, concessional lending from multilaterals requires aid allocations from industrial country governments, and the climate for increased concessional assistance is not good. Second, there are many competing demands for multilateral concessional assistance, and as in the past, the relative wealth of the Middle East, with the possible exception of the West Bank and Gaza, will limit access to these funds.

The above suggests that any future strategy should be based on the presumption that flows of external assistance directed to the public sectors of the region are likely to be more in line with those of the bust of the 1980s than the boom of the 1970s. The critical question then becomes: what can be expected from private flows? In the past, remittances from workers abroad have been the most important source of external funding for the private sector. Migration has served an important role in alleviating pressures in domestic labor markets and redistributing wealth from the oil-rich countries of the Gulf to the labor-surplus countries of the Mashriq. Remittances have been substantial, especially for Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Demand for migrant labor, however, has shrunk since 1990. The crisis in the Gulf, with the attendant movement of populations, dramatically reduced the level of remittances as Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia sent home several million Arab workers. The factors—economic, demographic, and political—influencing the level of remittances reveal the complexity of the phenomenon and, hence, the need for caution in suggesting how future flows may evolve. Nevertheless, the available evidence seems to point to one fairly robust conclusion remittances will decline as a share of GNP These arguments suggest that the most promising potential sources of private capital are going to be foreign direct investment and the savings abroad of domestic residents

PRIVATE EXTERNAL ASSETS AND PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT

The evidence regarding the costs of past reliance on extraordinary external financing for the public sector, and the expectation that such funding is not likely to be available in the future, point to the need for a new strategy The two major legacies of the past—a significant stock of mainly private external assets and a large stock of mainly public debt—suggest both a potential solution and a possible hurdle Table 5 provides a country-by-country comparison of the capital stock held abroad and the present value of debt For the region as a whole the two stocks are enormous, about $135 and $90 billion, respectively These numbers highlight two of the central propositions of this article, that past outflows of private capital constitute a valuable stock that could be attracted back to the region, and that the existing burden of debt may prove to be a severe obstacle to the pursuit of such a strategy

Accumulated savings abroad for the countries for which estimates are available was estimated at 120 percent of GDP in 1991, or $135 billion This measure does not include the savings abroad of Lebanese and Palestinians, which by themselves could reach tens of billions of dollars Yet, relative to GNP, the estimate still represents about three times the amount of savings abroad estimated for Latin America [12] The extent of capital flight and accumulated savings abroad, however, varies among countries in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, for example, the ratio exceeds 150 percent, but in Israel, the ratio is quite small [13]

At the same time, the potential of the debt overhang to thwart a strategy based on inflows of private capital also varies Using the criteria developed by the World Bank's *World Debt Tables*, Jordan and Syria are countries with a severe debt problem [14] So too was Egypt before it benefited from debt relief in 1991 Virtually all countries in the world that have reached such levels of indebtedness have encountered serious and long-term debt-servicing problems, with a significant negative impact on growth prospects

In these circumstances, establishing external creditworthiness becomes critical The recent experience of Latin America is instructive in this regard Net flows had dried up after the mid-1980s, a reflection of the inability of most Central and South American countries to grow out of their debt crisis However, after the Brady Initiative came into effect, the international financial market quickly recognized and rewarded improvements in creditworthiness For these countries, the restructuring of external debts has facilitated

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12 Ishac Diwan, Lyn Squire, and John Underwood, "External Finance in the Middle East "

13 One factor not taken into account by these measures, however, is external trade misinvoicing As such, these estimates can be considered as erring on the conservative side (although they may also be picking up the underinvoicing of unrecorded military hardware purchases, and in the case of Jordan, remittances to the residents of the West Bank and Gaza)

14 Countries are classified as "heavily indebted" when either one of their debt ratios is above a critical level These ratios and their critical levels are the present value of debt-to-export (200 percent) and the present value of debt-to-GDP (80 percent)

TABLE 5

Accumulated Savings Abroad and Present Value of External Debt, 1991

Country	Stock of Savings Abroad ($b)	Savings Abroad Over GNP (%)	Present Value of Debt ($b)	Present Value of Debt over GNP (%)
Egypt[a]	82.6	271	35.2	117
Israel	19.7	32	33.0	54
Jordan	6.2	163	7.9	208
Lebanon	n.a.	n.a.	1.8	43
Syria	26.1	161	12.1	75
Region[b]	134.6	120	90.0	78

Source: World Bank, *World Debt Tables* (Washington, DC, various years), Central Bank of Israel, *Abstract of Israel* (various years), and authors' computations.

a. Before debt relief.

b. The measures of savings abroad exclude Lebanon.

re-entry into international capital markets, and contributed to an environment in which strong policies have been easier to sustain. Is a comparable strategy required for the Middle East, and, if so, is it feasible?

DEBT OVERHANG AND METHODS OF RELIEF

The burden of external public debt can depress investment and economic growth through two types of channels: illiquidity effects and incentive effects. The illiquidity effect arises because there are only limited resources to be divided among domestic consumption, investment, and external transfers to service existing debt. Because there are limits to how much consumption can be reduced, funds that potentially could be used for investment are used instead for debt servicing. Liquidity considerations become important when the debt overhang is large enough to prevent a country from refinancing its repayment obligations with new voluntary loans.

The disincentive effects, by contrast, arise because expectations of future debt burdens tend to reduce the incentive for new lending and investment. Several reasons account for this situation. First, the domestic private sector's access to external funds and the interest of foreign investors are weakened in the presence of a debt overhang. The old debt deters new investors because there is no easy way to guarantee their seniority. Even if investors find very profitable investment opportunities, the prospects for profit repatriation will be reduced by the long line of claimants on the country's foreign exchange reserves. New investors will abstain from funding otherwise good investment opportunities out of a fear of being "taxed" by the old creditors.[15] In the extreme case, expectations of increased taxation can become self-fulfilling, resulting in a run-out of the domestic currency

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[15] Ishac Diwan and Dani Rodrik, "External Debt, Adjustment, and Burden Sharing: A Unified Framework," *Princeton Studies in International Finance* 73 (November 1992).

Second, the incentives for domestic investment are also affected The servicing of external public-sector debt requires both an external transfer (from the country to the creditors) and an internal transfer (from the private to the public sector) To earn sufficient foreign exchange, devaluations may be needed To collect the foreign exchange from the private sector, various taxes may have to be imposed, including the inflation tax, or domestic public debt must be accumulated These developments—as well as the expectations that they may take place in the future—depress investment and growth[16] and lead to capital flight [17]

Third, the uncertainty created by the debt overhang exerts a destabilizing influence on domestic financial markets, causing them to become less effective in intermediating between savers and investors Financial instability is exacerbated when the public sector also has large explicit and implicit liabilities at home, such as the implicit guarantee of private savings deposited in the domestic banking sector, social obligations contracted in the past, or liabilities toward social groups that would stand to lose disproportionately from reform [18] Because capital accumulated abroad by domestic residents cannot be tapped by the public sector, these effects can appear even when the private sector has sizeable foreign assets

These illiquidity and disincentive effects can pull highly indebted countries into a downward spiral The country's creditors suffer because the unrealized growth depresses their payoffs In such a situation, coordination among creditors can lead to pareto-optimal improvements involving the provision of liquidity and/or debt relief [19] Coordination between the creditor and the debtor can improve matters further, but both parties must commit themselves to some future action The creditor must provide liquidity and credible assurances that in the future it will not extract repayments that are too large by agreeing to some combination of new loans, debt write-offs, and lower interest rates on rescheduled debt [20] The debtor must demonstrate a commitment to invest a large share of any additional resources under the relief plan, with perhaps the most credible commitment being to take part in conditionality programs of the international finance institutions [21]

Because the existing literature has concentrated mainly on the relation between commercial banks and a set of Latin American countries, the role of grants—an instrument that is used only by official lenders—as provider of relief has not been explored Yet, in the Middle East, grants have played an important role in external transfers Moreover, the provision of new grants acts to some extent like debt relief ignoring incentive effects, it increases liquidity without increasing the stock of debt In fact, the two can be made exactly equivalent to a stream of future grants that, when discounted at the market rate of interest, yields a net present value of $1 This will happen if the provision of grants exactly equals the interest rate—$0 10 a year, forever discounted at a rate of 10 percent, has a net present value of $1

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[16] Paul Krugman, "Financing versus Forgiving a Debt Overhang Some Analytical Notes," *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (1988), pp 287–307, and Jeffrey Sachs, "Managing the LDC Debt Crisis," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2 (1986)

[17] Jonathan Eaton, "Public Debt Guarantees and Private Capital Flight," *World Bank Economic Review* 1, no 3 (1987), pp 377–95

[18] Guillermo Calvo, "Servicing the Public Debt The Role of Expectations," *American Economic Review* 78, no 4 (1988), pp 647–61

[19] An allocation is termed *pareto-optimal* if there is no alternative allocation that leaves everyone at least as well off, and makes some people strictly better off

[20] For an analysis of the optimal mix of liquidity and debt relief, see Kenneth Froot, "Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief," *International Economic Review* 30 (1989), pp 49–70

[21] Constantijn Claessens and Ishac Diwan, "Investment Incentives New Money, Debt Relief, and the Critical Role of Conditionality in the Debt Crisis," *World Bank Economic Review* 4, no 1 (1990), pp 21–41

In practice, however, this simple equivalence breaks down Precisely for this reason, arguments can be marshaled for choosing between an approach to debt relief based on debt reduction and one based on a prolonged flow of grants These arguments have to do with the dead-weight costs involved in debt reduction, on the one hand, and the credibility of a promise to provide grants in perpetuity, on the other The costs related to debt reduction—loss of reputation on the part of the borrower and regulatory costs that have to be borne by the lenders—have been noted and discussed in the context of the Latin American debt crisis While such a concern should not be exaggerated, it supports, nevertheless, an approach based on grants rather than debt reduction—a flow of grants can be put in place that provides debt relief equivalent (in net present-value terms) to debt reduction *and* avoids the costs associated with debt reduction

There is a powerful argument, however, against the use of grants This has to do with the credibility that the private sector attaches to a once-only event (debt reduction) versus a possibly protracted process (grants) A strategy based on attracting inflows of private capital to the region rests heavily on the private sector's assessment of *both* the credibility of the domestic reform program *and* the likelihood of successfully resolving the problems arising from the debt overhang Debt reduction achieves the second in a very convincing way An equivalent approach (in net present-value terms) based on grants achieves the same goal only to the extent that the private sector is convinced that future grants, indeed, will be forthcoming In other words, the certainty stemming from an approach based on debt reduction is replaced by the uncertainty arising from the possibility that future grants will not be forthcoming Moreover, this uncertainty is likely to increase with the size of the debt overhang because the grants will have to be larger and/or the period during which grants will be required will have to be longer, both of which eventualities are likely to decrease the private sector's confidence that debt problems, in fact, are being resolved

The uncertainty arises because donors rarely are able to commit to a predetermined flow of grants into the future, and even if they are, the private sector still may not be convinced When there are many donors, coordination failures exacerbate the commitment problem and further reduce the value of a grant-based strategy relative to debt reduction Donor coordination typically is weakened considerably when the donor group is large and diverse and the debt overhang is large, because burden-sharing considerations and strategic behavior become predominant For example, Western donors may be reluctant to lend to Syria, given its debt overhang to Russia, guarantees that the resources will benefit Syria, rather than Russia, must be provided, thereby complicating the process

These arguments suggest that, despite the formal equivalence in net present-value terms, debt reduction will become more attractive as the debt overhang increases and as the number of donors increases In other words, at some point, the private sector will hold the view that the level of grants required to resolve the debt problem is so unlikely to be sustained, that the feasibility of a grant-based strategy is undermined This, in turn, reduces the willingness of donors to pursue such a strategy

These two approaches—debt reduction and grants—have been followed in the Middle East In Egypt in 1990–91, debt relief took the form of unilateral debt reduction to the Gulf states and the United States This was followed by a Paris Club conditional debt reduction in 1991 (50 percent in present-value terms) that was made conditional upon reform and is to be delivered in three tranches, of which the second was approved in September 1993 In the case of Israel, on the other hand, a pure grant method was followed The improvement in Israel's overall external debt position since 1984 is directly related to the shift in US government assistance from loans to grants, following more than a decade of rapidly rising net foreign debt While debt relief was insufficient in either case to boost growth dramatically, it was, nevertheless, an important component in stabilizing domestic financial markets and in boosting creditworthiness In Israel, where the commitment of a single donor was evident to the private sector, this strategy allowed for a major rise in the accumulation of the private sector's liability abroad, while in Egypt, it precipitated a reversal of capital flight

WHO NEEDS DEBT REDUCTION?

The following analysis assumes that progress on restoring peace continues and that domestic policy reforms are implemented It investigates what type of financial framework is consistent with both economic growth and the restoration/maintenance of external creditworthiness There are three possible sources of funds domestic savings, external sources that accrue to the public sector, and private inflows In the short to medium term, domestic savings are constrained by the need to keep domestic consumption from falling too much External flows to the public sector are limited on the supply side Private flows, thus, are seen as the main source of financing, with a real potential in the short and medium term The main question, then, is can a strategy built on attracting private-sector finance succeed given the existing public-sector debt, and, if not, what is the most desirable type of debt work-out?

This set of issues is addressed by using a simulation model that tests whether these countries can attract the needed financing and grow faster than their external debt without having to cut consumption unduly The model assumes implementation of a domestic reform program, and takes into consideration the current structure of production and demographics While no simulation model can handle all the underlying determinants of growth, the capital-based model used here is a useful tool for quantifying the financing requirements associated with alternative growth paths The approach adopted involves specifying growth rates of GDP that will be sufficient to absorb expanding labor forces and allow for a gradual rise in real wages It also specifies increased efficiency on the utilization of resources, on the assumption that a reform program is implemented, and computes the investment rate needed to achieve the targeted growth Finally, the scenarios specify consumption targets and compute the net external capital flows that are needed to achieve external balance, given the estimates of future external financial obligations, expected levels of grants, and demographic projections

The goal of the exercise is to find out whether, given the growth prospects and the financing requirements needed to achieve this growth, the outstanding external debt is too large compared with the country's capacity to service debt If the answer is yes, a market-based strategy of growth out of debt will be unlikely to succeed, because it would be difficult to convince the private sector that austerity will be maintained long enough to resolve the public-sector imbalances and that the fruits from investment will not be taxed away in the future To derive policy implications, two questions must be addressed First, what is the highest debt ratio at which a country retains its creditworthiness? Second, what can be expected of grants and concessionary assistance in the future?

On the first issue, the answer revolves around the measurement of the size of a country's credit ceiling, that is, the level of external debt below which a country can be expected to honor fully its obligations in the future For simplicity, the ratio of debt to export plus remittances (D/X) is used as the relevant indicator of the capacity to service debt in the long run, recognizing, however, that the exact D/X ratio corresponding to a country's credit ceiling will vary from country to country [22]

To determine the most desirable strategy for escaping a debt overhang, it is also necessary to pass judgment on whether a country can attract and maintain grants over time Such an evaluation, however, is not an easy matter In general, a country's ability to attract concessional assistance is related to the size of its population, its GNP, how poor it is, and its geopolitical importance For highly indebted countries, concessional assistance in the form of new loans at below-market rates depends on the extent of the liquidity crunch, the existing investment opportunities, and the perceived ability of the country to use new resources efficiently

In the Middle East, the geopolitical factor has been the key In fact, when the only control variables used are population and GNP, the region seems to attract much more than its fair share of assistance (Table 6) In particular, the Mashriq and Israel have been receiving about three times their normal share of concessional assistance relative to both their GNP and their population, while within the Mashriq, Jordan has been able to attract more than its fair share of grants

Because it is difficult to specify what level of future grants the private sector would regard as sustainable, the following procedure is adopted First, how would the debt ratios evolve with a continuation of the level of grants observed in the recent past? The creditworthiness test is brought to bear on the simulations in a fashion consistent with recent international experience If, after five years of reforms, the D/X ratio remains below

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[22] Recent evidence suggests that credit ceilings are reached when the D/X ratio of a country falls somewhere between 150 and 225 percent, with the exact figure being country-specific

TABLE 6

Grants: International and Regional Comparisons, 1991

Country	Grants ($m)	Grant Element in new Loans (%)	Total Grants ($m)	Share of Grants over Share of Regional Population[a] (%)	Share of Grants over Share of Regional GNP[b] (%)
Egypt	3,355	35.7	3,846	0.66	1.76
Jordan	407	67.5	747	1.78	2.58
Lebanon	87	18.2	100	0.32	0.28
West Bank and Gaza	185	n.a.	185	0.88	0.95
Syria	109	29.3	226	0.16	0.17
Mashriq	4,143	32.2	5,104	0.63	1.19
Israel	3,500	n.a.	3,500	6.67	0.81
Region	7,643	n.a.	8,604	3.43[c]	3.03[c]

Source: World Bank, *World Debt Tables* (Washington, DC, 1992–93), and authors' computations.
a. Grants received by the country as a share of grants received in the region, divided by the population of the country as a share of regional population.
b. Grants received by the country as a share of grants received in the region, divided by the GNP of the country as a share of regional GNP.
c. Formulae are changed and refer to the region as a whole relative to all LDCs.

150 percent, external debt is not seen as a constraint to a market-based reform strategy, as long as the grants remain at their current level.

Second, for the remaining countries in which relief is required, the question then becomes what form this relief should take. In order to evaluate the feasibility of a grant-based strategy, it is necessary to compute the factor by which grants would have to be increased to yield a ratio of debt to exports of 200 percent five years into the reform program. If the grant multiplier is small, a grant-based strategy is considered feasible. If, however, the grant multiplier is large, a grant-based strategy is judged unlikely because it would be hard to convince investors of its success. In such a case, it would be difficult to attract private inflows on a sustainable basis in the absence of debt reduction.

Table 7 presents the results. Egypt (post–Paris Club full-debt reduction) and Israel achieve D/X ratios of less than 150 percent. For these countries, therefore, an external financing strategy based on the private sector is feasible if the current level of grants continues into the future, as seems likely. For all the other countries, a continuation of current grant levels is not consistent with long-run creditworthiness. In Lebanon, the required increase in grants may be forthcoming, because past levels of grants have been low and the country faces a major reconstruction program. This is also true of the West Bank and Gaza, because of international support following the peace agreement and an equally large reconstruction program. In the remaining two cases, the expectation that the

TABLE 7

Projected Present Value of Debt to Export Ratios (percent)

Countries	1991	In Five Years Current Grant Level	 Grant Increase Needed[a] to Ensure Creditworthiness
West Bank and Gaza[b c]	0	320	1 6
Lebanon[b]	140	225	1 7
Egypt (post-Paris Club full debt reduction)	148	143	0 5
Israel	153	135	0 2
Egypt (first-phase Paris Club debt reduction)	252	228	1 3
Syria	252	279	4 2
Jordan (pre-1992–93 debt reductions)	259	218	1 3
Egypt (pre-debt reduction)	331	290	1 8

Source Data based on authors' calculations

a Factor by which current grant level must be multiplied to yield a ratio of present value (PV) of debt to exports of 200, five years after the start of the reform program

b Includes reconstruction program See text

c In ten rather than five years, to account for the length of the reconstruction program

required increase in grants will be forthcoming may not be realistic—in Jordan, because the current level of grants has been unusually high, and in Syria, because the required increase is so large For these countries, debt reduction would be required

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY

How far have countries gone in implementing the strategy proposed here, and what has been the outcome in terms of volumes and types of private capital inflows? Egypt (debt reduction) and Israel (grants) have implemented the strategy outlined above The main factors determining inflows to these countries, therefore, are the amount of savings held abroad, domestic policy, and the geopolitical uncertainty still characterizing the region Savings held abroad by Israeli residents are relatively small The strategy for Israel, therefore, must be to emphasize foreign direct investment With respect to domestic reforms, Israel initiated an ambitious program in the late 1980s But growth in per capita GDP has remained small, at about 1 percent a year, and foreign direct investment has remained negligible, at approximately $120 million a year following the stabilization of 1985[23] While the business sector has shown some dynamism since 1991, there are no massive investments in the types of industries that can sustain growth, and unemployment has increased The moderate supply response seems to be related mainly to regional risk, since creditworthiness is expected to be maintained in the medium term It is increasingly apparent that the uncertain geopolitical situation has exerted a dampening effect on investment, with private investors—both local and foreign—preferring to wait on the sidelines and invest in financial instruments, rather than putting their funds at risk in long-term business ventures

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[23] Assaf Razin and Ephraim Sadka, *The Economy of Modern Israel Malaise and Promise* (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1993)

The outcome in Egypt has been different for quite specific reasons Unlike their Israeli counterparts, Egyptian residents hold significant amounts of capital abroad—an estimated $83 billion in 1991 [24] In these circumstances, a strategy of attracting this capital back to Egypt to finance private investment seems reasonable This strategy, however, has been only partially successful Following the debt agreement, the government has liberalized the foreign-exchange and capital markets Country risk has fallen, Egypt is expected to remain creditworthy in the medium term, and its vulnerability to changes in the level of grants it receives also has fallen (see Table 7) As a result, capital has returned—approximately $5 billion in 1992–93 However, this has not been translated into increased private investment Rather, foreign reserves rose sharply in 1994 The reasons for the caution of private investors include the overall regional outlook and the limited progress that has been made on the reform program In particular, privatization—seen as the answer to both chronic public deficits and the inefficiencies that plague the economy—has not taken hold, probably due to concerns about labor shedding In addition, the rapid increase in the public sector's domestic debt has driven up interest rates As a result, private investors remain unconvinced about government policy and rightly concerned about the high cost of credit

In the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon, the debt overhang is non-existent or manageable, but public-sector financing needs are large Significant improvements in public infrastructure and services are needed, not only to improve living conditions directly, but also to support private business activities and economic growth in general For the West Bank and Gaza, a recent World Bank study estimated the needs of the public sector to be approximately $600 million a year for the next five years, with annual external financing needs in excess of $400 million [25] In Lebanon, the cost of the National Emergency Recovery Program is estimated to be $2 3 billion for 1993–96, of which approximately $600 million a year will be required in the form of external assistance [26] In both cases, however, external debt is small and residents have access to large deposits abroad that can be repatriated under the right circumstances

In Jordan and Syria, a strategy of growth out of debt is unlikely to work in the absence of debt reduction In Jordan, the situation is borderline—a moderate increase in grants would allow the debt ratios to fall over time Jordan also has made progress on the domestic front The acceleration of the reform agenda is crucial in order to take full advantage of the potential created by the flow of return migrants However, the debt overhang—and especially its internal transfer aspect—is constraining the supply response The ratio of debt to exports stood at 260 percent in 1991, and is unlikely to fall below 220 percent in less than five years, even under optimistic assumptions about domestic reform, unless a larger share of international assistance is provided in the form of grants (approximately 20 percent above 1994 levels), or unless some debt relief is forthcoming Jordan, however, already receives more than its normal share of grants, whether the comparison is with the rest of the developing countries or within the region This would suggest that a grant-based strategy will be difficult for Jordan to follow There has been limited progress on debt reduction (Jordan reportedly has bought back most of its debt owed to the former Soviet Union), and a debt-reduction agreement with commercial creditors was finalized in 1994 Nevertheless, more debt reduction is needed Recently, the US government announced that it was willing to write off a large portion of the its debt, within the context of the peace process President Bill Clinton also has encouraged other OECD governments to follow suit

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[24] Ishac Diwan, Lyn Squire, and John Underwood, "External Finance in the Middle East "

[25] *Developing the West Bank and Gaza An Investment in Peace* (Washington, DC The World Bank, 1993)

[26] The projections for the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon reported in Table 7 include these extraordinary financing requirements

In Syria, even with the optimistic assumptions about domestic reforms and the provision of grants, the debt ratio will increase because large amounts of international financing are required to boost investment above its low level At the same time, a grant-based strategy does not appear feasible. Even though Syria receives less than its share of assistance, a grant-based strategy would be difficult to realize, because existing grants would have to be increased by a factor of 3 to 4 percent in order to achieve creditworthiness five years after the initiation of the reform program Thus, debt reduction will be needed More progress on domestic stabilization and reform is key before debt reduction can play a constructive role

A strategy of conditional debt reduction in Syria also would have to grapple with the heterogeneity of Syria's creditors Debt to the former Soviet Union is substantial, amounting to more than $10 billion and accounting for a significant proportion of total debt (probably more than 50 percent, depending on the exchange rate)[27] A concerted agreement between all creditors is unlikely to occur This suggests that a buyback-based strategy of debt reduction, in the context of an overall adjustment program, is likely to be preferred The issue of buybacks is potentially important because liquidity-constrained Russia may agree to liquidate its debts at attractive prices Of course, other creditors may object, because resources that could be paid to them (or invested at home to increase the debtor's capacity to repay in the future) would be paid to a single creditor Such an operation, however, can benefit both the debtor and the other creditors in the long run if the price is low enough Overall, the debtor benefits if it is less liquidity-constrained than the single creditor, and the other creditors benefit if the buyback price is below their own valuation of Syrian debt

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[27] Ishac Diwan, Lyn Squire, and John Underwood, "External Finance in the Middle East "

CONCLUSION

Three factors are critical to the resumption of growth in the Middle East: regional peace, domestic reform, and external financing. Although there is progress on the first, it is clear from the experience of the Egyptian-Israeli accord that peace will have to be regionwide and sustained before one observes a significant improvement in the business climate of the Middle East. Progress also can be seen on domestic reform, but with considerable variation among countries. Both to improve the productivity of investment and to attract external, private financing and further reform—both in terms of stabilization and structural adjustment—are required in most countries.

The review of past external financing strategies and of prospects for the future suggested the need for a switch to more reliance on private-sector financing. Is this feasible and consistent with the restoration of external creditworthiness? The answer is positive but qualified. For Egypt and Israel, past strategies of external debt management—debt reduction for Egypt and increased reliance on grants for Israel—already have ensured the creditworthiness of these countries. For the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon, the picture is clouded by their unusual financing needs in the immediate future. Assuming a plausible increase in grants, the financing needs can be met and external creditworthiness maintained. For Jordan and Syria, given the high level of grants in the former and the need for a significant increase in the latter, the required financing and the restoration of creditworthiness are likely to be compatible only if the stock of debt is reduced.

Ultimately, the analysis in this article depends on judgments about the likely availability of grants, and on judgments about how the private sector perceives the plausibility of future levels of grants. The analysis, however, does provide a quantitative basis upon which to make these judgments. External financing is not likely to be the binding constraint on regional development, even though the future availability of public financing is more constrained than in the past.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY

Massoud Karshenas and M Hashem Pesaran

SINCE the 1979 revolution, profound changes have taken place in the Iranian economy as a result of a combination of external and internal factors The revolution itself, the taking of US hostages in November 1979, the trade sanctions and freezing of Iranian assets that followed, the costly and protracted eight-year war with Iraq, and the vagaries of the oil market all have made their mark on the economy The Islamic Republic's response to these unfolding economic crises was to follow a policy of severe import compression, international economic isolation, and reliance on bureaucratic arrangements as principal allocative and distributive mechanisms in the economy The outcome has been a deteriorating economy, rising inflation, foreign indebtedness on an unprecedented scale, a substantial increase in rent-seeking activities at the expense of productive enterprise, a shrinking of capital stock, an inadequately trained work force, and economic institutions that are badly in need of fundamental reform

There is now a general consensus, both inside and outside Iran, that the economy is badly in need of reconstruction President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's First Five-Year Plan represented the government's manifesto for the reconstruction of the Iranian economy, and laid down a blueprint for Iran's future development This plan, formally approved by the *Majlis* (The Consultant Assembly of the Islamic Republic) in January 1990, was the product of years of negotiations and compromise and was made possible only after the cessation of hostilities with Iraq in August 1988 The plan covered the period from 1989/90 to 1993/94, and envisaged an average annual growth rate of 8 1

Massoud Karshenas is a senior lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, and M Hashem Pesaran is a professor of economics at Cambridge University The authors are grateful to Eric Hooglund, Richard B Parker, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions This paper is a substantially revised and updated version of the paper entitled "Exchange Rate Unification The Role of Markets and Planning in the Iranian Economic Reconstruction," presented at the international seminar on Between State and Market The Iranian Economy Since 1979, *sponsored by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, March 1993, Paris/Ivry, France* percent in real gross domestic product (GDP) and an annual average rate of 11.6 percent in real investment, with corresponding growth rates of 5.7 percent and 3.8 percent for private and public consumptions, respectively.

The First Five-Year Plan provided an important framework within which the government could embark on a program of structural reform and economic liberalization, although the quantitative targets envisaged in the plan were ambitious and could be achieved on a sustained basis only under very optimistic scenarios. The latest data released by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic suggest a mixed picture. Over the five years covered by the plan, the real GDP has grown by an average annual rate of 7.0 percent, which is only slightly below the plan's overall growth target.[1] Oil exports have risen from around 2 million barrels per day in 1989/90 to 2.8 million barrels per day in 1993/94. Investment as a percentage of GDP has increased from 11 percent in 1989/90 to 14 percent in 1992/93, and with the removal of trade and foreign exchange restrictions, private consumption expenditures at constant prices, which had shown only a modest growth of around 2.5 percent in 1989/90, grew by the staggering rates of 19.5 and 9.5 percent over the years 1990/91 and 1991/92, respectively, followed by more moderate and realistic growth rates of 5.1 and 2.6 percent for the last two years of the plan. Over the five-year period 1989/90 to 1993/94, private consumption expenditures at constant prices have risen by an annual average rate of 7.9 percent, which is well in excess of the plan's average annual growth target of 5.7 percent.

This excessively high consumption growth was accomplished primarily through increased imports of goods and services, which rose from 13.5 billion dollars in 1989/90 to around 25 billion dollars in 1991/92. According to the national income statistics released by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, during the first three years of the plan, imports of goods and services in constant prices rose by an average annual rate of around 28 percent. Given Iran's limited capacity to export and the prevailing weak international oil market, it is now clear that the high output and consumption growths achieved over the 1989–91 to 1991/92 period are unlikely to be repeated in the medium term.

The first important warning of economic troubles that lay ahead for the Iranian economy came from the substantial deterioration of the country's external current account and the associated difficulties experienced by Iran over the past two years with the repayment of its external short-term debts.[2] The adverse effects of these financing difficulties and foreign exchange shortages are already beginning to show in the real economy. The rate of growth of the GDP is estimated to be only around 2.5 percent for 1993/94, and is not expected to be much more in the coming year. Imports have already begun to fall in real terms and, thus, provide an important indication of likely future shortages of raw materials and machinery for the industrial sector and danger of further supply shortages and increased inflationary pressures in the final-goods sector of the economy. Despite large subsidies (direct and indirect) on food and energy, consumer prices have been rising at an accelerated rate Over the three years 1991/92 to 1993/94, the rate of consumer price inflation has risen from 19 5 percent in 1991/92, to 21 6 percent in 1992/93, and then to 26 3 percent in 1993/94 [3]

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[1] The figures for 1993/94 (the year ending March 1994) are preliminary. The output growth rates also refer to the Gross Domestic Product at market prices, and do not allow for adjustments due to the movements of the terms of trade.

[2] The size of Iran's external debt is estimated at somewhere between $18 to $28 billion dollars. See, for example, Vahe Petrossian, "Special Report: Iran," *Middle East Economic Digest*, 19 February 1993, pp. 7–15.

Thus, six years since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, there are still important obstacles in the way of a vigorous and sustained recovery of the Iranian economy The problems go well beyond the availability of financial resources and have deep structural roots that have been nourished by years of neglect and economic mismanagement Public enterprises and companies under the control and supervision of various foundations function largely as bureaucratic institutions, being more responsive to political than economic forces Legal, political, and economic uncertainties that surround private-sector investment also need to be addressed While the importance of private-sector investment for the reconstruction of the Iranian economy is recognized in the plan, there are still important ambiguities concerning property rights, the extent of private-sector participation, and the role of foreign private investment in Iran The problem of reconstructing the Iranian economy goes well beyond the physical reconstruction of war-damaged cities and the economic infrastructure It requires a whole new way of thinking about the role of markets and price and non-price signals in the allocation of the economy's scarce resources, in the adoption and assimilation of new technologies, in manpower training, and in a more comprehensive and equitable system of taxation What is needed is a cohesive economic strategy to render economic decision making *gradually* more responsive to the international market forces and domestic economic and political realities

For economic reconstruction to succeed, it needs to be approached in a general setting that addresses not only the issues related to transition out of a controlled war economy, but also the longer-term problems related to the respective roles of markets and planning in the process of development The accrual of substantial revenues from the oil sector to the government in a country like Iran inevitably confers an important role on the state in the process of development These same revenues also can lead to over-centralizing tendencies in economic decision making, with the government monopolizing the key allocative decisions The failure of the command economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are potent reminders of the pitfalls and shortcomings of centralized control of the country's economic resources

The serious external financing difficulties recently experienced by Iran, and the ensuing economic and financial uncertainties, are likely to lead to further political uncertainties and a concerted effort by some political groups to force a reversal of the structural reforms and liberalization policies of the past five years Such a move could also have decisive effects on the objectives and directions of the Second Five-Year Plan, which is currently under discussion in the Majlis [4] Once again, it appears that the course of Iran's future development stands at an important crossroads Should the country's development strategy rely more on market institutions and price mechanisms, or should there be a return to the idea of economic self-sufficiency and a controlled economy with increased government intervention? This article will be concerned primarily with the respective roles of markets and planning in the Iranian economy, discussing briefly some of the basic issues, and then focusing specifically on the Iranian case

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[3] These rates may not be too high by the standard of Latin American economies, but are unprecedented in Iran, where historical episodes of high inflation have been rather short-lived See M Hashem Pesaran, "The Iranian Economy During the Pahlavi Era," *Encyclopedia Iranica* (in press)

This article addresses, first, the issues related to the role of markets and planning in pre-revolutionary Iran, followed by a discussion of the problems of Iran's transition out of the controlled war economy, and an examination of the respective roles of planning and markets in economic reconstruction and long-term development of the country The government has taken important steps in recent years toward rationalization of the exchange rate system, and has initiated a number of policies to render the functioning of the economy more responsive to market conditions For these policies and initiations to be sustainable in the long run, however, they need to be complemented by other institutional, legal, and price reforms in the context of a suitable industrialization strategy These complementary measures are discussed in the concluding section

PLANNING AND MARKETS IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Markets are important mechanisms for efficient transmission of information and coordination of activities in a decentralized economy Competitive market forces also play a crucial dynamic role by inducing technological change and capital accumulation in profitable activities, and by continuously subjecting the producers to market forces and the financial discipline that generally accompany them [5] The effective operation of markets, however, requires the establishment of stable political and legal systems within which property rights can clearly be defined and secured Proper functioning of markets also requires a stable and largely predictable set of social and economic rules Arbitrary and unexpected interventions by the government, which affect the value of the assets of individual agents in the economy, could reduce the security of property rights, and, hence, the effectiveness of markets

In a developing economy such as Iran's, however, complete reliance on market mechanisms is neither feasible nor desirable There are important instances of market failure associated with the existence of externalities, incomplete markets, and information asymmetries, which may entail government intervention to counter the implied inefficiencies in the market economy These instances of market failure are particularly important in the early stages of economic development in which major industrial expansion is associated with substantial economies of scale and economies of learning

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[4] The Second Five-Year Plan was intended to cover the period 1994/95 to 1998/99, but it now seems very unlikely that it will be approved by the Majlis in time for its implementation to begin in 1994/95

[5] An important aspect of the inefficiency of state enterprises in the former centrally planned economies of Eastern European countries appears to have been closely related to their having a "soft budget constraint," and, hence, not being subject to rigorous financial discipline

The particular form that government intervention may take under these circumstances depends on the specific problem at hand and cannot be decided on the basis of some general universal prescriptions and rules. It can be argued, however, that everything else being equal, tax/subsidy methods of dealing with market failures are preferable to quantitative restrictions, since the latter may lead to additional costs by encouraging rent-seeking activities in the economy. In the case of market failures, which are associated with information asymmetries and incentive problems, the transfer of activities associated with the market failure to the public sector would not solve the problem and could easily turn into a source of more important government failures. Many of the problems of the former Soviet and East European command economies were indeed connected to this type of information and incentive problem.

Other considerations also need to be borne in mind. First and foremost is that in an oil exporting economy such as Iran's, in which the government directly receives a large portion of the national income in the form of oil revenues, planning assumes a more important role, as compared to non-oil-exporting economies. The government needs to dispose of its oil revenues, and this needs to be done within a planning framework. The government's expenditure plans, under these conditions, play a crucial role in directing the economy, as a whole, and in guiding and promoting private investment.

Of course, planning in an economy such as Iran's has to cover much wider issues than the medium-term expenditure plan of the government, especially since it has to deal with complications arising from the specific characteristics of oil as a source of government revenues. One of these complications is due to the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource, and oil revenues cannot be relied upon indefinitely. As a consequence, it would be misleading to refer to the oil revenues (net of development and extraction costs) as part of the national income—they should be treated, rather, as part of the national wealth, which is being depleted. It is therefore imperative for the sustainability of economic development, in the long run, that the depleted oil wealth be replaced by human and man-made physical capital. However, since oil performs a number of functions in the economy, the most important of which is the provision of foreign exchange, the sustainability of economic development cannot be ascertained merely on the basis of the construction of adequate, aggregate, man-made capital stock. What is even more crucial is to ensure an appropriate pattern of structural change in the economy so that the different functions of oil in the economy, particularly its foreign exchange contribution, are in time taken over by other sectors. This highlights the significance of structural change and, hence, the importance of industrial strategy as an integral part of planning in the Iranian economy. Before considering the role of planning and markets in the post-revolutionary period, it is worth reviewing briefly economic development in pre-revolutionary Iran.[6]

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[6] This literature is vast, and different accounts and further references can be found in George B. Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile* (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1977), Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926–1979* (London: Macmillan, 1981), M. Hashem Pesaran, "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran," *International*

The primary aim of medium-term economic plans should be to increase coordination of economic activities across sectors and to improve the overall stability of the economy. This role is of paramount importance in an oil economy, as oil prices are extremely volatile, and careful government planning can help to insulate the economy, in the short-run, from the resulting instability of foreign exchange revenues from oil exports. The evidence regarding pre-revolutionary Iran, however, suggests that, despite the existence of medium-term planning, short-term fluctuations in oil export revenues were very quickly translated into government investment, with rather short adjustment lags.[7] The destabilizing effect and wastefulness of this phenomenon was all too clearly seen in the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil price boom. This underscores the importance of political factors for an oil economy, that is, if the state, in such an economy, cannot be insulated from pressures of narrow interest groups, both from within the government administration and from outside, the consequences are more far-reaching than in the non-oil economies. These consequences are not only related to short-term economic stability, but also have a significant effect on the efficiency and long-term viability of the economy.

The nature of structural change in an oil economy like Iran's is crucial for the long-term sustainability of economic development. A crucial aspect of structural change is the extent to which the industrial sector can take over the foreign exchange provision role of the oil sector in the long run. To a large extent this depends on the industrial strategies and policies adopted by the government. The import-substitution industrialization policies pursued by the Iranian government during the 1963–79 period had the paradoxical effect of increasing the economy's dependence on the oil sector. At the same time, the highly protected manufacturing industries, which grew rapidly behind tariff walls, did not have the incentive to export, nor did they develop the efficiency required for competing in the international markets.[8] In fact, as research on the newly-industrializing countries of Asia and, particularly, South Korea and Taiwan shows, participation in export markets appears to be, itself, an important factor in learning and efficiency gains resulting from contacts with foreign markets and customers.[9] The availability of ample foreign exchange revenues from the oil sector, which may lead to a reduction in the urgency of earning foreign exchange through manufactured and other non-oil exports, can preclude oil-exporting countries from the benefits of this process of learning by exporting and the discipline of the international marketplace. Industrial growth can thus lead to a growing gap between the productivity of resources in the industrial sector of the oil-exporting country as compared to the rest of the world. The problems of industrial development in

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Journal of Middle East Studies 14 (1982), pp. 501–22, M. Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran," in Haleh Afshar, ed., *Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil* (London: Macmillan, 1985), Hassan Hakimian, *Labour Transfer and Economic Development: Theoretical Perspectives and Case Studies from Iran* (London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1990), and Massoud Karshenas, *Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[7] See Massoud Karshenas, *Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran*.

[8] See M. Hashem Pesaran, "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran."

[9] See, for example, Howard Pack, "Learning and Productivity Change in Developing Countries," in Gerald K. Helleiner, ed., *Trade Policy, Industrialization, and Development: New Perspectives* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 21–45.

such economies are thus likely to be associated, not with a low magnitude of investment or even disinvestment in the industrial sector, as in "Dutch Disease" theories, but with low productivity of such investment

Of course, the argument here is not to remove all protection from the domestic industry but, rather, to move toward an industrial policy that provides neutral incentives between domestic and foreign sales, and one that is committed to the gradual relaxation of the protection of "infant" industries along their learning curve as they expand and grow As it happened, industrial policy in pre-revolutionary Iran did not fulfill any of these conditions The level of protection was high, often granted in an *ad hoc* manner to a host of domestic industries without any coherent selection policy, and with an apparently indefinite period of commitment on the part of the government [10]

Due to the triple role that oil revenues play in oil-exporting countries (namely, provision of foreign exchange, addition to national savings, and contribution to government revenues), income distribution in these economies can be a far more serious problem than in other developing economies In the case of Iran (as in most other oil-exporting countries), the effect of an industrialization policy was a widening foreign exchange gap, with an increasing reliance on the oil sector to make up the shortfall However, the increased oil revenues, by adding to domestic savings and government revenues, also tended to alleviate the need for mobilizing domestic savings and augmenting government revenues through taxation This, in turn, weakened the redistributive effects of the tax system in Iran, and, combined with protective industrial policies favoring capital-intensive technologies, created growing tendencies toward worsening income distribution [11]

The large amount of subsidies distributed by the government in the form of cheap inputs and credit subsidies, combined with industrial and trade policies, generated substantial rents for those who could obtain access to government resources offered on a preferential basis [12] Such rents, which in some cases originated from policies that were in the first instance introduced for genuine economic reasons, in time gave rise to strong clientelistic ties that reinforced and perpetuated the rent-generating activities of the state [13] The recent literature on rent seeking has concentrated on the economic cost of this phenomenon in terms of the opportunity cost of resources devoted to obtaining access to such rent as well as resources spent on lobbying for the adoption and maintenance of rent-generating policies [14] Earlier economic literature had concentrated on the static efficiency losses arising from such interventions by the state in terms of misallocation of resources between different activities[15] In addition to these two sources of allocative inefficiency, there is also the issue of dynamic inefficiencies that arise because the super-normal profits in certain sectors of the economy prove to be persistent due to government intervention and protection. This type of long-term distortion not only encourages the flow of resources to the protected sector, but also can have a detrimental effect on the productive efficiency of the protected sector There will be little or no incentive on the part of the producers in the protected sectors to rationalize their production and management methods, or to embark on inventive activities essential for a successful integration of the domestic economy in the international marketplace Although quantitative measures of these different sources of efficiency loss in the case of Iran are not available, the latter source of dynamic inefficiencies associated with rent seeking can be particularly significant in the context of long-term economic development[16]

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[10] See Massoud Karshenas, *Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran*

[11] See M Hashem Pesaran, "Income Distribution and its Major Determinants in Iran," in Jane W Jacqz, ed, *Iran Past, Present and Future* (New York Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976), pp 267–86

[12] On credit subsidies, see Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "The Political Economy of Credit Subsidy in Iran, 1973–1978," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (1992), pp 359–79, and for subsidies to agriculture and industry, see chaps 4–6 in Massoud Karshenas, *Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran*

[13] It is important to note that government subsidies that are introduced on economic grounds e g , on grounds of economies of scale and learning, need not generate any economic rents in the private sector, since subsidies of this type are supposed to make enterprises, which would otherwise be loss-making, become viable

[14] Rent seeking refers to the socially wasteful activity of using scarce resources to secure a monopoly, and involves the transfer of resources from the productive sectors into activities with zero social product In the case of government intervention, the resources spent to capture the rent created by the intervention constitute the social cost of rent seeking The theory of rent seeking was introduced into the economics literature by Anne O

PLANNING AND MARKETS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

The 1979 revolution, the protracted war with Iraq, and the regime's political and economic isolation from the West have brought about profound changes in the Iranian economy Of course, the changes in a major way have been conditioned by the pre-existing structure of the Iranian economy as well as by the policy responses of the post-revolutionary government[17] For example, the problems associated with the distorted and inflexible industrial structure that had developed during the pre-revolutionary period started to manifest themselves in the 1980s, as three decades of rapid growth in oil-export revenues finally ended Similarly, the undesirable features of the inflexible fiscal machinery of the government that had developed before 1979 began to be felt more clearly after oil revenues started to decline and the expenditure needs of the government grew rapidly as a consequence of the war and the economic excesses generally associated with the revolution The restructuring that inevitably had to take place in the economy was

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Krueger, "The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society," *The American Economic Review* 64 (1974), pp 291–303, and later extended by Jagdish N Bhagwati, "Directly Unproductive, Profit Seeking (DUP) Activities," *Journal of Political Economy* 90 (1982), pp 988–1002

[15] It can be said that what the literature on rent seeking has added to the arguments on static efficiency losses resulting from the misallocation of resources between the existing economic activities, is the introduction of rent-seeking activities as additional activities with zero productivity that divert resources from existing productive activities

[16] It should be noted that while allocative efficiency losses result from any intervention that leads to prices diverging from competitive equilibrium prices, losses from rent seeking and from productive or dynamic inefficiency are associated with interventions that result in the accrual of rent to enterprises, e g , quantitative restrictions, direct subsidies, etc

[17] For a review of the economic development during the post-revolutionary period, see, for example, M Hashem Pesaran, "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran", M Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran", Sohrab Behdad, "Foreign Exchange Gap, Structural Constraints, and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Determination in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20 (1988), pp 1–21, Hooshang Amirahmadi, *Revolution and Economic Transition The Iranian Experience* (Albany State University of New York Press, 1990), Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic* (London I B Tauris, 1993), Adnan Mazarei, Jr , "The Iranian Economy Under the Islamic Republic Institutional Change and Macroeconomic Performance, 1979–1990," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (1995) (forthcoming)

significantly influenced by the particular economic policies adopted by the post-revolutionary government

One of the important institutional changes that took place as a result of the revolution was the nationalization of a considerable part of the large-scale modern industry as well as the entire banking and insurance industries These nationalizations were, to some extent, forced on the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan, as, in many cases, the owners and managers of some of these large-scale factories had left the country and the enterprises verged on collapse Although the government's official position was to safeguard the sanctity of private property, the question of the role of the private sector and markets in the economy was subject to continuous debate within the regime Government direct controls over the economy, however, were continuously increasing, particularly spurred on by the exigencies of running a war economy Foreign exchange shortages, which became especially acute from the mid-1980s, led to a policy of strong "import compression" and strict foreign exchange controls and rationing The shortfall in oil revenues at a time of increasing demand on government resources led to substantial budget deficits that heightened inflationary pressures in the economy, which intensified with growing shortages resulting from import restrictions, increasing production inefficiencies, economic sanctions, and war damage

To mitigate the impact of inflation on the standard of living and to alleviate the disruptive effect of severe shortages of major commodities, the government introduced throughout the war period an intricate system of rationing and direct subsidies for a large number of commodities Government controls in other economic spheres also increased significantly during this period The expanded governmental role was not solely, or even primarily, through a shift in balance from private and public ownership, but showed itself through direct intervention in the operation of markets—foreign exchange controls, maintenance of a system of multiple exchange rates, control on interest rates and bank credits—as well as direct price controls in a large number of product markets However, the government's growing intervention in the market did not mean the replacement of markets by planning, on the contrary, this was the only period since 1949 when medium-term development planning was virtually nonexistent in Iran

The Iranian economy in the 1980s can be characterized as a managed war economy rather than a centrally-planned command economy of the Eastern European type Government interventions during this period were largely myopic—dictated by immediate force of circumstances and used as short-term crisis management ploys—rather than being based on a well-thought-out and coherent economic plan Over time, substantial and entrenched price distortions developed in the economy, with serious consequences at all levels of economic activity, ranging from investment to production, trade, distribution, and consumption The economic reform program initiated by the government in the post-Iran-Iraq war period was intended to deal with some of these consequences The problems which these reforms have encountered can be understood only in light of earlier developments during the preceding eight years To appreciate some of these problems, it is necessary to consider the extent of price distortions and their likely consequences in some of the key markets

The Exchange Rate

Maintaining an exceedingly overvalued official exchange rate during the 1980s has received much attention in the literature [18] The growing overvaluation of the official exchange rate resulted from maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate during a period of adverse economic shocks, such as the oil price collapse and the substantial reduction in oil exports, the freezing of the country's foreign assets, the increased foreign exchange needs of a war economy, and the resulting growing inflationary pressures in the domestic economy The overvaluation of the official exchange rate became particularly acute in the latter half of the 1980s [19] One indicator of the growing disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market during this period was the substantial wedge that developed between the controlled official exchange rate and the black-market rate The premium on the black-market rate, which increased rapidly from low levels at the time of the revolution to 200 to 300 percent by the early 1980s and 500 to 600 percent by the mid-1980s, reached phenomenal rates of over 2,000 percent by 1989 The development of parallel exchange markets in developing countries that followed policies of quantitative exchange and import controls was a common phenomenon during the 1980s In few other countries, however, did governments maintain such substantial premiums over such long periods of time [20] The ability of the Iranian government to maintain this situation for so long was due to its direct control over the main source of foreign exchange revenue in the country

The twentyfold premium in the parallel exchange markets was indicative of the enormous subsidies that the government was (and still is) providing to those economic activities that benefitted from the government's exchange rationing system To what extent these subsidies benefitted the traders, industrialists, and public agencies that received the implicitly subsidized exchange rations, and to what extent they benefitted the final consumers, depended on various factors, such as market structure in the final product markets and the degree of government price controls and quantity rationing in these markets While the exact welfare implications of the system of foreign exchange rationing vary from one market to another, its overall income distribution implications have most likely been negative [21] Whatever the income distribution effect of the exchange rate overvaluation, clearly, from the efficiency point of view, it amounted to considerable losses in a number of ways First, given the significance and pervasiveness of the effect

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[18] See W Lautenschlager, "The Effects of an Overvalued Exchange Rate on the Iranian Economy, 1979–1989," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18 (1986), pp 31–52, Sohrab Behdad, "Foreign Exchange Gap Structural Constraints", and M Hashem Pesaran, "The Iranian Foreign Exchange Rate Policy and the Black Market for Dollars," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24 (1992), pp 101–25

[19] For different measures of real effective exchange rates over this period, see M Hashem Pesaran, "The Iranian Foreign Exchange Rate Policy and the Black Market for Dollars "

[20] See, for example, Peter J Montiel, Pierre-Richard Agenor, and Nadeem Ul Haque et al , *Informal Financial Markets in Developing Countries A Macroeconomic Analysis* (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1993)

[21] It is sometimes argued that since an important part of the implicit subsidies in the overvalued exchange rate was absorbed by import of essential goods, they must have been to the benefit of the poor and, hence, are income equalizing This is, however, a fallacious argument Even if such subsidies are income equalizing, which need not necessarily be so, they still could have been provided in a more effective and direct manner, rather than through exchange rate overvaluation (see, below)

TABLE 1
Structure of Production in Iran, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey

	GDP	Agriculture	Industry	Manufacturing	Services
Iran					
1965	100	26	36	12	38
1990	100	21	21	8	58
Mexico					
1965	100	14	27	20	59
1990	100	9	30	23	61
Thailand					
1965	100	32	23	14	45
1990	100	12	39	26	48
Turkey					
1965	100	34	25	16	41
1990	100	18	33	24	49

Source World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC, 1992)

of the exchange rate for relative prices in the economy as a whole, the existence of two or more highly divergent exchange rates, none of which could be said to be based on the fundamentals of the real economy, made rational decision making in the economy extremely difficult

Second, the uncertainties that inevitably are associated with such substantial differences between the official and the "free market" rates created further difficulties, leading to additional uncertainties in the economy, with adverse consequences for investment and productive activities, but favoring activities related to trade and services The price distortions associated with the hugely overvalued official exchange rate and the associated rationing process by the government also led to allocative inefficiencies The rent-seeking activities associated with this led to further diversion of resources from productive activities Some evidence of this reallocation of resources is provided in Table 1, which compares the structure of the GDP in Iran to a number of other countries What stands out in the table is the rapid increase in the share of services in Iran as compared to other countries at similar stages of economic development In fact, the 9-percent increase in the share of services in Iran during the 1980–90 period is higher than any other country reported in the table over the entire 25-year period from 1965–90 What is even more remarkable, however, is the increase in the share of trade in total services in Iran from about 18 percent in 1980 to more than 47 percent in 1989, which is an indication of the extent to which the considerable subsidies afforded to such activities (directly or indirectly) have diverted the country's increasingly scarce resources away from production and into trade[22]

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[22] According to the latest national income statistics, the share of trade, excluding transport and communications, in the GDP increased from 8 percent in 1980/81 to 20 percent in 1989/90, before falling back to 15 percent in 1993/94

Finally, the substantial subsidies given to private and public enterprises benefiting from the government's preferential official exchange rate can easily lead to managerial and production inefficiencies. Another source of production inefficiency can arise from the fact that the overvalued exchange rate may discriminate against exports. As pointed out earlier, this can shut off important dynamic economies of learning through exporting.

The problems associated with the exchange rate and other price and quantity controls, and the resulting disequilibria and inefficiencies that developed in the economy and were intensified during the war years, were all too clear and led the government to introduce a comprehensive liberalization and restructuring program after the war. The reforms were also partly influenced by the regime's desire to play a more active role in the international arena.[23] Reform of the foreign trade and exchange system has been an important element of this "liberalization" program. Since the war, a number of important steps have been taken toward unifying the exchange rate, culminating in the announcement of a unified rate by the Central Bank in early 1993. The new exchange rate policy was then put into effect in April 1993, and initially proved to be quite successful. The gap between the "official" rate (also known as the "floating" rate) used in bank transactions and the "free" market rate used for transactions outside the banking system virtually disappeared (see Table 2). With weakening oil prices and increasing domestic inflation, however, coupled with the government's difficulties in meeting external debt repayments, the gap between the two rates began to increase in late October 1993, and has continued to increase ever since. By the end of December 1994, the free-market rate for one US dollar stood at 2,680 rials and was some 50 percent higher than the so-called floating rate.[24] The exchange rates data reported in Table 2 suggest an important departure from the unified exchange rate policy, and can have harmful economic consequences.[25] The increasing gap between the official and the free rates, if allowed to continue, can have far-reaching implications for the reform policies that have been introduced over the past few years. As we shall observe in the next section, the root of the difficulties, which has simultaneously led to growing inflationary pressures, foreign exchange shortages, and the increasing gap between the official and the free-market exchange rates, has been the inability of the government to contain pressures for fiscal and monetary expansion subsequent to the unification of the exchange rate. To avoid the repetition of the economic policy mistakes of the past 15 years, it is crucial that the right mixture of monetary and fiscal policies be put into effect so that the depreciation of the value of the rial in the free market is slowed down, and the gap between the official and the free-market rates is stabilized.

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23. The proposed economic reforms also seem to be very much influenced by the analysis and recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. However, the need for economic reforms and the reconstruction of the economy after the eight-year war with Iraq was recognized by the regime and cannot be said to have been imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.

24. Since November 1993, the "floating" rate has been fixed at 1,750 rials per US dollar.

25. Since the final version of this paper was printed, another black market has developed for foreign exchange transactions, where one US dollar is being transacted at about 4200 rials in early March 1995, which provides another important departure from the government's exchange rate unification policy. See also the manuscript, "Planning and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Iran" (Cambridge University, January 1995). A Persian version of this paper is to appear in *Iran Nameh* (Washington, DC).

TABLE 2

*The "Official" and the "Free" Market US Dollar Rates**

	Official Rate (Rials)	Free Market Rate (Rials)
1993		
March	1,540	1,600
April	1,650	1,660
May	1,630	1,635
June	1,613	1,620
July	1,585	1,595
August	1,585	1,605
September	1,585	1,590
October	1,585	1,632
November	1,730	1,900
December	1,750	2,100
1994		
January	1,750	2,090
February	1,750	2,470
March	1,750	2,390
April	1,750	2,575
May	1,750	2,680
June	1,750	2,550
July	1,750	2,390
August	1,750	2,445
September	1,750	2,760
October	1,750	2,600
November	1,750	2,693
December	1,750	2,680

Source International Institute for Trade Relation Promotion (Tehran, 1994)
*The "official" rate (also known as the "floating rate") is used for foreign exchange transactions through the banking system, and the "free" market rate is used for transactions outside the banking system The rates refer to the last trading day of the month

The exchange rate unification policy, even if successful, is only one aspect of the badly needed economic reforms As discussed earlier, alleviation of price distortions is a first necessary, but by no means sufficient, step toward the construction of a dynamic and viable market economy An important aspect of the relative price movements during the 1980s is related to the question of price subsidies that kept the prices of commodities, regarded as essential or of strategic importance, at relatively low levels To give an idea of the extent to which price subsidies affected the relative price structure in the domestic economy, we concentrate on two important commodities, namely, bread and fuel—both basic commodities that affect the relative cost of all other economic activities

The food price policy of the government during the war years consisted of a combination of measures, such as subsidization, direct control of prices, and two-tier pricing based on coupon allocation for certain products The price of wheat flour was regulated through direct price subsidies and the provision of supplies through wheat imports and purchases from domestic suppliers to support the low relative prices. According to the figures in the government budget, the cost of wheat subsidies increased from 37 billion rials in 1982, peaked at about 68 billion rials in 1986, and then declined to 39 billion rials in 1989. These figures, however, do not convey the full extent and the real cost of bread subsidies, as they are highly sensitive to the exchange rate assumed for the valuation of the border price of wheat. This is one aspect of the cost of the disequilibrium in economies with multiple exchange rates noted above, namely, the extreme difficulties it poses for rational economic calculation and for reliable measurement of the opportunity cost of resources. What is certain is that the official exchange rate used for valuation by the government led to a considerable underestimation of subsidies granted by the government, particularly during the latter half of the 1980s, when the premium in the foreign exchange market stood at as much as twenty times the official rate. A more satisfactory indicator of price distortions introduced by consumer subsidies in this case may be obtained by examining the price of bread relative to other consumer goods over time. With the government's food subsidization policy, the price of flour provided to the bakeries was kept constant throughout the 1980s.[26] In fact, relative to the overall consumer price index, the price of flour has declined by more than 90 percent between 1980 and 1993.[27] In interpreting the implications of this decline, due care must be taken because the prices of a number of other consumer goods were also affected by government subsidies and controls in this period. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the relative food prices in international markets have been on a declining trend during the 1980s. With these in mind, it is still clear that a 90-percent decline in the relative price of wheat flour in just over a decade is far beyond what the economic fundamentals would have entailed.

Since the Iranian government during this period was maintaining a separate support price for wheat on the producers' side, the costs of the cheap bread policy were likely to have been more concentrated on the demand side, in the form of wastage, as well as on the use of wheat flour in activities (e.g., as animal feed) where, from the social point of view, cheaper alternative substitutes existed. Table 3 shows the likely wastage in the use of wheat flour in Iran by comparing Iran and a number of other Middle Eastern countries in terms of the growth of wheat consumption relative to total consumption per head over the 1961–89 period. As can be seen, despite a dramatic decline in the rate of growth of total consumer expenditures in Iran during the 1980s, the growth in demand for wheat continued along the same trend as it had in the 1970s. The comparison of Iran with other countries in the table also shows that the increase in the consumption of wheat in Iran during the 1980s stands out relative to other countries. In view of the fall in total real per capita consumption expenditure, some of the increase in wheat consumption per capita in Iran during the 1980s can be explained in terms of the substitution of bread for more

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[26] It is worth noting that, although the cost of flour sold to the bakeries was kept fixed by the government during this period, the price of bread in the final-product market was not fixed. For example, the increase in labor and other costs would have implied a rising trend in bread prices despite the fixed flour prices. However, given that flour is a major input in bread production, fixed flour prices would have implied substantial subsidies on bread consumption.

[27] In considering this 90-percent decline, it is important to note that the price of bread was already highly subsidized in 1978.

TABLE 3

Per Capita Wheat Consumption, and Average Annual Growth Rates of Wheat and Total Private Consumption Expenditures 1968–88

	Wheat Consumption (Kg/head)			Average Annual Growth Rates			
				1968–78		1978–88	
	1968	1978	1988	Wheat[a]	Total[b]	Wheat[a]	Total[b]
Iran	126.5	151.4	180.0	1.8	6.6	1.80	−3.3
Turkey	164.6	184.0	176.7	1.1	3.5	−0.40	0.9
Jordan	146.7	147.5	141.2	0.1	2.2	−0.05	1.1
Tunisia	152.9	183.8	199.0	1.9	7.5	0.80	1.8
Syria	153.1	150.3	180.4	−0.9	7.8	1.84	−3.2
Algeria	124.2	169.9	185.4	3.2	6.4	0.90	0.6
Pakistan	91.3	123.3	119.6	3.0	1.3	−0.30	1.9
India	33.1	41.9	50.4	2.4	0.9	1.9	2.3
Egypt	94.0	122.1	149.6	2.6	N/A	2.0	2.8

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC, 1991), and Food and Agriculture Organization, *AGROSTAT* (Rome, 1991).

a. Average annual growth of per capita wheat consumption.

b. Average annual growth of total real consumption expenditure per head.

expensive food items, e.g., rice, although this factor alone is unlikely to explain the increase in per capita consumption of wheat. Certainly not all of the 30-kilograms-per-head increase in wheat consumption observed between 1978 and 1989 can be attributed to such substitution.[28] Another explanation, opposite in reasoning to this last argument, is that a redistribution of income in the post-revolutionary period in favor of the poorer sections of the population, with higher income elasticity of demand for bread, may have been responsible for the observed excessive rates of growth of bread consumption. This explanation, however, does not seem to be correct, since the distribution of total consumer expenditures that moved moderately in favor of the poor in the period immediately following the revolution was not sustained and does not seem to have been significant enough to have prevented a negative growth in the consumption per head by the low-income groups (see Table 4).

Although further research is needed to discern the exact pattern of bread utilization in the Iranian economy, it is not implausible to attribute a large portion of the high rates of growth of consumption during the 1980s to general wastage encouraged by declining real bread prices and the possible utilization of cheap wheat as animal feed. To the extent that the latter may be true, bread subsidies beyond a certain limit, rather than alleviating

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[28] It should be noted that, even if such a substitution in the household food consumption pattern can explain most of the increase in wheat consumption, from the efficiency point of view, such direct subsidies are still wasteful, as the consumers would be better off if given the choice of allocating the subsidies between different consumer items.

TABLE 4
Inequality Measures Based on Size Distribution of Household Expenditures in Iran 1977–89

	Gini Coefficient		
	Rural Areas	Urban Areas	Whole Country
1977	0.448	0.520	0.530
1982	0.416	0.420	0.441
1983	0.427	0.434	0.454
1984	0.433	0.425	0.453
1985	0.427	0.424	0.452
1986	0.458	0.426	0.466
1987	0.412	0.436	0.446
1988	0.408	0.417	0.438
1989	0.418	0.418	0.438

Source: Central Statistical Office, Plan and Budget Organization, Tehran.

maldistribution of income, may help to exacerbate it—while the poor benefit less due to the consumption needs of the family, a rich farmer who uses grain as animal feed may benefit much more. Of course, this is not to deny the fact that bread is a major item in the consumption basket of the poor and that the removal of subsidies can inflict considerable hardship on them. This should be an important consideration in any policy that attempts to reform the subsidy system.

Another case of government subsidies leading to major distortions in relative prices relates to the energy sector. Government subsidies to energy consumption in Iran largely take the form of hidden subsidies, since the government is the main producer of energy products in the country. These hidden subsidies, which in recent years have been increasingly manifested in the losses incurred by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) despite free access to crude oil supplies, become visible when we compare the prices of various petroleum products in Iran with their international counterparts. As in the case of wheat prices, however, such a price comparison poses the problem of choosing an appropriate exchange rate for the conversion of international prices into domestic currency.[29] Given exchange rate-induced distortions and other structural disequilibria prevailing in the Iranian economy, it may be more informative to compare the trends in the prices of oil products relative to other products in the economy over time. Over the past thirty years, with the exception of gasoline, prices of energy sources in Iran have remained virtually the same until very recently[30] The result was that the real price of energy in Iran followed a declining trend, particularly during the inflationary decades of the 1970s and 1980s[31] Despite the considerable increase in gasoline prices in the early 1980s, real gasoline prices began to decline steadily from 1985, and by 1993 the real price of gasoline was 35 percent of its value in 1959 The real price decline in the case of fuel oil is even more glaring Despite a 66 percent price increase in 1987 and a 150 percent price increase in 1990, by the end of 1990 the real price of fuel oil had declined by more than 147 percent as compared to the early 1960s If we consider that the past three decades have been years of major price increases for energy products at the international level, the growing divergence of energy prices in Iran from their international counterparts becomes particularly clear[32] The outcome of the sizable price distortions in the energy sector can be of even greater concern than the distortions in the price of bread discussed above The energy pricing policy is particularly costly under the current circumstances, in which the scope for expanding oil production and refinery capacities is very limited Every barrel of oil saved through conservation or more efficient use of energy is readily convertible into badly needed foreign exchange revenues

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[29] Assuming a purchasing-power parity exchange rate of 350 rials per US dollar, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani estimates the following US dollar equivalents for the domestic prices of oil products per liter in 1991: 3 cents for gas/oil, 1 cent for kerosene and fuel oil, and 14 cents for gasoline. These prices are clearly well below the international prices. See his "Pricing of Petroleum Products in Iran" mimeo (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and Oxford: Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, 1992).

In addition to wastage and allocative inefficiencies inherent in such a policy, the long-term implications are more serious, since energy prices significantly influence the whole technological trajectory of the economy Table 5 presents comparative figures on the growth of commercial energy consumption and GDP growth in Iran and a number of other countries Table 6 provides a more detailed set of energy statistics for Iran The substantial increase in the elasticity of energy consumption from the pre-revolutionary to the post-revolutionary period in Iran, as well as Iran's high elasticities as compared to other countries', suggests an inefficient use of energy in Iran In addition, there are concerns about the adverse environmental effects of hydrocarbon-intensive technologies, which have already induced the governments of the OECD countries to impose carbon taxes as a corrective measure

The move toward unifying the exchange rate and correcting the substantial price distortions of the kind discussed above has major social and economic implications The extent, intensity, and duration of relative price distortions in Iran imply that their adverse effects on the economy have assumed an entrenched position and that their removal, even if gradual, cannot be achieved without initially causing major social and economic dislocations

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[30] All the data on fuel consumption and prices in Iran reported in this paper are based on Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Pricing of Petroleum Products in Iran " We are very grateful to Dr Salehi-Isfahani for giving us access to his data on energy consumption in Iran, which he has compiled from primary sources, including the NIOC itself

[31] Real prices are here measured, unless otherwise specified, by deflating energy prices by the consumer price index

[32] It should be noted that, even though crude oil prices at the producers' end have been declining over the past decade in the international market, at the consumers' end they have been increasing continuously in non-oil economies, and particularly in the OECD countries, as a result of increased energy taxation

TABLE 5

GDP Growth and Growth of Commercial Energy Consumption in Selected Countries
(Average annual growth rates)

	1965–80		1980–90[a]	
	GDP	Energy	GDP	Energy
Iran	8.7	12.8	0.6	6.2
Turkey	6.2	8.5	5.1	6.9
Egypt	7.3	6.2	5.0	5.0
Morocco	5.7	7.9	4.0	2.9
Indonesia	7.0	8.4	5.5	4.1
Nigeria	6.0	12.9	1.4	4.8
Mexico	6.5	7.9	1.0	1.2
Venezuela	3.7	4.6	1.0	2.1
Malaysia	7.4	6.7	5.2	7.8
United Kingdom	2.3	0.9	3.2	0.8
Italy	4.3	3.7	2.4	0.9
Japan	6.4	6.1	4.1	2.1
United States	2.7	2.3	3.4	1.5

Source World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC, 1992), and Table 6 from Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Pricing of Petroleum Products in Iran," mimeo, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (Oxford, 1992)

a In the case of Iran, periods refer to 1968–78 and 1979–90, respectively

TABLE 6

Growth of Consumption of Commercial Energy in Iran by Type of Fuel

	1965–78	1979–90
Gasoline	14.69	3.50
Fuel Oil	9.76	4.90
Gas Oil	14.34	4.90
Kerosene	12.13	0.50
Natural Gas	—	16.00
Total	12.80	6.20

Source Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Pricing of Petroleum Products in Iran," mimeo, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (Oxford, 1992)

Alternative Schemes to Direct Price Subsidies

One of the important social repercussions of the exchange rate unification policy is the elimination of the subsidies implicit in the prices of the consumer goods imported at the overvalued official exchange rate. Since the unified rate (measured in terms of the units of domestic currency) is higher than the official rate (in the case of Iran it was 23 times higher when the exchange rate unification policy was put into effect in April 1993), the implicit subsidies are substantial, and the unification of the rates can result in socially and politically unsustainable increases in prices of food and other essential items in the consumption basket of the poor, unless, of course, large enough subsidies are introduced explicitly in the government budget It is therefore necessary to consider carefully different ways of dealing with this important problem Broadly speaking, there are three schemes for alleviating the adverse effects on the poor and other vulnerable groups in the society universal direct price subsidies, targeted direct price subsidies, and income supplements for the poor

Under the universal direct price subsidies scheme, the unfavorable impact of the exchange rate unification on the domestic price of certain basic necessities and strategic commodities is alleviated by keeping the final consumption prices of these commodities at, or close to, their pre-reform levels This scheme seems to be favored by the government. It amounts to the maintenance of the status quo with regard to the prices of essential and politically-sensitive commodities It is the least troublesome of the three schemes from the social and political viewpoint, but it is the least satisfactory from an economic perspective Given the overall inflationary impact of the exchange rate unification policy, the continuation of price subsidies, indeed, exacerbates price distortions in the economy, encourages consumption waste and production inefficiencies, and, in the long run, cannot be sustained In addition, in the short run, this is an increasingly costly program to implement, as it covers both the rich and the poor Despite all its shortcomings, this scheme is still better than the grant of implicit subsidies through a grossly overvalued exchange rate, because the amount and nature of the subsidy is explicitly reflected in the government budget

The targeted direct price subsidies scheme provides subsidies to target groups through a two- or multi-tier pricing system In this scheme, different target groups are provided with different degrees of subsidies through bread and other coupons, while the final price to the consumer, in general, remains the unregulated "free" market price There are many advantages of this scheme over the first From the efficiency point of view, since the market-price distortions are to a large extent removed, there will be considerable gains in efficiency This will be the case particularly if the target groups are not forced to retain the whole of their rationed purchases and can trade their bread coupons in the "free" market This scheme is also more equitable than the first, since the subsidies are targeted at the poor and other vulnerable groups in society The second scheme, therefore, is expected to have considerable welfare gains over the first, but its main problem is that of implementation The identification of target groups and the administration of the system are difficult

The third scheme, income supplements for the poor, is similar to the second scheme except that, instead of receiving bread coupons, the target groups receive the implicit premium in their bread coupons in the form of food stamps of certain value, which can be spent in shops The advantage of this scheme over the second is that it is likely to be administratively less cumbersome and less costly to implement More importantly, it gives the consumers and the government a degree of overall flexibility, badly needed in an economy in a state of transition It does not require the creation of separate side markets in different types of coupons (bread, meat, sugar, etc), and it gives the consumer more flexibility in solving his or her expenditure allocation problem The second scheme may prove too inflexible as a transitional device, as the government may find it politically difficult to raise coupon prices in an inflationary economy As with the second scheme, however, this third scheme also suffers from the problems associated with the identification of the target groups in an economy like Iran's One solution to this problem could be to provide the cash subsidy to all households regardless of their income levels—as already occurs under the direct price subsidy scheme—and tax the more affluent groups more heavily The distributional issues in the economy can then be dealt with through direct taxation This, however, requires a much more effective system of taxation than presently exists in Iran

SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM POLICY RESPONSES TO EXCHANGE RATE UNIFICATION

For the exchange rate unification policy to be effective and durable, it is essential that it be accompanied by a number of other financial and budgetary policies as well as by long-run structural policies aimed at increasing the country's growth potential In the short run, the credit and interest policies of financial institutions must be made more responsive to the inflationary consequences of the exchange rate unification and the effective devaluation of the rial that will inevitably follow The unification of the exchange rate in the first instance results in a substantial increase in demand for credit by firms who previously have had access to the "preferential" exchange rate This, in turn, places the banking system under considerable pressure, particularly by semi-government agencies, such as the enterprises under the auspices of the Foundation for the Oppressed, to accommodate a substantial increase in domestic credit The credit and interest policy of the banks clearly can have important consequences for the eventual success of the exchange rate unification policy A wholly accommodating credit policy can lead to excessive monetary expansion that likely would erase most of the benefits of the unification policy, at least in the short run This can be particularly serious if the cost of credit is artificially kept low, as such a policy would most likely intensify the credit-rationing problem and lead to further undesirable rent-seeking opportunities Keeping the cost of borrowing and lending artificially low can also have undesirable consequences for the mobilization of domestic savings for investment activities The aim should be not to allow the real rate of interest to decline even further and to become more negative than it is already Even if it is assumed that the supply of domestic savings in a country like Iran is not very responsive to interest rate changes, the adverse impact of a large, negative real interest rate on mobilization of domestic savings for investment should not be underestimated

The budgetary implications of the exchange rate unification also require special attention Given the importance of oil revenues in the government budget, a nominal devaluation of the rial increases government revenues denominated in rials, and in the short run can result in a substantial reduction in the government budget deficit. This apparent improvement in the government budget, however, should not be regarded as permanent, and easily can be reversed, as the effect of devaluation starts to feed into higher domestic prices and wages. What is needed is a close monitoring of the level and composition of government expenditures. Expenditure-switching policies that direct resources from consumer imports toward domestic investment and production are needed.

Considering that the unification policy has been put into effect in stages and over a number of years, and bearing in mind that a large proportion of consumer goods are already imported at "free" or parallel market rates that are likely to be close to the unified rate, it follows that the immediate impact of unification will be on prices of imported raw materials and equipment rather than on prices of imported consumer goods. To the extent that higher raw-material and input prices are passed on, the result is likely to be higher prices of domestically produced consumer goods relative to imported consumer goods, rather than lower relative consumer prices, which is often the immediate consequence of a straightforward devaluation. This initial adverse price effect on domestic producers of consumer goods needs to be followed by policies designed to make domestic production more efficient and competitive, and demands for the introduction of further protective measures through higher tariffs and other restrictions on imports of consumer goods should be strongly resisted. It is worth noting that this adverse cost effect, in fact, moderated the high level of profits enjoyed by domestic producers over the last few years in view of the large differential in the exchange rate applicable to their imported inputs and imported consumer goods.

What is important in the transition period is, thus, for the government to resist pressure groups, both from within and outside of the government, that press for either higher government expenditure or protection in response to economic reforms. Yielding to either would intensify inflation and neutralize the effects of the reforms. The immediate expenditure of all of the increases in the domestic currency value of the government oil revenues would be inflationary, even if the overall budget was kept in balance. This would be particularly so if the increase in government expenditures took the form of current-account spending and wage and salary increases, rather than investment in the economy that would remove infrastructural bottlenecks and increase the country's productive capacity. The inflation that would result could also defeat the original purpose of the unification of the exchange rate by pushing the free-market rate even higher.

The recent data on monetary aggregates indeed suggest that the accelerated depreciation of the free-market exchange rate since October 1993 has been closely associated with growing inflationary pressures resulting from the inability of the government to contain the pressures for fiscal and monetary expansion that generally follow exchange rate unification. The rate of expansion of the public-sector indebtedness to the banking system has increased from the annual rates of close to 9 to 10 percent during the 1989–92 period, to just over 12 percent in 1992/93, to the unprecedented height of close to 60 percent in 1993/94. By contrast, the expansion of credits to the private sector, while still too high, has been contained to nearly 30 percent in 1993/94[33] As a result, the rate of growth of the money supply (M1) has jumped from 20 percent in 1992/93 to close to 37 percent in 1993/94 The growing inflationary pressures in the economy and the rapid depreciation of the free-market exchange rate since October 1993 are the direct consequences of inadequate fiscal and monetary discipline The apparent foreign exchange shortages, which are commonly believed to be the source of the government's inability to stabilize the exchange rate and prevent an increasing divergence between the official and the free-market rates, are simply the symptoms of monetary and financial mismanagement It would be a mistake to view them as evidence against the exchange rate unification policy The apparent moves toward the re-adoption of old policies, such as import compression through quantitative controls and the fixing of the official exchange rate at unsustainable levels, apart from re-introducing the sort of economic inefficiencies discussed in the previous section, are also likely to exacerbate the problem of foreign exchange shortages In particular, the overvaluation of the official exchange rate under growing inflationary pressures in the domestic economy is likely to undermine the growth of non-oil exports, which has been one of the important by-products of the foreign exchange reforms of the past few years[34]

The exchange rate unification and other reform policies also need to be accompanied by an appropriate long-term industrialization strategy Whether by design or by default, during the past three decades Iran has followed an import-substitution industrialization strategy that focuses on protecting industries through high tariffs on the import of finished products, investment licensing, credit subsidies, and cheap raw materials As the experience of Iran and many other countries following similar policies shows, the industries developed in this manner tend to be inefficient and rather slow in adopting new production and management technologies Lack of competition and the inability to reap the benefits of economies of scale, due to the limited size of the domestic market, are among the important factors contributing to this state of affairs As noted in the section on planning and markets, the shortcomings of this industrialization strategy are often emphasized in major oil-exporting economies, as oil revenues allow the government to protect inefficient domestic industries over a much longer period than would be possible otherwise[35]

An alternative industrialization strategy would be to abandon the inward orientation of the old strategy for a more balanced, outward-oriented industrialization strategy that focuses on promotion of non-oil exports, particularly in the industrial sector, in which economies of "learning by exporting" are highest In the case of Iran, the move toward a more outward-oriented strategy will be particularly beneficial, as it releases oil revenues used to protect inefficient industries for greater investment in human capital and infrastructure that are essential for growth and industrialization[36] The outward orientation of such a strategy also has the additional advantage of subjecting domestic producers to the discipline of foreign competition It is, however, important to recognize that the implementation of such a policy in the case of Iran does not imply a laissez-faire approach, and still requires a considerable degree of government intervention and subsidization of domestic industries The primary difference between the two strategies is the degree to which domestic producers under each strategy are subject to foreign competition Industrialization under both strategies requires some form of government protection and support in order to exploit the scale economies and to take proper advantage of the most recent advances in technology

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[33] The rate of growth of the private-sector indebtedness to the banking system has, in fact, decreased from 39 percent in 1991/92 to 29 and 30 percent over the years 1992/93 and 1993/94, respectively

[34] Non-oil exports over the past five years have increased from less than $1 billion to over $3 billion in 1993/94 It seems unlikely, however, that this rate of expansion will continue with the new restrictive trade and exchange rate policies

[35] See M Hashem Pesaran, "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran" and "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran", and Massoud Karshenas, *Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran*

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the success of any development strategy within a mixed-economy framework requires an adequate and stable legal and political environment before rational economic decision making can materialize, both within the public and private sectors In the absence of a comprehensive reform program that encompasses these broader institutional requirements, economic measures, such as the unification of the exchange rate and the removal of price distortions, on their own will remain ineffective and can even lead to further economic hardship without any long-term benefits

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[36] The recent theories of endogenous growth and the empirical evidence on the cross-country differences in output growth have highlighted the importance of learning and investment in human capital as the most important determinants of output growth See Paul M Romer, "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," *Journal of Political Economy* 94 (1986), pp 1002–37, and Robert E Lucas, Jr , "On the Mechanics of Economic Development," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 22 (1988), pp 3–22 Cross-section analysis by J Bradford De Long and Larry Summers also suggests a strong relationship between equipment investment and economic growth See, for example, two articles by J Bradford De Long and Larry Summers "Equipment Investment and Economic Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 (1991) pp 157–211, and "Equipment Investment and Economic Growth," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (1992) In the case of Iran, however, the efficiency of the equipment investment is also of utmost importance and should be addressed seriously in any economic reconstruction program

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MINNESOTA

Chronology

July 16, 1994-October 15, 1994

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and South Asia, Western Europe*
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Regional Affairs, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon

1994

July 17: Israeli forces and Palestinian police exchanged fire during a riot in the Gaza Strip. Palestinians Riad Yasin and Yasir al-Sultan were killed and 98 Palestinians and 17 Israeli soldiers were wounded. Both sides claimed they were fired on first. Riots also broke out in Ramallah and Hebron. Israeli police sealed off the Gaza Strip. [7/18 NYT, FT]

July 18: Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat ordered the suspension of the Palestinian weekly newspaper *Filastin al-Thawrah*. [7/28 FBIS]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Israeli negotiator Elyaqim Rubinstein and Jordanian negotiator Fayiz al-Tarawinah were held at Ein Avron on the Israeli-Jordanian border to discuss border, water, and security issues. [7/19 FBIS, NYT]

July 19: In Damascus, US secretary of state Warren Christopher met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian relations. [7/20 FBIS]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations at Ein Avron concluded with the creation of a committee to delineate borders and an announcement that negotiations would resume 8 August. [7/20 FBIS, NYT]

Israeli soldier Gay Ovdya was shot to death near Rafah in the Gaza Strip. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility. [7/20 FBIS]

July 20: US secretary of state Christopher, Jordan's King Hussein, and Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres met at the Dead Sea to discuss the tripartite Jordanian-US-Israeli Commission on economic projects. [7/21 FBIS]

July 21: Egyptian president Husni Mubarak met with Israeli foreign minister Peres to discuss Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. [7/22 FBIS]

Tripartite negotiations at the Dead Sea concluded. [7/22 FBIS]

In the Gaza Strip, US secretary of state Christopher met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss economic aid for the Gaza Strip. [7/22 FBIS, JP]

July 22: In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad. [7/23 NYT]

Israel reopened its border with the Gaza Strip after a five-day closure. In Nablus, Israeli soldiers killed one Palestinian and wounded five others. Three bombs exploded in Hebron, causing no injuries but prompting widespread rioting in which thirteen Palestinians were injured in clashes with Israeli soldiers. In the Gaza Strip, one Israeli soldier was wounded. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. [7/22 FBIS, 7/23 NYT, 7/25 FBIS]

In the Gaza Strip, between 7,000 and 15,000 Palestinians organized by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) demonstrated to protest Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. [7/25 FBIS]

July 23: PLO chairman Arafat led a session of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on a 100-day plan for the Gaza Strip involving expansion of the border crossing, work permits for Palestinians to work in Israel, and employment for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Arafat announced the following allocation of responsibilities within the PNA:

Atif Alawinah, *Customs and Taxes*
Amin Haddad, *Communication*
Samir Hulaylah, *Trade* [7/25 FBIS]

July 24: In Damascus, Egyptian president Mubarak met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations. [7/25 NYT, FBIS]

Palestinian Husni Dhib was shot to death in Qalqilyah in the West Bank by an unidentified gunman. [7/25 FBIS]

July 25: In Washington, Jordan's King Hussein and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Washington Declaration ending the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel. The agreement established direct phone lines between Jordan and Israel, opened two border crossings, and pledged accelerated negotiations over border disputes, water issues, and the abolition of economic boycotts. [7/26 FBIS, FT, WP]

Israeli soldier Jacques Atias died of wounds sustained in the 17 July riots in the Gaza Strip. [7/25 FBIS]

July 26: PLO chairman Arafat appointed 'Awn al-Shawwa mayor of Gaza City. [7/27 FBIS]

July 27: In Oslo, Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian negotiators signed an agreement on water, following a round of secret talks. [7/28 FBIS]

July 28: In Cairo, negotiations led by Israeli Danny Rothschild and Palestinian Nabil Shaath were held on the transfer of authority in the West Bank. [7/28 FBIS]

Palestinian security officers in the Gaza Strip barred the sale of the Jerusalem-based newspaper *al-Nahar*, and the East Jerusalem magazine *Akhbar al-Balad*. [7/29 WP, 7/30 NYT]

Three Fatah members were sentenced to life in prison by a military court in Ramallah for killing Israeli Hayim Mizrahi on 30 October 1993. [7/29 FBIS]

July 30: In Ramallah, fourteen Palestinians were wounded by Israeli soldiers during rioting. [8/2 FBIS]

Palestinian sources stated that *al-Nahar* would not be permitted to resume publication until its editor was replaced. PNA Culture and Information Minister Yasir Abd-Rabbuh denied the PNA's connection with the ban on either *al-Nahar* or *Akhbar al-Balad*. [8/2 FBIS]

July 31: In Taba, Egyptian president Mubarak and Israeli prime minister Rabin met to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations. [8/1 NYT, FBIS]

Aug. 1: In Jerusalem, Palestinian negotiator Muhammad al-Ris and Israeli negotiator Yehonatan Bashi completed agreements for the implementation of the economic protocol negotiated in May 1994 on the importation of Palestinian agricultural produce into Israel. [8/2 FT, FBIS]

The PNA banned *Kan'an* magazine from circulation in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, stating it supported PFLP views. [8/2 FBIS]

Aug. 2: Israeli and Jordanian negotiators met to finalize plans for a new border crossing between Eilat and Aqaba. [8/3 FT]

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Danny Rothschild and Nabil Shaath over the transfer of authority concluded with an agreement on the transfer of power in social affairs. [8/4 FBIS]

The Israeli parliament endorsed the Washington Declaration by a vote of 91 to 3. Jordan's King Hussein flew over Jerusalem en route from Europe to Amman. [8/4 NYT]

In the West Bank, gunmen wounded two Israeli soldiers. [8/4 FBIS]

Aug. 4: In the West Bank, Israeli soldier Vitali Rutenberg was wounded by gunmen. [8/5 JP]

Aug. 5: PLO chairman Arafat reportedly banned publication of the East Jerusalem-based *al-Bayan* in the Gaza Strip. [8/8 FBIS]

Aug. 6: In Alexandria, US secretary of state Christopher met with Egyptian president Mubarak and PLO chairman Arafat to discuss Israeli-Syrian relations and international aid to the Palestinians. Christopher then flew to Jerusalem and met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss Israeli-Syrian relations. [8/7 NYT, WP, 8/8 FBIS]

Aug. 7: In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian relations, and to request Syrian help in halting Hizballah attacks in southern Lebanon. No progress was reported. [8/8 NYT, FT]

Six hundred HAMAS members demonstrated to protest PLO chairman Arafat's appointments of Fatah members to the Gaza municipal council. Two hundred and fifty PFLP members demonstrated, calling for the assassination of Arafat-appointed Gaza City mayor 'Awn al-Shawwa. [8/9 FBIS]

A bomb exploded in a Tel Aviv cemetery, injuring the suspected bomber. Two other bombs were found and defused. [8/8 FT]

Aug. 8: Israeli prime minister Rabin and Jordan's King Hussein opened a border crossing in Aqaba during the first official visit to Jordan by an Israeli leader. The crossing was open only to foreign tourists but would be open to Israelis and Jordanians following signing of a formal Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. US secretary of state Christopher met with Rabin and Hussein following the ceremony to discuss trilateral Israeli-US-Jordanian plans for regional development and the planned 30 October economic summit to be held in Casablanca. [8/9 NYT, FT, WSJ]

In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Danny Rothschild and Nabil Shaath were held to discuss the transfer of civilian authority in the West Bank in health affairs, education, taxes, and tourism. [8/9 FBIS]

The personnel of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron departed after completing a three-month term to promote security following the 25 February massacre. [8/9 NYT]

The Israeli government thanked Syria for its role in stopping Hizballah attacks in southern Lebanon. [8/9 NYT]

Aug. 9: In Cairo, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Rothschild and Shaath concluded. [8/10 FBIS]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Rubinstein and al-Tarawinah resumed at a hotel on the Israeli-controlled side of the Dead Sea to discuss borders, water issues, and trade Progress was reported on flights over Israel, connection of electricity grids, border crossings, and control of drug-trafficking Agreement was reached to dispatch joint survey teams to demarcate the border according to a 1928 League of Nations map [8/9 FBIS, 8/10 FT, WSJ]

Israeli-appointed Jericho mayor Jamil Sabri Khalaf submitted his resignation, stating that he had been stripped of administrative power by the Palestinian self-rule government [8/10 WP]

Aug. 10: PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli prime minister Rabin met at the Erez checkpoint in the Gaza Strip and announced accelerated talks to expand Palestinian self-rule and to hold elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip [8/11 NYT]

Aug 12: In East Jerusalem, three Palestinian gunmen opened fire on Israeli police, wounding two Israeli police and one volunteer Two of the gunmen were shot to death and one was wounded HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack [8/13 NYT]

Aug. 14: In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiators completed agreements on customs and indirect tax measures [8/15 FT]

Three Israeli soldiers were wounded by a bomb south of Bethlehem In the Gaza Strip, gunmen opened fire on a delivery truck, killing one Israeli and wounding three others HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attacks, which sparked rioting by Israeli settlers [8/15 FBIS, 8/16 WP]

Aug 15. Israeli-Jordanian negotiations at the Dead Sea hotel resumed on border demarcation and water issues [8/16 FBIS]

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations resumed at the Erez checkpoint on the transfer of authority in education, health, social welfare, tourism, and taxation [8/16 NYT, WP]

Palestinian security forces arrested 35 HAMAS members in connection with the 14 August attacks in the Gaza Strip following Israeli prime minister Rabin's demand for a crackdown on HAMAS In the Gaza Strip, 200 HAMAS members demonstrated to protest the crackdown [8/16 NYT, WP]

Aug 16. At the Israeli Dead Sea hotel, Israeli-Jordanian negotiators Rubinstein and al-Tarawinah signed an economic agreement that would allow Jordan to export up to $30 million to Palestinian merchants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and agreed to broaden Palestinian powers of taxation to help finance Palestinian self-rule [8/17 NYT, FT, FBIS]

In Alexandria, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss planned Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [8/17 FBIS]

Aug. 17: In Alexandria, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Israeli foreign minister Peres and Palestinian negotiator Shaath began on the transfer of self-rule in the West Bank and the passage between Jericho and the Gaza Strip [8/8 FBIS, NYT]

Israeli soldiers shot to death a Palestinian trying to enter the Gaza Strip [8/18 FT]

Aug 18: In Alexandria, negotiators Shaath and Peres agreed to expand Palestinian control of education and cultural affairs in the West Bank by the end of August [8/19 WP]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations at the Dead Sea concluded, and an agreement was signed to link Jordanian and Israeli electricity grids [8/19 FBIS]

Aug. 19. The first group of 250 Palestinian prisoners, mainly Fatah members, was transferred from Israeli to Palestinian custody in Jericho [8/22 FBIS]

Norwegian foreign minister Bjoern Godal and the UN secretary general's envoy to the Gaza Strip and West Bank, Terje Larsen, met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss improvements in the supervision of economic aid to the PNA [8/22 FBIS]

Aug 20: Six Palestinians were injured and one Palestinian killed in clashes with Israeli soldiers in Ramallah [8/22 FBIS]

Aug 21: In Amman, Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations led by PNA culture minister Abd-Rabbuh and Jordanian prime minister Abd al-Salam al-Majali were held to discuss bilateral relations [8/22 FBIS]

In Tunis, PLO chairman Arafat met with Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Arafat then flew to Cairo, where he met with Egyptian president Mubarak and Palestinian negotiator Shaath to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [8/22 FBIS]

Palestinian police imposed a curfew on Rafah following clashes that erupted after a Palestinian policeman shot to death 17-year-old Palestinian Salih Shaair and wounded Palestinian Jalal Kishta after they reportedly resisted arrest. Six Palestinians were wounded in the clashes Six Palestinian police were detained regarding the incident [8/22 FBIS]

Aug. 22: In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Rothschild and Shaath resumed to discuss taxes and budgetary questions [8/23 FBIS]

Aug. 23: In Amman, Palestinian-Jordanian talks led by PNA culture minister Abd-Rabbuh and Jordanian prime minister Abd al-Salam al-Majali concluded. [8/24 FBIS]

Four Israeli soldiers were wounded by a grenade thrown at the Civil Administration base in Bethlehem The PFLP claimed responsibility [8/24 FBIS, 8/25 FBIS]

Aug. 24: In Cairo, negotiators Shaath and Rothschild initialled the Palestinian Early Empowerment Accord to begin the transfer of the administration of schools, tourism, health and welfare services, and taxation in the West Bank as of 29 August The Israelis would control the remaining government functions until after the Palestinian elections [8/25 NYT, FT, FBIS]

Israel transferred control of the public schools in Ramallah to Palestinian administration [8/25 WP]

Kach member Ben-Tziyor Gobstein was released from prison after serving a six-month administrative detention sentence [8/25 FBIS]

The *Jerusalem Post,* citing *al-Hayat* (London), reported that Israeli and Iraqi representatives had met in New York during August [8/24 JP]

Aug. 25: The Israeli army imposed a curfew on Hebron following riots in which two people were wounded In Nablus, six Palestinians were wounded in clashes with Israeli soldiers [8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 26. Israelis Gil Revah and Shlomi Kapah were stabbed to death near Tel Aviv HAMAS claimed responsibility [8/28 WP, 8/29 FBIS]

Aug. 28 The Israeli cabinet approved the Palestinian Early Empowerment Accord but stated that it was conditional on Palestinian efforts to halt violence [8/29 FBIS]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Rubinstein and al-Tarawinah resumed at the Dead Sea hotel to discuss security, water, borders, and aviation [8/29 FBIS]

Israeli border police stopped the Pakistani ambassador to Egypt from entering the Gaza Strip to make preparations for Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto's planned visit [8/29 FBIS]

Jericho mayor Jamil Khalaf transferred his authority to a 13-member council that included representatives from HAMAS and the PFLP [8/29 WP]

In the West Bank, Palestinian Nidal Hasan Shihadah al-Khuli was killed and six other Palestinians injured in a clash between two groups of Palestinian police [8/29 FBIS]

During the investigation into the 26 August stabbings near Tel Aviv, Israeli police arrested four hundred Palestinian workers in Israel who did not have correct work permits [8/29 FBIS]

Aug 29: In Jerusalem, Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa, Israeli prime minister Rabin, and Israeli foreign minister Peres met to discuss bilateral relations and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [8/30 FBIS]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations at the Dead Sea hotel concluded without reaching further agreements [8/30 FBIS]

Pakistan's prime minister Bhutto canceled a planned 4 September trip to the Gaza Strip after Israeli officials stated that she had not followed agreements to get Israeli approval for her visit [8/30 NYT]

Aug. 30: More than 50 Palestinians were arrested in Israel for working without permits [8/31 FBIS]

Aug. 31: *Rose al-Yusuf* (Cairo) reported that Iraqi and Israeli officials had held several meetings since February 1994 to discuss the establishment of relations [8/31 FBIS]

The trilateral Israeli-Jordanian-US economic committee, led by Rubinstein, al-Tarawinah, and US representative Dennis Ross, met in Washington [9/1 FBIS]

Sept. 1: Israel and Morocco agreed to establish liaison offices in Rabat and Tel Aviv, and Morocco announced it would open an office in the Gaza Strip for relations with the Palestinian self-rule government [9/2 NYT, FT]

The PNA opened schools in Ramallah under its control [9/2 NYT]

Palestinian police released the remaining four HAMAS members who were arrested after two 14 July attacks at an Israeli roadblock in the Gaza Strip [9/2 FBIS]

Sept. 4: In Jericho, more than 200 Palestinian prisoners, who were transferred from Israeli prisons on 19 August, clashed with Palestinian police to protest against spending the remainder of their terms in Jericho [9/6 FBIS]

Israeli soldier Oren Edri from Hebron was arrested on charges of assisting an unidentified Israeli militant group to obtain weapons [9/5 WP]

Sept. 5: Germany signed an agreement to loan the PNA DM23 million to fund infrastructure and development projects [9/8 FBIS]

In the Gaza Strip, gunmen killed one Israeli soldier and wounded two others The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility [9/6 NYT]

Al-Nahar was allowed to resume publication, reportedly after its publisher, Uthman al-Hallaq, agreed to present a pro-PLO stance [9/6 NYT]

Sept. 6: Palestinian police arrested five DFLP members in the Gaza Strip in connection with the 5 September attack on an Israeli patrol in the Gaza Strip [9/7 FBIS]

Two Palestinians were killed while assembling a bomb near Nablus [9/7 FBIS]

Sept. 7: In the Gaza Strip, Palestinian police arrested 21 members of the Islamic Jihad [9/8 FBIS]

Sept 8: Israeli prime minister Rabin told his cabinet that he had informed US intermediaries in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations that Israel would undertake a partial pullback from the Golan Heights over three years, but would not dismantle the 32 Israeli settlements [9/9 NYT]

The Jerusalem-based newspaper *al-Tali'ah* resumed publication [9/9 FBIS]

Sept. 9: In Paris, the World Bank announced that a meeting of donor countries had been canceled after Israeli and Palestinian negotiators could not agree on funding institutions in Jerusalem, a "final status" issue that the Israelis argued was to be negotiated later [9/10 NYT]

Sept. 11: In Washington, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Itamar Rabinovich, and the Syrian ambassador, Walid al-Muallim, met to discuss bilateral relations [9/12 FBIS]

PFLP members Mahmud Salman and Jalal Lukh were sentenced to life imprisonment by a Tel Aviv district court for the February 1994 murder of Israeli Shay Shujer [9/14 FBIS]

Forty-five members of Islamic Jihad and DFLP, arrested on 6 September, were released [9/12 FBIS]

Sept. 12: Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Rubinstein and al-Tarawinah resumed near the Sea of Galilee to discuss water, security, and borders [9/13 FBIS]

Israel gave the PNA $5 million in taxes collected on goods imported to the self-rule area via Israeli ports [9/13 FBIS]

Sept. 13: PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli foreign minister Peres met in Oslo to discuss the transfer of funds to East Jerusalem Agreement was reached on a 15-point joint declaration [9/14 FBIS]

Sept. 14: Eight Israeli settlers from Qiryat Arba in the West Bank were arrested and charged with plotting to kill Palestinians [9/15 NYT]

Sept 16: Ahmad Quray, Minister of Trade and Economics in the PNA, resigned, citing dissatisfaction with PLO chairman Arafat's policies [9/17 WP]

Sept. 17: In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Palestinian self-rule [9/20 FBIS]

Sept. 18: In Rafah in the Gaza Strip, Palestinian policeman Yusri al-Hams was killed in a clash between Palestinian police and HAMAS members. Both sides blamed the other for the shooting, and three HAMAS members were arrested in connection with the incident. [9/19 NYT, FBIS]

Sept. 19: Israeli minister of housing and construction Binyamin Ben-Eliezer stated that Israel was holding secret negotiations with Syria, although not at the ministerial level. [9/20 FT]

Sept. 20: A Palestinian was shot to death by Israeli soldiers as he attempted to cross a roadblock at al-Ram. [9/21 FBIS]

Sept. 22: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian representatives, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia announced that they would attend the 30 October economic conference in Casablanca. [9/23 FT]

Three Israelis were wounded in a clash with Israeli security forces in Hebron after they attempted to enter the Cave of the Patriarchs. Three Israelis were arrested in connection with the incident. [9/23 FBIS]

The PNA released three HAMAS members following discussions between PLO chairman Arafat and HAMAS officials Mahmud al-Zahhar and Isma'il Haniyah. [9/23 FBIS]

Sept. 23: Russian immigrant Natasha Ivanov was killed in Ashdod. An unidentified PFLP member claimed responsibility. [9/26 FBIS]

Sept. 25: Israeli soldiers shot to death an attacker who stabbed an Israeli settler in the Neve Deqalim settlement. [9/26 FBIS]

Israeli prime minister Rabin and PLO chairman Arafat met at the Erez checkpoint north of the Gaza Strip to discuss Palestinian elections, financial donations, and border crossings. After the meeting they announced that negotiations would begin on Palestinian elections on 3 October. [9/26 NYT, FBIS]

Sept. 26: The Israeli government lifted the two-year ban on building new housing for Israeli settlers inside the West Bank, and Israeli prime minister Rabin approved plans for building one thousand units at the Alfey Menashe settlement. [9/27 FBIS, FT]

Baruch Marzel, the former leader of the Kach movement, was released from the Sharon prison. [9/30 FBIS]

Sept. 28: In Tunis, Tunisian president Ben Ali met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss Palestinian self-rule. [9/29 FBIS]

Sept. 29: In Aqaba, Israeli prime minister Rabin met with Jordan's King Hussein to discuss water rights and bilateral relations. [9/30 FBIS]

Sept. 30: The members of the Gulf Community Council announced that they would partially lift the 46-year-old boycott of Israel and would end their blacklisting of the US and other foreign companies that traded with Israel. [10/1 NYT]

In Hebron, Israeli soldiers shot to death a Palestinian after he stabbed an Israeli soldier. Rioting erupted after the incident. [10/3 FBIS]

Oct. 2: Israel and Tunisia agreed to exchange economic liaison officers as a first step toward establishing diplomatic relations. [10/3 NYT]

Three Kach members were arrested as they demonstrated outside the home of the director of Shin Bet in Jerusalem. [10/3 FBIS]

In Aqaba, Jordan's King Hussein met again with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. [10/3 FBIS]

Oct. 3: In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Palestinian Sa'ib Urayqat and Israeli Danny Rothschild were held to discuss Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [10/4 FBIS]

In Washington, Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Israeli foreign minister Peres announced plans for cooperative economic development and a new border crossing. [10/4 NYT, WP]

Israeli prime minister Rabin won parliamentary approval by a vote of 53–41 for his foreign policies, including negotiations with Syria. [10/4 FBIS]

Palestinian police detained 65 DFLP members in connection with attacks against Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip. [10/4 FBIS]

Oct. 4: Israeli soldiers arrested thirty Fatah and HAMAS members from Ramallah. [10/5 FBIS]

Palestinian police released twenty DFLP members in the Gaza Strip. [10/5 FBIS]

Oct. 5: In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on elections, led by Rothschild and Urayqat, ended with no progress reported but plans to resume on 10 October in Cairo. [10/6 NYT]

In Washington, Israeli foreign minister Peres met separately with Omani foreign minister Yusuf Bin Alawi and Tunisian foreign minister Habib Ben Yahya to discuss bilateral relations. [10/6 WP]

An Italian citizen and a Spanish citizen were wounded in an explosion in the West Bank. [10/6 FT]

Oct. 6: Rabbi Ido Elba of Qiryat Arba in the West Bank, accused of heading an anti-Palestinian movement, was charged with publishing racist material and conspiracy to purchase weapons. [10/7 FT]

Oct. 9: US secretary of state Christopher arrived in Jerusalem to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations. [10/10 NYT]

Two gunmen opened fire in downtown Jerusalem, killing Israeli soldier Maayan Levy and Palestinian Samir Mughrabi and wounding 13 people. The gunmen, identified as Issam al-Johari and Hassan Abbas, were shot to death by police, and a third suspect was arrested. The Qassam Brigades of HAMAS claimed responsibility. [10/10 NYT, WP, 10/11 NYT]

Oct. 10: In Eilat, Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Rubinstein and al-Tarawinah were held to discuss borders, water, and security issues, to be followed by another round of negotiations in Aqaba after 17 October. [10/11 FBIS]

Negotiations on Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza resumed in Cairo, led by Rothschild and Urayqat. [10/11 FBIS]

In Amman, Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations led by Jordanian Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabidah, minister of education, and PNA information minister Yasir Abd-Rabbuh met to discuss Islamic courts in Jerusalem and administrative procedures in the West Bank. [10/12 FBIS]

Oct. 11. The Qassam Brigades of HAMAS announced that they had kidnapped Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman and would kill him on 14 October unless Israel released Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, the founder of HAMAS, Shaykh Salah Shehadeh, the leader of the Qassam Brigades, Abdel Karim Obeid, a Hizballah cleric abducted by Israel from Lebanon in 1989, and Mustafa al-Dirani, abducted by Israel from Lebanon in May 1994, as well as all imprisoned Qassam members, all Palestinian women, and 200 other prisoners Israel sealed off the Gaza Strip and stopped Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Cairo [10/12 NYT, FT, FBIS]

In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations He then flew to Amman and met with Jordan's King Hussein to discuss Israeli-Jordanian negotiations [10/12 NYT, FBIS]

Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations in Amman concluded with agreements on trade, customs duties, and economic relations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip [10/12 FBIS]

Oct 12: In Amman, Israeli prime minister Rabin and Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Jordan's King Hussein to discuss Israeli-Jordanian negotiations [10/13 WP, FBIS]

In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations [10/14 FBIS]

HAMAS released a video on which abducted Israeli soldier Wachsman said that he would be killed by 9 p m on 14 October unless the HAMAS demands were met Israeli prime minister Rabin told Arafat that Rabin held him personally responsible for Wachsman's life [10/13 NYT]

Palestinian police arrested dozens of alleged Islamists in a search for Wachsman PLO chairman Arafat met with HAMAS representatives Mahmoud Zahar and Khaled Hindi in the Gaza Strip [10/13 WP]

Oct. 13: In Jerusalem, US secretary of state Christopher and Israeli prime minister Rabin held a press conference on the Israeli-Syrian negotiations [10/14 FT]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Rubinstein and al-Tarawinah in Eilat concluded with no agreements reached [10/14 FBIS]

Palestinian police arrested 200 HAMAS members in a search for Wachsman [10/14 NYT]

Oct. 14: Nahshon Wachsman was shot to death by his HAMAS captors when Israeli forces stormed their hideout in Bir Nabala in the West Bank Three kidnappers and one Israeli soldier were killed, and nine Israeli soldiers were wounded in the shootout Two Palestinians were captured The captors had reportedly agreed to a 24-hour extension of the deadline [10/15 NYT]

The Nobel Committee announced that PLO chairman Arafat, Israeli prime minister Rabin, and Israeli foreign minister Peres would receive the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize Committee member Kare Kristiansen resigned to protest Arafat's selection [10/15 NYT]

In Alexandria, Egyptian president Mubarak met with US secretary of state Christopher and PLO chairman Arafat to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [10/14 FBIS, 10/15 NYT]

Oct 15. In Nablus, pro-HAMAS demonstrators clashed with Israeli soldiers Two Palestinians were wounded [10/16 WP]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

See also, Regional Affairs, Egypt

1994

July 26. A natural gas explosion in Leninsk, Kazakhstan, killed five people, wounded four, and left twenty-seven people missing [7/27 FT]

Aug. 19: Two hundred and fifty alleged Islamist guerrillas crossed from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and attacked Russian troops guarding the border Seventeen Russians and fifty guerrillas were killed, and fourteen Russians were wounded [8/20 WP, NYT]

Aug 23: Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Turkmenistan's president Saparmurat Niyazov were scheduled to sign an agreement to build a $7 billion pipeline to carry Turkmenistan's gas via Iran and Turkey to Europe [8/24 FT]

Sept. 1: Vassilya Inoyatova, leader of the Birlik opposition group in Uzbekistan, was charged with anti-state activities [9/2 FT]

Sept. 5: The cabinet of Kyrgyzstan resigned, saying that the government had become paralyzed by a stalemate between reformists and conservatives in the parliament President Askar Akayev ordered new parliamentary elections by February 1995 [9/6 FT]

Sept. 6· In Uzbekistan, bread and flour prices tripled as the government attempted to meet International Monetary Fund standards in order to receive its backing for the Uzbek currency, the som [9/6 FT]

Sept 7: The parliament of Tajikistan voted to delay the planned 25 September elections until 6 November in order to give opposition party members representation [9/8 FT]

Sept. 8· In Moscow, Azerbaijan's president Haydar Aliyev and Armenia's president Levon Ter-Petrosian met to negotiate an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict No agreement was reached [9/9 FT]

Kyrgyzstan's president Akayev signed a decree enabling foreign investors to repatriate profits in hard currency instead of only in goods made or purchased in the former Soviet Union as previously required, and abolished a 5 percent withholding tax on dividends on foreign companies [9/9 WSJ]

Sept 13. Several government ministries based in the Kazakhstan capital of Alma Ata announced their plan to relocate more centrally, 1,000 kilometers to the north in Akhmola, where President Nursultan Nazarbayev wanted to seat the capital [9/14 FT]

Sept. 16. A land mine killed four Russian border guards and wounded four people in Tajikistan [9/17 NYT]

Sept 17: In Tehran, a cease-fire agreement was signed by representatives of the Tajikistan government and the opposition [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 18: Tajikistan's government forces announced that they had surrounded opposition troops and taken control of their strategic stronghold. [9/19 WSJ]

Sept. 20: In Baku, representatives of the British Petroleum-led consortium signed an agreement worth $8 billion with Azerbaijani president Aliyev to develop oil fields in Azerbaijan. Russia had demanded that the pipeline pass through Russian territory and refused to recognize the deal. [9/21 NYT, FT]

Sept. 23: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reported that the government of Uzbekistan had increased its arrests of political opponents of president Islam Karimov, listing seventeen people it claimed were being held as political prisoners. [9/24 WP]

Oct. 1: In Baku, Azerbaijan, gunmen shot to death deputy parliament speaker Afiyaddin Dzhalilov and security chief Shamsi Rahimov. [10/3 FBIS]

Oct. 3: Azerbaijan's president Aliyev imposed a state of emergency after Interior Ministry troops held captive Ali Umarov, general prosecutor, to demand the release of their "jailed colleagues." [10/4 FT]

Oct. 4. President Aliyev announced that a coup attempt led by riot police loyal to Deputy Interior Minister Rovshan Javadov was underway, and that troops had seized the airport and administrative buildings in Gyandzha, 180 miles northwest of the capital. [10/5 NYT]

Oct. 5: President Aliyev announced that he had crushed a coup attempt in Gyandzha, and accused Russia of attempting to destabilize the government over the $7 billion oil deal signed with the Western consortium. [10/6 FT]

Oct. 6: President Aliyev fired Prime Minister Suret Huseinov, giving no reason. Interfax news agency reported that seven people were killed in the coup attempt. Russia released a statement denying President Aliyev's charges that it had been involved in the crisis. [10/7 FT]

Oct. 11: Kazakhstan's government resigned at the request of President Nazarbayev, who called for faster economic reforms. [10/12 WSJ]

Oct. 12: Kazakhstan's parliament named Akezhan Kazhegeldin to be Prime Minister. [10/13 WSJ]

Regional Affairs

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq, Lebanon

1994

July 18: In Buenos Aires, at least 37 people were killed, 127 wounded, and 56 reported missing in an explosion at the offices of the Delegation of the Argentine Israeli Association and the Israeli Mutual Association. A German citizen and an Iranian citizen were arrested in connection with the bombing. [7/19 NYT, WP, 7/21 NYT]

July 19: Turkey and Russia signed an agreement to settle a $480 million Russian debt to be repaid in cash and barter over two years. [7/20 FT]

July 21: In Buenos Aires, 15,000 people demonstrated to protest the 18 July bombing. The death toll rose to 44, and 50 people were still missing. [7/22 NYT]

July 22. A Lebanese-based Islamic group called the Partisans of God claimed responsibility for the Buenos Aires bombing. [7/23 NYT]

July 24: In Tehran, Turkish president Suleyman Demirel met with Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to discuss bilateral relations. [7/25 FBIS]

July 25: The death toll for the Buenos Aires bombing rose to 80, with 24 people missing and presumed dead, and 231 injured. [7/26 FT]

July 26: A car bomb exploded in front of the Israeli embassy in London, wounding fourteen people. [7/27 NYT, FT]

Argentine police detained the owner of the van used in the Buenos Aires bombing, as the death toll rose to 96. [7/27 WSJ]

July 27: In St. Louis, Palestinian immigrants Tawfiq Musa, Luie Nijmah, and Saif Nijmah pleaded guilty to racketeering, illegally purchasing weapons, obstructing investigations, and helping to plan terrorist acts on behalf of the Abu Nidal group. [7/28 NYT]

A car bomb exploded in London's Finchley area outside Balfour House, a building that housed Israeli and Jewish organizations, wounding five people. Israeli officials criticized British security for Israeli and Jewish organizations, to which the British government responded by stationing 24-hour armed police guards at more than one hundred Israeli and Jewish sites. Extra guards were also added at Israeli and Jewish sites in Paris. [7/28 FT, NYT]

Argentine police questioned two Iranian citizens in connection with the 18 July bombing. [7/28 NYT]

July 28: Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres blamed Iran for the bombings in Argentina and London, and US secretary of state Warren Christopher implied involvement by the Iranian government and the Hizballah. Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri held an emergency cabinet session, alerting ministries to possible Israeli retaliatory attacks in southern Lebanon. [7/29 NYT]

In Cyprus, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Kliridhis to discuss bilateral relations. [7/29 FBIS]

July 29: Argentine police detained three Buenos Aires men in connection with the 18 July bombing. [7/31 NYT]

July 30: Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and Saudi Arabia's King Fahd met to discuss bilateral relations. [8/1 FBIS]

July 31: In an interview with *al-Hayat* (London), Muhammad al-Hijazi, secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, announced that a joint Egyptian-Libyan security committee had been formed to search for missing Libyan dissident Mansur Kikhia, who was kidnapped from Cairo on 13 December 1993. [8/2 FBIS]

Aug. 7: Pakistan's prime minister Benazir Bhutto met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to discuss bilateral issues. [8/8 FBIS]

Aug. 8: Federal Argentine judge Juan José Galeano reportedly found evidence linking Iranian diplomats to the 18 July bombing [8/9 NYT]

Aug. 9: Argentine judge Galeano ordered the arrest of four employees of the Iranian embassy, Ahmad Allameh Falsafi, Mahvash Monsef Gholamreza, Abbas Zarrabi Khorasani, and Akbar Parvaresh, in connection with the 18 July bombing [8/10 WP]

Kuwait and Russia signed an agreement on joint military cooperation and Kuwaiti purchase of Russian weapons for its land forces [8/10 FBIS]

In Jiddah, UAE president Zayid Bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan met with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to discuss bilateral relations [8/10 FBIS]

Pakistan extradited three Egyptian Islamists to Cairo [8/10 FBIS]

Aug. 10. In Alexandria, UAE president Al Nuhayyan met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations [8/11 FBIS]

The Iranian foreign ministry criticized Judge Galeano's arrest of the Iranian embassy employees, saying the employees had been out of Argentina for at least nine months [8/11 NYT]

The *Financial Times* reported that Argentine president Carlos Menem called for the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador to Argentina but left the final decision to the Argentine foreign minister Four former and three current diplomats at the Iranian embassy had been accused of participating in the bombing [8/11 FT]

In Khartoum, Sudan's president Umar al-Bashir met with Libyan delegate Sulayman al-Shukhumi to discuss bilateral relations An agreement was signed for economic cooperation [8/12 FBIS]

Aug 11: In Ankara, negotiations led by Turkish foreign minister Mumtaz Soysal and Iraqi foreign minister under-secretary Riyad al-Qaysi were held to discuss the reopening of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline [8/12 FBIS]

Aug. 12. In Muscat, Yemen's president Ali Abdallah Salih and Oman's Sultan Qabus met to discuss bilateral relations [8/13 FBIS]

Aug. 13: The Argentine security forces were put on alert after Israel and other unidentified countries notified them that another bomb attack was imminent [8/14 NYT]

Aug 15: Iran recalled the Iranian ambassador to Argentina, Hadi Suleymanpur, and announced that staffing at the Argentine embassy in Tehran would be cut to two people [8/16 FBIS, 8/17 FT]

Illich Ramirez Sanchez, alias Carlos the Jackal, was arrested in Sudan and extradited to France Sanchez was accused of 83 deaths in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the 1975 kidnapping of eleven ministers at an OPEC meeting [8/16 NYT, WP, FT]

In Qatar, Pakistan's prime minister Bhutto met with Qatar's Amir Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani to discuss bilateral relations [8/17 FBIS]

Aug. 16: Carlos the Jackal was arraigned for planning a 1982 bombing in Paris that killed one person and wounded 63 others In 1992, he had been sentenced *in absentia* to life in prison for the 1975 killing of two French security officers [8/17 NYT]

Aug. 21: In Damascus, Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Shar, Turkish foreign minister Mumtaz Soysal, and Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati met to discuss regional issues and the Kurdish population of northern Iraq [8/22 FBIS]

Aug. 22: In Tehran, Turkmenistan's president Saparmurad Niyazov met with Iranian president Rafsanjani to discuss regional economic issues [8/23 FBIS]

Aug. 24: In Geneva, Egyptian president Mubarak met with UAE president Al Nuhayyan to discuss bilateral relations [8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 25: Citing conflicts of interest, a US federal judge disqualified lawyers William Kunstler and Ronald Kuby from defending Ibrahim El Gabrowny, accused of plotting to bomb several New York landmarks [8/26 NYT]

Argentina's Supreme Court dropped the charges against four Iranians charged in the 18 July bombing, sending the case back to the investigating judge, Juan José Galeano [8/26 NYT]

Aug 26: Two Spanish tourists were shot to death at a Marrakesh hotel Two Algerians were arrested in Fes and the Moroccan government imposed a compulsory visa on all visitors of Algerian nationality in connection with the murders [8/29 FBIS]

Aug. 27: Algeria closed its border with Morocco after the Moroccan government announced it would demand entry visas of Algerian nationals in response to the 26 August murders of two Spanish citizens [8/29 FBIS, FT]

Aug. 28: Turkish president Demirel met in Amman with King Hussein to discuss bilateral relations [8/29 FBIS]

Aug. 31: Algerian president Liamine Zeroual, Sudanese president Umar al-Bashir, and Libyan president Muammar Qadhafhi met in Tripoli to discuss regional issues [9/1 FBIS]

Sept. 2: In Damascus, Lebanese president Ilyas al-Hrawi met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss bilateral relations [9/6 FBIS]

Sept. 5: Carlos the Jackal refused to answer any questions by a French magistrate regarding the charges against him, claiming that he had been kidnapped from Sudan [9/6 WP]

In Tripoli, Algerian president Zeroual and Sudanese president al-Bashir met separately with Libyan president Qadhafhi to discuss bilateral relations and to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1 September 1969 revolution [9/6 FBIS]

Five Swiss employees of the Von Roll company were charged with providing weapons components to Iraq [9/6 FT]

Sept. 6: Eight alleged Islamists were arrested in France in connection with the 26 August murders in the Marrakesh hotel [9/7 FBIS]

Sept. 7: In Geneva, Iraqi and Kuwaiti negotiators at the International Committee of the Red Cross met to discuss Kuwaitis missing in the 1991 Gulf War Kuwait claimed that 609 Kuwaitis were being held in Iraq, Iraq denied the claim [9/8 FBIS]

Sept. 11· In Tehran, Pakistan's president Faruq Ahmad Khan Leghari met with Iran's president Rafsanjani to discuss bilateral relations [9/12 FBIS]

Sept. 12. Iran and Pakistan agreed to build an oil refinery in Pakistan and to export Iranian gas to Pakistan [9/13 FT]

In Rabat, Pakistan's prime minister Bhutto met with Moroccan King Hassan II to discuss bilateral issues [9/13 FBIS]

Sept. 14· The one hundred and second session of the Arab League Council was held in Cairo [9/15 FBIS]

In Rabat, King Hassan met with UAE president Al Nuhayyan to discuss bilateral relations [9/15 FBIS]

Sept. 15. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat met with Turkish foreign minister Soysal to discuss bilateral relations [9/16 FBIS]

Sept. 17: Police in Berlin tightened security in response to a report that followers of Abu Nidal were planning to assassinate Ignatz Bubis, the leader of the largest German Jewish organization [9/18 NYT]

Sept. 19· In Kuwait City, Pakistan's president Leghari met with Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah to discuss bilateral relations [9/20 FBIS]

In Damascus, Abd al-Rahim Subay'i, minister of state for planning affairs, and Minori Kubota, Japanese ambassador to Syria, signed an agreement for a $6 million loan to increase Syrian agricultural and food production [9/22 FBIS]

Sept 21. In Ankara, Pakistan's president Leghari met with Turkish president Demirel to discuss bilateral relations [9/22 FBIS]

Sept. 24. In Damascus, Greek Cypriot leader Klirıdhis met with Syrian president al-Asad to discuss bilateral relations [9/26 FBIS]

Sept 25. In Islamabad, US and Pakistani officials signed energy agreements worth $4 billion for power generation and oil exploration contracts [9/26 NYT, 9/27 FT]

In Jiddah, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd met with Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev to discuss bilateral relations [9/26 FBIS]

Sept. 27. In New York, US president Bill Clinton met with Azerbaijan's president Haydar Aliyev Aliyev requested US diplomatic intervention in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict and help in garnering recognition from Russia of the 20 September Azeri oil deals with the British Petroleum-led consortium [9/28 WP]

Oct. 2: In Ankara, Azerbaijan's president Aliyev met with Turkish president Demirel to discuss bilateral relations [10/3 FBIS]

Oct 11. In Rabat, PLO chairman Arafat met with King Hassan to discuss bilateral relations and the Palestinian participation in the October economic conference in Casablanca [10/12 FBIS]

Oct 13: In Ankara, Kyrgyzstan's president Askar Akayev met with Turkish president Demirel to discuss bilateral relations [10/14 FBIS]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia

1994

July 24: Attacks on Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Gulboddin Hekmatyar during the period 18–24 July caused an estimated 18 deaths and 77 casualties [7/19, 7/22, 7/25 FBIS]

July 27. Mohammad Naser Mansur, a Hekmatyar commander, and ten soldiers were killed in clashes in the Laghman province that left fifty people dead [7/28 FBIS]

July 30: Mirwais Jalil, an employee of the BBC Radio in Kabul, was killed by Hekmatyar's forces in Chelsoton [8/1 FBIS]

Aug. 7: Attacks on Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar during the period 1–7 August caused an estimated 22 deaths, including Muhammad Akbar, deputy commander in Logar Province, and 20 casualties Hekmatyar reportedly lost six positions in Meydan province [8/4, 8/5, 8/8 FBIS]

Aug. 17 Clashes in Kabul between forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar and President Borhanoddin Rabbani during the period 9–17 August caused an estimated 65 deaths and 135 casualties [8/10, 8/12, 8/17, 8/18 FBIS]

According to Radio Afghanistan, Prime Minister Hekmatyar was wounded in a clash in Logar province An aide to the Prime Minister denied the claim [8/17, 8/19 FBIS]

Aug. 27· Twenty-three schools in Kabul that had been closed since 22 December 1993 reopened

Aug 31: Attacks on Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar during the period 27–31 August caused an estimated 59 deaths and 317 casualties [8/29, 8/31 FBIS, 8/30 WP]

Sept. 9. Attacks on Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar during the period 5–9 September caused an estimated 44 deaths and 200 casualties [9/6, 9/7, 9/9, 9/12 FBIS]

Sept 12. Forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar and General Abdul Rashid Dostam reportedly captured the town of Khenjan [9/13 FBIS]

Sept. 15: Attacks on Kabul killed thirteen people and wounded four Forces of President Rabbani reportedly seized areas in the Fariab province from Dostam forces [9/16 FBIS]

Sept. 18: Gholam Reza Haddadi, the Iranian ambassador to Kabul, reported that he had arranged a cease-fire effective midnight 15 September, but the cease-fire had collapsed within hours [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 27: Attacks on Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar during the period 18–27 September caused an estimated 231 deaths and 981 casualties [9/19, 9/21 FBIS, 9/28 NYT, WSJ]

Oct 3: President Rabbani's planes bombed General Dostam's and Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces west of Kabul, killing 28 people and wounding 15 [10/4 FBIS]

Oct. 8: President Rabbani's forces reportedly captured the Chakh district in the Logar province [10/13 FBIS]
Oct. 10: Seventeen people were killed and thirty-eight injured in bombing of Kabul by Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces [10/12 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Regional Affairs

1994

July 16: Hilal Bin Salem Hamoud al-Siyabi, Oman's ambassador to Algeria, and Qasim Askar Jubrani, Yemen's ambassador to Algeria, were reported missing and feared kidnapped after the burned wreckage of their car was discovered near Khemis el-Kechna, east of Algiers [7/17 NYT, 7/18 FBIS]
July 17. Omani ambassador al-Siyabi was found alive and in good condition in an unspecified area Yemeni ambassador Jubrani was reportedly released with al-Siyabi in Algiers [7/18 NYT, 7/26 FBIS]
July 20: Muhammad Lamine Laghoui, an APS journalist, was shot to death near his home in Bou Saada [7/21 FBIS]

Twenty-four soldiers were killed in an attack on the al-Qall area east of Algiers [7/26 FBIS]
July 24: Benouahman Said, accused of the 20 July murder of journalist Laghoui, was shot to death by police [7/25 FBIS]
July 27: The US government announced that an attack or kidnapping of US citizens in Algeria had been planned, and urged all US citizens to tighten security [7/28 WP]
Aug 1: Mustapha Bounata, chairman of the executive delegation of Oud Koreiche municipality, was shot to death [8/2 FBIS]
Aug 2: Security forces killed 22 alleged Islamists and arrested 23 in Blida, Skikda, Tizi Ouzou, and Tlemcen provinces [8/3 FBIS]
Aug 3· In Algiers, five French citizens were killed by gunmen attempting to deliver a bomb to a housing complex for French personnel The Islamic Armed Group (GIA) claimed responsibility [8/4 NYT, FT, 8/5 FBIS]

In Algiers, French foreign minister Alain Juppé and French defense minister François Léotard met with President Liamine Zeroual to discuss security measures following the murder of five French citizens [8/4 FT, FBIS]
Aug. 4: The Netherlands closed its embassy in Algeria, and Belgium issued an advisory to Belgians to leave Algeria France announced it would move the 1,000 French citizens in Algeria to sites more easily protected [8/5 NYT]
Aug. 5: The European Community pledged a $36 million agricultural aid package [8/8 FBIS]

France interned sixteen alleged Algerian Islamists at an army post and urged Western countries to crack down on any activities of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) [8/6 WP]

The *Financial Times* reported that France had arrested nine alleged Islamists and ordered six deported [8/7 FT]
Aug. 6: The GIA advised Algerian students and teachers to stay away from schools and universities, saying that any schools that remained open would be bombed or burned [8/7 NYT]

The FIS demanded the release of seventeen alleged Islamists being held in France and threatened reprisals for their arrest [8/7 WP]
Aug. 7: The French government tightened security following the FIS warning Three thousand people were questioned in Paris and fifty-one were arrested for further questioning France also banned five Islamic publications [8/8 FT, WSJ, 8/10 NYT]
Aug. 8: President Zeroual invited party leaders of eight organizations—the National Liberation Front (FLN), the Socialist Forces Front, the Islamic Society Movement (HAMAS), the Assembly for Culture and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, the Party of Algerian Renewal, the Ettahadi Movement, and the Nahda—to the second round of national dialogue discussions to be held on 21 August [8/9 FBIS]
Aug. 10: Six alleged Islamists were detained by French police [8/11 FT]

Algerian police accused FIS member Djamel Zitouni of leading the 3 August attack on the French Embassy [8/11 FT]
Aug. 14: The Assembly for Culture and Democracy and the Ettahadi Movement announced that they would not participate in the national dialogue talks [8/15 FBIS]
Aug. 15. Journalist Brahim Taouchichet, director of the French *Horoscope* magazine, was kidnapped near the Tahar Djaout press center in Algiers [8/16 FBIS]

Gunmen shot to death Chinese citizens Qian Youyang and Liu Kaifa in an Algiers suburb Two of the gunmen were killed by police [8/16 WP]
Aug. 16: Austria closed its embassy in Algiers [8/17 FBIS]

Journalist Brahim Taouchichet was released by his kidnappers [8/17 FBIS]
Aug. 18: Ten Islamic associations, including those for health, education, finance, and information and culture, were suspended for six months by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection [8/19 FBIS]

An earthquake hit the Mascara region 250 miles west of Algiers, killing 171 people, injuring 300, and leaving approximately fifteen thousand homeless [8/19, 8/21 NYT]
Aug. 21: The second round of the national dialogue discussions opened in Algiers and was attended by Abdelhamid Mehri of the FLN, Nourreddine Boukrouh of the Party of Algerian Renewal, Mahfoud Nahnah of HAMAS, Abdallah Djaballah of Nahda, and Bensmail Khaled of the Movement for Democracy in Algeria [8/22 FBIS]

Messaoud Messaoudi and two of his aides, accused of the 12 March jailbreak from the Tazoult prison, were killed by police in Batna [8/22 FBIS]

Aug. 22: Stamblouli Rabah, chairman of the Tizi Ouzou Federation of Students' Parents, was shot to death at his home in Tizi Ouzou [8/23 FBIS]

Aug. 23: In Benzerga, National Transition Council member Kaci Abdallah Mohamed was shot to death [8/25 FBIS]

Aug 30: FIS Consultative Council member Othmane Aissani was given a conditional release from the Serkhadji prison after serving eighteen months without a trial or conviction [8/31 FBIS]

Aug. 31: The French government deported to the African state of Burkina Faso twenty of twenty-eight Algerians who had been detained since 5 August [9/1 FT]

Sept. 3: Forty-one alleged Islamists were killed in Bouira province and Tazoult municipality in Batna on 2–3 September [9/6 FBIS]

Khellafi Mohamed, a magistrate in Boufarik, was shot to death in his house in Chlef [9/6 FBIS]

Sept. 4: FIS leader Abassi Madani offered a truce in a letter to President Zeroual [9/5 FT]

Sept. 5 National dialogue talks concluded with no agreements reached but with plans to resume 20 September [9/6 FBIS]

Sept. 8 Government officials announced they had begun secret negotiations in August with FIS leaders Abassi Madani, Ali Belhadj, and four of their associates in Blida [9/9 NYT]

Security forces killed thirteen Islamists in Boumerdes province [9/12 FBIS]

Sept. 11: H'madi Mansri, a member of the central committee of the FLN, was wounded by gunmen near Annaba Five people were killed in a village near Jijel [9/12 FBIS]

Sept. 13: FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj were released from prison in Blida and put under house arrest FIS ruling council members Omar Abdelkader, Nourreddine Chigara, and Kamel Guemmazim were released from prison [9/14 FBIS, FT]

Sept. 15: Nineteen people were killed by alleged Islamists throughout the country, three in Oum El-Baouaghi [9/16 FBIS]

Sept. 17. Cheikh Boudjara Soltani, a HAMAS member and the founder of the Conference of Theologians and Preachers, and Ali Layeb, chairman of the Provincial Bureau of HAMAS in Skikda, were shot to death in Constantine [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 19: Leila Aslaoui, the government spokeswoman and junior minister, resigned to protest the release of FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj [9/20 FT]

Sept. 20: The national dialogue talks were held but no progress was reported [9/21 FBIS]

Sept. 22: FLN member Djamel Azzeddine was found murdered in El Tarf He had been kidnapped from his office on 20 September [9/26 FBIS]

Sept. 23. Alleged Islamists Si Abdallah, alias Abou Meriam, and Ahmed Abdesselam were killed by police in Biskra province [9/26 FBIS]

Sept. 25: Photographer Baroudi Mouloud and journalist Smail Zbagdi were killed in separate incidents in Tipaza and Bachdjarahi, respectively [9/26 FBIS]

Sept. 26: GIA leader Cherif Gousmi was killed by police in Algiers [9/27 FT]

Socialist Forces Front member Ait Messaoud Kaci was killed in Thenia [9/27 FBIS]

Bosnian citizen Jure Markicevic was shot to death near Skikda Abdallah Fardeheb, a professor of economics at Oran University and an Ettahaddi member, was shot to death in Oran [9/27 FBIS]

Sept. 27: Saidi Youcef, a lawyer in Baraki, was kidnapped and killed [9/28 FBIS]

Sept. 30: Berber singer Cheb Hasni was shot to death in Oran A second Berber singer, Matoub Lounes, was reported kidnapped from Tizi Ouzou [10/1 NYT]

Thirty-seven alleged Islamists were killed by security forces during the period 27–30 September [10/3 FBIS]

Oct. 2: More than ten thousand Berbers demonstrated in Tizi Ouzou to demand recognition of their language by the government and to demand the release of singer Lounes [10/3 NYT]

Oct 4: Six alleged Islamists were killed in Chlef, Mascara, and Mila provinces [10/5 FBIS]

Oct. 5: The GIA announced that it had appointed Abou Khalil Mahfoud to succeed Cherif Gousmi, who was killed by police on 26 September [10/6 FBIS]

Ali Tahanouti, president of a national association of football clubs, was shot to death in Bordj-Menaiel [10/5 FBIS]

Oct 6: Security forces killed five alleged Islamists on a two-day sweep in M'Sila and Oum El-Bouaghi provinces [10/12 FBIS]

Oct. 8: French citizen Jean-Paul Marière was found murdered near Hamidi, and Justice Ministry official Nourredine Chenoun was shot to death in Hussein Dey [10/12 FBIS]

Oct. 9: The World Bank granted Algeria a loan of $200 million for its imports and $100 million for construction of a toxic waste center [10/13 FBIS]

Chief police inspector Redouane Kermal was killed in Algiers Five alleged Islamists were killed in Bouira, Chlef, and Tipaza [10/12 FBIS]

Oct. 10: Berber singer Matoub Lounes, kidnapped 25 September, was released near Tizi Ouzou [10/11 FBIS]

Twenty-five alleged Islamists were killed in Boufarik, Bouira, Chlef, El Harrach, Medea, and Skikda during the period 6–9 October Roger Merle, a French consultant engineer, was shot to death east of Algiers [10/11 FT, 10/12 FBIS]

The GIA claimed responsibility for the murders of Cheb Hasni and Ali Tahanouti [10/11 FBIS]

Oct 12 Two bombs exploded outside the justice ministry and Algiers university, killing an employee of the South Korean industrial company Daewoo [10/13 FT]

Security forces killed twelve alleged Islamists in Djerma, Sidi Hadjeres, and Soumaa Lahcen Bensadallah, second deputy chairman of the Guidance and Reform Association of HAMAS, was killed outside of his home in Hai El Badr [10/13 FBIS]

Oct. 13. Six alleged Islamists were killed by security forces in Ain Defla, Boumerdes, Mekhatria, and Tipaza [10/14 FBIS]

Bahrain

See also, Iraq

Cyprus

See also, Regional Affairs, Turkey

1994

Aug. 30: The UN Security Council approved resolution 939 calling for renewed negotiations toward a single sovereignty with two politically equal communities. The negotiations would be led by unidentified UN Security Council members and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. [8/1 FBIS]

Aug. 28: The Republican Assembly of the Turkish republic of northern Cyprus approved a resolution that rejected federation as the only solution for the Cypriot conflict, stating that the Turkish Cypriots had unconditional rights to sovereignty. [8/29 FBIS]

Aug. 30: The Turkish Cypriot government endorsed a motion by the Assembly that formally abandoned seeking a federal solution and passed a motion to coordinate foreign, defense, and security policies with Turkey. [8/31 FT]

Sept. 14: Five Greek Cypriot and four Turkish Cypriot political party members met in Copenhagen to discuss bilateral negotiations. [9/16 FBIS]

UN special envoy to Cyprus Joe Clark met with Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Klirdhis in Nicosia. [9/15 FBIS]

Sept. 18: UN envoy Clark met with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas. [9/19 FBIS]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

July 16. An Egyptian military court condemned five people to death for an attack on Interior Minister Hassa al-Alfi in August 1993. [7/17 NYT, 7/18 FBIS]

July 23: Egyptian security killed two alleged Islamic militants in Asyut. [1/25 FBIS]

Aug. 3: Alleged Islamists shot to death alleged police informer Amir Hassai in al-Badari. [8/4 FBIS]

Aug. 3: The Cairo Criminal Court dropped libel charges against Labor Party leader Ibrahim Shukri and *al-Sha'b* chief editor Majdi Ahmad Husayn. [8/4 FBIS]

Aug 14: Alleged terrorist Ali Sayyid Hasani, wanted by police for "terrorist activities," was killed in a battle with police in Asyut. [8/15 FBIS]

Aug. 12: *Al-Sha'b* military editor Abd al-Sattar Abu Hasayn was released from prison. [8/18 FBIS]

Aug. 19: Ibrahim Faraj, the Wafd Party's secretary general, died in Samanhud in the Gharbiyah governorate at the age of 91. [8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 21: Muntasir al-Zayyat, a defense lawyer for Islamists, who was arrested on 18 May 1994, was charged with membership in the Islamic Group. [8/23 FBIS]

Aug. 22: The government extended Muntasir al-Zayyat's imprisonment for 45 days to allow further investigation. [8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 26: Gunmen fired on a bus en route from Luxor to Suhaj, killing a 14-year-old Spanish child, Pablo Usan, and wounding three other people.]8/27 WP, 8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 28: The Islamic Group warned that participants in the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) were in danger. Egypt tightened security at hotels and tourist sites. [8/29 WP]

Sept. 1: Gunmen shot to death two police officers in Asyut. [9/2 NYT]

Two guards, Nazmi Abu-Shamah Muhammad and Muhammad Zaydan Muhammad, were shot to death at a church in Qift. [9/2 FBIS]

Sept. 5: Three alleged Islamists, reportedly involved in the 26 August shooting, were killed in a clash with security forces. Twenty alleged Islamists were arrested in Suhaj. [9/6 FBIS]

According to Republic of Sudan Radio (Omdurman), Egyptian forces took over the town of Hala'ib, Sudan, and took a Sudanese officer into custody. The officer was later released. [9/6 FBIS]

Sept. 6: In Cairo, Mubarak met with Azerbaijan president Haydar Aliyev and Pakistan's prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who were attending the ICPD. [9/7 FBIS]

Sept. 12: At the Mallawi Bridge, gunmen killed one policeman and wounded two police and four bystanders. [9/13 FBIS]

Sept. 14: Alleged Islamists shot to death one policeman and wounded four people in a mosque in Salamun village in Suhaj province. [9/15 FBIS]

Sept. 15: Fuli Muhammad Fuli and Hamid Sa'ud Mustafa, accused of firing on police in Mallawi on 12 September, were shot to death by police in Mallawi. [9/16 FBIS]

Sept. 17: Gunmen opened fire on UN aid officials on the highway between Qus and Luxor, killing four police officers and a UNICEF representative. [9/18 NYT, 9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 18: Three alleged terrorists were killed by security forces during a raid on their home in Qift in the Quna governorate. [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 19: Mustafa Bakri, editor-in-chief of *al-Ahrar,* was arrested on charges of taking bribes to print anti-government statements. He was released on bail. [9/20 FBIS]

MENA (Cairo) reported that three alleged terrorists and a policeman were shot to death in Qusiyah, Asyut. [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 22: Mustafa Bakri, editor of *al-Ahrar,* was questioned about articles published in his paper and detained overnight. [9/23 WP]

Sept. 26: Lawyers Ibrahim Nasr and Husayn Jabu were arrested for contacting Tharwat Salah Shihatah, convicted of a November 1993 assassination attempt against Prime Minister Sidqi. [9/27 FBIS]

Sept. 27: Gunmen opened fire on a tour in Ghardaqa, killing a German tourist and two Egyptians and wounding a German and an Egyptian [9/28 WP]
Sept. 28: Security forces arrested more than 50 alleged Islamists in Ghardaqa following the murders of three people [9/28 FBIS]
Sept. 28: Security forces arrested 150 people in connection with the attack in Ghardaqa [9/29 FBIS]
Sept. 29: The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the attack on the Ghardaqa resort [9/30 FBIS]
Oct. 1: In al-Badrashin, security forces killed alleged Islamist Mansur Hamid Marzuq [10/4 FBIS]
Oct. 2: *MENA* (Cairo) reported that security forces arrested 3,062 alleged Islamists [10/3 FBIS]

Police killed Mansur al-Alfi Humaydah, a member of the Islamic Group in al-Badrashin, wanted in connection with the attack in Ghardaqa [10/3 FBIS]

Riots broke out at the Egyptian Company for Spinning and Weaving in Kafr al-Dawwar to protest disciplinary actions taken by the board of directors against the employees Seventy-five protesters were arrested, 29 protesters and 11 police wounded, and one citizen was killed [10/12 FIBS]
Oct. 4: Lawyer Muntasir al-Zayyat was ordered detained for an additional 45 days [10/5 FBIS]
Oct. 5: Police arrested 13 alleged Islamists in connection with an attack at Ghardaqa [10/6 FBIS]
Oct. 14: Novelist Naguib Mahfouz was stabbed and critically wounded in Cairo by unidentified assailants [10/14 NYT]
Oct. 15: Police arrested a suspect in connection with the attack on author Naguib Mahfouz [10/16 WP]

Iran

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Iraq

1994

July 31: Security forces arrested alleged Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) member Mahdi Nahvi in connection with the 20 June bombing of the Imam Reza Shrine Nahvi was wounded in the capture [8/1 FBIS]
Aug. 2. Nahvi died from bullet wounds sustained during his arrest [8/3 NYT]
Aug 3. Riots broke out in Qazvin after the parliament rejected a bill by a vote of 105–103 to separate Qazvin from Zanjan province and establish a separate provincial government, allowing Qazvin to retain more profits and taxes from its agriculture sector [8/4 FT, 8/5 WP]
Aug 4 The government announced that it would allow Qazvin to separate from Zanjan province to become part of Tehran province [8/5 NYT]
Aug. 8. In Qazvin, clashes between demonstrators and government soldiers killed 37 people and injured 386 Seven hundred and forty-five people were arrested [8/9 FBIS]

The parliament ordered the government not to cut subsidies on food and medicine but agreed to cuts in domestic energy subsidies The parliament ordered a 25 percent cut in Iran's foreign debt by the end of the current five-year plan [8/9 FT]
Aug. 13. Alleged MKO member Bahran Abbas Zadeh was hanged for plotting to bomb the Makki Sunni Mosque in Zahedan [8/16 FBIS]
Sept. 1: At a speech to the UN Disarmament Conference, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati proposed a Gulf defensive security pact that would curb buildups of conventional weapons and outlaw weapons of mass destruction, with regional provisions to insure cooperation [9/2 FT]
Sept. 14: Mohsen Nurbaksh was appointed governor of the Central Bank [9/15 FBIS]
Sept. 26: CIA director James Woolsey, Jr., said Iran was only eight to ten years away from building nuclear weapons and was attempting to purchase ready-made weapons and Russian nuclear materials [9/27 WSJ]
Oct. 13: An Iranian aircraft crashed near Natanz, killing all 66 people on board [10/13 FBIS, 10/14 FT]

Iraq

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

1994

July 19: According to *Tercuman* (Istanbul) the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) camp in Zhalah was evacuated [7/27 FBIS]

Twenty people were killed in clashes between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Beharka village near Irbil [7/27 FBIS]
July 23 The KDP and PUK concluded talks in Paris, and reportedly reached a compromise peace settlement to be signed by KDP leader Masud Barzani and PUK leader Jalal Talabani [7/25 FBIS]
July 25: According to *al-Majd* (Amman), Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, was under house arrest [7/26 FBIS]
July 30: According to the Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Iranian forces shelled the village of Sanbu in the Sulaymaniyah governorate, injuring 19 people [8/1 FBIS]
July 31. KDP and PUK forces clashed near villages in the Sulaymaniyah region in northern Iraq killing two people and wounding seven others [8/3 FBIS]
Aug. 3: Samal Majid Faaj, Minister of Planning, was relieved of his post and appointed Minister of State [8/4 FBIS]
Aug. 4: Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan leader Ghafur Hamzai was killed outside his home in Baghdad [8/5 FBIS]
Aug. 7: Between 30 and 43 people were killed and 63 wounded in clashes between the PUK and Kurdistan Islamic League (KIL) in the Qalat Dizah area near the Iranian border [8/8 FBIS, 8/9 FBIS]
Aug 8: Two Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) members were killed by Iraqi forces in Baghdad [8/9 FBIS]
Aug. 13: Gunmen shot to death one member of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission and wounded two

others on the Safwan-Baghdad highway in the Iraqi demilitarized zone, the first killing since the deployment of the force in 1991 [8/14 WP, 8/15 FBIS]

Aug. 18. Fifteen people were killed in clashes between the PUK and forces of the KDP and KIL in Qalat Dizah, twenty miles from the Iran-Iraq border [8/19 FBIS]

Aug. 20: President Saddam Hussein banned the sale of alcohol in hotels, bars, and restaurants, allowing it only in homes or sold by non-Muslims in stores at least 200 yards from a mosque [8/21 NYT]

Aug. 22: Government forces reportedly bombed the city of Chamchamal, killing one person and wounding four others [8/24 FBIS]

A car bomb exploded in Baghdad, killing a child and wounding thirteen people [8/23 NYT]

Aug 24: Iraq arrested hundreds of currency dealers in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul to protect the falling dinar They faced amputation of a hand if convicted [8/25 WSJ]

Aug 26· PUK leader Jalal Talabani escaped a car-bomb attack in Irbil, northern Iraq, that killed one person [8/29 FBIS]

Aug. 28: Zamman Abdal-Razzaq was the target of an attack on his house in al-Nasiriyab that killed one person Al-Razzaq was unhurt [8/29 FBIS]

Aug. 29: A previously unknown group, Muslim Iraqi Vanguards for National Salvation Organization, claimed responsibility for the 22 August bombing in Baghdad [8/30 FBIS]

The Kurdistan parliament of Iraq held an emergency meeting, attended by PUK leader Jalal Talabani and KDP leader Masud Barzani [8/30 FBIS]

Sept. 7. A CIA report stated that Saddam Hussein's draining of the southern marshlands had created an environmental disaster and destroyed a safe zone for Shi'i rebels [9/8 WSJ]

Sept. 8: Two Iraqi officers were killed and twelve wounded in an explosion at an intelligence service training exercise in Baghdad [9/26 FBIS]

The US Air Force charged Randy W May, the F-15 pilot who accidentally shot down two US helicopters on 14 April over northern Iraq, with 26 counts of negligent homicide and two counts of dereliction of duty He faced dismissal and a maximum prison term of 26 years Five crew members of an AWAC radar plane were also charged with dereliction of duty [9/9 NYT]

Sept. 13: The Iraqi military reportedly attacked inhabitants of the Amarah province in the southern marshlands region Twenty-five soldiers were killed and 15 wounded [9/16 FBIS]

Sept. 19: Iraqi authorities amputated the ears of 780 army deserters An unspecified number of people died from the procedure [9/20 FBIS]

Sept. 27. The government announced a reduction in food rations, reducing each person's daily intake by up to 50 percent Prices of flour and sugar doubled [9/28 FT]

Oct. 3: UN special envoy Rolf Ekeus arrived in Baghdad to assess readiness of long-term monitoring systems, in preparation for a report to the UN Security Council on 10 October [10/4 FT]

Oct. 5: Saddam Hussein set a 10 October deadline for the UN to lift sanctions against Iraq as a condition for continued cooperation on monitoring [10/6 FBIS, 10/7 WSJ, 10/9 NYT]

Oct. 6· Rolf Ekeus stated that one long-term monitoring system on Iraq's arms was in place and was provisionally operational [10/7 NYT]

Oct. 7: Iraq moved 10,000 troops to Basra, 30 miles from the Kuwait border US president Clinton dispatched a US aircraft carrier to the Red Sea and put thousands of Army and Marine troops on alert Iraq denied it had plans to invade Kuwait [10/8 NYT, WP]

Oct. 8: Iraqi forces 12 miles from the Kuwaiti border totalled 50,000 The United States ordered 4,000 Army troops to Kuwait in addition to the 12,000 troops already in the region and the 2,000 Marines off the shores of Kuwait [10/9 NYT, WP]

Kuwait massed its total armed forces of 20,000 men on the Iraqi border [10/11 FBIS]

Oct. 9· The United States announced it was sending at least 36,000 troops and 51 combat planes to the Gulf as 80,000 Iraqi troops were reportedly near or moving toward the Kuwaiti border [10/10 NYT, WP]

The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting and condemned Saddam Hussein's threat to cease cooperating with UN disarmament [10/10 FT]

Oct 10: Iraq announced it was withdrawing troops from positions along the Kuwaiti border, but Clinton rejected the claim and said he was sending hundreds of new aircraft to the region to reach a total of 550 Britain announced it would send 800 marines, six planes and a destroyer unless Iraq retreated within 24 hours [10/11 NYT, FT]

Masud Barzani, leader of the KDP, arrived in Tehran for talks at the foreign ministry [10/11 FBIS]

Oct. 11: Iraqi troops and weapons were reportedly withdrawing from the Kuwait border, and Iraqi foreign minister Muhammad Said Sahhaf stated that all but 8,000 troops had been removed from the border US officials announced that they had sent 100 additional warplanes to the Gulf and were putting 155,000 ground troops on alert The United States claimed that Iraq had violated the cease-fire agreement of the 1991 Gulf War and, therefore, had nullified its opportunity to have the sanctions against it lifted [10/12 WP, NYT]

The United States proposed a plan to the UN Security Council that would require Iraq to withdraw permanently the Republican Guards from the south but would allow 50,000 Iraqi army troops to stay Alain Juppé, French foreign minister, voiced French opposition to the US proposal [10/13 FT]

Rolf Ekeus released a favorable report on Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, but stated that Iraqi threats to UN inspectors and the recent troops movements to the Kuwaiti border limited Iraqi credibility Ekeus stated that he believed that Iraq no longer had the capability of using weapons against Kuwait or any power in the region [10/12 NYT, FT]

The United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF) reported that 2 5 million Iraqi children and mothers faced severe malnutrition because of the recent Iraqi reduction of food rations [10/13 FBIS]

Oct. 12: In Kuwait, US secretary of state Warren Christopher met with British foreign minister Douglas Hurd and members of the Gulf Community Council (GCC). The GCC agreed to support a US plan to deter aggression, pledged to repay the US costs of deployment, agreed to allow overflying rights to allied aircraft, and pledged to contribute forces to Kuwait [10/13 NYT, FT]

Six thousand US troops with US patriot missiles, 2,000 UAE planes, and 145 British soldiers arrived in Kuwait. A French destroyer with 226 men and several Bahraini naval vessels arrived off the coast [10/12 FT, 10/13 FBIS]

Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev met in Baghdad with President Hussein to discuss the crisis [10/13 FT]

Iraq stated that it would not recognize Kuwait until economic sanctions were eased [10/13 FT]

Oct. 13: In Baghdad, Russian foreign minister Kozyrev announced that Iraq had agreed to recognize Kuwait in return for a six-month monitoring of Iraqi weapons followed by an easing of sanctions against Iraq [10/14 NYT, FT]

The United States announced it would keep warplanes and a division of tanks in the region, to be stored at a Saudi military base, even if Iraqi troops were withdrawn. US intelligence reports stated that approximately 10,000 Republican Guards had halted near Nasiriya, and that troops near Qalat Salih were delaying their retreat [10/14 NYT, WP]

Oct. 14: The United States requested a vote on a joint US-British-sponsored Security Council resolution that would condemn Iraqi deployments, demand troop withdrawal, and order Iraqi cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. Russia requested postponement of the vote until after 17 October. US defense secretary William Perry said that the United States would take military action against Iraq if it did not withdraw [10/15 NYT]

Oct. 15: The Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iraq complete its withdrawal of troops to their positions before the crisis, and warned of "serious consequences" if troops were returned to southern Iraq. Russia reportedly agreed to support the resolution in return for a reference to the Russian-Iraqi agreement of Iraq's recognition of Kuwait [10/16 WP]

US defense secretary Perry stated that Iraqi troops near Nasiriya were preparing to resume their retreat. Iraqi officials stated that they would not attack Kuwait and could not sustain military action [10/16 NYT]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Lebanon

1994

July 18: The Knesset rejected by a vote of 56–44 a no-confidence motion introduced by the Tzomet and the National Religious Party concerning rioting in the Gaza Strip [7/19 FBIS]

Aug. 16: Israel closed its stock exchange until 21 August in order to introduce financial changes, including a 10 percent capital gains tax on stock market profits and foreign exchange liberalization that would allow Israeli companies to invest abroad and foreign companies to issue shares on the Israeli market [8/17 WSJ, FBIS, 8/18 FT]

Aug. 21: The stock market reopened and dropped nearly 10 percent following the lifting of the 10 percent cap on fluctuations of share prices and the announcement of a 10 percent tax on stock profits as of 1 January [8/22 NYT]

Sept. 26: The Bank of Israel raised interest rates by 1.5 percent [9/30 FBIS]

Oct. 11: The Knesset rejected by a vote of 56–45 a no-confidence motion submitted by the Likud and the Tzomet concerning Israeli-Syrian negotiations [10/12 FBIS]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Sudan

1994

July 21: Jordanian police announced they had captured Muhammad Ismail Abequa, a Jordanian citizen who fled to Jordan after allegedly killing his wife in New Jersey on 7 July. The United States had asked for extradition [7/22 NYT]

July 22: The Jordanian government announced that they would try Abequa, who would face the death penalty if convicted. US officials were seeking his extradition [7/23 NYT]

July 23: Abequa confessed to the 7 July murder of his wife [7/24 WP]

July 30: The British government converted JD60 million of Jordan's loans to grants [8/1 FBIS]

July 31: Muhammad Abequa said that he would prefer to stand trial in Jordan [8/1 NYT]

Aug. 2: Japan agreed to loans totalling $171 million to support energy programs [8/3 FBIS]

Aug. 7: The United States reportedly agreed to write off $220 million of the $755 million Jordanian debt by the fiscal year ending 30 September 1994 [8/8 FBIS]

Sept. 27: Prime Minister Abdul-Salam Majali announced that Jordan renounced its religious links to the West Bank and was dismissing hundreds of employees of the forty religious sites in the West Bank in a transfer to Palestinian control [9/28 NYT]

Kuwait

See also, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1994

Aug. 31: Finance Minister Nasir al-Rawdhan announced a $12 billion, five-year plan to privatize state-owned water, electricity, and communications industries. [8/1 FBIS]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

July 23: Israeli soldiers kidnapped Lebanese citizen Qasim Rayhan, accused of plotting attacks against Israel, from the Israeli self-declared "security zone." [7/24 WP, 7/25 FBIS]
July 25: Israeli soldier Shay Walstein was killed in the "security zone" during an attack by Hizballah forces in which thirteen Israeli soldiers were wounded. [7/26 FBIS]
Aug. 1: An unidentified person was killed by Israeli forces while attempting to illegally cross the border near Bra'shit in the "security zone." [8/2 FBIS]
Aug. 2: Yusuf al-Shuraydi, a suspect in the 1986 bombing of the Berlin discotheque that killed three people and injured 230, was acquitted of murder charges in Lebanon. German authorities were seeking his extradition. [8/3 FBIS]
Aug. 4: Israeli warplanes mistakenly bombed a house in Deir al-Zahrani in the "security zone." Eight to ten civilians were killed and fifteen to eighteen were wounded. The Israeli army apologized for the error. Israeli jets also bombed two Hizballah bases in Ein Bouswar. [8/5 NYT, FBIS]
Aug. 6: Hizballah forces attacked an Israeli patrol in al-Ayshiyah, killing Israelis Oren Avshalom and Yevgeniy Braslawsky, and wounding at least two other Israeli soldiers in the "security zone." Israeli and Hizballah forces exchanged fire. [8/7 NYT, 8/8 FBIS]
Aug. 18: Hizballah members set off a bomb in the "security zone," injuring two Israeli soldiers. Three Hizballah members were wounded in the ensuing battle. [8/19 NYT[
Aug. 29. Hizballah forces attacked Israeli soldiers in the "security zone," killing Israeli soldier Ofer Harush and wounding two other soldiers. One Hizballah member was killed. [8/30 FBIS]
Sept. 3: Deputy Prime Minister Michel al-Murr was appointed Interior Minister in a cabinet reshuffle. Shahe Barsoumian was appointed Social Affairs Minister. [9/6 FBIS]
Sept. 5: One South Lebanon Army (SLA) member was killed and four wounded by Hizballah rockets in the "security zone." [9/6 FBIS]
Sept. 8: Israeli soldier Ohad Nissim was killed and another Israeli wounded by Hizballah gunmen in the "security zone." Israeli forces wounded two Lebanese in retaliatory raids. [9/9 WP, JP]
Sept. 16: A UN soldier was wounded in an Israeli attack on the town of Sribbin in the "security zone." [9/19 FBIS]
Sept. 21: Three members of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon were wounded in an explosion on the al-Munyah-al-Qalaylah road. [9/22 FBIS]
Oct. 6: A bomb exploded in Bint Jubayl in the "security zone," killing three members of the SLA and wounding six others. [10/7 FBIS]
Oct. 11: Israeli forces reportedly deported 26 residents of Kafr Hunah in the "security zone" to the north of the area. Israeli forces denied the claim. [10/12 FBIS]
Oct. 12: The 26 deportees from Kafr Hunah were allowed to return following a demonstration in the UN headquarters in Bir Hasan. [10/13 FBIS]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs

1994

Sept. 1: Libyan president Muammar Qhadafi held celebrations to mark the 25th anniversary of the overthrow of King Muhammad Idris. [9/2 FT[

Morocco

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

July 19: King Hassan II announced changes in his cabinet:

Driss Jettou, *Trade, Industry, Handicraft, and External Trade*

Mourad Cherif, *Finance and Investments* [7/20 FBIS]

July 21: King Hassan announced the release of 424 political prisoners. [7/22 FBIS]

A Moroccan airliner en route from Agadir to Casablanca crashed in the Atlas Mountains, killing 44 people on board. [8/22 NYT]

Aug 25: Investigators of the 21 August airliner crash announced that the pilot, Younes Khayati, had deliberately crashed the plane in a suicide attempt. [8/26 WP]
Sept. 20: Forty Moroccans were arrested in Tunisia as they reportedly were preparing to immigrate illegally to Italy. [9/21 FBIS]
Sept. 27: The Privatizing Ministry announced it would sell its stakes in five enterprises: Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur, the Simef diesel and electric motor maker, the Sonasid steel mill, the Somas oil company, and the Sochapresse publication distribution company, worth $438.4 million in total. [9/28 FT]

Oman

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Algeria

1994

Aug. 30 Two hundred alleged Islamist dissidents, including four employees of the Petroleum Development Oman, were arrested on sedition charges. [8/31 FT]
Aug. 31: *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* reported that 430 people were detained during a six-week investigation into

alleged Islamist activities Trials of between sixty and seventy people were to begin in September [9/1 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Egypt

1994

July 21: Riots broke out when monsoon rains cut off electricity to the majority of Karachi [7/22 WSJ]

July 25: Former Intelligence Bureau chief Imtiaz Ahmad and an aide were arrested on charges of high treason for their alleged part in a bribing plot to overthrow Prime Minister Bhutto's government in 1989 [7/26 FBIS]

Aug 23. The opposition party Muslim League leader and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif warned that Pakistan possessed the atomic bomb and an attack by India could trigger a nuclear war A Foreign Ministry spokesman denied the claim [8/24 FT]

Prime Minister Bhutto condemned Sharif's claim that Pakistan had nuclear weapons, and Indian officials demanded international action to stop the Pakistan nuclear program [8/25 NYT]

Aug. 25: The government announced plans to expel from Karachi one million immigrants of Afghan, Bangladeshi, Burmese, Indian, and Iranian origin [8/26 WSJ]

Aug. 28: The government ordered an investigation into the Habib Bank, Pakistan's largest bank, and the National Bank of Pakistan, alleging that they were involved in fraudulent loan dealings of up to $32 7 million under former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif [8/29 FT]

Sept 7 A US intelligence report stated that Pakistan had agreed to pay China $15 million to purchase M-11 ballistic missiles The report, if true, would prompt US economic sanctions against both Pakistan and Chinese government-run companies [9/8 WP]

Sept. 11: Nawaz Sharif stated in an interview with the *Washington Post* that Pakistan's army chief Aslam Beg and intelligence chief Asad Durani had presented a plan in 1991 for selling heroin to pay for military operations Durani and Beg denied the claim [9/12 WP]

Sept 14. The government announced it would investigate Sharif's allegations that army and intelligence chiefs proposed selling heroin [9/15 WP]

Sept. 13. Sharif denied the *Washington Post* allegations and said that the interview never took place The *Washington Post* stated Sharif had been interviewed by Pakistani correspondent Kamran Khan at Sharif's home in May [9/14 FBIS]

Sept. 15: Nawaz Sharif called for a general strike on 20 September to protest government policies on inflation and unemployment [9/16 FBIS]

Sept. 18: Nawaz Sharif launched a $100 million suit against the *Washington Post* regarding the alleged interview [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 21. Pakistan said it would buy from France three Agosta class submarines, worth $950 million [9/22 FT]

Sept. 27: President Leghari launched a 4 billion rupee suit against Nawaz Sharif on charges of libel [9/28 FBIS]

Oct. 2. Six people were killed and twenty wounded when a bomb exploded in a bus 94 miles from Islamabad [10/3 FT]

Oct. 10: One thousand one hundred political opponents of Prime Minister Bhutto were arrested immediately before a planned general strike [10/11 NYT]

Oct. 11: In anti-government protests, gunmen fired on a bus in Charsadda, killing two and wounding eight In Karachi, gunmen opened fire on a bus, wounding several people Nine to twelve people were reported killed throughout the country Opposition spokesman Sartaj Aziz reported that 12,000 supporters had been arrested since 5 October The government put the number at 400 [10/12 NYT, WSJ]

Qatar

See also, Regional Affairs

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1994

July 24: Muhammad al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat seeking asylum in the United States, alleged that Saudi Arabia had provided technology and up to $5 billion for Iraq's nuclear weapons program between 1985 and 1990 [7/25 WP]

Aug. 6: Former Saudi diplomat al-Khilewi said that Saudi Arabia had tried to buy nuclear research reactors from China and a US company in 1989, despite having signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988 [8/7 NYT]

Aug. 24: Al-Khilewi was granted political asylum in the United States [8/25 WSJ]

Sept. 8: Saudi Arabia announced it would buy $1 16 billion worth of military trainer aircraft from British Aerospace Company [9/9 WSJ]

Sept. 18. The London-based Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights reported that Saudi authorities had arrested more than 1,000 political activists, mainly in Buraydah [9/19 FBIS]

Sept. 26: The government announced it was holding Sheikh Salman Audah and 110 of his followers in connection with anti-government activities. [9/27 FT, WP, 9/28 NYT]

Sept. 19: The *New York Times* reported that Saudi security forces had arrested hundreds of alleged Islamists in September The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights stated that 1,300 had been arrested [9/22 NYT]

Oct. 5: King Fahd appointed a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs to be led by Prince Sultan, the Defense Minister and King Fahd's brother, to "widen the government's authority over religious interpretation " [10/6 NYT]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs, Egypt

1994

July 19: According to Agence France-Presse, at least 1,000 people were killed and thousands fled following fighting between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and SPLA-United in the Bahr al-Ghazal region in the south. [7/20 FBIS]

The third session of the Sudanese peace talks, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, resumed in Nairobi. The Sudanese government was represented by the speaker of the National Transitional Assembly, Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, the Minister for Regional Government, Dr. Ali al-Hajj Muhammad, and the Minister of State, Nafi al-Nafi. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was represented by Salva Kiir Mayar Dit and Yusuf Kuwamakki, and the SPLM-U was represented by Dr. Richard Mula. [7/21 FBIS]

July 22: The government declared a cease-fire effective 23 July. [7/25 FBIS]

July 23: Spokesman for the SPLA declared that the government had not honored their cease-fire and had launched ground and air attacks north of Nimule near the Ugandan border. [7/25 FBIS]

July 27: The SPLM, led by John Garang, announced a cease-fire. [7/28 FBIS]

July 28: President Umar al-Bashir announced that the state council elections would be delayed until at least March 1995. [7/29 FBIS]

Aug. 3: Muhammad Abdullah Abd al-Rahman al-Khulayfi and Muhammad al-Mahi Muhammad Ahmad were sentenced to death for the 4 February shootings at the mosque in al-Thawarah in Omdurman. [8/4 FBIS]

Aug. 25: The government closed down *al-Masirah* newspaper after one issue following its reappearance after a seven-month halt, reportedly due to reports by the paper that Jordan had extradited Carlos the Jackal to Sudan at the request of US intelligence. [8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 29: SPLA representatives reported that government forces had launched new attacks on SPLA forces in the Bahr al-Ghazal region of southern Sudan. [8/30 FBIS]

Sept. 12. The government closed the office of *al-Khartum International* newspaper, citing no reason. [9/13 FBIS]

Demonstrations were reported in Abriui, in the northern region, to protest local taxes and local governments' lack of payment of salaries since June 1994. One person was wounded and 75 arrested. [9/13 FBIS]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

Aug. 24: Elections were held for 250 seats in the People's Assembly. Seven thousand candidates ran for the 250 seats. [8/25 FT]

Aug. 27: Syria's ruling coalition, the National Progressive Front (NPF), a seven-party coalition headed by President Hafiz al-Asad's Ba'ath Socialist party, won 167 of the 250 seats in the People's Assembly. The election turnout was 20.33 percent. [8/29 FBIS]

Tunisia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Morocco

1994

Sept. 23: Tunisia and the World Bank signed two loan agreements totalling $156.3 million for education and utilities. [9/26 FBIS]

Turkey

See also, Regional Affairs, Cyprus, Iraq

1994

July 20: According to *Ozgur Ulke* (Istanbul), government forces attacked areas of Lice in Diyarbakir district, burning 300 houses and killing at least one person. [8/1 FBIS]

July 22: The Constitutional Court annulled five decrees designed to facilitate Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's privatization program, including an organizational chart for the privatization agency. [7/28 FBIS]

July 26: The Liberal Party was established by Besim Tibuk. [7/27 FBIS]

The Turkish air force launched an attack against alleged Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members in the Mezi region of northern Iraq, killing 79 people and wounding 51. [7/27 FBIS]

July 27: Justice Minister Seyfi Oktay and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin resigned, and President Suleyman Demirel announced a new cabinet:

Mehmet Mogultay, *Justice*
Mumtaz Soysal, *Foreign Affairs*
Mustafa Yilmaz, *Public Works and Housing*
Nihat Maktap, *Labor and Social Security*
Mehmet Donen, *Industry and Commerce*
Timurcin Savas, *Culture*
Halil Culhaoglu, *Tourism* [7/28 FBIS]

July 28: Government forces attacked an alleged PKK camp on Cudi Mountain. 59 PKK members and nine soldiers were killed in the clash. [8/1 FBIS]

July 29: According to *Ozgur Ulke,* 800 soldiers demonstrated in Diyarbakir to protest the maltreatment of a soldier. [8/5 FBIS]

July 31: Twenty-five labor associations and organizations, including public transportation, banks, hospitals, and municipal services, demonstrated in the Kadikoy district of Istanbul to protest the government's alleged failure to honor a May agreement for a pay increase. [8/1 FBIS]

The Turkish air force bombed the Sinat region of northern Iraq, killing 30 people and wounding 44. [8/9 FBIS]

Aug 2: The Turkish air force bombed the Hakurk region, killing 145 people and wounding 80 [8/9 FBIS]
Aug. 3: Six Kurdish members of Parliament—Mahmut Alinak, Orhan Dagan, Hatip Dicle, Sirri Sakik, Ahmet Turk, and Leyla Zana—were put on trial for treason and faced the death penalty if convicted [8/4 NYT, FT]

Three alleged terrorists were killed during a raid in Bagcilar district of Istanbul [8/4 FBIS]
Aug. 5: Twenty-six people were killed and 29 wounded in fighting in the Sinat region [8/9 FBIS]
Aug. 8 One hundred and fifteen people were killed and 135 injured in a Turkish air attack on northern Iraq [8/9 FBIS, 8/11 FBIS]

Alleged PKK members kidnapped two Finnish tourists near Tunceli [8/9 FBIS]
Aug. 9: Twenty-four alleged PKK members were killed in clashes in Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Mus, and Sirnak A military vehicle hit a land mine in Mus, wounding 35 soldiers [8/10 FBIS]
Aug. 10: Alleged PKK members blocked the Van-Bahcesaray highway, killing eleven persons and wounding three [8/11 FBIS]

The nine-member True Path Party (TPP) chairmanship council resigned [8/11 FBIS]
Aug. 12: Nine people were wounded in an explosion in Istanbul's Topkapi bus terminal [8/15 FBIS]
Aug 14: Dogan Baran was appointed Minister of Health [8/15 FBIS]

Alleged PKK members raided the Renkdagi village in the Alacakayi District of Elzag, killing ten people and wounding one [8/15 FBIS]
Aug. 15: The air force reportedly killed 51 and wounded 39 alleged PKK members in raids in the Haflanin region in Iraq [8/22 FBIS]
Aug. 17: The Republican People's Party (RPP) Central Executive Council members, including Secretary General Ertugrul Gunay, resigned [8/19 FBIS]

Fifty-three alleged PKK members were killed throughout the southeast in clashes with security forces [8/18 FBIS]
Aug. 18: In Adana, alleged PKK member Lokman Alicioglu was killed while attempting to plant a bomb [8/19 FBIS]
Aug 20: The air force killed 41 alleged PKK members and wounded 35 in the Sinat region [8/22 FBIS]
Aug 21: According to *Ozgur Ulke,* 17 people in the Kurtalan district of Siirt, three people in the Dilevasi county of Gebze, and three people in the Silvan district of Diyarbakir died of cholera, and 155 people were being treated for it in Ankara Selim Olcer, head of the Turkish Doctors' Syndicate, said that more than 500 cases had been reported in Ankara [8/22 FBIS]

Health Minister Dogan Baran stated that there were no cholera cases, but rather an epidemic of acute intestinal infection [8/22 FBIS]

Twenty-two alleged PKK members were killed near the Kirmizitastepe region in Bitlis in clashes with security forces PKK members killed six soldiers and wounded five others in Baskale township in eastern Van province [8/22 FBIS]
Aug. 22: Three people were killed and four injured near a recruitment office in Istanbul [8/24 FBIS]

The European Union announced an additional review date of September 1995 before Turkey would be allowed to enter the Customs Union [8/23 FT]
Aug. 25: Turkey's central bank raised interest rates from 70 percent to 240 percent in the overnight market, following a two-day drop of 11 percent of the lira against the dollar [8/26 FT]
Aug. 27: The government rejected a plan for US military aid that would require a favorable report on human rights in Turkey and on Greek-Turkish negotiations over Cyprus before the release of aid [8/29 FBIS]
Aug. 29: Turkey was to open the Huur border crossing with Iraq [8/30 WSJ]
Aug. 31 Two hundred and five people were killed by the Turkish air force in an air operation in the Bhadawan-Khidran region of Iraq [9/1 FBIS]
Sept. 7: The National Willpower Party was established by Huseyin Ozalp and Cemal Sahin, who announced that the party would join the TPP on 10 October [10/12 FBIS]
Sept. 12. Turkey's government and unions agreed to postpone wage increases for 700,000 public-sector workers following protests against the government's refusal to index pay raises to inflation, at a 100 percent annual rate [9/13 WSJ]

Turkey requested the extradition from France of Dursun Karatas, the leader of Dev-Sol [9/13 FBIS]
Sept. 14: Forty-six alleged PKK members were killed in clashes with police in Adakli, Cunar, Mayidagi, and Senduli districts [9/15 FBIS]

The Turkish air force bombed two PUK checkpoints and the Behere, Fila, and Saranisa areas of northern Iraq where 10,000 refugees lived [9/15 FBIS]
Sept. 22: Adnan Tunca and Mustafa Gumus, schoolteachers from Batman's Besiri district, were kidnapped and murdered [9/23 FBIS]
Sept. 26: More than 200 Kurds were reportedly killed in clashes with government forces in eastern Turkey during the period 23–26 September The government announced it would allow the six Kurdish MPs on trial for treason to run for election in parliament if they were acquitted [9/27 FT]

Four people were killed and eight injured when gunmen fired on a bus in the Sehitlik region of Bingol's Ilicalar township [9/27 FBIS]
Sept 28. Sixteen alleged PKK members were killed in clashes with security forces near Sirnak's Silopi district and Hikkari's Cukurca district [9/29 FBIS]
Sept. 29. Former minister of justice Mehmet Topac was shot to death in Ankara [9/30 FBIS]

Esref Gecmez and Ali Riza Gecmez, the son and son-in-law of the mayor of Silvan, Kemal Gecmez, were killed in an attack on the mayor's home [9/30 FBIS]
Sept. 30: Turkish forces announced they had killed Celal Barak, the PKK leader in the Tunceli province, and his second-in-command, Abdulhadi Bilgic [10/1 WP]
Oct 3: Rebih Cabuk, the People's Democracy Party chairman for Yuregir district, and Sefer Cer, a member of the Executive Council, were shot to death in Adana [10/5 FBIS]

Oct. 7: President Suleyman Demirel reportedly ordered an investigation into reports that security forces had burned more than 12 villages in the Ovacik district of Tunceli province. [10/13 FBIS]

Oct. 10: Former Democracy Party (DEP) members of parliament Selim Sadak and Sedar Yurttas were indicted on charges of treason and crimes against the state. [10/11 FBIS]

The Turkish air force bombed PKK camps in the Bote river region in northern Iraq. [10/11 FBIS]

Uluc Gurkan, Republican Peoples Party deputy from Ankara, resigned. [10/12 FBIS]

Oct. 12: National Willpower deputies Huseyin Ozallp and Cemal Sahin joined the TPP, raising the TPP's seats in parliament to 178. [10/13 FBIS]

UAE

See also, Regional Affairs

1994

July 17: An agreement between Touche-Ross, the liquidators of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), and Abu Dhabi was finalized for presentation to creditors and courts. The agreement required that the Abu Dhabi shareholders contribute $1.8 billion to a global settlement fund. [7/18 WSJ]

July 25: The Abu Dhabi appeals court adjourned hearings on BCCI until 7 September. [7/26 FT]

July 29: Imran Imam, a former accounts officer at BCCI's London headquarters, was convicted by the Serious Fraud Office in London of conspiracy to conceal documents and to falsify records, as well as furnishing false information. [7/30 FT]

Aug. 1: The UAE began levying 4 percent tariffs on most imports in order to coordinate tariffs within the Federation in preparation for a possible Gulf Arab Common Market. [8/2 FT]

Aug. 3. Imran Imam was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of conspiring to falsify documents. The US prosecutors had submitted pleas in his defense because of his cooperation in the US investigation. [8/4 FT]

Sept. 21: Litigation against former BCCI directors Ghanim Faris al-Mazrui and Sheikh Khalifah Nasr al-Masoari was dropped in exchange for a payment by them of £1.4 million. [9/22 FT]

Yemen

See also, Regional Affairs, Algeria

1994

July 16: The government sealed off Aden until 24 July to allow aid convoys to distribute food and water, and imposed a daily seven-hour curfew at 10 PM. [7/17 NYT]

July 23: According to Agence France-Presse, government troops fired on protestors in Mukalla, wounding several people. A spokesman denied the claim. [7/25 FBIS]

Up to 150 cases of cholera and 17 deaths had been reported during the period 21–23 July. International Committee of the Red Cross officials were working to restore water, cut off during the war. [7/24 NYT]

July 26: The curfew was lifted on Sanaa and other cities. The Aden-based newspaper *14 October* resumed publication after a two-week gap. [7/27 FBIS]

The government freed 4,000 soldiers and officers from the south who had surrendered to the government, declaring a general amnesty for southern soldiers. [7/27 NYT]

July 28: Representatives of the government and former southern officers met for talks sponsored by the UN, led by mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. [7/29 NYT, FBIS]

Aug. 11: President Ali Abdallah Salih announced that the southern-based Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) would only be allowed to participate in the government if it expelled the leaders involved in the war, and called for former vice president and southern president al-Bidh to be extradited from Oman. [8/12 FBIS]

Sept. 3: In Aden, clashes broke out between forces of the Islamic Jihad Organization and government forces, killing 20 people. [9/6 FBIS]

Sept. 6: Ali Salih Abbad Muqbil was elected secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, replacing Ali Salim al-Bidh. [9/7 FBIS]

Sept. 10: Alleged Islamists attacked police stations in Aden, killing ten police. [9/12 FBIS]

Sept. 28: Yemen's parliament adopted a new constitution based on Islamic law, and announced that the president would be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term, and would be given the right to appoint his own vice president. The five-member presidential council would be disbanded. [9/29 FBIS]

Oct. 2: Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was appointed vice president. The House of Representatives re-elected President Salih. [10/3 FBIS]

Oct. 3: The acting Prime Minister, Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Ghani, submitted the resignation of his government. [10/4 FBIS]

Oct. 6: A new cabinet was announced.

'Abd al-Wahab al-Anisi, *Deputy Prime Minister*

'Abd al-Karim 'Ali al-'Iryani, *Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister*

Muhammad Sa'id al-'Atar, *Deputy Prime Minister and Industry*

'Abd al-Qadir Bajammaj, *Deputy Prime Minister and Planning and Development*

Yahya Myhammad al-Mutawakkil, *Interior*

Muhammmd Ahmad al-Junayd, *Finance*

Muhammad Alim Basindwah, *Information*

Ahmad Musa'id Husayn, *Transportation*

Ahmad Muhammad al-Anisi, *Communications*

Yahya Husayn al-'Arashi, *Culture and Tourism*

Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Barani, *Social Security, Social Affairs, and Labor*

'Abdallah Ahmad Ghanim, *Legal Affairs and House of Representatives Affairs*

Sadiq Amin Abu-Ra's, *Civil Service and Administrative Reform*

Faysal Bin-Shamlan, *Oil and Mineral Resources*
Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab Zubari, *Supply and Trade*
Najib Sa'id Ghanim, *Health*
Muhammad Husan Dammaj, *Local Administration*
Ghalib al-Qurashi, *Awqaf and Guidance*
'Abd al-Rhaman Bafadl, *Fish Resources*
'Abd al-Wahhab Lutfi al-Daylami, *Justice*
'Abd al-Malik 'Ali al-Sayyani, *Defense*
Ahmad Salim al-Jabali, *Agriculture and Water Resources*
Ali Hamid Sharaf, *Construction, Housing, and Urban Planning*
'Abduh 'Ali al-Qudati, *Education*
'Abd al-Wahhab Rawih, *Youth and Sports*
'Abdullah Muhsin al-Akwa', *Electricity and Water Resources* [10/7 FBIS[

THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL 1992

Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, editors

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326 pp • $19 95 pb • ISBN 0-7914-2176-7

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Book Reviews

Mirror, Mirror. . .

Review Article by Mary Ann Tétreault

The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte, by Lucette Valensi Tr by Arthur Denner Ithaca, NY and London Cornell University Press, 1993 99 pages Acknowl to p 101 Notes to p 116 Index to p 119 $22 50
Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince, by Patricia Springborg Austin University of Texas Press, 1992 vii + 289 pages Bibl to p 335 Index to p 351 $50

During the early modern period, the dream of a Christian commonwealth in Europe was reinforced by contemporary religious literature describing the theory of the four monarchies Derived from the story of the Old Testament prophet Daniel, the theory predicted that four historically defined imperial cycles would end with the rise of a new world order based on universal salvation, peace, and happiness (Valensi, pp 49–51) By the second half of the sixteenth century, however, European elites had come to understand that the Protestant Reformation presented enormous obstacles to European unification under a Christian imperium The prospects for a glorious new world order became even more remote as the resolution of the Thirty Years' War codified into international law the fissures the Reformation had cut across the map of Europe

The fragmentation of Europe supported a growing absolutism that threatened classical ideals of civil society built on assumptions that governmental and non-governmental elites should share power in the state In her book, *The Birth of the Despot,* Lucette Valensi argues that the developing discourse on the Oriental despot indicated both disquiet at the prospect that the Turks were more likely than any Christian king to reunite Europe, and reaction against domestic shifts in power from the nobility to kings and *signori* As a result, this discourse reflected fears of spreading despotism in western Europe as much as observations about Ottoman decline

Valensi's story is centered on Venice and its traditions of statecraft Venice defined international relations for the rest of Europe through the device of ambassadorial reports, public speeches delivered with great ceremony when an ambassador returned from abroad After 1524, these speeches were also subsequently circulated in manuscript form

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> [T]he Venetian ambassadors had perfected an admirable grid through which to observe and read the political realities of their day Following a codified order, they described and measured the limits of each state, its human, material, and financial resources, its army and its navy, they evaluated the government in power, took inventory of the alliances it maintained, the conflicts in which it was engaged, and they indicated what advantage Venice could gain from the existing situation (p 15)

Venetian ambassadors were members of the ruling class, and their discourse was shaped by strong ideals of a civic and world order that reflected their position Of primary concern to Venice and, filtered through its ambassadors' sensibilities, to the rest of western Europe was the condition of the Ottoman Empire As long as the dream of a unified Christian Europe persisted, the Ottomans were its dark antithesis, challengers in the race toward a new European empire Fears of Turkish conquest contributed to what Valensi describes as "a persistent ambivalence" in the reports by Venetian ambassadors about Ottoman power and the structure of Ottoman domestic society (p 23)

> Up until the 1570s, the political and military institutions of the Ottoman Empire, the men in the sultan's service, had inspired in the Venetians words and ideas of order, beauty, and perfection To them, the imperial edifice presented a severe and imposing architecture, and its sumptuous grandeur was one they recognized (p 55)

Valensi compares the Venetian attitude toward the Ottoman Empire at that time to European attitudes toward the United States after World War II its "political, economic, and military hegemony may be ill-abided, but its achievements and its political regime dazzle and fascinate [N]o one thinks to challenge its legitimacy" (pp 55–6) Even Ottoman enslavement of captured "Christian children" was depicted by ambassador Bernardo Navagero as merely one more manifestation of a "system in which every part was subordinate to the center in a relation of mutual tension an imposing construction whose architecture seemed to conform to the canons of beauty set down by Palladio" (p 31) Navagero's description of the Ottoman Empire "manages to explain" that it maintained a permanent state of war in part to guarantee the continual supply of these children to the seraglio, while couching the conversion of the captives to Islam as a process of "giv[ing] them to understand their law" (p 32)

The ambassadors' gloss over behavior that would soon become the subject of their intense criticism was undertaken by men who simultaneously admired the Ottoman system and were repulsed by significant aspects of its orchestration the lack of order and predictability in the transfer of power, the complete dependence of the system on the person of the sultan, the absence of social constraints, such as a hereditary nobility that could check "a prince's degeneracy", and what was a complete reversal in the Ottoman Empire of the direction of the transfer of money and gifts, customary in the European Mediterranean since the time of the Greeks, between the political dignitary and others occupying the "civic space " In Venice, "a citizen in his country's service gave not only of himself but of his fortune as well" (p 42) At the Sublime Porte, gifts were expected to flow the other way

The Venetian ambassadors resented the necessity of having to give gifts to everyone who was, or even might be, in a position to grant a favor Such a system violated their own principles, under which gifts went from the top down as a measure of a man's civic worth rather than from the bottom up to ensure his rise Even worse was the lack of assurance about who was actually "up" from one's own position the " 'wheel of fortune' could at any moment raise a subject up from obscurity Which meant that the Venetians had to face the intolerable constraint of having to bestow gifts on those less important than they in order to obtain some advantage" (p 43) Even before the reversal of the signs that turned what had formerly been approved into a target of criticism, the Venetian ambassadors regarded the Porte as an anti-Venice, just as the Ottoman Empire was envisioned by many Europeans as the antithesis of Christian Europe

However, the Porte was not the only anti-Venice Medician Florence also played that role Venetians constructed Florence rhetorically as a tyranny resting on an excessive democracy purposely promoted to bring down the power of the nobility, its leader was criticized as sexually profligate as well as tyrannical, a despot who arrogated all power to himself (p. 90). Similar images of despotism were subsequently applied to English rulers, first to James I and then, following the Revolution, to Oliver Cromwell. By the late seventeenth century, such rulers and regimes were referred to consistently as tyrannies run by morally corrupt men. They were grouped together with the Ottomans as members of the "family of tyrants," a category no longer assumed to apply only to antiquity.

> It was therefore against that model, and against any other threat to Venetian independence—Counter-Reformation culture, the consolidation of monarchical regimes—that Venice, though an oligarchy itself, shored up its libertarian and republican convictions. (p. 91)

"Good government" critics throughout Europe used epithets such as "Calvinoturkism" and "Turkopapism" to describe their opponents, whom they accused of wanting to "reduce [the country] to a state of Turkish-like tyranny" (p. 91). It soon became common practice to invoke the Ottoman Empire as a terrible example in virtually all such critiques, and eventually to do so by using the term "despotism," which, during previous centuries, had fallen out of use as a common synonym for tyranny.

Patricia Springborg also surveys the development and redefinition of "despot" and "despotism" by European political theorists during the Renaissance, as she examines the evolution of "Oriental despotism" as a foil for "Western Republicanism" from ancient to early modern times. Springborg shows that European apposition of a virtuous West to a tyrannical East began long before the Renaissance, having its roots in the political writings of the ancient Greeks. Among the most familiar sources she discusses is Aristotle's essentialist justification of slavery, which appears in *Politics*. Even more interesting in the context of today's literature on democracy and democratization is her analysis of Aristotle's classification of regimes based on the number of rulers, and how the democracy Aristotle describes compares to the Hellenist understanding of democracy, the model actually used by Renaissance republicans as well as by the modern West. In the process, Springborg calls into question the theoretical, structural, and moral criteria used to define democracy today and how the criteria adopted support hegemonic aspirations of dominant classes as well as dominant states.

Aristotle wrote from a place and at a time that resemble Venice during the Renaissance. During Aristotle's time it was the autonomy of Greek cities that was threatened from the East, by the "orientalization of Hellas" and from the West, by the growing power of Rome. In addition, Aristotle lived in "a society in which slavery was a customary institution and where slaves were generally Asiatics captured in war" (p. 23). Springborg locates Aristotle's position on slavery both in his own marginalization as a non-Athenian—by placing barbarians (i.e., non-Greeks) beyond the pale, he shores up the position of non-citizen Greeks—and in his desire to defend private property, one that he shares with John Locke, who, as Springborg points out, also excused slavery and on similar grounds.

Aristotle projects the image of the slave as a barbarian who is captured like a wild animal, one whose "condition" marks him as a "slave by nature" (see Springborg's citations to *Politics* on p. 27). Springborg sees Aristotle's insistence that physical differences enable one to distinguish between free men and slaves, as dictated not only by racism but also by the nature of the *polis* as a warrior state. This allows him to sidestep some of the moral dilemmas posed by the capture and enslavement of human beings by defining those most likely to be captured as less than human. It also permits a reconciliation between what Aristotle regards as immoral, the capture and enslavement of possibly noble Greek losers by Greek winners, and what he regards as morally acceptable, the capture and enslavement of Asiatics of any rank by Greeks (p. 29).

Springborg points to other dilemmas that reinforce Greek racism—those arising from the nature of the city-state as a multi-ethnic society. Such dilemmas are related to structural as well as ideological differences in patterns of rule between the stable, patrimonial states of Asia (a term that includes Egypt and its "three thousand year Reich" under the pharaohs) and the cosmopolitan, expansionist, politically unstable city-states of Greece. Intercultural or nationalistic quarrels often conceal conflicts over access to power and wealth between an established elite and challengers to its legitimacy. The legitimacy of such new men to rule can be contested most effectively if they can be characterized as outsiders. Thus the Greeks' insistence on their *autochthony*, the aboriginal status of ethnic Greeks, in the face of extensive historical and mythographic traditions in which Greeks describe themselves as descendants of Cadmus the Phoenician, the eponymous Aegyptus, and other city founders identified in legend as migrants from "Asia " Springborg notes that Plato, who had traveled widely and had probably heard the stories of these foreigner-founders abroad as well as at home, cited autochthony as a rationale for Athenian solidarity against both military encroachments by Asians and the contamination of the city by foreign elements (p 29) At the same time, however, Plato viewed patriarchal kingship on the Egyptian model as a different but also legitimate form of rule (p 53)

Springborg distinguishes between those philosophers from Plato through Polybius to Marx who viewed history as universal, sequential, and evolutionary, and others, such as Aristotle, who saw history as cyclical (p 41) The latter, with their "static" worldview, developed a tripartite classification of constitutions based on the number of rulers—the one, the few, or the many—and whether they were "good" monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, or "bad" tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy A supposed "organic" connection between the good and bad forms of a particular type encouraged some to advocate the construction of mixed or balanced constitutions to check the characteristic excesses of the individual types of which they were composed[1] Springborg notes that some of these same assumptions are also "constitutive of 'classical republicanism,' from Herodotus and Pindar through Polybius and Machiavelli" (p 42) A similar understanding of the corruptibility of pure political forms guided the construction of the US constitution[2]

In contrast, philosophers operating primarily from the evolutionary or "progressive" point of view begin "with the concept of needs and the means of subsistence and concomitant forms of social and political organization " Theirs are stories about the "anthropologies of the state of nature and civil society," and many feature the "reconstruction of society" following a great cataclysm "Archetypal" elements include "the transition from a hunter-gatherer mode of production to clans and primitive kingship" and a notion of the concomitant development of moral and social-political forms There is also an assumption of growing size as well as increasing institutionalization (p 43)

Despite the amorphism and heterogeneity of this perspective, Springborg emphasizes the distinction between it and the static view, because a close examination of the content of progressive writings shows how "misplaced" are "notions of social and political development" that glorify the *polis* as "the quintessential social form of the ancient world" (p 45) In fact, these writings show that the *polis* was neither an end point nor even a way station on a single path Instead, multiple political forms with separate histories coexisted with it, and many of them were more "successful," if political success can be measured in terms of growth and stability

A critical reevaluation also reveals an alternative conception of constitutions and regimes which, in modern discourse, calls on the *polis* for its legitimacy, but in reality is based on a classification of types of rule very different from the one outlined by Aristotle This alternative classification is organized structurally by dividing regimes into those that are ruled by the one and those ruled by the many However, the many envisioned under the binary classification is much closer to the few conceived by Aristotle than to his notion of the many, even though the latter was itself a highly limited category

There is an ideological basis for this binary classification as well, arising from a desire to accommodate what progressives saw as necessary growth The democracy of the static theorists rests in part on an assumption of a community sufficiently small to enable social sanctions to be applied effectively, and sufficiently uniform so that sanctions would not be challenged As a *polis* grew into an empire, however, community sanctions lost their power to control self-interested behavior Thus, there was a need to develop systems that could achieve, in the words of Polybius, "a growth of power and an internal political harmony" simultaneously (p 63)

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[1] See, for example, the discussion in *Politics*, tr by Hypocrates G Apostle and Lloyd P Gerson (Grinell, IA Peripatetic Press, 1986), especially sections 8 and 9

[2] See J G A Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1975), especially chap xv

As a consequence, democracy becomes "constitutional republicanism " Its qualities are no longer defined by positive liberties embodied in the notion that "every cook can govern,"[3] but rather as a constitutional system that divides private from public space by guaranteeing negative liberties such as political equality and freedom of speech, a conception antithetical to Aristotle's notion of man as a *zoon politikon* and the private person as morally deficient Republicanism also joins the notion of the benevolent king, the *megalopsuchas*, to the notion of *euergetism*, beneficent notables and the patronage they confer, thereby ensuring the consent of the many to the aristocrat's right to rule (p 76) Hellenistic reformulations of democracy from participatory government into a regime based on consent enabled Alexander to position himself as the savior of the *polis* and Polybius to regard the marcher lord and his companions as the ancestors of "representative government of contemporary feudal states" (p 92)

> [T]he classical writers had their hidden agendas too But their purposes were only incidentally economic It is almost certain that Aristotle did not condone the aspirations of Alexander Plato believed that the stability of the fragile *polis* depended on the careful curtailment of expansionist forces and maintenance of the delicate class balance Hellenistic writers turned to a celebration of Empire The excitement engendered by constantly expanding economic and social vistas captured the imagination of all those who followed the great Alexander, who led the march East [W]hat "republicanism" promised was that stability which comes from the spread of power among a ruling elite [T]his new "republicanism," which did not rule out a remote *imperium* did not suffer from the limitations of the *polis* as a small-scale stationary state Indeed, those long vistas of progress and development believed to have been opened up by the revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were already opened up here (pp 182–3)

Consent elided the distance between democracy and republicanism and underpinned a new distinction among regimes It was no longer the number of rulers but whether the ruled consented to the rulers' exercise of power that separated the two forms Republican elites achieved consent through beneficence—recall from Valensi the Venetian way of demonstrating one's right to rule In contrast, the tyrant ruled without consent—the Ottoman way But Springborg shows us just how tenuous the distinction was between the republican West and the despotic East In Machiavelli's Florence, "the already narrow space between democracy and despotism" was eroded further by "taming the prince, tying him to constitutional government, and retaining the old term *tirano* with its old meaning 'rule without laws' " (p 183) Thus, it is not the absence of popular participation but merely the absence of laws that distinguishes tyranny from what is left of democracy As a result, the story of the Oriental despot remains a necessary construct if the West is to continue to see itself as the embodiment of the good despite its abandonment of the system to which it professes reverence and adherence

Valensi's book is beautifully organized and written Shaped like an oratorio, it follows a simple narrative line in intricate melodies that are pristine and classical in form Springborg's book is much more difficult to read Its many narrative lines cross and snarl as often as they weave themselves neatly into patterns, the music in this book recalls Alban Berg and the moral and tonal dissonances of "Lulu" rather than Antonio Vivaldi and "*Juditha Triumphans*," the metaphor around which Valensi constructs her tale

The lack of clarity in Springborg's work is a result of several factors Among them are the constant interruption of the narrative by profuse in-text references, a desire for accuracy in the representation of classical texts, which leads the author to qualify many of her generalizations—a laudable effort if it is carried on in footnotes rather than within the body of the text, and organization by chronology and author rather than by concept Where she departs from these complications in construction, Springborg's conceptual vision is both morally compelling and explicitly connected to contemporary concerns, such as the sacrifice of political values for economic gain, and the search for the roots of anti-Semitism in its various forms

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[3] C L R James, *Every Cook Can Govern* (Jackson, MS New Mississippi, Inc , 1986)

If Springborg's book can be said to have an organizing metaphor, it is that of the mirror for princes, cautionary tales designed in part to remind rulers of the dangers of excess

> As a highly transportable form, "oriental despotism" moves from Moscow to Tehran, Damascus to Baghdad [b]ut everywhere it performs the same function the grim reminder to those who would take the logic of economic expansionism too far, that corruption ultimately leads to tyranny (p 185)

Just as positive views of the Venetians about the Ottoman Empire can be compared to European feelings about the United States after World War II, negative views of challengers to the West can be seen as the source of repeated rhetorical constructions of an evil empire in the East Samuel Huntington's threatening clash of civilizations just substitutes an evil Islam for the evil Soviet empire[4] Every incarnation of the oriental despot is equally embedded in truth and imagination and equally rooted in a Western tradition that translates the fear that its own virtue will be lost into the more acceptable fear of an evil outsider

As both of the books reviewed here point out, however, hysterical sightings of tyrants in the East should rather be read as barometers of rising despotism in the West Springborg speculates that twentieth-century Oriental despotism became totalitarianism because "Western economic acquisitiveness ha[d] reached correspondingly gargantuan proportions" (p 185) Meanwhile, post-totalitarian dreams of a new world order seem as remote as sixteenth-century hopes for peace and universal salvation

When we think back to Hitler's use of anti-semitism to shore up the legitimacy of Nazi tyranny, we understand why the tales of Oriental despots are mirrors for princes that today's leaders should gaze into deeply "The secret to [stable expansion is] republican rule based on moderation and the middle classes the politics of balance" (p 289) When moderation declines and the middle classes with it, the face of the despot in the mirror is likely to be the prince's own

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[4] Samuel P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," in *Foreign Affairs Agenda 1994* (New York Council on Foreign Relations, 1994)

ARABIAN GULF

Doctor Mary in Arabia: Memoirs, by Mary Bruins Allison, M D Austin University of Texas Press, 1994 xxvii + 323 pages Stats to p 329 $42 50 cloth, $17 95 paper

Reviewed by Mary Ann Tétreault

Dr Mary Allison has written a fascinating book about her nearly forty years as a medical missionary in the Arabian Gulf Most of her time was spent in Kuwait, but she also served in Bahrain and Oman An acute observer of the physical world, Dr Mary's descriptions of landscapes, markets, and the ever-changing color of the sea will evoke for anyone who has lived in the area strong, sensually textured memories of heat, dust, colors, and scents She also has much to say about medical science, social organization, and living arrangements But when it comes to the inner lives of human beings, including her own, Dr Mary looks at walls instead of through windows

Conventional wisdom says that travel broadens the mind, but the novels of Henry James reveal the virtually invincible provincialism of traveling Americans (and others) who were reared within the uncontested certainties of provincial middle-class life Dr Mary's outlook grew out of such an upbringing and was strongly reinforced by the religious faith that led her to become a missionary Her irresistible desire was to convert Muslims to Christianity The story of the nearly uniform thwarting of this desire by the immovability of the objects of her efforts is a testimony to the power of religious fundamentalism, Christian and Muslim, to seal minds against successful contradiction Dr Mary is so much the Christian counterpart of the dogmatic Muslims she worked with and lived among that it is startling

Allison tells us that she used her diary, letters, and reports to her board to refresh her memory as she wrote, but that memory was the primary wellspring of her story This rings true Page after page of descriptions of trauma, disease, and the means used to treat them are too vivid to be mere reconstitutions from statistics such as those provided in an appendix to the text Even more vivid are Dr Mary's agonies over her medical failures, which, as she herself realizes, are more intensely remembered than the successes that so vastly outnumbered them Together with her accounts of everyday life, the stories of Dr Mary's professional efforts paint a detailed picture of some of the hazards of pre-oil Kuwait

Descriptions of then-prevailing disease patterns, with eye and lung ailments prominently represented, remind us of the enormous benefits that oil revenues brought to the populations of the Gulf The tiny domain of the medical missionaries was surpassed by state medical facilities in Dr Mary's professional lifetime The new government hospitals with their large staffs were able to serve entire populations, not just the few who could be treated in the much smaller mission facilities As a result, many formerly endemic diseases were virtually eradicated Social changes initiated by oil revenues also had an impact on public health The tragedy of the child-bride who bled to death as the result of the sexual demands of her elderly husband is less likely to recur today Among the effects of widespread public education funded by oil income is that the average age of marriage for girls has risen and, along with it, the degree of their social and physical protection from sexual exploitation Although rising incomes also brought more leisure, more food, and less exercise, the average Kuwaiti, like the average American, probably prefers the ills of affluence to those of deprivation

Another intriguing aspect of Dr Mary's memoirs is what they tell us about the missions and the missionaries themselves The saga of missionaries in the Middle East is much less well-known than the story of religiously motivated adventurers in the Far East The widely different perceptions of the relative impact of missionaries on these two regions may lie in disparate conditions ranging from variations in the relationships among missionaries, other imperialists, and local groups in host countries, to differences between Islam and Confucianism as belief systems Dr Mary's book invites future attention from scholars on this subject

Dr Mary in Arabia is a valuable addition to the writings of foreigners about the Middle East Like William G Palgrave, John Daniels, and Harold and Violet Dickson and their daughter, Zahra Freeth, Mary Allison provides detailed information on many aspects of life in this region to readers with few contemporary native sources at their disposal While the information outside of the author's area of expertise is not always accurate—there are problems with dates, for example, and the introduction, written by others, is a poor summary of regional history and politics—Allison writes with authority about her experiences as a medical missionary The fact that she is a complicated and interesting human being adds to the pleasure of reading what she has to say about her profession and the places where she practiced it

Mary Ann Tétreault is the director of the Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics at Iowa State University

Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, by F Gregory Gause III New York Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994 xv + 199 pages Notes to p 216 Gloss to p 219 Bibl to p 228 Index to p 236 $16 95 paper

Reviewed by Moyara Ruehsen

It is refreshing to find a book that fills an important niche in the area of Arab Gulf studies that has not been filled adequately for at least two decades There have been a few recent, noteworthy books that examine specific countries in the region, but no British, American, or Canadian publications have done a thorough job of looking at the Gulf as a whole, nor, in particular, at the subtleties of the political landscape in this region [1]

F Gregory Gause III, a professor at Columbia University, is one of a new breed of academics specializing in the Gulf in an era of dramatic change and increasing accessibility for scholars traveling to the region Based on his considerable knowledge of the Gulf and more than sixty interviews conducted during two visits to the area while he was a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Gause's new book, *Oil Monarchies*, adds to our understanding of the unique forms of political participation that are emerging in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates)

One of the key purposes of this book is to dispel some of the conventional wisdom regarding the Gulf, which assumes that these oil monarchies are traditional, tribal societies with little or no regard for modern, democratic, political institutions At the same time, Gause is not an apologist A second purpose is to convey a better understanding of the domestic political environment in the region to academics and current and future policy-makers in the hope of preventing some of the mistakes that have been made in the past in foreign policy crises, such as the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage debacle

To his credit, Gause elected to divide the book up thematically rather than by country This was a wise choice, since much of what happens in each of these monarchies must be viewed in a regional context He includes chapters on Islam and tribalism, oil, political participation, foreign and defense policies, future challenges, and, finally, US-Gulf relations The best chapters are those addressing domestic political developments and foreign relations, which is to be expected, given Gause's background as a political scientist He is on less solid ground when discussing the economies of these rentier states in the third and sixth chapters These sections are not inaccurate per se, but they are not written with the skill, lucidity, and depth that characterize the rest of the book

The final chapter on American policy considerations is excellent Gause makes a compelling case for America's continued interest and involvement in the region, and begins his arguments by cleverly debunking several of the reasons that are often cited for why the United States should pull out of the area There is, of course, the obvious argument for maintaining good relations with these monarchies The six GCC states have between them roughly half of the world's proven oil reserves in this hydrocarbon age And in spite of OPEC's declining share of world oil production, Saudi Arabia still has enough market share to influence global energy prices with moderate shifts in production But Gause's argument goes well beyond the oft-stated objective of ensuring an uninterrupted flow of oil to the rest of the world He makes the valid point, for instance, that what happens in the Gulf cannot be completely separated from the over-arching Arab-Israeli dispute, as Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait proved

There are almost no obvious errata to speak of, with perhaps one notable exception the omission of the island nation of Bahrain from the regional map on pages xiv–xv Unfortunately for the Bahrainis, this is not an uncommon error Many a cartographer has made such an egregious mistake

That minor point aside, *Oil Monarchies* represents a much-needed contribution to the literature on the Gulf The book is the product of sound scholarship, is well-written, and of digestible length It is indispensable for any university-level course on Gulf or Middle East politics and deserves to be on the bookshelf of any serious Gulf scholar

Moyara Ruehsen is an assistant professor in the International Policy Studies Division of the Monterey Institute of International Studies

IRAN

From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution, by Ehsan Naraghi Tr by Nilou

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[1] Two notable exceptions might be J E Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States Steps Toward Political Participation*, Washington Papers no 131 (New York Praeger, for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1988), and Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (New York Cambridge University Press, 1990)

Mobasser Chicago Ivan R Dee, 1994 ix + 270 pages Chron to p 276 Index to p 283 $28 95

Reviewed by James A Bill

Our library of books about Iran and the Iranian Revolution continues to expand as hundreds of scholars, journalists, politicians, and other observers record their interpretations for posterity Generally, there are two categories of writing serious scholarly analyses and personal recollections and reminiscences These two categories can be further divided into those books of little value and those of serious quality The former include superficial, biased apologias and studies that repeat the tired old conventional wisdom about Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and post-revolutionary Iran

Unfortunately, the books that deform and mislead outnumber the volumes that inform and enlighten by a factor of five to one Fortunately, Ehsan Naraghi's *From Palace to Prison* is a personal account that belongs to the minority category It provides a number of profound observations that go far to explain the revolution and subsequent events in Iran

Ehsan Naraghi is a French-educated, fiercely independent scholar-observer who knew how to survive in the Pahlavi political pressure cooker while at the same time sharply criticizing the system from within He was at his best when he directed Tehran University's Institute for Social Studies and Research in the 1960s At the Institute, he provided an academic protective umbrella for dozens of bright, young Iranian social scientists who produced important, documented studies of the ills of Iranian society If these studies had been seriously heeded by the shah's government, Iran's explosive political history of the past two decades might possibly have been different If the US government had known of these studies (all published in Persian), the subsequent tragedy of US-Iran relations might have been averted Although distrusted by the shah's secret police (SAVAK), Naraghi had access to Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, to Queen Farah, and, at the very end, to the shah himself

The first part of *From Palace to Prison* is an account of Naraghi's eight audiences with the shah during the last hundred days of Pahlavi rule It is in these reconstructed interviews that Naraghi provides his cogent analysis of the shah's Iran

According to Naraghi, the three major causes of the Iranian revolution were gross inequality, corruption and economic nepotism, and regime brutality Such problems generated "a host of grievances which trickle[d] into a river swollen by numerous small streams of discontent" that eventually overflowed "into an ocean of bitterness" (p 12) In framing his argument, Naraghi provides much valuable material about the Pahlavi Foundation, SAVAK, the financial shenanigans of the shah's brothers and sisters, and the courageous, but futile, attempts by Queen Farah to stem the corruption and to moderate the oppression

Naraghi blames the shah for unleashing the religious opposition that provided the political momentum that led to the Revolution He traces this anticlerical action to 1962 when the shah abusively and abrasively attacked the religious leaders in the holy shrine in Qom Although this reviewer would identify the catalyzing event to be the regime's brutal murder of "Ayatollah" Saidi in 1970, the basic argument is sound The shah must bear the blame for alienating the religious leaders and, ultimately, for the Revolution itself, not because he modernized his country too rapidly, but because he frontally attacked his own religious establishment As a result, the 'ulama' were forced to fight for their very survival, and fight they did

Despite his discomfort during the Pahlavi period, Ehsan Naraghi found his position considerably more painful after the Revolution He was imprisoned twice for a total of 31 months during the early years of the Islamic Republic His vivid descriptions of life in Evin prison explain much about the spirit and style of the Islamic government

The bulk of the prisoners were young, naive ideologues who opposed the Islamic regime from a variety of leftist positions These individuals ranged from orthodox Tudeh stalwarts to more radical members of such organizations as the Fedayan-i Khalq and the Mujahedin-i Khalq These activists were politically immature, internationally inexperienced, and intellectually simplistic The Mujahedin, for example, fervently believed that their victory was imminent Their false expectations continued even after their leaders had collaborated with Iraq's Saddam Hussein, thereby alienating patriotic Iranians everywhere

In one particularly trenchant observation, Naraghi compares the younger generation of prisoners to the older generation who represented the ancien regime He argues that the young radicals in prison had more in common with their young pasdar (revolutionary guard) captors than with their fellow prisoners, who had held high positions in the shah's government The latter were selfish and self-indulgent while the younger individuals were generally motivated by idealism and great generosity Naraghi reports awakening in the middle of the night in his crowded cell to see a number of his younger cellmates standing on their feet in order to allow others space to sleep more comfortably Such behavior represented a new spirit, a spirit of caring and giving, not one of ignoring and taking

Ehsan Naraghi can best be described as a veteran political survivor During the shah's regime, he maneuvered to protect himself, while at the same time he struggled to reform the system from within As a result, he was not trusted by either the revolutionary opposition or by the monarchists When the shattering revolution pulled Naraghi into its fiery vortex, searing and scarring him, he again found himself distrusted by all sides In the end, however, Naraghi survived and was released from his last stint in prison on 28 September 1983

In many ways, the story of Ehsan Naraghi is the story of Iran, a country that has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for survival Throughout history, Iran has overcome numerous challenges that have left the country shaken but triumphant, battered but never beaten Naraghi's book explains why the Iranian revolution was necessary, and why Iran will continue to be a major actor on the world stage in the years ahead

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L'utopie sacrifiée: sociologie de la révolution iranienne, by Farhad Khosrokhavar Paris Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993 337 pages Bibl FF235 paper

Reviewed by Kaveh Ehsani

L'utopie sacrifiée is one of the most insightful and original contributions to the sociology of the Iranian Revolution published in recent years The gist of this book is based on three implicit and interconnected assertions First, as the Iranian Revolution was a mass movement, the basis of its sociology should be the perceptions and motivations of the popular classes, who were its main actors Second, the Revolution, and the social transformation accompanying it, was a new paradigm, unprecedented in Iranian history It was the work of newly formed social actors—mostly young, urban, literate men and women of modest backgrounds—pursuing new types of involvement in politics, with new attitudes toward power and the world In short, a new *imaginaire*[1] was at the center of the revolutionary events in Iran, which must be comprehended on its own terms, and not by references to preconceived notions of traditional culture, ideology, or religiosity This leads to the book's third premise, that the Iranian Revolution signaled a clear break with the past and not some utopian quest for an alleged return to a traditional community The Revolution was a configuration of peripheral modernity, signaling a rupture at many levels between generations, with the old communal order, and within the semiotic field of the relationship to self, to the body, and to power

Khosrokhavar sharply criticizes the existing conventional theories of the Iranian Revolution—most notably those of Nikki Keddie, Said Amir Arjomand, and Ahmad Ashraf, among others—for unduly emphasizing the role of traditional Islam and of traditional elites, personified by bazaar merchants and shi'a clergy This conventional approach has obscured and mystified the depth of the discontinuity brought about by modernization, accompanied by the irruption of the new imaginaire that has changed the interpretation of religion and authority, especially among the younger generation This generation was born and socialized after the watersheds of the White Revolution, the petrolization of the economy, and swift and extensive urbanization It is the child of the demise of traditional Iranian society, and the transition to the uneven and distorted modernity of the 1960s and 1970s Consequently, the ambiguous mental universe of the main actors of the Revolution—the urban youth of lower-middle-class origin, their "fathers' generation," women, the Hizballah, the intelligentsia, the urban poor, and rural migrants—has remained alien to these authors

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[1] See Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society,* tr by Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge MIT Press, 1987) for a discussion of the concept *imaginaire*

Stylistically, *l'Utopie sacrifiée* is written as a long, analytical narrative, rather than as yet another chronology of events The first half of the book is a thick description of this complex revolutionary imaginaire, revealing an eagerness among the young generation to break with the traditional order and to appropriate modernity to their own advantage The second half covers the selection of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the paramount leader by this heterogeneous grassroots movement, the evolving role of the other charismatic clerical leaders, and the ultimate defeat of the revolutionary utopia, followed by despair, intolerance, and the sacralization of Khomeini

Khosrokhavar's insistence on writing a sociology of social upheaval "from below" is the basis of some of the most thought-provoking discussions to have been published about, among other topics, the role of women, the lack of an organic intelligentsia, the "necrophilic" cult of martyrdom displayed by the revolutionary militia in the Iran-Iraq war, and the role of corruption as a systematic strategy of resistance by society against an intolerant and totalizing state

Perhaps the most appropriate way to evaluate this contribution to the crowded body of literature about the Iranian Revolution is to classify it as a powerful manifesto for an alternative conceptualization of this historic event Manifesto is an apt label for the book, because it should be seen within the context of the author's previous work, especially his fascinating fieldwork on urban housing, and the oral history/anthropology of the Revolution [2] This also explains the curious lack of almost any empirical information in the book itself

L'utopie sacrifiée is by no means a definitive statement There are serious problems of style, theoretical premise, and even empirical assumption The book is too long and often inexcusably repetitive, and its demographic theory of human agency, with the amorphous category of "the young generation" as the principal actor, simply lacks sufficient rigor However, this book cannot be ignored, if simply because it is among a handful of studies on the subject that are actually based on field research, and not the textual exegesis of published documents and newspaper accounts! It is a tremendously thought-provoking work, and should be welcomed by all those tired of the repetitive and unimaginative string of material continuously printed about Iran An edited translation, which eliminates the redundancies and supplements them with the author's highly original field research, would be highly recommended

Kaveh Ehsani is a Ph D candidate in the Department of Geography at Johns Hopkins University

Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran, by Darius M Rejali

Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 xviii + 176 pages Appends to p 213 Notes to p 253 Bibl to p 276 Index to p 289 $46 95 cloth, $19 95 paper

Reviewed by Margaret Lynd

In *Torture and Modernity*, Darius M Rejali attempts to account for the processes he believes have led to the normalization of torture in the modern world While focusing attention on historical and cultural details particular to Iran, Rejali situates his analysis within Michel Foucault's theoretical discussion of the political dimensions of modern disciplinary institutions and practices [1] Rejali's book offers a thoughtful analysis of the Iranian situation, but also suggests more generally that modern states, regardless of their economic or political structure and even when they do not actively participate in torture, almost certainly have in place the disciplinary structures that allow them to slip easily into the aggressive use of torture to contain potentially subversive subjects

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[2] See Farhad Khosrokhavar and Paul Vieille, *Le discours populaire de la révolution iranienne*, volume 1 Commentaire, volume 2 Entretiens, (Paris Contemporanéite, 1990), Farhad Khosrokhavar and Bernard Hourcade, "L'habitat révolutionnaire à Téhéran, 1977–1981," *Herodote*, 31 (Fall 1983), pp 61–83, and Farhad Khosrokhavar, "Nouvelle banlieue et marginalité la Cité Taleghani à Khak-e Sefid," in *Téhéran, capitale bicentenaire*, ed by Chahriar Adle and Bernard Hourcade (Paris and Tehran Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992), pp 307–28 Most of the author's other work over the past decade has been published in the journal *Peuples mediterranéens*

[1] This discussion is outlined most clearly in Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish The Birth of the Prison*, tr by Alan Sheridan (New York Vintage Books, 1979) and *The History of Sexuality An Introduction*, tr by Robert Hurley (New York Vintage Books, 1980)

The troubling question Rejali poses is whether modern torture is an aberration, an unfortunate consequence of singular configurations of circumstance and history, or whether, on the contrary, it is an integral element of the modern disciplinary state Based on his analysis of Iran, Rejali convincingly concludes it to be the latter, at least when certain cultural features are also present The insistence on the importance of cultural differences and propensities is central to Rejali's partial rejection of other theoretical positions, particularly Marxism and humanism, which, while useful, cannot fully account for the recurrence of torture In fact, Rejali argues, torture in the modern state is a disciplinary mechanism parallel to, and fully consistent with, other institutionalized disciplinary systems—education, medicine, the military, law, labor, and penal Like the disciplinary procedures of these seemingly more benign institutions, torture is contained, systematic, invasive—and very effective

The function of torture in the late twentieth century, Rejali further contends, is rarely to extract information or confession, to exact retribution, or to underscore and deepen moral responsibility Rather, in keeping with other disciplinary mechanisms, torture is intended to reform and normalize, to transform real, potential, or wholly imagined dissidents into docile and obedient subjects by invading the minds and bodies of its victims The effects of modern torture—particularly its traumatizing psychological effects—produce subjects who not only pose little problem to authoritarian governments, but who also are likely to serve well an economic system that requires a tractable and unrebellious labor force

While Rejali finds Foucault's articulation of discipline as a theoretical concept particularly useful to his own argument, he also faults Foucault for what he considers a general failing to take adequate account of cultural differences in his theoretical formulations Moreover, he contends, far from explaining the persistence of modern torture, Foucault's writings, especially *Discipline and Punish*, suggest that as disciplinary procedures become entrenched, torture ceases to be a useful method of control Rejali's answer to this apparent contradiction is to map out the various forms torture has taken in Iran over the past two centuries and compare them to the changes other mechanisms of order and control have similarly undergone *Torture and Modernity* is persuasive in its call to study concrete historical/geographical/cultural situations, especially the specific disciplinary practices that characterize them, in order to understand more fully how modern (European) institutions have insinuated themselves and continue to function within a host of very diverse non-European societies

The case of Iran is of particular interest precisely because, Rejali says, the Islamic Revolution, ostensibly a rejection of Western influence and a return to "tradition," has systematically and effectively incorporated Western practices of discipline in its enforcement of Islamic tradition This is an ironic situation indeed, Rejali contends, since the nature of punishment in Iran since 1979 has far less to do with historical examples of Islamic traditions of either governance or justice than it has to do with the disciplinary apparatus of modern Western societies Rejali's strongest argument for this position is his comparison of the function of torture during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Iranian society Torture during the Qajar period of the nineteenth century, Rejali says, was primarily public and ritual, punishments were intended to be commensurate with, or at least in some way related to, the crime By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this public ritual character had begun to disappear Modern torture was born, and along with it the modern medical, educational, military, and penal procedures and practices to which it is parallel If those modern procedures were deployed with particular zeal during the reign of the Pahlavi shahs, the very pervasiveness of those procedures, Rejali contends, made torture all but inevitable by the Islamic revolutionaries who succeeded them

It is this transition to modernity that Rejali documents through his discussion of the changing nature of torture in Iran (and through a photographic essay appended to the text) Rejali is not interested in psychoanalytic studies of torture that locate motivation in the recesses of individual psyches and the dialectics of desire and power, insisting rather on the comparative study of actual practices of torture—the "how" rather than the "why"—in relation to specific cultural propensities and their transformation over time Rejali's unprepossessing style and what he calls an old-fashioned concern for readability (Rejali's table of contents is a comprehensive, descriptive outline that includes not a single cryptic or clever turn of phrase) should not lead readers to underestimate his theoretical sophistication Rather than offer detailed criticism of Foucault's (and others') limitations, Rejali enriches the Foucauldean perspective he adopts by illustrating the principle that cultural specificity is integral to cultural studies

Rejali is further concerned to make his book accessible to a broad spectrum of readers not only to cultural theorists and Middle East scholars, but also (and perhaps he is to be applauded for his "old-fashioned" stance in this regard) to an unspecialized, educated readership struggling to understand modernity, an audience with limited access to helpful scholarship in this world of free-floating information bytes and media spins on the one hand and highly abstract social theory on the other This book probably will not receive much attention outside the world of Middle East scholarship, and that is a likelihood much to be regretted

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LIBYA

The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 1830–1932, by Ali Abdullatif Ahmida Albany State University of New York Press, 1994 xv + 144 pages Appends to p 151 Notes to p 188 Gloss to p 193 Refs to p 217 Index to p 222 $49 50 cloth, $16 95 paper

Reviewed by Ronald Bruce St John

In the introduction to this valuable study, Ali Abdullatif Ahmida rightly states that the study of modern North Africa in general, and Libya in particular, has been dominated by scholars mostly interested in French and Italian colonial studies, British social anthropology, and, to a lesser degree, what he terms the modernization school of the United States One result of this generally Eurocentric focus is that the rich human history of resistance and struggle for survival in Libya has tended to be lost This is especially true of the social and political history of Libya in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period of intense change initiated by the expansion into the countryside of colonial powers, first Ottoman and then European In an effort to broaden the focus of modern Libyan studies, the author follows the lead of other contemporary scholars of North Africa, like Colette Establet, in reexamining Libyan colonial society and history from the viewpoint of the colonized

Beginning with the year 1830, Ahmida explores the nature of the state and political economy of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan, with an emphasis on the impact of Ottoman state centralization, the decline of the Saharan trade, and the penetration of European financial capital His examination of the political economy of Cyrenaica challenges the image of pre-Sanusi Cyrenaican tribal structure as primitive, feuding, and anarchic On the contrary, he suggests, Cyrenaica possessed an elaborate, well-organized tribal structure And it was this structure that facilitated the spread of the Sanusi order among the tribes of the region

The ensuing discussion of the Libyan reaction to Italian colonialism is noteworthy, most especially the author's attempt to differentiate collaborators by social class and socioeconomic background Drawing on sources of Libyan oral history, Ahmida suggests that many collaborators were chiefs and notables without firm religious or nationalist goals, who cooperated with the Italians largely to protect tribal or economic interests At the same time, he rightly emphasizes that collaboration was often a very complex process with many different nuances in different parts of the country

Islam and nationalism, for example, were interpreted differently according to the socioeconomic interests of the urban classes and tribes in various parts of the country Such diverse backgrounds were integral to factionalism in Tripolitania, which was not simply the product of personal rivalries, as some historians have argued, but instead resulted from a variety of socioeconomic forces. In contrast, the cohesion of the Cyrenaican tribes was the product of many decades of education and mobilization by the Sanusi leadership. The Sanusiyya created a state, based on trans-Saharan trade and anticolonial, pan-Islamic ideology, which enabled the Cyrenaican tribes to resist Italian domination for two decades.

The Making of Modern Libya also adds perspective to contemporary politics in Libya. The early statements of the Revolutionary Command Council, beginning with the Proclamation of the Republic on 1 September 1969, attempted to mold anticolonial resistance into support for the revolutionary government by invoking the traditional past, decrying the corruption of the monarchy, and promising a thorough transformation of Libyan society. In the process, an enormous gap developed between the ideas, beliefs, and myths of Muammar Qadhafi's regime and the respective historical realities that its ideology purported to describe and explain. While this distortion of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Libyan history has long been recognized, Ahmida sheds new light on the full extent to which the revolutionary government, and the Idris monarchy to a lesser extent, molded Libyan history to fit regime needs and requirements.

The book includes an impressive bibliography of Libyan as well as English, French, and Italian language sources. Two notable exceptions are John Wright's *Libya, Chad, and the Central Sahara*, which should be consulted in any study of the Saharan trade, and Emrys L. Peters's *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica*, a collection of articles of great insight and originality.[1] Both are highly relevant to central themes of the book under review and, thus, their absence is surprising.

In his conclusion, Ahmida boldly states that he has unearthed the buried social history of Libya between 1830 and 1932. While this is an overstatement, he has improved our understanding of state formation, colonization, and resistance in this crucial period in Libyan history. In so doing, he has generated at least as many questions as he has answered. As he himself suggests, much more research needs to be done to gain a full understanding of the impact of colonial state policy on either the anticolonial resistance or the socioeconomic transformation of Libya. Ali Abdullatif Ahmida has begun this process, as well as outlined an alternative research agenda that moves beyond conventional sources to deepen our understanding of Libyan social and political history.

Ronald Bruce St John is the author of Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1969–1987 *(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Saqi Books, 1987) and the* Historical Dictionary of Libya *(Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1991).*

TURKEY

Turkey: A Modern History, by Erik J. Zurcher. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993. Distrib. by St. Martin's Press, New York. xiii + 322 pages. Maps to p. 325. Bibl. to p. 343. Biogs. to p. 371. Index to p. 381. $49.95.

Reviewed by Sabri Sayari

Erik J. Zurcher has written a comprehensive and very readable history of modern Turkey. Although conceived as a textbook that "in no way has any pretensions of being an original piece of research" (p. 7), it coherently draws together an immense amount of material and skillfully integrates contrasting approaches to the study of the late Ottoman and modern Turkish history. One of the principal merits of the book is that it addresses several different audiences. Due to the author's ability to cut across different disciplines, the study is likely to be of interest to historians, economists, and political scientists alike. At the same time, the authoritative treatment of the last two hundred years of Turkish history will be a valuable resource for students and the general public.

The book is divided into three parts that follow the author's periodization of the history of modern Turkey. Part I covers the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the Young Turks' ascendancy to power in 1908 Zurcher's focus on the growing economic, cultural, and diplomatic interaction between Europe and the Ottoman Empire is informed by an eclectic approach that takes into account both the increasing incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy and the impact of European ideas, institutions, and practices on Ottoman reforms and Westernization efforts By not wholly subscribing to either the "dependency" or "modernization" theories, but making judicious use of each, Zurcher provides a balanced analysis of the dynamics of change that ultimately transformed the political map of the Middle East and the Balkans and paved the way for the emergence of modern Turkey

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[1] John L. Wright, *Libya, Chad, and the Central Sahara* (Savage, MD: Barnes & Noble-Imports, 1989), and Emrys L. Peters, *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica: Studies in Personal & Corporate Power*. Ed. by Jack Goody and Emanuel Marx (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Part II, "The Young Turk Era in Turkish History, 1908–1950," is arguably the best section of the book It is devoted to the domestic and international developments that accompanied the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the newly established Turkish Republic This novel periodization reflects Zurcher's belief that there were significant political, ideological, and economic continuities between the Young Turks and the Kemalists—a theme that ran through his two earlier works [1] In addition to documenting these continuities, he highlights the political dynamics of the Kemalist one-party state and the radical reform measures undertaken by Ataturk that laid the foundations of a modern and secular state The economic problems and challenges that Turkey faced in the 1920s and 1930s, and the country's transition from an authoritarian one-party regime to democracy in the immediate aftermath of World War II constitute the two other issues that receive substantial attention Zurcher's discussion of the formative years of the Republic offers a useful corrective to the official historiography of the period on various issues, such as the real meaning and intent of Mustafa Kemal's famous 36-hour speech in 1927

Part III focuses on the achievements and problems of Turkey's experience with democracy since 1950 Zurcher provides an overview of the growth of democratic pluralism and rapid economic development amidst increasing social and political instability during four decades of competitive politics He examines the changes and continuities in political parties and their leadership, the breakdown of Turkish democracy and the relatively brief periods of military rule in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and the emergence of extremist political movements belonging to the Marxist left, ultra-nationalist right, Islamic fundamentalism, and Kurdish separatism In the concluding section, Zurcher discusses important trends in Turkish politics and foreign policy since 1980, such as democratization and economic liberalization, intensification of the Kurdish problem, and Turkey's involvement in Middle Eastern security issues as a result of its participation in the Allied Coalition during the 1991 Gulf War

Although *Turkey A Modern History* is consistently informative and sparkling with insightful interpretations, it is not devoid of some questionable judgments, factual errors, and omissions For example, the claim that "the Kemalist state was undoubtedly authoritarian and totalitarian" (p 194) overlooks a considerable body of political science literature that emphasizes the significant differences between these two regime types Several important characteristics of Turkey's one-party regime, such as the dominance of the state apparatus over the Republican People's Party (RPP), the absence of a well-articulated ideology, the lack of periodic attempts at mass mobilization and political terror, and the government's experiments with limited pluralism, suggest that the Kemalist state had far more in common with modern authoritarian regimes than totalitarian systems Similarly, the author's description of Turkey's transition to democracy in the late 1940s gives undue emphasis to external pressures and domestic economic problems at the expense of the singularly important role played by President Ismet Inonu, whose full support for democratization—especially after he realized around 1947–48 that the costs of repressing the newly founded opposition parties might outweigh the risks of political liberalization—was a key factor in the transformation of Turkey's political system Zurcher's designation of *Bizim Ev* as a "pressure group" (p 264) defies the widely accepted definition and usage of the concept, since it was more a social club formed by former Democratic Party elites than an organized group, and his view that

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[1] Erik J Zurcher, *The Unionist Factor The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement* (Leiden E J Brill, 1984), and *Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic The Progressive Republican Party* (Leiden E J Brill, 1994)

"the police and the security forces had become the exclusive preserve of Turkes's NAP [National Action Party]" (p 276) in the late 1970s ignores the fact that the police were deeply divided and polarized between two professional unions representing the extreme right and the Marxist left The biographical notes on important personalities in Ottoman and Turkish history, while useful, also have numerous errors or omissions For example, Mihri Belli returned to Turkey in the late 1970s and survived an assassination attempt on his life, Ecevit ousted Inonu as the RPP's leader in 1972, not in 1973, Nihat Erim's life and political career came to an end in 1980 at the hands of the Marxist *Dev-Sol* terrorists, Ragip Gumuspala died in 1964, not in 1965, Turgut Ozal was appointed by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in 1979 as undersecretary of the State Planning Organization and not to the cabinet, and Zekeriya Sertel did, in fact, return to Turkey for a brief period prior to his death Last, but not least, the author's decision to forgo footnotes in the text has mixed results It makes the book more readable but also leaves the reader wondering about the sources, especially on some of the more controversial views and interpretations offered by Zurcher

Notwithstanding these minor flaws, there is much to commend this book It makes an important contribution to the study of modern Turkish history and broadens our understanding of the complexities of Turkey's political, social, and economic development Zurcher's analysis will advance discussion among the specialists on a wide range of issues As such, it is a welcome addition to the field of Turkish studies and deserves to be widely read

Sabri Sayari, Executive Director, Institute of Turkish Studies, Washington, DC

BIOGRAPHY

The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement, by Zvi Elpeleg London Frank Cass, 1993 xvi + 181 pages Notes to p 200 Appends to p 214 Chron to p 217 Bibl to p 230 Index to p 239 $35

Reviewed by Philip Mattar

Zvi Elpeleg, a former military governor in the occupied territories, has attempted to write an objective and original biography of Hajj Amin al-Husseini's entire political career, but, while his tone is non-polemical, his account is seriously flawed His book covers two distinct periods of the Mufti s life, before and after 1948 The first half covers al-Husseini's family background and his appointments as Mufti and as President of the Supreme Muslim Council There is very little that is new in the first half, largely because nearly all Elpeleg's sources are secondary works and newspapers The second half of the book is original and more detailed Here, he discusses Hajj Amin's relations with Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser, Jordan's King Hussein, and the Palestine Liberation Organizaton (PLO), which, Elpeleg claims, owes its political doctrine to the Mufti

Elpeleg is correct in crediting the Mufti with bringing the Palestine problem to the attention of the Islamic world, making it a central issue of neighboring Arab countries, and unifying the Palestinians around nationalist objectives But most of his other conclusions are untenable

An underlying thesis of *The Grand Mufti* is found in its subtitle, "Founder of the Palestinian National Movement" Elpeleg concludes that because the Mufti is a symbol of defeat, Palestinian historiography has yet to recognize his place in Palestinian history Elpeleg is quoted on the book's jacket as stating that the Mufti "is the Weizmann, the Ben-Gurion, even the Herzl of the Palestinian national movement" Most Palestinians would probably wish that he had played just one of these roles

Theodor Herzl established the World Zionist Congress The Mufti did not even participate in the establishment of the Muslim Christian Associations in 1918, nor in the Palestine Arab Congresses that formulated and articulated Palestinian national demands Herzl was the theoretician and founder of Zionism through his speeches and writings The Mufti articulated no theories and is not known for any of his speeches and writings Chaim Weizmann was Zionism's lifeline to Britain and other Western centers of power and was instrumental, among other things, in procuring the Balfour Declaration The Mufti has no Balfour to his credit, had little clout with world leaders, and his influence in Arab countries was mitigated by British control of these countries David Ben-

Gurion's capable political and military leadership led to the creation of a state. The Mufti's traditional and intransigent leadership helped deprive the Palestinians of theirs.

Elpeleg seems all too eager to implicate the Mufti in murder and mayhem. He writes that al-Husseini "orchestrated" (p. 23) the 1920 riots that resulted in the deaths of five Jews (and four Palestinians, whose deaths Elpeleg does not mention). In fact, no such conclusion can be found in British documents. Elpeleg implies that the Mufti encouraged the Baghdad pogrom against the Jews on 1 June 1941, but gives no evidence implicating the Mufti, who had fled to Tehran on 29 May 1941.

The book's dust jacket states that Elpeleg "makes a strong case implicating the Mufti in the destruction of European Jewry." In fact, the author's case differs little from the original charges made in 1946 by the Jewish Agency, which the British Foreign Office in 1946 found "very vague and not considered as decisive evidence against the Mufti for having participated in any atrocities against the Jews."[1] Other British officials wrote that the Zionists were using this meager evidence for propaganda purposes against the Mufti and the Palestinians.

Elpeleg states, without evidence or citation, that "large parts of the Arab world shared [the Mufti's] anti-Jewish sympathy with Nazi Germany," which was "expressed at the time . . . by naming children after Nazis such as Hitler and Rommel" (p. 179). I wonder how many Arab Hitlers Elpeleg knows or can find in Arab phone directories?

Elpeleg is no doubt correct in his presentation of the Mufti as being anti-Jewish (not just anti-Zionist as many Arabs claim) by the onset of World War II. Indeed, the Mufti cooperated with the most barbaric regime in modern times in the hope of evicting Britain from Palestine. With disregard for Jewish lives, he wrote letters urging the authorities not to allow Jews to go to Palestine, where, he felt, they would displace Palestinians. As reprehensible as this may have been, it does not mean that the Mufti participated in the Final Solution. Only a thorough and nonpartisan account, based on voluminous captured German documents, could elucidate the role of the Mufti in Germany.

Elpeleg derides the Mufti for his "fantastic" belief that Britain and the Jews "plotted" to expel the Palestinians and hand over Palestine to the Jews. Elpeleg seems unaware of the extent to which Zionists and sometimes British leaders between the 1880s and 1948 discussed the "transfer" of Palestinians. The author attributes the loss of Palestine to competition and differences between Arab rulers and to the weakness of Arab society. He does not mention Britain's military-backed Balfour policy, which allowed the Yishuv to grow, through immigration and land purchases, and to establish quasi-governmental and military institutions, nor the agreements between 'Abdullah and the Jewish Agency between 1946 and 1948 to divide Palestine between them.

Elpeleg's unsubstantiated assumptions and conclusions stem partly from his disregard of archival sources, primarily the Colonial and Foreign Office documents of the Public Record Office (PRO), which are indispensable for the Mandate period. Out of about 500 footnotes, only ten cite PRO documents. In addition, he relies on the old histories and ignores such recent scholars as Muhammad Muslih on the origins of Palestinian nationalism, Ann Lesch on the frustrations of the Palestinian national movement, Neil Caplan on Arab-Jewish contacts, Avi Shlaim on the Zionist-Hashemite agreement, Nur Masalha on expulsion, Benny Morris on the exodus, and many more.

The book has some factual errors. For example, Hajj (not Haj) Amin was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, not Grand Mufti (p. 29) and, hence, the title, or mistitle, of the book. Elpeleg's Mufti emerges in 1921 as the political leader of the Palestinians, whereas the archival record shows that Hajj Amin's leadership was not secure until the 1929 Western Wall political violence. The length of Hajj Amin's political career is given as 60 years (p. xv), 44 years (p. 144), and 30 years (p. 174). The book also has some translation problems: Arab Executive Committee, not Arab Institute Committee, the PLO's Executive Committee, not the PLO's Institute Committee. In addition, it has dozens of transliteration mistakes. For some strange reason the long *alif* is rendered "a'a," so that Kamal Haddad becomes Kama'al Hadda'ad, Salah becomes Sala'ah. and so on, throughout. The dipthong is inconsistently given as ai or ay or ei, so there is Jamal al-Husayni, Amin al-Hussaini, and Anwar Nasseibeh The *'ayn* is often rendered *hamza* and vice versa, or is absent

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[1] Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/52585/E1984/515/31

Despite its deficiencies, this work is useful because of its coverage of the Mufti's activities after 1948, a period about which we know little And, despite his ideological lapses, Elpeleg's tone is unemotional, an encouraging sign in Israeli writings about the Palestinians

Philip Mattar is the Executive Director of the Institute for Palestine Studies He is the author of The Mufti of Jerusalem *(New York Columbia University Press, 1992)*

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The Economy of Modern Israel: Malaise and Promise,

by Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka Chicago and London University of Chicago Press, 1993 x + 225 pages Tables to p 246 Refs to p 250 Index to p 256 $34 95

Reviewed by Emma C Murphy

In what is essentially a book for economists, Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka review the recent economic history of Israel in considerable detail

Chapters 1 and 2 of this work are devoted to providing an analysis of the background to and policies of the 1985 stabilization program Although the program undoubtedly proved a success in curbing Israel's runaway inflation, the authors are intensely critical of some of the basic policy tools of the program's architects, which they believe contributed to the 1988–89 recession The stabilization program, which consisted principally of the realignment of key prices and fiscal and monetary restraint, created a short-lived boom that rapidly deteriorated into recession Apparently, the recession was totally unforeseen by Israel's policymakers and was largely attributed by them to the combined effects of excessive wage increases and the *intifada* (uprising)

Razin and Sadka, by contrast, point to the persistent and (in their view) mistaken determination of then-Finance Minister Moshe Nissim to maintain a freeze on the exchange rate and to use it to manipulate wage and price stability On top of this, the restrictions on capital imports intended to limit the money supply pushed interest rates uncomfortably high In short, the authors claim, "the monetary policy pursued [subsequently] should be viewed as the fundamental force driving the economy into recession, a recession further deepened by the intifada and the rise in the effective tax burden" (p 65) Michael Bruno, the governor of the Bank of Israel at the time, is singled out for particularly heavy criticism

The authors move in the succeeding parts of the book to discuss some of the primary economic issues facing Israel in recent years, notably, the impact of the intifada and Israel's own stranglehold on the economies of the occupied territories, the implications of emigration from the former Soviet Union, taxation policy, international trade, and economic liberalization Unfortunately, the pages on the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip can only be termed as entirely misleading It is inappropriate to describe the economic relationship between Israel and the occupied territories as "a classic example of the integration of a 'large' and a 'small' economy," or to assert that it has resembled anything close to a common market (pp 74–7) Israel has imposed an extensive set of military orders that circumvent its obligations under international law and that (contrary to the inference of the authors on page 76) effectively replace and certainly override existing Egyptian and Jordanian law These military orders, which cover everything from the planting of a tomato plant to the picking of wild thyme, have undermined any independence of the Palestinian economy and have been used to ensure that the economic benefits of the relationship are nearly all in Israel's favor

Most critically, Israeli governments have sought to deny the Palestinian population any independent engine for growth by severely restricting capital accumulation and credit for development—for example, by closing the existing sources of formal agricultural loans to farmers in the late 1960s and early 1970s Israeli practices have been so well documented, not least by international agencies such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),[1] as well as by renowned Israeli academics such as Meron Benvenisti, that it does the authors little credit to display what amounts to willful blindness Benvenisti's own description of the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories—that it resembles "integration and exclusion," integration into the dominant economy when it benefits that economy and exclusion when it does not—is far closer to the truth [2]

The section on the economic effects of the intifada attributes Palestinian economic dependence wholly to indigenous social backwardness (p 88) Israel is portrayed as a benevolent administrator whose efforts are hindered by a destructive and bullying Palestinian leadership that has imposed the economic weapons of the intifada on its own people against their preferences Although the economic means of fighting the occupation are accurately listed, an understanding of their origins is missing For example, the attacks on Israeli banks were never simply attacks on institutions representing Israeli sovereignty (p 93) The Israelis had forcibly closed existing Arab banking structures and replaced them with branches of Israeli banks, which held their deposits in Israel and strictly controlled the credit available to Palestinians The profits of the banking sector accrued only to Israel, while the lack of alternative sources of credit stifled Palestinian attempts at development

Although one can argue with the authors on many of their "facts," their representation of the nature of the occupation, and the response to it, the single most disturbing feature of this section is the bland acceptance of Israeli countermeasures, such as curfews, roundups, and other collective punishments, which are illegal under international law Although other Israeli practices, including those regarding taxation, land expropriation, and settlement of civilian Israelis on occupied land are likewise illegal, collective punishment in the pursuit of economic control should never be considered as legitimate economic policy

It is a relief when the authors turn again to consideration of the Israeli economy In explaining historical economic growth in Israel, the massive financial support provided by the United States and Jews outside of Israel is, surprisingly, barely referred to, and one is left wondering at the description of Israel's economy as exhibiting "the rigors of a market economy" (p 109) Nonetheless, the vital nature of taxation policy, international trade, and economic liberalization make the final chapters topical and informative Sections written with the professional economist in mind may lose the general reader, but the essence of the prescription appears to be in favor of continued reform and further liberalization of the economy The potential crisis spots for the future—health care and pension provision—will be familiar to economists throughout the developed world, while the sources for optimism—the influx of new immigrants and prospects for peace in the region—have yet to prove their economic potential

The Economy of Modern Israel is packed with data and models, but short on political economy This would not necessarily be a problem, but in a country where economic policy is influenced so heavily by political input, most absolutely in the case of the occupied territories, one can only be aware that this is a book about economics but not about the economy

Emma C Murphy is a British Academy postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, and the co-editor of Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East *(New York and London British Academic Press, 1993)*

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, ARTS

Arab Comic Strips: Politics of an Emerging Mass Culture, by Allen Douglas and Fedwa Malti-Douglas Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1994 xiii + 227 pages Notes to p 245 Sources to p 257 Index to p 263 $39 95 cloth, $19 95 paper

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[1] The authors would have done well to read such reports as *The Palestinian Financial Sector under Israeli Occupation* (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3/rev 1, New York, 1989) or *Palestinian External Trade under Israeli Occupation* (UNCTAD/RDP/SEU/1, New York, 1989) These reports describe unequivocally the destructive and damaging effects that Israeli economic policies have had on the occupied territories

[2] See Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip Survey*, West Bank Data Base Project (Jerusalem, 1986), p 45

Reviewed by Eric Davis

Studies of popular culture are still relatively rare in the field of Middle Eastern studies Examinations of the political and social impact of comic strips are even rarer Hence, the appearance of a comprehensive and insightful study of this genre is a welcome addition indeed

The discipline of Middle Eastern studies in the West has often been resistant to incorporating new theoretical and conceptual paradigms *Arab Comic Strips* provides at least one indicator that this trend has begun to change The study reflects the influence of both political economy and post-modernism The former's influence can be seen in the authors' focus on mass culture and "history from below," while the latter's manifests itself in the authors' use of semiotics and their eschewal of any linear model of social change or totalizing discourse

The strengths of *Arab Comic Strips* lie in its comprehensive treatment of the genre it scrutinizes The authors present extensively detailed studies of comic strips that range from Iraq and the Gulf to North Africa and France Further, the strips they select cover a wide thematic and ideological terrain Pan-Arabist, Islamist, hybrid Western-Arab, and radical leftist strips all receive in-depth analysis Through this analysis, the reader gains great insight into political and cultural debates specific to particular regions of the Arab world The juxtaposition of strips representing different thematic, ideological, and geographical perspectives constitutes comparative analysis at its best

Following a brief introduction, the study begins with a discussion of the Egyptian comic *Miki* as a "mixed form" that uses foreign characters but places them in indigenous settings The authors point to the emphasis on pharaonic rather than Islamic motifs as *Miki*'s effort to promote a more secular and Egyptian-centered cultural perspective The next two chapters focus on two of the most prominent Arab leaders Gamal Abdul Nasser and Saddam Hussein Here the authors present a sophisticated analysis of the way in which the visual representation of the two leaders works to enhance their stature In chapter five's discussion of the Egyptian leftist Ahmad Hijazi, the reader is exposed to the cartoonist's trenchant critique cf Egypt's business elites, of the mass media's "use to infantilize and control the Egyptian population," and of hierarchy and authority generally In chapter six, Islamic strips produced in Egypt, such as *Zam Zam*, *al-Muslim al-Saghir*, and *al-Firdaws*, provide a penetrating look into the attempt of Islamist forces to socialize Egyptian children and the populace at large

These strips stand in sharp contrast to those Syrian strips presented in chapter seven, which are produced by the ruling Baath party While the Islamist strips focus on the family and personal values, through *al-Tali'i* and *'Usama* the Syrian strips privilege the state, emphasize the "modern and technological," and tout President Hafiz al-Asad as the "father-leader "

In chapter eight, the authors shift to North Africa, discussing the Tunisian strips, *al-'Irfan* and *Shahlul*, both directed at children and both published by the ruling Neo-Dustur party, and the semi-official *al-Riyad* One of the interesting themes presented here is the use of *turath* (national heritage) to legitimize modernizing policies of the ruling regime Chapter nine analyzes *Majid*, which is produced by Egyptian cartoonists and sponsored by the United Arab Emirates and is the childrens' magazine of highest circulation in the Arab world According to the authors, *Majid*'s strength lies in its ability "to assume the totality of the Arab heritage and to serve a Pan-Arabism in both political and cultural terms" (p 151)

Bilingual strips largely directed to Algerian audiences in both Algeria and France provide the content of chapters ten and eleven The ideology of the revolution continues to infuse domestic Algerian strips while the problems of the "beurs," France's North African immigrants, ground the strips produced in France The authors' short conclusion emphasizes the potentially subversive character of comic strips in confronting the many authoritarian regimes that currently dominate the Arab world (p 225)

To mention the shortcomings of *Arab Comic Strips* is less to highlight fundamental flaws than to point to directions for future research Perhaps most significant is the question of the study's conceptual unity As the study's sub-title suggests, the authors view the strips that they analyze as representative of a form of mass culture

However, as some of the strips are produced by the state for purposes of ideological indoctrination, e.g., those from Iraq and Syria, it is not immediately obvious that they do in fact reflect a mass impulse. The semiotic prism through which strips are viewed does not seem to be conducive to inquiring about the relationship between state authoritarianism and the ability of comic strips to achieve their potential as a medium of mass culture. In most Arab states, the official suspicion of mass culture and states' efforts to suppress or channel it into areas that support the ideological perspectives of the ruling political class hamper this genre's development.

Finally, one would have liked to have seen greater attention paid to the historical dimensions of Arab comic strips. Whatever happened to the Arab world's superman, Nabil Fawzi, and why is there no mention of *al-Ahram*'s Salah Jahin, for example? In other words, from what historical contexts have these strips evolved? Might not a better understanding of their past be suggestive of their future potential to influence the politics and culture of the region?

Despite these criticisms, this is a fine study that will greatly benefit any reader interested in Arab politics and society. It also underlines how little the popular culture of the Arab world, and of the Middle East more broadly defined, is understood.

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The Zephyrs of Najd: The Poetics of Nostalgia in the Classical Arabic Nasib, by Jaroslav Stetkevych. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993. xii + 201 pages. Append. to p. 234. Notes to p. 297. Bibl. to p. 318. Index to p. 326. $52 cloth, $21 paper.

From Arab Poet to Muslim Saint: Ibn al-Farid, His Verse, and His Shrine, by Th. Emil Homerin. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. xii + 97 pages. Notes to p. 133. Gloss. to p. 141. Bibl. to p. 155. Index to p. 162. $39.95.

Reviewed by Roger Allen

This review brings together two excellent additions to the library of works in English on Arabic poetry. Jaroslav Stetkevych, professor of Arabic Literature at the University of Chicago, has devoted himself for more than two decades to research and teaching on the subject. Th. Emil Homerin, now at the University of Rochester, is a former student of Stetkevych and thus belongs to what is now often referred to as the "Chicago school."

Stetkevych's long-awaited study takes as its topic the developments that took place with regard to the *nasib*, the section of the Arabic *qasidah* that, as his study clearly demonstrates, first appears as the elegiac opening of the earliest examples of Arabic poetry but then is gradually transformed to become a feature of major symbolic resonance that impinges upon the poem as a whole. In the opening chapter, he examines the qasidah as a "structure," using three different approaches: the purely formal approach adopted by the majority of classical Arab critics and of their Western counterparts, a comparison with the structural logic and moods created by the classical sonata form, and lastly, the ternary pattern of Arnold van Gennep's "separation-transition-incorporation" construct as found in his famous study, *The Rites of Passage*.[1] This chapter shows standards of scholarship that set the pattern for the book as a whole, providing abundant proof of the amazing breadth and depth of the author's erudition, and not only through a complete familiarity with the Arabic poetic tradition itself—with examples of the poetry rendered into a sonorous English idiom—but through comparison with the poetry and poetics of other traditions, classical and modern. For those who wish to consider Stetkevych's analyses with reference to the original Arabic texts, the Appendix (pp. 205–34) provides numbered examples of every line discussed.

In the second chapter, the author analyzes the changing nature of the nasib, examining in detail the poetry of Hassan ibn Thabit, Abu al-Atahiyah, Dhu al-Rummah, Ibn Khafajah, and Ibn al-Farid. Once again, these are the poets whose works are discussed in detail, but the works of many others are also included as, to quote his own words, the author explores "peripheries" that are "rich in entanglements" (p. 101). The cogency of the author's argument provides convincing proof of his major contention, namely, that, far from being a static component of the Arabic qasidah, the nasib "demands, critically, a constant renewal of interpretation even as it is constantly renewing itself in the alchemist's forge of a poetic vision which filters through historical changes in new moods and preoccupations" (p. 102).

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[1] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

The third chapter concerns itself with a well-known aspect of the nasib, namely, the presence of place-names. Stetkevych investigates what he terms the nasib's "landscape" through multiple references that range from the famous opening of Imru al-Qays's *mu‘allaqah* (collection of qasidahs) to a poem composed in Spain by Ahmad Shawqi (d. 1932). The emphasis in the poetry on wistful citations of the Najd region permits a further comparison with the classical tradition of Arcadia. Similarly, the fourth chapter explores the presence of the pastoral theme within the Arabic poetic tradition, particularly the fascinating "cosmic pastoral" whereby the poet becomes shepherd of the firmament itself, again the theme of the chapter is illustrated with numerous examples, the latest being that of Ibn Hazm (d. 1063), whose self-conscious invocation of the theme is discussed in some detail (pp. 157ff.). In the final chapter, Stetkevych branches out from the depiction of Paradise and Hell as found in the Quranic text to note instances of the motif in both poetry and prose, before completing his study with a survey of another kind of "space of delight," the enclosed garden that reflects the inner space of the poet's own longings—the final illustration being provided by the Andalusian poet, Ibn Zaydun, with his recollections of the palace of madinat al-Zahra' outside Cordoba.

If the scholarship and literary insight in this work are both superb, it remains to be said that the presentation is no less so. Text and footnotes are laid out with admirable clarity (as are the Arabic examples in the Appendix). One finishes a reading of this book with a sense of vicarious satisfaction, in that a work of such scrupulous analysis places the wonderful tradition of early Arabic poetry firmly into the comparative literary realm where it may serve to expand the critical horizons of scholars in other world literary traditions. Given the central importance of poetry within the Arab-Islamic cultural domain, it goes without saying that Stetkevych's *hauptwerk* has to be read by all those concerned in the humanistic study of the Middle East.

Homerin's study of the mystical poet, Ibn al-Farid (1181–1235), is divided into four chapters which, as the title suggests, trace the course of Ibn al-Farid's life, his development as a poet, and the process whereby he attained the status of *wali* or Muslim "saint." The first two chapters follow the course of the poet's life, the first based on biographical sources, the second on more hagiographic materials and, especially, the *Dibajat Ibn al-Farid* of his grandson, Sibt Ibn al-Farid. Homerin shows himself to be admirably familiar with the sources, and he uses the texts to good critical effect in order to reveal the intricacies of religious politics within the Sufi community during the Ayyubid period. It should also be noted that the copious examples from Ibn al-Farid's *Diwan* that are included in the text are attractively translated into English.

The third chapter, entitled "Controversy," explores the status of Ibn al-Farid's mystical beliefs in the years following his death, most notably, it examines in detail the political and economic bases of the theological debate that preoccupied the intellectual life of Cairo during the 15th-century reign of Qa'it Bey and his fellow Mamluk, Barquq. Homerin summarizes with admirable clarity the writings of a number of scholars surrounding the debate instigated by the Shafi‘i scholar, Ibrahim al-Biqa‘i, including such illustrious figures as al-Sakhawi and al-Suyuti. With the retirement of al-Biqa‘i to Damascus in disgrace, the sainthood of Ibn al-Farid was secured, and visits to his tomb-shrine increased.

The next chapter is entitled "Disjunction," and explores the decline in the fortunes of Ibn al-Farid's shrine. Homerin begins with an account of the throngs of people recorded by the famous Turkish intellectual and traveler, Evliya Celebi (1611-ca. 1684), as a participant in the Friday session (*hadrah*) at the mosque, and then follows the diminishing fortunes of the building and its rituals through the factionalism of later Mamluk rule, the opposition of modern Islamic reformers such as Rashid Rida, and, following the 1952 Revolution, the uneasy modus vivendi between the religious movements of Egypt and the government that controlled the extent of their activities Appended to this survey is an assessment of more recent scholarship, both in Arabic and European languages, concerning the poet and his beliefs The study ends appropriately with references to the poetry of Ibn al-Farid that are to be found in the fiction of Naguib Mahfouz, "thus, late in the twentieth century this thirteenth-century Muslim persists both through the power of his poetry and the belief in his sanctity" (p 97)

With this volume now at hand, the publication of the author's separate study of Ibn al-Farid's poetry, to be called *Passion Before Me, Fate Behind,* is eagerly anticipated This particular volume is extremely well presented, the only misprint that caught my eye was "Oattan" for "Qattan" (p 74) The notes and glossary are both comprehensive and useful

These two very different works—one an analysis of the Arabic poetic tradition on the broadest possible scale, the other a detailed study of a single poet and the story of his shrine—mark a further, important step in the long and continuing process of providing for a Western readership scholarly studies that apply contemporary modes and standards of criticism to the Arabic literary tradition In their different ways, both serve as models of what is needed

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MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite, by Robert D Kaplan New York The Free Press, 1993 xi + 312 pages Bibl to p 317 Index to p 333 $24 95

Reviewed by Teresa A Thomas

Perhaps the best line in the book is when the author muses, "Generalizations about Arabists are easy, provided one has never met any" (p 130) But this is followed by nine chapters which only reinforce an outdated stereotype The repeated use of the term "Arabists" to refer to US Middle East area experts, a term which he acknowledges is pejorative, reveals the book's underlying negative tone These members of an "American elite" are seen as wealthy WASPs with a romantic view of "Araby," another unusual, even archaic term

While the book opens with an interesting reiteration of the American Protestant missionary and British experience, it is far less convincing when forging an intellectual connection between that past and America's modern diplomats Throughout, the exceptional is presented as typical the missionary story segues into the careers of two State Department Arabists, William A Stoltzfus and Talcott Seelye (p 119) Of the more than one hundred Arabic language specialists the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) trained between 1947 and 1975, only two were born in the Middle East Kaplan points to them as "the unintended result" of the FSI Arabic program, as though there were many like them

The modern Arabists were not the "American elite" he would have the reader believe, and as a group they were no more elite than the Foreign Service as a whole Many whom he strives to make "courtly and Waspy" just don't fit the description, and his effort is fraught with internal contradictions on page 154 William Stoltzfus, Richard Parker, James Akins, and Andrew Killgore are "a courtly and Waspy elite," but later Akins is "not courtly and polite   not a rich WASP but a poor Quaker" (p 172) Elsewhere, Parker is "an army brat" who can only afford Kansas State (p 118) and Killgore is returned to his "humble origins" on an Alabama farm (p 156)

In fact, those trained after the FSI established its Arabic program in 1947 were from diverse backgrounds, and most graduated from state universities or private colleges their common denominator was linguistic talent Kaplan asserts that the "true middle-class democratization" of the State Department occurred in the eighties, but the elite had faded away decades earlier

In tracing their history, he overlooks some pioneers He argues that the first American Arabist was Eli Smith, not William Hodgson (pp 27 and 91) But Smith's work was Biblical translation, while Hodgson was a State Department linguist, who worked as a translator and treaty negotiator He studied Arabic and Turkish in the region, and his experience is overwhelmingly more analogous to that of modern Arabists Moreover, two Arabists and a few academics have written studies of Hodgson, and the *Foreign*

Service Journal has recounted his story. Far more Middle East hands would be aware of Hodgson than of Smith.

The first African-American Arabist was not Bernard Johns in "the early 70s," but Terence Todman, who studied Arabic at the FSI in 1960. The first woman "assigned to serve in Araby" was not April Glaspie in 1967, but Winifred Weislogel, who served in Tripoli in 1961 and studied at FSI in Tangier in 1963. While being critical of Glaspie, Kaplan never discusses the difficulties women of her generation faced in the State Department.

In 1942, Kaplan notes, when Loy Henderson headed the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (NEA), an American diplomat of the day observed: "The Near East! Nothing ever happens there" (p. 90). In 1942, the United States was staging a full-scale invasion of North Africa, the statement, however, was not made in 1942, but in 1938 to Evan Wilson, a member of the US Foreign Service. Loy Henderson, who never studied Arabic, was not the Arabists' role model, as Kaplan asserts. A more likely candidate would have been Raymond Hare, who served his entire career in the region, studied Arabic, headed NEA, and mentored a number of young officers who rose to ambassadorships.

There is no clear definition of who is or is not an Arabist: included are people who do not speak the language or even regard themselves as Arabists. Lucius Battle, who never studied Arabic and held one regional post, told Kaplan he was "the first non-Arabist" to head NEA, but Kaplan calls him one of "the last of the old-school Arabists"(pp. 149–50). Hermann Eilts is portrayed as passing the FSI fluency examination by a "count to ten in Arabic." While Kaplan cited Eilts's Association for Diplomatic Studies Foreign Affairs oral history interview,[1] he makes no mention of the years of Arabic and area studies described in it. Although criticized for "seeing Israel in only the simplest stereotypes" (p. 142), a number of Arabic-trained Foreign Service officers served, not just in the East Jerusalem consulate, but in Tel Aviv and Haifa, and one as US ambassador to Israel.

The turning point for the Arabists, according to Kaplan, comes in 1969 when a group called the "peace processors" gradually replaced the entrenched Arabists. "While their NEA colleagues enjoyed Oriental rugs and old British travel books, [Joseph] Sisco and [Alfred] Atherton fell in love with documents and memoranda"(p. 162). Cloying romantic metaphors aside, how could a group, who often invested two years in language study and built careers as political reporting officers, not be policy "wonks"? Kaplan's "peace processors" followed the Kissinger recipe for step-by-step diplomacy, and might more accurately be termed "piece processors."

The mantra of Middle East hands was a just and comprehensive peace and a broader approach. A number of Secretaries of State, from Henry Kissinger to George Schultz, were advised that excluding Palestinians, Syrians, or Saudis from the process would doom American efforts. The advice was not heeded and that may be why it took until 1993, and the Norwegians, to achieve the beginnings of a settlement. Time has shown the wisdom of the Arabists' counsel.

Iraq is used to substantiate the author's assertion that these were "the secret drivers of American policy since World War II." But when Ambassador April Glaspie met Saddam Hussein in August 1990, she was not so much "freighted with the baggage of a venerable Arabist tradition," as she was by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 26, bearing President George Bush's signature. Kaplan dismisses, with various excuses, his own evidence that George Bush, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Haass, the National Security Council (NSC) member in charge of Iraq, established a policy of accommodation (p. 294), and then pleads that Glaspie should have used "common sense." His argument is weakened by his earlier admission that this was "a policy handed down from above" (p. 261).

Kaplan raises the issue of anti-Semitism by making a revealing point about Richard Parker, stating he had "ugly caricatures of Begin" on his study walls (p. 12). This is a serious charge and should not be taken lightly. Both Kaplan and I interviewed Parker at about the same time, and I did not find them ugly. Moreover, they are not caricatures of Menachem Begin, but political cartoons of Richard Parker.

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[1] The Association for Diplomatic Studies conducts the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, which interviews retired Foreign Service officers and politically appointed diplomats.

While claiming Arabists hate Ariel Sharon (p 142), Kaplan does not explain Sharon's role in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, nor the consequences for America In the next year our Beirut embassy was bombed with 63 killed, the US Marine barracks were bombed with 241 killed, and later the East Beirut embassy building was bombed Kaplan decries the isolation of US diplomats in the Riyadh embassy, which "had 'security' written all over it," but does not mention that it was also bombed in 1983

Not a word is said about the murders of Ambassador Cleo Noel and George Curtis Moore in Khartoum in 1973 There is only a passing reference to the murder of former Deputy Secretary of NEA Rodger Davies Less than one line is devoted to the murder of Ambassador to Lebanon Francis Meloy in 1976, which fails to mention that his aide Robert Waring and their driver also died Would the violent murder of nearly a half dozen of his subjects undercut Kaplan's thesis that they maintained an unrealistic "romance" with "Araby"?

Kaplan might have looked at what they have written, but his bibliography contains only one article by a State Department Arabist In taking such a superficial look, Kaplan fails to dig beneath the stereotype, and as a result only embellishes it One hears the faint whine of an axe grinding when he refers to a breed "going extinct" (p 234) or a briefing as "one of the last gasps of the Arabist old guard before they drowned" (p 191)—one senses him waiting for the bubbles to rise Although he opened his book stating he wished to "empathize, not sympathize" with his subjects, he has done neither

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Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, 2d ed., by Richard Schofield London Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993 xv + 207 pages Appends to p 215 Index to p 226 £15

Reviewed by David H Finnie

One of the nagging loose ends left over from the 1991 Gulf War is the matter of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait The roots of the difficulty are very deep they are tangled in British-Ottoman diplomacy, early Iraqi nationalism, the discovery and development of oil fields underlying the disputed area, the displacement of Britain by the United States as the "guardian of the Gulf," the end of the Cold War, and the rather surprising recent emergence of the United Nations as a factor to be reckoned with in Gulf affairs All these and many subsidiary complications are reviewed in meticulous detail in the revised and expanded version of this study by Richard Schofield, a geographer and director of research at the Geopolitics and International Research Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

But why, one may ask, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the celebrated Security Council Resolution 687, establishing the limits of the frontier and providing for its demarcation, does the boundary problem still qualify as a "loose end"? First, because of continuing wariness in Washington and at the UN about Iraq's belated pledge (10 November 1994) to recognize Kuwait's independence and the boundary between the two countries Second, because if history is any guide, no foreseeable successor government is likely to abandon what Iraqis universally regard as Iraq's just historic claims to adequate access to the waters of the Gulf Third (and here Schofield's analysis breaks new ground), because of certain rather technical and problematic aspects of the terms of reference and mode of operations of the UN's Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC)

This last consideration focuses on the process by which UNIKBDC has demarcated (i e , plotted and marked) the boundary in the shallow estuaries leading from Iraq's only major port at Umm Qasr, past the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubayan, to the open waters of the Gulf As Schofield neatly puts it, "UNIKBDC's operations hit choppy water in the Khor Abdullah" (p 198) Too arcane to elaborate here, the matter caused friction and dissension among Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and UN officials and consultants involved in the work of the Commission, leading even to the resignation of its chairman Is this unhappy tale just choppy water in an estuary? Or does it constitute a material flaw in the post-Gulf War settlement? Where the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border is concerned, nothing is ever very certain for long

Schofield's account of the work of the Boundary Commission provides the sort of detailed chronicle of UN affairs rarely accessible in the public domain The convoluted story perhaps illuminates a homely truth that the finer aspects of a complex international dispute cannot always be accommodated with finality in the majestic provisions of a Chapter VII resolution of the UN Security Council The dominant mode of the Council is command there will always be room in international affairs for negotiation, conciliation, and common sense

Unaccountably, the publisher's handsome front cover for the second edition (1993) is precisely identical to that of the first (1991), whereas the two versions are by no means interchangeable Schofield has enhanced his original work with a hundred emendations and improvements, not least by bringing it up to date through late 1993 Check the copyright page to be sure you are looking at the right edition

David H Finnie, a lawyer, is the author of Shifting Lines in the Sand Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq *(Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1992)*

Oil, the Persian Gulf States, and the United States, by Võ Xuân Hân Westport, CT and London Praeger Publishers, 1994 xi + 162 pages Bibl to p 167 Index to p 173 $55

Reviewed by Gwenn Okruhlik

The flow of capital and goods between states is a central concern to students of international political economy In this book, Võ Xuân Hân, an economist, concentrates on investment and trade relations between the United States and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) He attempts to place these relations in historical and contemporary contexts Readers who want information about broad trends in US-GCC trade over several decades will find general economic data There are chapters devoted to the energy equation, the lands and their economies, the changing relationship between private oil companies and host countries, the trade connection, and prospects for future trade What the author does not offer, however, are explanations of the various economic statistics and trends

Perhaps because the book lacks a clearly argued thesis, it contains several contradictions and omissions Several examples will suffice The critical role of Saudi Arabia as swing producer is never examined, even though the book is on US-GCC relations In describing changes in the ties between the multinational oil companies and producer states, the author suggests both that an era characterized by a spirit of cooperation and partnership began with the death of the old concession system (p 95) and that the chance for confrontation has become greater without the benefit of the buffer function traditionally performed by companies (p 108) Further, without explaining the tension, he states that the dominance of rent promotes instability (p 71), yet later says that these states have proven attractive to investors because of their remarkable stability (p 88) Also, it remains unclear whether the East-West rivalry will be replaced by a North-South conflict (p 152), or if North-South relations can be expected to be less confrontational in character (p 160) Other statements are troublesome as well Pre-oil Arabia was in fact more than "the land of endless deserts, oases, and camels" (p 62), as has been demonstrated by Altorki and Cole [1]

The terms Arab, Middle East, and Gulf Cooperation Council are sometimes used without clear distinction The unit of analysis is actually the last Though the discussion is placed in the context of North-South relations, it is probably an overstatement to say that "OPEC has been the catalyst of change for the whole structure of North-South relations themselves" (p 38) Hân does acknowledge the inequality in distribution of oil wealth within the GCC countries, but stretches the point when he states that a tiny minority has been made very rich "while life of the great majority [has] remained little touched" (p 70)

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[1] Soraya Altorki and Donald Cole, *Arabian Oasis City The Transformation of 'Unayzah* (Austin University of Texas Press, 1989), and "Was Arabia Tribal?" (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association, Washington, DC, 1991)

The lives of most people have been touched in ways positive and negative through distributive schemes and through the increasing intrusion of the state

In much of the text, the evident is stated as conclusion, e g , the author indicates that US imports exceed exports, resulting in a deficit, and that the development in oil trade parallels that of overall trade Broad trends in trade patterns are delineated but not accounted for through analytical reasoning

The final chapter appears to be written from the perspective of a foreign private investor, as local protectionist policies are called "troublesome" and the prospect for US military exports "brighter" if regional political stability deteriorates What Hân calls "the bureaucratic infringement" on the freedom of travel of foreign business persons (p 156) is more political in nature

There is academic literature on the rentier state, international trade relations, and the GCC that is not utilized in the book It is difficult to interpret the statistics because it is unclear if and how military sales, investment, and training assistance are included in the data Finally, the text contains many misspellings and grammatical errors In short, while Hân has collected information to provide a general description of US-GCC trade and oil relations, the reader will have to look elsewhere for analysis

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The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, by Gilles Kepel Tr by Alan Braley University Park Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994 viii + 203 pages Index to p 215 $35 cloth, $14 95 paper

Reviewed by John O Voll

Gilles Kepel has undertaken a number of studies of Islamist movements and now, in this book, he examines the broader phenomena of religious resurgence in three religions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism—at the end of the twentieth century Kepel suggests important dimensions of each of the resurgences that are better understood when they are viewed through a broad, comparative perspective This broader and more inclusive perspective is not unique to Kepel's work Instead, Kepel's work shows that this perspective has now reached a level of maturity with a substantial body of monographic material available on which to base descriptive and comparative analyses

The studies of religious resurgence at the end of the twentieth century have become more global in coverage in recent years Kepel's volume can be placed in the emerging scholarly literature The huge "Fundamentalism Project," directed by Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, covered virtually every major tradition of world religion [1] No individual scholar can have the same comprehensive inclusiveness as the volumes published by this project, but works by individuals provide a basic foundation for the library of materials Among the broadly conceived works by individual scholars, the book by Bruce Lawrence, *Defenders of God,*[2] deals with the same three religions but gives greater emphasis than Kepel to more theoretical considerations In contrast, the study by Mark Juergensmeyer[3] deals also with developments in Hinduism, Buddhism, and other traditions, but focuses on the issue of the relationship between religious revival and the secular nation-state In terms of coverage, Kepel provides more coverage of developments within Christianity in Europe and gives greater attention to movements which attempt the re-religionization of society "from below " Issues of state power and control are an important part of Kepel's analysis, but he provides important insights into developments in non-state sectors of society as well

Kepel begins with an introductory discussion of "religions in a confused world," in which he sets his basic argument that the message of the movements of religious resurgence "does not spring from a dethronement of reason or from manipulation by hidden forces, rather it is the undeniable evidence of a deep malaise in society that can no longer be interpreted in terms of our traditional categories of thought" (p 11) He then presents separate chapters on the resurgence in "Mediterranean Islam," Roman Catholicism in Europe, North American Protestantism, and Judaism in Israel and the diaspora A short concluding discussion provides a summary of the main points of the volume

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[1] The major volumes resulting from the work of this project began with Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby, eds , *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1991)

[2] Bruce B Lawrence, *Defenders of God The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (New York Harper and Row, 1989)

[3] Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1993)

One of the important themes in this analysis is the distinction between re-religionization "from above" and "from below " In each of the religions discussed, there were significant movements of religious resurgence which attempted to transform society by creating alternative societies or converting individuals rather than imposing the transformation from positions of power Over time, political agendas of the movements changed, especially as governments became aware of the growing popular power of the religious resurgence, and movements from below often mingled with movements of religionization from above

This structure of analysis provides an important perspective from which to examine issues of religion and politics, as well as highlighting important comparisons For example, popular democratic aspirations and commitments in Europe and the United States place a "constraint by democracy" (p 98) on movements of re-religionization that does not exist in Islamic societies Similarly, the widespread popular acceptance of secular perspectives in countries like France, Italy, and the United States make the nature of resurgence movements "from below" different from those working in societies where secularism was a foreign and elite ideology

Kepel continually reminds the reader of the similarities and differences among the various movements described However, the comparisons tend to be on specifics and come as interjections in the line of description of the particular movements The broader comparative and theoretical perspectives are less immediately presented to the reader It would have been helpful if Kepel had done more to indicate how his analysis fits into the important theoretical and analytical perspectives that have emerged in recent years One might expect, for example, with his emphasis on the importance of re-religionization from below and the importance of popular resentment at the intrusion of broader secular forces into the life of society, that Kepel would at least give some recognition to the important theoretical considerations of just such matters by Jurgen Habermas with his concept of the "colonization of the lifeworld" and the popular response[4] Similarly, discussions of the new religious movements in the global contexts by scholars like Roland Robertson[5] provide an important conceptual basis for consideration of the case studies presented by Kepel

For people especially interested in Middle Eastern resurgences, Kepel presents a very important reminder that Middle Eastern movements do not exist in a vacuum This book is a significant antidote to the sometimes careless "Islamic exceptionalism" that is found in many discussions of the Islamic resurgence It is to be hoped that this title will be found in the reading lists of serious courses dealing with the contemporary religious resurgences in the Middle East and in the libraries of the scholars who teach such courses

John O Voll, Department of History, University of New Hampshire

The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed, by Cameron R Hume Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1994 xi + 216 pages Appends to p 236 Notes to p 255 Bibl to p 262 Index to p 269 $29 95

Reviewed by Gary Sick

Iran and Iraq have tested the ingenuity of the Security Council at some crucial turning points in the history of the United Nations In 1946, the effort to dislodge Soviet troops from northern Iran was the opening skirmish for the newly created Security Council and set the tone for more than forty years of Cold War wrangling Subsequently, the UN had to deal with Iraq's 1961 threat to annex Kuwait, an attempt by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran to annex Bahrain in 1970, and the feud between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-'Arab River in the mid-1970s Starting in 1979, the UN found itself at the center of US diplomatic efforts to free American hostages in Tehran The international body was paralyzed when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, but eventually crafted the resolution that brought the war to an end in 1988 When Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council followed the US lead and for the first time in its history acted in unison to repel the aggression

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[4] See, for example, the analysis in Echo Fields, "Understanding activist fundamentalism Capitalist crisis and the 'colonization of the lifeworld,' " *Sociological Analysis* 52, no 2 (1991), pp 175–90

[5] See, for example, Roland Robertson and JoAnn Chirico, "Humanity, globalization, and worldwide religious resurgence A theoretical exploration," *Sociological Analysis* 46, no 3 (1985), pp 219–42

Cameron Hume has used this sequence of events to illustrate the transformation of UN peacekeeping from the deep freeze of the Cold War through the perestroika thaw to the heat of Desert Storm Hume, an American Foreign Service officer, was at the US Mission to the UN in the late 1980s, when the members of the Security Council began to search for a way out of the Iran-Iraq war, and again in 1990 as they experimented for the first time with the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter Most of his book is devoted to a reexamination of those fateful events

The author's insider status is a great blessing and a small disappointment As one who was present, he is able to identify with authority the dominant issues His description, for example, of the intimate geography of UN diplomacy in the anterooms of the Security Council chambers, the transformation of ceremonial dinners into substantive encounters, the new role of the counselors of the five Permanent Representatives, who began to meet in polite but productive brainstorming sessions, and the choice of private residences rather than offices for the increasingly frequent consultative meetings among the five are presented with the kind of precision that comes from being there For anyone who is seriously interested in the elaborate diplomatic game that ended the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Hume provides a set of previously unpublished negotiating documents that alone are worth the price of the book

Almost casually, he offers interpretations of several controversial incidents that have the ring of authenticity Information from a Soviet defector was fed back to Iran and resulted in the total destruction of the Tudeh Party in 1983 Most US accounts credit this coup to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Hume gives full credit to British intelligence

As an official, however, the author must observe a level of discretion that occasionally can be frustrating Instead of describing directly the arguments and policy conflicts that are inevitable in events of this magnitude, the author quotes from the public record Although these carefully selected excerpts no doubt accurately reflect the essential issues in the debate, there is a bloodlessness and non-judgmental quality about the text that one suspects would be quite different if the author could simply call the blows in his own words

Hume is meticulously fair, if uncritical, in describing the positions of each of the states involved in these events The US Mission no doubt perceived this process at times as a contest to win the battle of the briefs, and some of that spirit understandably creeps into the text A bit more reflection about tactics and objectives would have been welcome

This book demonstrates just how messy and equivocal is the process of forging a policy in a forum of sovereign states As the author notes in his concluding remarks, "The belief that the United Nations has an independent personality is wrong Member states constitute the United Nations" (p 215) This book describes how the member states operate, in good times and bad And it does so with grace and insight.

Gary Sick is Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The History of the Saffarids of Sistan and the Maliks of Nimruz, (247/861 to 949/1542–3), by Clifford Edmund Bosworth Costa Mesa, CA Mazda Publishers, 1994 xxvi + 477 pages Bibl to p 502 Index to p 525 $49

Reviewed by Richard N Frye

The writing of political histories in chronological order is at present unpopular, but Edmund Bosworth is one of those rare scholars who follow Ranke's dictum that history should be the recording of what actually happened The author has written much on this period in the history of Iran and is acknowledged as the foremost authority on the Saffarids, the dynasty which arose from plebeian ranks and ruled Sistan for centuries The present work is based on lectures Bosworth gave at Columbia University and is greatly enlarged with a formidable array of footnotes The select bibliography comprehensively supplements the footnotes The maps and tables are also a great aid to the reader There is little one can add to this encyclopedic treatment of the Saffarid dynasty and their successors, the Nasrids in Sistan, who are called the Maliks of Nimruz in the sources

One chapter is devoted to the administration and organization of Saffarid domains One might have wished for more information on this and social questions, for the proliferation of names and political changes is tedious Although the author discusses the *'ayyārs*, whom Bosworth translates as vigilantes, the reader would have appreciated an explanation of why they were so important, especially in this land Such an item as the important pre- and Islamic shrine of Kuh-i Khwaja is not mentioned, although other sites or buildings are described One misses any analysis of changes in the life of the people other than their joining one military expedition or leader in his struggle for control over Sistan The extensive use of coinage by the author to determine exact dates of rule, however, is noteworthy

The main source used by Bosworth is the Persian language *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, but he also makes prodigious use of other sources to give a most complete history of the golden age of a once prosperous and important land, now a poor and desolate border area between Iran and Afghanistan One might dispute minor points in the book, but it is remarkably free of mistakes, including few typographical errors, and until new sources appear, it will remain the definitive work on the history of the Saffarids

Richard N Frye is Emeritus Aga Khan Professor of Iranian at Harvard University

A History of Qarabagh: An Annotated Translation of Mirza Jamal Javanshir Qarabaghi's Tarikh-e Qarabagh, by George A Bournoutian Costa Mesa, CA Mazda Publishers, 1994 xvi + 138 pages Bibl to p 144 Gloss to p 147 Index to p 157 Facsimile of Persian Text, 62 pp $24 95

Reviewed by Dennis R Papazian

Mirza Jamal's history of Qarabagh from 1740 to 1806 is one of the essential sources for any study of Transcaucasia and, perhaps, even Iran Qarabagh can roughly be defined as that area which extends from the confluence of the Kur and Arax rivers to Georgia in the north and present-day Armenia in the west Qarabagh can be divided into three parts the lowlands, the piedmont or high valleys, and the mountainous area known today by the Russian name, Nagorno-Karabakh The lowlands and the high valleys lie in present-day Azerbaijan, while mountainous Qarabagh is presently in contention between Armenians and Azeri Turks The term "Azerbaijan," however, is reserved by Mirza Jamal for the northwest province of Iran

Mirza Jamal's history begins at the time of the collapse of the Safavid Iranian empire, which allowed the petty rulers of Transcaucasia to assert their independence and to compete with one another for territory, and it ends with the emergence of the Qajar dynasty in Iran and the final Russian conquest of the Caucasus Jamal chronicles in some detail the rule of Panah Khan and his son Ebrahim Khan, who successively governed Qarabagh He also covers, in passing, the campaigns of Nader Shah Afshar in Transcaucasia, the struggle for the Iranian throne, the contention between King Erekle II of Georgia and Hajji Chelibi of Shakki, the temporary unification of Iran under Karim Khan Zand, the final Qajar victory, and the unsuccessful attempts of Aga Mohammad Khan, Fath 'Ali Shah, and 'Abbas Mirza to halt the inevitable Russian conquest

Mirza Jamal's history presents us with a vivid, remarkably objective, and informative picture of an era of almost constant warfare marked by intrigue, conspiracy, and treachery It was a time of endlessly shifting alliances driven by family and clan loyalties, but, above all, personal self-interest—a time long before the appearance of present-day nationalism and its ethnic allegiances

Bournoutian is well-prepared, by training and experience, in knowledge of languages to translate and annotate the work of Qarabaghi (ca 1774–1853) Bournoutian's field of specialization is northern Iran and Transcaucasia, and he has done primary research in the archives of the republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan He is also learned in the history of Russia, Iran, and the Middle East In his scholarly research, Bournoutian uses Arabic, Turkish (modern and Ottoman), Azeri-Turkish, Iranian, Armenian, Russian, French, German, and English

Bournoutian's successful translation is based on a facsimile edition (1877–78) of the 1847 version, which is reproduced in this volume following the index The original is written in the *nasta'liq* script, occasionally combined with the *shekaste* script

Scholarly annotations—which perhaps comprise three-quarters of the book—are numerous, often lengthy, and always invaluable Bournoutian corrects chronology, explains terminology, identifies personages, clarifies events, gives modern equivalents of weights, measures, and dates, elucidates many minor points, and corrects errors of names, places, and facts His annotations use information from other Qarabaghi chronicles (such as Mirza Adigozal Beg's *Qarabagh-name*[1] and 'Abbas Qoli Aqa Bakikhanov's *Golestan-e Eram*[2]), as well as works by Iranian historians (such as Eskandar Monshi's *Tarikh-e Alamaraye 'Abbasi*[3] and the anonymous work *Tadhkirat al-Muluk*[4]), and he has excluded, except for a few necessary references, all Armenian, Russian, and West European sources The objectivity of his scholarship, accordingly, cannot be doubted

Bournoutian has prefaced his translation with an extensive and useful introduction and four detailed maps He follows it with an extensive bibliography of primary works in Persian, Azeri, Turkish, Arabic, Russian, Georgian, French, and English (including translations from Armenian, Latin, Turkish, Russian, and Arabic), as well as a list of numerous secondary sources He also has produced a valuable glossary of selected terms and an index

This English translation is the first complete, unexpurgated, and fully annotated edition of Mirza Jamal's *Tarikh-e Qarabagh* in any language Russian (1959), Azeri (1959), and Turkish (1990) translations have been published but, as Bournoutian points out, these earlier translations have scant scholarly annotations and, more importantly, they have omitted certain passages The 1990 Turkish edition, for example, is a translation of the 1959 Azeri translation (including its introduction), and has retained all its errors and omissions—particularly with reference to the Armenians

The *Tarikh-e Qarabagh*, accordingly, has contemporary political implications Since the 1950s, Azerbaijani and Turkish scholars have denied the historical presence of Armenians in Qarabagh Mirza Jamal offers ample evidence that the Armenians of mountainous Qarabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh) not only existed, but enjoyed quasi-autonomy and played a significant role in the complex political and military affairs of the time

Bournoutian has provided the academic community with an exceptionally lucid, annotated translation of an important chronicle covering a complex period of Transcaucasian history His work will undoubtedly remain the standard scholarly text for decades to come

Dennis R Papazian, professor of history, The University of Michigan-Dearborn

The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire, by Avigdor Levy Princeton Darwin Press, 1992 xv + 124 pages Notes to p 150 Chron to p 164 Bibl to p 176 Append to p 178 Index to p 196 $19 95

The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, by Stanford J Shaw New York New York University Press, 1991 xiii + 271 pages Appends to p 288 Notes to p 301 Bibl to p 344 Index to p 380 $60

Reviewed by Jane Hathaway

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[1] (Baku Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, 1950)

[2] (Baku Elm Press, 1970)

[3] Tr by Roger M Savory as *History of Shah 'Abbas the Great* 2 vols (Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1978)

[4] Tr and ed by Vladimir Minorsky as *A History of Sharvan and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries* (Cambridge W Heffer & Sons, 1958)

The quincentennial of Spanish Jews' immigration to the Ottoman Empire has yielded quite a number of publications. Brandeis University celebrated early with a 1987 conference on Ottoman Jewry. Avigdor Levy has expanded his introduction to the forthcoming volume on this conference into a book-length overview of the conclusions reached. Even in this modest chronological narrative, Levy does not shrink from the revisionist opinions aired at the conference (conference participants are acknowledged in parentheses). He points out that the Sephardic migration occurred when the Ottoman Empire was rapidly expanding and in need of fresh, enterprising populations, and that the Ottoman administration was able to use Jewish functionaries to keep the local elites of the conquered territories in check. Still, he gives due weight to the entrenched Romaniot and *musta'rab* (Arabized) communities in these territories, noting that these non-Sephardic elements constituted a majority of Ottoman Jewry well into the seventeenth century. In examining communal structures, Levy cites the finding of recent scholarship that a chief rabbi for Istanbul, though not for an empire-wide millet, is identifiable as early as the mid-fifteenth century.

The prosperity of leading Sephardim during the reign of Suleyman I (1520–1566) is well-known. Levy's depiction of the ensuing three centuries as "the age of standstill and decline" is unfortunate, however, a quasi-revisionist survey should acknowledge rethinking of the standard Ottoman decline paradigm. Instead, exceptions to the scheme of pervasive, unstoppable decline, such as the prosperous Jewish community of seventeenth-century Izmir, are treated as aberrations. On the other hand, the Shabbatai Zvi affair is treated cautiously as neither a symptom nor a catalyst of communal decline. Oddly, however, the author does not consider the surge of Kadizadeli puritanism that conditioned the Ottoman response to the false messiah.

European penetration during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries created unprecedented opportunities for the empire's Christian populations and arguably contributed to nationalism in the Ottoman Balkans early in the nineteenth century. The Jews of these provinces, often seen as beholden to the Ottoman state, frequently suffered from these movements. On the other hand, as a reliably loyal minority, Jews were increasingly employed in the Ottoman administration and armed forces during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Levy considers the 1890s, before the separatist upheavals and ethnic strife that preceded World War I, the period when Jews fared best under Ottoman rule. With the Tanzimat reforms, Jews had acquired an unprecedented degree of equality, by the end of the century, moreover, the upheavals that erupted in the wake of the reforms had dissipated. Ottoman Jewry also benefited belatedly from the European Jewish enlightenment, which brought Jewish philanthropic and educational organs into the empire. By the time the empire disintegrated, its Jewish population was an entrenched segment of Ottoman society whose upper strata had achieved an impressive degree of education and wealth. Many Jews took significant roles in the formation of the Turkish republic.

In contrast to Levy's brief survey incorporating the contributions of many scholars, Stanford Shaw's book is a weighty work reflecting the author's distinctive perceptions. Rather than conceding the varied interpretations that the study of Ottoman Jewish history inevitably yields, Shaw offers a black and white history in which the Ottomans and their Jewish friends battle villainous indigenous and foreign Christians. Shaw idealistically terms the empire's acceptance of the Spanish emigrés "the ingathering of the exiles," downplaying any purely pragmatic motives on the sultans' part and skirting the fact that many Sephardim settled elsewhere before entering Ottoman territory. Shaw's treatment of the so-called era of decline is similar to Levy's, although Shaw is far more insistent on the decline of Jewish cultural and intellectual life during these centuries. He seems ill-disposed toward mysticism, portraying the Kabbalism of Luria, Caro, and Shabbatai Zvi as degenerate and harmful to the Jewish community.

More unsettling is Shaw's tendency to attribute the empire's decline, and with it the decline of Jewish fortunes, to the influence of *devsirme* recruits, that is, Christian converts taken into military slavery. He implies that, despite their conversion and regardless of their particular backgrounds, these recruits remained implacably hostile to Jews and thwarted their advancement at every turn. The indigenous Christians, largely Greeks and Armenians, who profited from European commercial penetration during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are depicted in much the same light Indeed, Shaw treats the blood libels of the mid-nineteenth century as Christian conspiracies, where a more balanced analysis would have acknowledged that minority populations tend to compete for economic and social advantage, above all at times of profound social change Perhaps his most astonishing assertion is that eastern Christians transmitted the blood libel and other forms of anti-Semitic harassment to their European brethren, thus helping to prepare the ground for the atrocities of World War II

Since Shaw's study includes the end of the empire and the republican era, he points out the contributions of Jews and Donmes to the independence movement and addresses Zionism, showing great understanding of Ottoman-Turkish suspicion of the movement toward a Jewish state His account of Jewish life in the Turkish republic is roseate, discounting every possibility of discrimination, including measures such as the capital tax known as the *varlık vergısı* that, while perhaps not intended as discriminatory, undeniably had that effect Shaw's study is most rewarding when it expounds on little-known features of Jewish life, such as the evolution of Ladino or the Sephardic musical heritage These enlightening nuggets make the generally unnuanced, apologetic tone of the book all the more disappointing

Levy and Shaw offer two divergent tributes to the anniversary of the Sephardic exodus Nonetheless, both works represent the fruition of this quincentennial, their appearance and that of other such studies is gratifying

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WOMEN

The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press, by Beth Baron New Haven, CT and London Yale University Press, 1994 x + 193 pages Notes to p 245 Index to p 259 $27 50

Reviewed by Arlene Elowe MacLeod

The myth that men first promoted women's rights in Egypt is countered in this examination of women's journals in the decades prior to the 1919 revolution Baron describes her project as the attempt to recover women's voices by tracing the beginning of the Arabic women's press, revealing a new female literary culture The fame of male writers such as Qasim Amin has overshadowed a lively literary interaction in which women participated as authors, editors, and readers While traditional accounts of women's public activism in Egypt usually begin with the 1920s, Baron argues for the need to look instead at female intellectuals and the journals they produced to understand the evolution of women's entry into public life

One strength of this interesting historical reconstruction is the emphasis on the connections between literary culture and social transformation Baron discusses the relationship between authors and readers who participated in this new literary climate, and details the dramatic changes in women's lives under debate By situating the texts, she avoids the ahistorical tendencies common to accounts of Middle Eastern women and gives a vivid portrait of a time of change Women writers emerge, not only as acute observers, but also as initiators of change, re-imagining community and family, a process that continues in the debates over women's role in the Arabic press today

Baron found few accounts of individual lives and little autobiography But she draws our attention to the ethnic and religious differences among women writers, from the work of Syrian Christians in the earlier period to the endeavors of later Egyptian writers, both Christian and Muslim While these writers elaborate a variety of arguments, it is intriguing that they generally justified their work, not as personal expression, but as a service to others and to larger causes One poignant example concerns the emphasis on children's health in an era of high child mortality Articles counseled women to breast-feed their children, rather than using less attentive wet nurses Indeed, authors would write only after all their domestic duties were done, as they were careful to inform their readers, writing was intended to enhance and not replace domesticity In a related point, many used pseudonyms, rather than breaking customary ideals of seclusion, and in fact the debate over revelation of names parallels the debate over dropping the face veil

Contemporary middle-class ideals, which emphasize women working outside the home in order to serve their families and be better mothers rather than for personal satisfaction, reveal the same concerns Articles in these 16- to 48-page journals dealt with work, education, marriage, household instruction, and included literary selections, often serialized Seeming much like women's magazines today, some comparison to contemporary Middle Eastern or Western women's magazines might have been interesting to include

One important question, given the centrality of domesticity, is whether these writers are actually feminists Most articles, Baron argues, pursue the idea of women's rights within a framework of difference from men, not equality While a great deal of popular literature on Middle Eastern women certainly sees feminism and Islam as antithetical, Baron offers a nuanced explanation based on the notion that the label "feminist" is too broad and obscures important differences of opinion By pointing out the different strategies—secularist, modernist, and Islamist—appearing in women's writing, she gives us a rich picture of the debates

Going beyond the texts themselves, Baron notes that creating a journal involved both a business and a literary activity Being a writer or editor was one of the only professions open to women, due to journalism's rather low, and therefore unregulated, status at the time Editing a journal prepared women for entering politics and the other professions, and women formed associations around journals for charitable or academic purposes that became an organizational foundation for future public activism

Throughout, Baron emphasizes the upper- and middle-class status of the writers and editors, who saw themselves as producers of literary texts within the high tradition, rather than as allies with lower-class women and their oral culture and expressive forms, such as storytellers These status concerns remain important for lower-middle-class women today, who pursue the articles in the contemporary women's magazines for hints on maintaining an upper-middle-class home Baron offers, in this most interesting book, not only an account of the origins of women's writing and public activism, but historical insight into the new middle class and its ideologies Domesticity, including a marital ideal of love and greater care of children, is an important middle-class value in Cairo today The debates of the women's awakening make timely reading

Arlene Elowe MacLeod is associate professor of political science at Bates College and the author of Accommodating Protest Working Women, the New Veiling, and Change in Cairo *(New York Columbia University Press, 1993)*

Recent Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Asian States' Relations with the Middle East and North Africa: A Bibliography, 1950–1993, by Sanford R Silverburg and Bernard Reich Metuchen, NJ and London Scarecrow Press, 1994 xii + 158 pages Index $22 50 Following World War II the Asian states became increasingly interested in the Middle East and North Africa, and in recent years relations between the regions have become closer for economic and financial reasons This bibliography offers a listing of published works in English as well as in other major Western and some non-Western languages on the diplomatic, political, economic, and religious aspects of the relationships between Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa The bibliography is listed alphabetically by area or country and by author within these subdivisions There is also an index of authors (NW)

A Bibliography of Islamic Law, 1980–1993, by Laila al Zwaini and Rudolph Peters Leiden and New York E J Brill, 1994 ix + 239 pages Indices $80 The book, intended for both researchers and practitioners in Islamic law, supplements three other named bibliographies and includes Western language publications between 1980–93 The emphasis is on the Middle East and North Africa, but includes information on sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia There are bibliographic subdivisions by topic and region (NW)

Historical Dictionary of Egypt, by Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr Metuchen, NJ and London Scarecrow Press, 1994 xix + 369 pages Bibl Tables $42 50 The book contains a chronology of main events in Egypt from 3100 BC to 1994, a physical description of the country, a summary of its history, and a bibliography of works on the country divided down into 20 subheadings

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Annotations have been prepared by the book review editor with the assistance of **Will O Sands and Nancy Wood.**

The dictionary itself deals principally with notable Egyptians in various fields, organizations, and events from the time of Napoleon to the present There are also entries on foreigners who played a role in Egyptian history (NW)

Oriental Rugs: A Bibliography, by George W O'Bannon Metuchen, NJ and London Scarecrow Press, 1994 ix + 744 pages Refs $79 50 A comprehensive English-language bibliography of Oriental rug and carpet literature, covering the years 1877–1992 The book is divided into three main categories carpets, Islamic arts and textiles, and maintenance, care, and related books, with general and geographic subdivisions Entries are numbered, alphabetized by author, and include standard bibliographic information and brief annotations, as well as cross-references to geographic areas and various subject matters (NW)

U.S. Foreign Relations with the Middle East and North Africa: A Bibliography, by Sanford R Silverburg and Bernard Reich Metuchen, NJ and London Scarecrow Press, 1994 xvii + 586 pages Index $59 50 Following the earlier *U S Foreign Policy and the Middle East/North Africa A Bibliography of Twentieth Century Research* (1990), this bibliography incorporates new citations covering the earlier period and newer works that examine the post-Cold War period, including the effects of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf Crisis and War on US-Middle East relations The book offers "a reasonably comprehensive" listing of works in Western languages—in a wide range of published formats—on US foreign policy toward the Middle East (NW)

IRAN

The Boundaries of Modern Iran, ed by Keith McLachlan New York St Martin's Press, 1994 ix + 150 pages Index $49 95 A collection of essays by nine authors, the majority of whom are associated with the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, that describe the emergence of Iranian boundaries and state territory The studies analyze the problems ensuing from the frontier delimitations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and discuss, among other tensions, those related to the boundaries along the Shatt-al-Arab and on the continental shelf of the Persian Gulf Separate chapters cover Iran's northeastern borders, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, territoriality and the Iran-Iraq War, and the ethno-linguistic links between southern Iraq and Khuzistan (NW)

Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution, by John Foran Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1993 xvi + 452 pages Notes Refs Index $49 50 This study examines the history of social change in Iran from the 16th- and 17th-century Safavid dynasty up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 Foran aims at a definition of Iran's changing social structure and seeks to rationalize its recurrent social explosions Emphasis is placed on the degree to which relations with the West have complicated an already complex social structure with societal and economic dependence (WS)

Irangeles: Iranians in Los Angeles, ed by Ron Kelly et al Berkeley University of California Press, 1993 xiv + 396 pages Contribs Index $75 cloth, $35 paper Originally a photography project, this volume was expanded to include essays and interviews and discloses the socio-political character of the large concentration of Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles Aspects of class, politics, gender, religion and subethnicity are addressed in order to portray the "variety and complexity" (p xiii) of Iranian identity (WS)

Islamic Development Policy: The Agrarian Question in Iran, by Asghar Schirazi Tr by P J Ziess-Lawrence Boulder, CO and London Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993 xi + 347 pages Bibl Index $38 Analyzes Iranian agricultural policy as affected and complicated by the Islamization of government in 1979, addressing the broader notion of an Islamic development policy The book explains the dilemmas of the shah's agricultural policy and its damaging legacy, Islamic agricultural policy and the circumstances which muddled it, and the Islamic Republic's "economic morality" and its failure to solve concrete agrarian problems (WS)

IRAQ

Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, ed by Fran Hazelton London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ Zed Books, 1994 x + 260 pages Chron Index $55 cloth, $22 50 paper This book, edited for the Committee against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI), makes available for the first time in English the views and ideas of opposition Iraqis, "scattered over three continents," on how to get rid of the current regime in Iraq and how to salvage a stable future for their fellow Iraqis Among the topics treated Baathist ideology and practice, Saddam Hussein, women, economic devastation, underdevelopment and outlook, the Kurdish parliament, suppression and survival of Iraqi Shi'is, destruction of the southern marshes, human rights, the opposition, and Iraqi attitudes toward the United States and the West (NW)

ISRAEL

The Elections in Israel, 1992, ed by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir Albany State University of New York Press, 1995 ix + 326 pages Index $19 95 Describes the political turnover resulting from the 1992 elections, and discusses the gender gap, the political behavior of the Arabs in Israel, voting trends of recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the PLO, US-Israeli relations, the campaign, the pre-election polls in the Israeli press, and efforts toward political reform (NW)

For Our Soul· Ethiopian Jews in Israel, by Teshome G Wagaw Detroit Wayne State University Press, 1993 xi + 293 pages Notes Gloss Bibl Index $42 95 Examines the immigration and assimilation of virtually the entire population of Ethiopian Jews into Israel during the period of 1977–92. Wagaw studies the tribulations of transition and the alienation of resettlement through issues of family formation, primary and advanced education, modernity, work skills and habits, and community crises. (WS)

A Small Place in Galilee: Religion and Social Conflict in an Israeli Village, by Zvi Sobel. New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1993. xix + 253 pages. Notes. Gloss. Index. $39.95. Yavneel, an old farming community of 460 households, was founded between 1901–04 by Baron Rothschild. This book discusses Yavneel's geographic setting, its founding and growth as an agricultural community, and its present-day reflection of Israeli society's competing religious, historical, ethnic, ideological, and economic trends. The book also addresses issues facing Israeli society at large, particularly in the chapter titled, "Whatever Happens Here Will Happen in the Whole Country. It's Not What We Hoped For." (SAK)

Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges, ed. by Keith Kyle and Joel Peters. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993. Distrib. by St. Martin's Press, London and New York. xii + 292 pages. Appends. Notes. Contribs. Index. $49.50. Examines Israeli society and domestic politics. Discusses Zionism, the Israeli political system from 1948–92, reforms in the electoral process, major changes in the Labor and Likud parties, and the Arab vote. Analyzes the Israeli economy, including the reforms begun in 1985, and the effect of increased immigration. Describes the effects of these factors on Israeli foreign policy. (NW)

JORDAN

Jordan: An Invented Nation? Tribe-State Dynamics and the Formation of National Identity, by Schirin H. Fathi. Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994. 296 pages. Appends. Bibl. n.p. cloth. This study, accepted as a dissertation at the University of Hamburg, traces the special relationship and interaction between tribe and state. It analyzes changes that have brought the current drive for democratization in Jordan. Chapters cover tribal structures, historical background, political and socio-economic changes, and the making of a nation-state. (NW)

LEBANON

Lebanon—Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War, by Dilip Hiro. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xiv + 274 pages. Appends. Notes. Bibl. Index. $35. This book recounts the 1975–90 civil war between Lebanon's pro-Western Maronite-Christian community and its nationalist Muslim community. Hiro begins with the war's historical and geographic roots. The main narrative depicts the schism prior to and following the 1982 Israeli invasion, emphasizing factors that sustained the lengthy conflict. Chapters highlight the emergence of the Lebanese national movement, Syria's military intervention, Israel's first invasion in 1978, the creation of a Maronite "mini-state," Israel's 1982 invasion and its consequences, the return of Syrian domination, the political crisis of September 1988, the Ta'if Accord and its negative impacts, and the ways in which the Lebanese government attempted to cope with the protracted war. (WS)

SYRIA

Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. by Eberhard Kienle. London: British Academic Press, 1994. xiii + 187 pages. Notes. Contribs. Bibl. Index. $45. A collection of essays resulting from a May 1993 conference at the London School of Oriental and African Studies on economic and political changes in Syria. The authors discuss Syria's economic reform, particularly the 1991 law encouraging private Syrian, Arab, and foreign investment in areas hitherto reserved for the public sector. The essays analyze the potential impact of this reform on political change and international realignments. (NW)

TURKEY

Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, ed. by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. xi + 270 pages. Bibl. Contribs. Index. $59. Examines developments in the democratization of Turkey following the military intervention of 1980, including demilitarization and civilianization of the regime, evolution of the electoral process, liberalization of the economy, Turkey's foreign policy and position toward various countries and issues, the influence of Islam, and the role of the presidency. (NW)

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace, ed. by Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler. London and New York: British Academic Press, 1994. Distrib. by St. Martin's Press. viii + 270 pages. Notes. Contribs. Index. $59.50. Fourteen contributors from Israel, the Arab Middle East, Britain, and the United States discuss the prospects for peace between Israel and Arab states. Topics addressed include, among others, peacekeeping forces and the international order, Arab acceptance of peace with Israel, the impact and meaning of the 1992 Israeli election, and Israel's relations with the United States, Europe, and some of the states of the former Soviet Union. Mark Tessler and Jamal Sanad are optimistic that there is no monolithic pattern of Arab hostility toward Israel. Less optimistically, Ian Lustick indicates that after 1982–84, Israeli contemplation of withdrawal from the occupied territories has become difficult, and risks "regime breakdown" due to potential extra-legal opposition. (SAK) to significant political parties in various parts of the world—furnishes data on modern political parties and organizations as well as historical background on the following areas and countries North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen There is also a chapter on the Palestinians and information on Kurdish political groups (NW)

Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge after the Cold War, by Phebe Marr and William Lewis Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1993 vii + 253 pages Contribs Index $55 cloth, $16 95 paper National security analysts consider the effect on US goals and interests in the Middle East of the ending of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the ensuing Gulf War The authors—in chapters on such topics as oil, Moscow and the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Islam, and ethnic and sectarian conflict—analyze forces likely to shape the region in the coming years, suggesting possibilities for new US policy initiatives (NW)

Strike Eagle: Flying the F-15E in the Gulf War, by William L Smallwood Washington, DC and London Brassey's Inc, 1994 xii + 218 pages Gloss Append Index $23 An account of the training and combat actions in Iraq of crews of the F-15E, an advanced new plane equipped to hit ground targets at night The book—based on talks with the pilots and others—describes the departure of an F-15E squadron from its US base and its subsequent activities in Iraq, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, including details regarding the plane's prowesses and the feelings and thoughts of the pilots, both in combat and otherwise (NW)

Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East, by Fred R von der Mehden Gainesville University Press of Florida, 1993 xiii + 128 pages Notes Bibl Index $22 95 cloth, $12 95 paper This study, focused primarily on the post-World War II era, analyzes interaction between the Middle Eastern states of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, and the Southeast Asian states of Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand Topics include economic relations, with an inquiry into the economic impact of Islam as a shared religion, political relations, with a focus on Middle Eastern involvement in Southeast Asian domestic politics, and intellectual interaction, studying the character of Middle Eastern Islamic influence on Southeast Asia (SAK)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Mission to America. Five Islamic Sectarian Communities in North America, by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith Gainesville University Press of Florida, 1993 xii + 226 pages Appends Notes Bibl Index $34 95 cloth, $18 95 paper This study concentrates on the American Druze, the Ahmadiyya Community, the Moorish Science Temple of America, the Ansaru Allah, and United Submitters International—five Islamic/American sectarian communities considered by Shi'i and Sunni Islam to be heterodox and infidel The authors focus on Islamic identity, examining each group's claim to legitimacy, pertinent theological concerns, distinguishing traits, and the problems encountered by assertion of faith contrary to conventional Islam and the secular American environment (WS)

Signs in the Heavens· A Muslim Astronomer's Perspective on Religion and Science, by Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad Beltsville, MD Writers' Inc, 1992 xvii + 174 pages Bibl Index $12 paper The author, a Palestinian-American Muslim with a BA from Harvard and a PhD in astronomy and astrophysics from the University of Arizona, presents in non-technical language a book about Islam and astronomy (NW)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North Africa, by Jeremy Berkoff Washington, DC The World Bank, 1994 xix + 72 pages Appends Refs $6 95 paper This report, part of the "Directions in Development" series, reflects the World Bank's ongoing concern with water resource problems It discusses the Bank's shift from a focus on "the needs of individual water-using sectors to an integrated management approach" (p v), and the implications of this new policy for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Trying to avert an "impending crisis" in MENA water supply and quality, the report suggests improvement to water quality, efficiency, and allocation by discussing issues of supply and demand management (SAK)

WOMEN

In the Eye of the Storm. Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed by Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl Syracuse, NY Syracuse University Press, 1994 xi + 227 pages $39 95 cloth, $17 95 paper Based in part on presentations at a conference held by the Foundation for Iranian Studies and the Middle East Center of the University of Pennsylvania in October 1991, the papers discuss different aspects of women's lives in the Islamic Republic of Iran Topics include women's education, women's issues and the Majlis, female labor, sources of female power, legal status of women in the family, and excerpts of the Islamic penal code of Iran relating to women (NW)

Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World, ed by Mary Ann Tétreault Columbia University of South Carolina Press, 1994 viii + 456 pages Contribs Index $39 95 The authors discuss revolutions and women's roles in the movements that brought them about, and the effect of the outcome on women's status and gender relations Countries studied are Afghanistan, Angola, Bolivia, Chile, China, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Mozambique, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe (NW)

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Abbreviations

A./a., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc
Amer., America, American, etc
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc
Assoc , Association
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics, Economie, économique, etc
For , Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Historie, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst., Institute, Institut, etc
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc
internaz., internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Med./Méd., Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc
Probs., Problems
Quart., Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep., Report
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Societe, social, etc
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc
US, United States
Z , Zeitschrift

The Bibliography of Periodical Literature has been prepared with the assistance of **Jennifer L. Buteau, Gina M. Carty, Alex Neff, Jordan Rankin, and Will O. Sands**

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

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

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

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

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Editor's Note

WITH this, my first issue, I step into the shoes of a long line of distinguished editors of *The Middle East Journal*, who have made it the highly respected publication it is today Harvey Hall, William Sands, Richard Parker, Jean Newsom, Christopher Van Hollen, and Eric Hooglund They are a daily source of inspiration, as I strive to maintain their high standards and preserve the fifty-year tradition of excellence of the *Journal*

In the past five months I have been very fortunate to receive the advice and assistance of previous editors and of many on the Board of Advisory Editors Richard Parker was the kindest and most patient of mentors, Jean Newsom shared her own experiences with me and gave her support when I needed it most, Rouhollah Ramazani in numerous telephone conversations shared his thoughts with me about the *Journal*, Bernie Reich, John Damis, Howard Reed, Don Peretz, Phebe Marr, and others were all helpful in many different ways

I begin my tenure as Editor assisted by a new and dynamic team Marcia Annis, the Managing Editor, has done an excellent job, under very trying circumstances, in a period of transition Sarah Bright, who left us in April for graduate school, trained Jordan Rankin, a bright and hard-working intern, to be the new Editorial Assistant Before she left, Sarah prepared the Chronology for this issue with the help of Jordan She is missed by all for her warmth, cheerfulness, and efficiency Sana Abed-Kotob, who was introduced with me in the previous issue of the *Journal*, came on board last December as Book Review Editor She has worked on both the Winter and the Spring issues Last but not least, Nancy Wood is our invaluable Publications Assistant and the veteran member of the team, who works on all aspects of the *Journal*

Fewer, but no less important, changes have taken place on the Board of Advisory Editors Elizabeth W Fernea resigned this spring, as she will be abroad this coming academic year She was a great asset to the *Journal* and will be missed Nemat Shafik, an economist with the World Bank who works on the Middle East and North Africa, has joined the Board. She holds a D.Phil. from Oxford University, teaches at Georgetown University, and has published extensively in her field. She is already proving to be a great help.

There have also been some changes in the format of the *Journal*. For the convenience of the reader, authors have been asked to prepare a 75-word abstract, which is placed at the start of each article. This makes possible a rapid overview of the contents of the *Journal*, and facilitates the process of indexing and summarizing the *Journal*'s articles. It does away, however, with the need for an editor's thematic presentation of the authors' works. In the future, the editor's note will deal with related topics or with issues of interest to the readers. Notes by guest editors, as in the forthcoming issue on gender and politics, and notes by experts with an insider's knowledge of a pertinent topic, will, at times, take the place of the editor's note. If you wish to see a particular issue discussed in that format, write and let us know.

Mary-Jane Deeb

RUSSIA, THE WEST, AND THE CASPIAN ENERGY HUB

Robert V. Barylski

The Caspian basin contains large proven reserves of oil and natural gas, which are economically recoverable under the right political conditions. If properly developed, those reserves could provide world markets with some two million barrels of oil a day and give the energy-exporting states substantial income, thus providing a chance for the Caspian basin to become a prosperous energy hub between the Middle East and Russia. For four years, however, the interested states have failed to agree upon the political and military prerequisites to build a stable regional energy regime. This essay analyzes the reasons for that failure and suggests a general strategy that should improve prospects for cooperation.

ALTHOUGH the Cold War has ended, geopolitical competition has not. A new, more competitive, regional international system is forming around the Caspian basin in response to declining Russian national power, rising local nationalism, and the arrival of major Western energy corporations. The Caspian basin contains major oil and gas deposits that have attracted multibillion-dollar investments by Western firms. Since the flag often follows the great multinationals, Great Britain, the United States, and other Western powers have entered the Caspian political circle. Western states now have concrete interests in the Caspian region's developing natural gas and petroleum industry, in

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Robert V. Barylski is Associate Professor of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida at Sarasota.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ■ VOLUME 49, NO. 2, SPRING 1995

addition to their traditional stakes in the Middle East This essay argues that a strategy aimed at nurturing a Caspian basin energy system that is both a buffer and a link between Russia and the Middle East is in the best interests of the West, the five Caspian littoral states—Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—as well as Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey

THE SOVIET LEGACY

During its last thirty years, the Soviet regime deliberately prevented the Caspian region's energy resources from being developed, and deprived Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan of the opportunity to reach for substantially higher standards of living The Soviet regime gave priority to oil and gas fields inside the Russian Federation, directed new capital into Russia's western Siberian fields, and built pipelines that linked them to Western markets It maximized exports by restricting domestic oil and gas consumption and by using more nuclear and hydroelectric power at home It imposed a grand plan on the entire Union It decided if and when Caspian reserves would be tapped and how the income would be distributed From Moscow's point of view, it made neither political nor economic sense to permit general, open competition by the fifteen constituent republics for foreign investment and foreign export market shares As a result, the Caspian's untapped oil and gas deposits became future opportunities waiting for the political situation to change Ambitious Azeri, Kazakh, and Turkmen political leaders were eager to liquidate the Soviet state, to take control over its assets, and to seek foreign partners to invest in natural resource development They began to explore such opportunities in the waning months of Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency, as the Soviet state relaxed its grip It was Russian president Boris Yeltsin, however, who threw open the doors

In December 1991, when Yeltsin disbanded the Soviet state, the Soviet energy system lost its authoritative political center, and the network of exploration, production, and transportation facilities began to unravel Oil output fell from a peak of 11,000,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1988 to about 7,000,000 b/d in 1994 Each of the fifteen republics nationalized the defunct Soviet state's energy facilities in its territory The vast southern oil and gas reservoirs moved out of Moscow's de jure control, and Azeri, Kazakh, and Turkmen leaders sought foreign partners to develop their national wealth Once major Western multinationals such as British Petroleum (BP) and US-owned Chevron confirmed that the Caspian region's oil and gas deposits were large and potentially economically attractive, Great Britain, the United States, and the energy-importing states felt it to be in their national interests to encourage the Caspian Sea basin to develop independently of Russia and the Middle East, as a third major source of energy flowing into world markets The new republics were naively enthusiastic about prospects for Western political and economic support They expected Great Britain and the United States to promote viable, independent states in the Caucasus and the Caspian region

RUSSIA'S THREE POLICY STAGES

The natural attraction between the West and the three energy-rich Caspian states—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—presented Russian policy makers with three choices First, Russia could retreat and permit the region's states to build a more independent Caspian energy system with Western partners Second, Russia could attempt to dominate the Caspian basin and strive to impose its own energy development plan, one highly favorable to Russian interests Third, Russia could follow a pragmatic but stubborn strategy that would renegotiate relationships with the former Soviet republics but impose some limitations upon their sovereignty From late 1991 to early 1995, Russian policy moved through three stages that roughly corresponded to these policy options

Stage One Rejecting the Soviet Imperial Legacy

During the first stage, 1991–92, Yeltsin's administration abandoned Soviet neo-imperial strategy, reduced the Russian military presence, and agreed to divide Soviet economic and military assets with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan Russia evacuated its well-developed naval bases, housing, and educational institutions in Azerbaijan and relocated its fleet to Astrakhan at the northern end of the Caspian Sea[1] It distributed Soviet tanks, planes, armored personnel carriers (APC), and other military supplies to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, despite Armenia's and Azerbaijan's undeclared war over Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia's civil war[2] Some 220 tanks and APC's went to Armenia and Azerbaijan[3] Russian minister of defense Pavel Grachev proposed that Russia withdraw its military forces from the three Caucasian republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—over a two-year transitional period[4] Moscow also divided the Caspian Sea floor into separate national energy sectors, and Russia's Ministry of Energy signed the appropriate agreements[5]

Yeltsin's disorderly retreat from the Soviet empire threatened Russian national interests and state integrity Anti-Russian nationalism, the allure of oil wealth, and the perception that Russia was weak opened a window of opportunity for secessionists among peoples of Islamic heritage inside the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus (Chechnya) and along the lower and middle Volga valley (Tatarstan)[6] Both contained significant oil fields and refineries, which their local elites wanted to control In August 1991, as Yeltsin defeated the anti-Gorbachev *putsch* and took power in Moscow, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a Soviet Air Force general of Chechen ethnicity, overthrew the communist political machine in Grozny, the capital of Russia's Chechen-Ingush region, declared independence, and immediately formed his own personal security and armed forces When Yeltsin denounced Chechen independence, Dudayev adroitly organized elections that endorsed himself and the principle of independence He offered Russia security treaties on condition that Moscow recognize Chechen independence, but Yeltsin rejected them The Kremlin began making political and military threats Dudayev called Moscow's bluff and won when the Russian military, in 1991 and 1992, negotiated a withdrawal that left 80 percent of its arms in Dudayev's hands[7] Those negotiations suggest that Yeltsin had expected to reach an acceptable compromise with the Chechen regime Otherwise, since the main rail and pipeline routes between Russia and Azerbaijan pass through Chechnya, Kremlin strategists would have attempted to overthrow Dudayev at the time These oil and power issues became more urgent when Western energy corporations began to make firmer commitments to the Caspian basin's development in 1992 and 1993

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[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense's daily, *Krasnaya zvezda* (hereafter, *KZ*), reported primary military changes See Vladimir Manukha, *KZ*, 30 October 1992

[2] Colonel A Dokuchayev, *KZ*, 24 June 1992 Locals also seized arms illegally

[3] Major General V Tatarnikov, *Armiya*, No 2 (1993), pp 21–2

[4] Lt Colonel V Astafyev, Captain V Ermolin, *KZ*, 15 May 1992

[5] See Aidyn Mekhtiyev, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 October 1994 According to Azeri oil professionals, the Soviet state set the sector borders some 19 years ago

[6] See Hafeez Malik, "Tatarstan's Treaty with Russia Autonomy or Independence," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no 2 (Winter 1994), pp 1–36

Stage Two Moscow's Struggle to Recover Strategic Advantages

During the second stage, 1992–93, Russia sought to control the former Soviet Union's (FSU) entire southern frontier from the Black Sea to China The greater Caspian basin, except for Iran's sector, was to become a Russian protectorate This idea, however, was not acceptable to all of the Caspian states Two of the Caspian's western-rim states—Azerbaijan and Georgia—were opposed Armenia and the eastern-rim states of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan favored a closer relationship with Moscow

At the May 1992 Tashkent meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia asked the former Soviet republics to form a CIS collective security alliance In the western Caspian group, only Armenia joined the alliance It needed Russian support for its drive to unite with Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region and wanted Russian protection against either Turkish or Iranian expansion into the Caucasus Azerbaijan refused to join the alliance because its nationalists believed Moscow was abetting Armenian rebels Azerbaijan also wanted to expand its relations with Turkey and Iran Georgia rejected the CIS alliance because it perceived Russia as being sympathetic to Abkhazian rebels and hostile to Georgia's drive for national independence General Dudayev's rebellion in the Chechen-Ingush region further complicated Russia's transcaucasian security problems

The eastern Caspian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan joined the CIS collective security alliance Since half of Kazakhstan's population was of European, mainly Slavic, descent, it could not break away from Russia without precipitating a civil war Turkmenistan had a small population, significant natural resources, and long borders with Iran and Afghanistan It needed the protection of a powerful military ally, and only Russia could play that role Furthermore, the political elites that had governed Kazakhstan,

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[7] See Major A Petrov's interview with Dudayev, *KZ*, 26 October 1991, and the Russian Ministry of Defense's official statement in *KZ*, 18 February 1995

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan during the Soviet period remained in power and maintained political order at home The regime in each state imposed some limitations upon political competition that effectively blocked overtly anti-Russian politicians from gaining power [8] In the long run, however, if the Caucasian region consolidated its independence, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could re-evaluate their relationship with Russia It was imperative, therefore, that Moscow hold Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the rebellious North Caucasian peoples in check An unambiguous military-political shift seemed prudent

The Russian state rapidly expanded and upgraded the North Caucasian (NCMD) and greater Volga military districts The NCMD covers the isthmus between the Black and Caspian Seas The NCMD received some of Russia's best trained and equipped armed forces—armies relocated from the Baltic states, Germany, and the Caucasus Those forces were primarily trained for traditional warfare against NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces They were not prepared for the type of military-political conflict required to impose Russian order on the Caucasus The NCMD military build-up was a warning to Turkey and Iran to respect Russia's sphere of influence in the greater Caspian region It also reminded Western oil companies that Russian political and military support was required to insure the peaceful development and export of Caspian-basin oil Ambitious, overtly anti-Russian, native politicians received similar messages

Armed rebels overthrew Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Abul'faz Elchibei, the popularly elected nationalist presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan, respectively The Kremlin would not protect "anti-Russian" regimes that neither joined the CIS collective security alliance nor signed bilateral military and security agreements with Russia [9] Russia prevented outside powers, such as Turkey, from giving Azerbaijan and Georgia significant defense assistance, but did not block the flow of arms to rebels Armenian nationalist fighters conquered more than 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory, and Abkhazian and other rebels scored similar successes against Georgia As their domestic situations deteriorated, President Haydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Edvard Shevardnadze of Georgia were compelled to improve relations with Russia In September 1993, Aliyev joined the CIS and its collective security alliance, but refused to give Russia either military bases or control over his country's borders unless Russia made a clear-cut commitment to defend Azerbaijan's territorial and political integrity That same month, Shevardnadze granted Russia military bases in Georgia and accepted Russian troops on its border with Turkey, but resisted more extensive Russian political domination In December 1993, Azerbaijan quietly gave the Russian state oil company a 10-percent share in its impending "deal of the century" partnerships with Western oil firms Further energy cooperation between Baku and Moscow would entail a price Russia would have to convince Armenia to withdraw from conquered lands and to accept Azerbaijan's de jure and de facto sovereignty over Karabakh By the summer of 1994, fighting in Georgia and Azerbaijan had ceased, but Aliyev and Shevardnadze found Russia unwilling to give them iron-clad agreements that reaffirmed their territorial integrity and sovereignty

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[8] The exception to the rule was Tajikistan, where old-line communists botched the transition, used civil war to regain power, and wrecked the country Russia's mistakes in Chechnya reflect similar miscalculations

[9] See Robert V Barylski, "The Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Near-Abroad Syndrome," *Central Asia Monitor*, Nos 5 & 6 (1993), and Barylski, "The Russian Federation and Eurasia's Islamic Crescent," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no 3 (1994), pp 389–416

In Grozny, General Dudayev still defied Russian federal authorities, but the Kremlin made headway against him It split Chechen-Ingushetia and made Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev, a 38-year-old ethnic Ingush, its administrative head Aushev was a career officer in the Russian armed forces and a highly decorated veteran of the Afghan conflict Yeltsin promoted him to Colonel General, but rather than appointing him directly as military governor, called an election in early March 1993 that Aushev would clearly win As president, Aushev then appointed a Russian soldier, Lieutenant General Boris Agapov, as his vice president

What had the Yeltsin administration gained? It had agreements with Georgia and Armenia that allowed Russia to establish military bases in their territory and committed Russia to defending their external borders It had prevented the three Caucasian republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—from cooperating in a common effort to rid themselves of Russian control It had slowed down but not torpedoed Western investors' attempts to develop Azeri oil resources What had the Yeltsin administration lost? Russian political influence had been severely undermined throughout the region None of the ethno-political conflicts embedded in the Caucasus had been resolved

Stage Three A Maturing Russian Strategy?

The transition to a third stage was easier to conceive than to implement Russian policy makers debated two competing strategies On the one hand, the pragmatic accommodationists argued that the Kremlin could lead the FSU's energy exporters along the policy high road Russia could share in the Caspian region's new prosperity by playing the role of the friendly big partner who would guarantee the region's security and hold stakes in key regional investments, but would not attempt to prevent the Caspian states from enhancing their economic and political independence In this model, Russia would protect the new regional oil regime, but would not have veto power over its main features On the other hand, state realists warned that since Russia was capital-poor and was generally regarded as a declining power, it could not compete successfully against Western capital and local nationalism in the Caspian basin They warned that unless harsh measures were taken, Russia would be pushed out of the region and Russia's defeat in the Caucasus would encourage secessionist movements in southern Russia They called for Russian veto power over all major Caspian energy developments

In the policy struggle between state realists such as Yevgeny Primakov, director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, and pragmatic accommodationists such as Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the state realists gained the upper hand Their position dovetailed with Yeltsin's drive to strengthen his executive powers at home and to enhance the Russian state's influence throughout the FSU Moderates who advocated calm, steady, economic and political development based on compromise and partnership faced difficult times, but they kept working for accommodation even as the hard-liners provoked diplomatic and military confrontation

In April 1994, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a note to the British government asserting Russia's right to coordinate all energy development in the Caspian Sea basin Britain was targeted because BP had spearheaded the international effort to develop Azerbaijan's offshore oil [10] Although Amoco, a US corporation, had joined BP in the Azeri project, Moscow was reluctant, for numerous reasons, to directly confront US president Bill Clinton's administration Although Azerbaijan and Georgia urged the Clinton administration to support their sovereignty against Russia, the United States had not done so in order to avoid a deep rift with Moscow Congress favored Armenia and restricted US aid to Azerbaijan Furthermore, the United States was deeply and permanently committed to the defense of the Persian Gulf's energy basin and was reluctant to be drawn into Caspian affairs Russia's role as protector of the Caspian was more compatible with Washington's interests than intensified civil war and open competition between Iran, Russia, and Turkey Some US oil companies were also actively seeking a major role in Russian energy development projects inside the Russian Federation, which were potentially larger than the Azeri and Kazakh deals [11]

Kremlin state realists argued that Russia had to make Azerbaijan accept its Caspian strategy On 21 July 1994, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev and Primakov convinced Yeltsin to sign secret Directive No 396, "On Protecting the Interests of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea," which made the standard Russian realist case for a Russian sphere of influence They urged Chernomyrdin to use economic leverage vigorously to force Azerbaijan to yield But Chernomyrdin did not embrace the hard-line policy, and the Russian state oil company, Lukoil, therefore did not withdraw from its agreement to take a 10-percent stake in Azerbaijan's project By remaining in the consortium, Lukoil gave Russia official status as a partner Chernomyrdin's participatory strategy seemed better suited to post-Soviet and post-Cold War competitive realities On 20 September 1994, President Aliyev hosted a grand ceremony in Baku, where the "deal of the century" was signed The Republic of Azerbaijan became partners with the following British Petroleum and Ramco of Great Britain, Amoco, Pennzoil, Unocal, and McDermott of the United States, Statoil of Norway; Delta-Nimir of Saudi Arabia, and the state oil companies of Turkey and Russia [12]

Next, Aliyev left Azerbaijan for consultations with British and US leaders and an appearance at the United Nations While Aliyev was in the United States talking to Clinton, a coup was staged against him Several opposition leaders "escaped" from prison, and two officials close to Aliyev, including the chief of his special presidential security group, were assassinated Aliyev rushed home to lead the battle for his political life and to protect the "deal of the century." He survived the coup and proceeded to use the crisis to ferret out rivals such as his own prime minister, Surat Huseynov, who slipped into exile with Russian assistance.[13]

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[10] See Aidyn Mekhtiyev, "Azerbaijan British Petroleum Will Develop Caspian Oil—But Something Will Come Russia's Way Too", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 March 1994, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter, *CDSP*) 46, no 9, pp 22–3

[11] See Alexei Pushkov, *Moscow News*, 14–18 November 1994

[12] Azerbaijan Newsletter, 16 November 1994 (Washington, DC Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan)

On 12 October 1994, Russia convened a closed meeting of the five Caspian states, including Iran, and announced that a regional cooperation organization would be established. Azerbaijan refused to accept Russian proposals for operating rules that gave all members veto power over any major offshore energy project.[14] Although the proposed rule would have made big and small powers equal partners, it would have given Russia a veto over Azerbaijan's energy future. While in Moscow, Aliyev met with Chernomyrdin, who reaffirmed his acceptance of the "deal of the century." On 15 November 1994, Azerbaijan's parliament ratified the oil contracts. Later that month, Aliyev offered Iran a 5-percent share in the deal to broaden support for it. US objections to Iran's participation, however, persuaded Aliyev to replace Iran with Exxon, a US multinational.[15]

Great Britain, the United States, and other Western powers conducted their public efforts on behalf of peace in the Caucasus primarily through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations. By late 1994, Russia was in a diplomatic fix. It had been calling upon the international community to share peace-keeping costs in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It had also publicly committed itself to respect the territorial integrity of the three Caucasian republics. Yet, when the West, including Turkey, began to show a serious interest in playing a major role in peace keeping, Russia demurred. Azerbaijan was ready to give Moscow the principal role in peace keeping, only if Moscow forced Armenia to withdraw its armies from the Lachin corridor and Shusha. This was a litmus test of Russia's commitment, since Armenia could not control Nagorno-Karabakh without those two pieces of land. Aliyev also insisted that any peace settlement be monitored by international peace-keeping forces. President Shevardnadze made similar proposals regarding the Abkhazians in Georgia's civil war.[16]

FACING THE CHECHEN ANOMALY

In the spring of 1994, as Kozyrev and Primakov promoted a hard-line policy toward Azerbaijan's "deal of the century," Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS) organized an armed rebellion against Dudayev. The FCS recruited a motley group of anti-Dudayev Chechens, active-duty personnel from various Russian armed forces, and others for this special, covert assignment. After several unsuccessful attempts to instigate a rebellion against Dudayev, the Yeltsin administration decided to risk a larger assault on Grozny, with Russian troops posing as Chechen rebels.

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[13] Aliyev's television addresses provide full details. See FBIS-SOV-94-192, pp. 45–9, FBIS-SOV-94-193, pp. 30–3, and FBIS-SOV-94-194, pp. 44–52.

[14] See Sanobar Shermatova, *Moscow News*, No. 42, 21–27 October 1994.

[15] See David Knott, "Caspian Sea Activity Picking Up Off Former Soviet Union Republics," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 30 January 1995, p. 32, and *Oil and Gas Journal*, Newsletter, 15 May 1995.

[16] See Stephen J. Blank, *Energy and Security in Transcaucasia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994). Blank provides an excellent analysis of how rebellions from Kurdistan to Abkhazia affect the pipeline question.

On 26 November 1994, pro-Moscow forces easily fought their way into Grozny, where they expected to be joined by anti-Dudayev rebels Their victory, however, turned into a stunning political defeat because no general uprising took place The Kremlin failed to rescue its stranded fighters, and Dudayev captured them and exposed them to the Russian mass media, which divulged the entire sordid tale in bold headlines It was Yeltsin's "Bay of Pigs " Dudayev offered to negotiate a settlement that recognized his independence and removed Russian military, police, and security forces from Chechen territory He set free the Russian captives after extracting an official admission that they were Russian military personnel and not an authentic Chechen opposition group A deeply embarrassed Yeltsin rejected any compromise with Dudayev and accused him of all manner of criminal activity

Yeltsin's team decided that Dudayev could be intimidated into submission, and Moscow began assembling a large invasion force of some 20,000 to threaten Chechnya Dudayev warned the Russian public that he would stand and fight Russia's free press printed his interviews with fairly accurate predictions of the tragedy to come [17] Grozny, the Chechen capital, would have to be taken, building by building, its Russian-speaking population would become the war's primary civilian victims On 9 December 1994, Yeltsin issued a presidential *ukaz* ordering Dudayev's forces to surrender their arms Two days later, ill-prepared, hastily assembled federal troops pushed into rebel zones The Chechens fought with regular and irregular forces Snipers picked off Russian officers, civilians blocked roads, and youngsters rallied to war Some volunteers and mercenaries from as far away as Afghanistan, Jordan, and Latvia fought in Dudayev's forces Yeltsin's federal troops were surprised by the strong resistance and made slow initial progress Moscow therefore rushed more troops to Chechnya, doubling its forces to some 40,000 [18] On New Year's Day 1995, they launched a second offensive, which drove Dudayev's forces from Grozny but destroyed much of the city Three important towns remained under rebel control Argun, Gudermes, and Shali In mid-March, after Dudayev's forces refused to surrender peacefully, the federal armies began clearing them Moscow was winning the main ground war The Yeltsin administration demonstrated that brute military force could prevent secession, but the political and economic costs were great Furthermore, the Russian military deeply resented the fact that it was paying with its blood and reputation for the political miscalculations of civilian politicos

Dudayev's survival at the head of a small, strategically located proto-state of approximately 1,100,000 people of Islamic heritage became a symbol of the Russian state's weakness Yeltsin had expected Dudayev to make the "statesman-like" choice between a suicidal, destructive civil war and exile When Dudayev stood and fought, he exposed Russia's tactical vulnerability, its military's intense displeasure with current politicians, and the drawbacks of bullying strategies Although Moscow seemed to have won the main war, its ability to control the peace had not yet been demonstrated The episode did not inspire confidence in the Kremlin's ability to serve as the benevolent, general protector of the Caspian energy hub, but it did show that Russia would not permit itself to be evicted from the region. In February 1995, Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin named Salambek Khajiyev to head the reconstruction administration for Chechnya. Khajiyev was an ethnic Chechen who advanced through the Soviet hierarchy to become a major energy executive at the all-Union level in Moscow. His appointment fit Russian plans to secure and rebuild the Chechen region as a loyal, integral part of its greater Caspian energy system.[19] In June 1995, Chernomyrdin's involvement expanded when Yeltsin left him to handle the negotiations that ended the Budyennovsk hostage crisis, a daring rebel terrorist strike at a town inside Russia.

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[17] See Alexei Venedikov, "Dzhokhar Dudayev 'This Is Intervention, Pure and Simple'," *Moscow News*, No 48, 1994

[18] Pavel Grachev, "Nado iskhodit iz togo, shto eto byla spetsial'naya operatsiya" (It must be seen as a special operation), *KZ*, 2 March 1995

THE OIL AND GAS TRANSPORTATION ISSUE

There are three primary centers of active energy development in the Caspian region: Azerbaijan's oil fields, Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil fields, and Turkmenistan's natural gas fields (see Figure 1). A fourth center could develop if Iran expands the exploration and development of its Caspian Sea tracts. Russia's commanding military position in the NCMD and Volga regions and the existing Russian pipeline system give Russia important advantages in competing for the right to become the primary export route for new Caspian oil and gas. Turkey, Russia's main rival for the transportation business, has offered a different route through Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey, but Ankara would have to resolve its Kurdish problems in order to convince the oil companies that this route would be secure. Furthermore, chronic fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan also has damaged Turkey's prospects, since Armenian forces hold parts of the preferred pipeline route between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In order to avoid Armenian-controlled territory, the pipeline would have to make a jog into northern Iran—something the United States would veto unless its relations with Iran improved. Such political facts make the Turkish route less attractive than the Russian route in the short run. Oil companies that need immediate access to world markets, therefore, either have to cooperate with Russia or face costly delays. Chevron's experience illustrates that point.

In April 1993, after five years of negotiations, Chevron Oil and Kazakhstan established their joint venture.[20] Although it took substantial corporate energy to cope with the quaint and idiosyncratic practices of post-Soviet bureaucracies and Russo-Kazakh competition, Chevron persisted and oil began to be produced. Kazakhstan eagerly anticipated its share, approximately 80 percent of the profits—an unprecedented contract that stimulated thinking around the Caspian Sea basin about the personal and national benefits of joint ventures with major Western corporations. By the summer of 1994, Chevron had 3,000 workers employed and was spending about $1 million per day on the Tengiz project. Richard Matzke, president of Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc., described

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[19] See Vitaly Strugovets, "Chechenski narod sam opredelit svoe budushchee" (Chechen people will determine their own future), *KZ*, 22 February 1995.

[20] See Sergei Kozlov, "Right to First Oil—Documents are Signed, Chevron Goes to Work," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 April 1993, *CDSP* 45, no. 15, p. 20.


RUSSIA
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Atyrau
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Odessa
Komsomolsky
Aral Sea
RO
Iron Horn
Novorossiysk
Roshchino
Aktau
Grozny
Black Sea
Ichcherskaya
UZBEKISTAN
BU
Burgas
Batumi
GE
Tbilisi
Caspian Sea
Istanbul
Bosporus
Trabzon
AR
AZ
Baku
Krasnovodsk
Ankara
TURKMENISTAN
TURKEY
Midyat
Tabriz
Rasht
Ceyhan
Sarakhs
Tehran
Mosul
SYRIA
IRAN
LE
Mediterranean
Baghdad
Isfahan
IRAQ
IS
JO
Basra
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
Refinery
Major Oil/Gas Field Development
Existing Oil Pipeline
Existing Products Pipeline
Existing Gas Pipeline
Planned Gas Pipeline
Proposed Oil Pipeline

Figure 1 Courtesy of the Petroleum Finance Company, Ltd , Washington, DC, 1995

his firm's joint venture with Kazakhstan as "Chevron's biggest and most important project since the opening of Saudi Arabia about 50 years ago "[21]

Proven, recoverable crude oil reserves covered by the Tengiz project are estimated to contain 6–9 billion barrels But the Tengiz fields lack direct access to open sea lanes and the 750,000 b/d that Chevron projected to export from Kazakhstan would have to move through other countries The Kremlin wanted the oil to pass through a Russian pipeline and terminal system and wanted Moscow's treasury to collect handsome transit fees Kazakhstan preferred other routes that reduced its political dependence upon Russia President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan argued that point with President Clinton during his Washington meetings in early 1994 The United States, however, favored the Russian proposals over those of Kazakhstan that sketched new outlets through Iran Washington's strained relations with Tehran worked in favor of the Russian position

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[21] "Chevron Confident Tengiz Project Still on Track," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 20 June 1994, pp 32–6

Russia wants its deep-water Black Sea port, Novorossiysk, to be the primary terminal where Caspian Sea energy products enter the world's shipping lanes According to this plan, the crude would then move through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean Turkey prefers a southwestern land route that uses Turkish Mediterranean oil terminals, gives Ankara's treasury substantial oil transit income, and strengthens Turkey's ties with the Turkic peoples of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan Turkey warned Russia that heavy shipping of crude through the Straits entailed unacceptable ecological risks, and claimed a right to limit it Russia denounced Turkey's efforts as violations of treaty obligations that guarantee Russia free passage through the Straits[22] Moscow also identified sea-land-sea alternatives to the Turkish Straits—a route across Bulgaria to Greek Mediterranean ports

In January 1995, Kazakhstan, Oman, and Russia announced a historic pipeline deal that would serve Russian strategic interests—a massive pipeline, approximately forty inches in diameter, that would stretch east from Novorossiysk and then arch over the northern shore of the Caspian into Kazakhstan's new oil fields If built, it would carry close to two million b/d[23] Kazakhstan, Oman, and Russia hold 25 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent of the shares, respectively—an interesting partnership between Persian Gulf and Caspian energy system elites Russo-Arab cooperation in energy development and marketing is potentially a very significant link between Moscow and the Middle East The NCMD could become the hub of a giant network of pipelines reaching from western Siberia to Iran, from the Ukraine and Central Europe to Kazakhstan and Central Asia

By cooperating with Russia, Chevron and Kazakhstan advanced their projects, although far too slowly for Chevron Matters were worse for Azerbaijan and its main foreign partners, British Petroleum and Amoco The oil reserves of the Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli fields contain an estimated 4–5 billion barrels of oil, and production was expected to peak at about 750,000 b/d[24] More fields were also expected to be discovered Experts had predicted that another 18–20 billion barrels of oil could be found under the Caspian Azerbaijan's economic and political future depends upon the successful implementation of the "deal of the century," but that would require a pipeline to reach world markets Although the "deal of the century" was signed in November 1994, the pipeline issue remains a political time bomb The deal requires the pipeline issue to be settled within six months of signing

If Russia had defeated the Dudayev regime quickly, it would have immediately pressed Azerbaijan and its partners to finance a new pipeline to move oil north from Baku to Grozny, and then to join the grand East-West pipeline being financed by Kazakhstan, Oman, and Russia Russia was close to clinching the Caspian basin's energy export system, but Yeltsin's Chechen war cut Russia off from Azerbaijan and increased Baku's interest in alternate routes Instead of uniting the Caspian energy system, the war divided

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[22] See Azer Murashiyev, "Diplomatic Geography Smells of Oil," *Moscow News*, No 27, 8–14 July 1994

[23] "Plans Advance for Caspian Crude Oil Pipeline," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 30 January 1995, pp 38–9

[24] "Three Fields Slated for Development Off Azerbaijan," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 26 September 1994, p 48

it into a peaceful Eastern segment and an unstable Western segment. Azerbaijan and its Western partners were boxed in by the Chechen war in the north, the Kurdish and Armenian rebellions in the east, and poor relations between Iran and the United States to the south. Ironically, revolutionary Iran was comparatively stable, and its leadership found common ground with Azerbaijan's Aliyev, who offered Tehran a stake in Iranian oil development. Iran began to look more attractive as a transit route.[25]

Turkmenistan is an interesting case because it began selling natural gas to world markets in 1994 through swap deals with Iran—an arrangement whereby Iran uses some gas from Turkmen fields located near its border, sells its own gas abroad, and credits the sale to Turkmenistan. Fields closer to Uzbekistan and the existing Soviet pipeline system send their products into the Russian system.[26] Turkmen planners hoped that international gas sales would earn $8 billion annually in the beginning of the next century. In August 1994, Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov signed agreements in Iran for a $7-billion, 4,000-kilometer pipeline that will link Iran, Turkey, and Turkmenistan.[27] Russia argues that it is more economical for Turkmenistan and other Caspian states to engage in swapping with Russia and to invest in upgrading Russian transportation systems than to build new pipelines through Iran and Turkey. But Russia seems willing to support limited energy sales through Iran. Western energy experts agree that it is cheaper to move some Caspian oil and natural gas into Russia for domestic consumption and to export Russian gas and oil to Europe.[28] They also recognize that Iran's potential role in a greater Caspian energy system will not be realized until political relations with the Western powers and the Arabian oil exporters improve.

Strategic thinkers at Iran's Institute for Political and International Studies, with the assistance of oil- and gas-industry experts, drew a grand plan for an energy distribution system linking the Arabian Peninsula, the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, Pakistan, and Turkey through Iran.[29] The new system would improve utilization of existing Iranian pipelines and complement or compete with Russia's north Caspian system. If built as designed, Iran's gulf ports of Kangan and Bandar 'Abbas would become major outlets for Caspian energy over the next twenty years. The Iranian route would also be a Russian link to the Persian Gulf. Since it makes economic sense to seek the least expensive routes, and political sense to diversify them, not all Caspian oil and gas should flow through the Russian pipeline systems. Energy destined for the Far East might better flow across Iran to gulf ports, while some oil and gas destined for European markets could move through Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey.

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[25] *US Azerbaijan Council News*, 1, no. 2 (November 1994); Reuters, 11 November 1994.

[26] See "Turkmenistan Seeks Acreage Bids," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 30 May 1994, p. 35.

[27] See Maksim Yusin, "Turkmenbashi Helps Teheran Break Out of Its International Isolation," *Izvestiya*, 25 August 1994, *CDSP* 46, no. 34 (1994), pp. 22–3.

[28] "FSU Seen with Big Role to Play," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 4 April 1994, p. 80.

[29] See "Huge Natural Gas Reserves Central to Capacity Work, Construction Plans in Iran," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 11 July 1994, pp. 48–51.

THE CASPIAN BASIN IN WORLD ENERGY STRATEGY THREE ALTERNATIVES

The orderly management of world energy markets has at least four basic parts 1) investment in new production in anticipation of future demand, 2) geopolitical diversification of supplies, 3) political and military protection of the exporting states, and 4) political and military protection of energy transportation systems As industry planners peer into the next century, they see the Middle East and the FSU as two known sources of large new supplies [30] Foreign policy implications for the advanced industrial states are clear Energy-importing states should promote energy development in the states of the FSU because that would prevent energy prices from rising sharply as world energy demands increase Furthermore, large-scale cooperation in energy development between the FSU and the advanced industrial states would enhance prospects for post-communist political and economic reform Estimates of the amount of FSU oil that could be developed at economically attractive prices range from 12 percent of current proven world reserves to as high as 30 percent [31] Natural gas is even more abundant, and current Russian exports alone already account for 40 percent of the international trade in that commodity [32]

The cooperative strategy points toward a bipolar Eurasian energy system primarily consisting of two large, regional, energy-exporting systems—the Middle East, centered on the Persian Gulf, and the FSU, centered on the Russian Federation The United States would continue to support the Persian Gulf system and would actively maintain the military and political balances required to guarantee an increasing supply of oil from the Middle East to world markets at reasonable prices The US Central Command would continue to be the core military force responsible for the defense of the greater Persian Gulf energy system It would be enhanced by regional alliances and NATO

The Russian Federation would lead the second, or FSU, energy system It would orchestrate energy development throughout the FSU, and the Russian military would take primary responsibility for the defense of FSU energy production and transportation facilities The key Russian military districts in this system would be the NCMD, which is strategically located between the Black and Caspian Seas and the Volga-Urals district, its strategic reserve The CIS collective security alliance would be the main treaty system The bipolar model suggests a grand deal between the United States and the Russian Federation, a decision to accept one another's respective energy spheres of influence Although it is an overly simplified model, it is a useful heuristic device that raises major

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30 See Robert Tippee, "Middle East Capacity Expansion," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 11 July 1994, pp 34–5, Valery Neverov and Aleksandr Igolkin, "Neft v mirovoi politike" (Oil in world politics), *KZ*, 22 September 1994, and Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, "Oil Reopening the Door," *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 1993), pp 81–93

31 Neverov and Igolkin, "Neft v mirovoi politike " In *Russia 2010* (New York Random House, 1993), Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson identify Neverov as an example of a new type of patriotic Russian capitalist (see pp 271–2) Neverov et al want the Russian state to use its power to guarantee Russians control of the industry and the lion's share of profits

32 See John D Grace's expert analysis in "Russian Gas Reserves Base Large, Overstated, Costly to Maintain," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 6 February 1995, pp 71–4, and Grace, "Cost Russia's Biggest Challenge in Maintaining Gas Supplies," 13 February 1995, pp 79–81

questions about the development and protection of vital world resources But there are political and economic arguments that point toward a more complex model in which a third energy hub is created between the Russian and Middle Eastern energy systems This third hub would emerge around the Caspian Sea

There are several reasons why the Caspian hub would be attractive to the West and might even be attractive to Iran, Russia, and Turkey[33] It is in the West's interest to diversify its supplies of oil and natural gas The creation of a third major energy hub would be better than relying upon just two major exporting systems The Caspian hub could serve as a buffer as well as a bridge between the Middle East and Russia A stable and prosperous Caspian region—politically independent of Iran, Russia, and Turkey—could ease Iranian and Turkish fears of Russian expansion and vice versa, and would contribute to Iran's reintegration into the global political economy Azerbaijan could also emerge as a major regional commercial center A stable, prosperous Caspian basin would reduce Western concerns about a hypothetical Russian-led alliance of energy exporters, a super-OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) that could wield extraordinary power over energy markets

The third hub is a pipe dream unless the West cooperates with Russia in the Caspian in a manner that moderates Russian policy without undermining regional stability On the other hand, Moscow will not cooperate unless it is convinced that Russian national interests are best served by a loose energy consortium It would want general agreements about market shares and pipelines with Caspian states and major corporations Moscow would also need a general game plan for its relationships with Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries Moscow has been more interested in bringing Iraq's oil into the world market than either Azerbaijan's or Kazakhstan's

For thirty years, Moscow earned billions of dollars through arms sales to anti-Western regimes in Iraq, Libya, and Syria The Cold War provided Moscow with customers that it otherwise would not have had Anthony Cordesman indicates that annual Soviet arms sales to the Middle East during the 1980s ranged from $20 to $25 billion[34] These figures tally with those of Russian foreign policy analysts writing in the current Russian press[35] Further, the various conflicts in the Middle East boosted world oil prices and gave the Soviet Union an extra $25 billion in oil profits from 1973 to 1982 With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, oil prices rose to about $40 a barrel, and the Kremlin earned about $12 billion a year in 1980 and 1981 from Soviet oil sales to customers in the capitalist world[36] In the summer of 1994, while the Russian Foreign Ministry was complaining about Western oil deals with Azerbaijan, it was actively working with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on agreements worth some $10 billion to Russia in new projects It was also seeking preferential treatment on the repayment of some $7 billion that Iraq owed Russia[37] Foreign Minister Kozyrev defended his Iraqi ploy as the reassertion of legitimate Russian strategic interests "Of all the superpowers," he said, "Russia is the closest to the Persian Gulf region, we cannot therefore leave it behind "[38]

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[33] Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson modeled Russo-Iranian competition for Azerbaijan's oil and identified how Russia might benefit without direct political and military control over Azeri oil This is similar to the cooperative model I propose See *Russia 2010*, pp 201ff

[34] See Chapter 2 in Anthony H Cordesman, *After the Storm The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO Westview, 1993)

[35] See, for example, Aleksandr Shumilin, "Hand Extended to Saddam Hussein Again," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 April 1993, and *CDSP* 45, no 15, p 22

[36] See Steve Mufson, "CIA Alters Its Soviet Forecast," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 May 1981

From Kozyrev's perspective, when Iraq starts selling oil, billions of petrodollars will once again flow to Moscow and help Russia's financially strapped military-industrial complex On the other hand, if and when Azerbaijan begins exporting large amounts of oil, the revenue thereof will not feed the Russian treasury as generously Azerbaijan is more likely to use its new wealth to promote its independence from Russia Kazakhstan's oil projects will benefit Russia more than Azerbaijan's, since Kazakhstan's citizens, defense system, and economy are more firmly linked to Russia Thus, as long as state realists are in power, they will demand that Azerbaijan export its oil through the Russian pipeline system and thereby provide the Russian treasury with a steady income Russian control over such a pipeline would naturally give Moscow political influence in Baku

CONCLUSION

For various political and economic reasons, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to draw all the Caspian basin's energy flows to the north into its own energy distribution system The energy importers, such as Great Britain and the United States, and the three energy exporters—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—will prudently strive to diversify their routes to world markets and will resist Russian efforts to control all of these routes The West should play the role of honest broker by promoting peaceful, cooperative economic development in the Caspian basin The United States can and should play a more active role in encouraging the peaceful resolution of the Caucasian wars and reasonable cooperation with Russia to guarantee the successful development of the Caspian basin's energy resources as a third hub between Russia and the Middle East, a link as well as a buffer Such cooperation naturally extends into the Middle East The situation calls for leadership based upon a clearly articulated plan that involves Russia in post–Cold War structures without promoting Russian hegemony or provoking Russian insecurity

Russia has not provided the type of regional leadership expected of a mature great power, neither has the West The major actors are still somewhat uncertain about their strategic objectives and the policies that flow from them The United States and Great Britain should have worked harder and more openly in partnership with one another and Russia to promote peace in the region A country such as Azerbaijan is an ideal candidate to encourage cooperation between Great Britain, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and the United States In an ideal world, Russia and the Western powers would cooperate to enhance the economic and political viability of the newly independent states

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[37] Based on Russian Foreign Ministry official statements to ITAR-TASS, 3 October 1994, FBIS-SOV-94–192, p 3

[38] Aleksei Agureyev and Dmitry Gorokhov, "Kozyrev on Role in Preventing Gulf War," ITAR-TASS, 17 October 1994, FBIS-SOV-94–201, p 5

ISRAELI-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Robert O. Freedman

Russian-Israeli relations under President Boris Yeltsin in the 1992–94 period continued the sharp improvement that had begun in the final three years of the Gorbachev era (1988–91) Emigration continued at high levels, cultural relations blossomed, trade developed, particularly in the agricultural sphere, and political relations became fully normalized Despite pressure from the anti-Israeli (and anti-Semitic) right wing of the Russian political spectrum, Yeltsin promoted ties with Israel while taking an "evenhanded" position on the Arab-Israeli conflict He also sought to exploit Russia's position as co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process to bolster his domestic position, particularly in 1993 and 1994

OTHER than continental Europe, perhaps no area on the globe saw a greater transformation of Soviet foreign policy in the era of President Mikhail Gorbachev than the Middle East When Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union in March 1985, the Middle East was clearly an area of superpower competition Moscow backed the Arab rejectionists such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Syria in their confrontation with Israel, and viewed Egypt, an ally of the United States, as an enemy The Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations with Israel, had reduced Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to less than 1,000 per year (as opposed to a high of 51,000 in 1979), and continued to champion the 1975 anti-Israeli "Zionism is Racism"

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resolution of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly In the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Soviet Union had alternately tilted first toward Iran and then toward Iraq, as it sought to keep maximum influence in both countries, while at the same time trying to prevent the United States from becoming the sole outside guarantor for the Arabs against Iran[1]

At the time when Gorbachev was ousted from power with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there had been a massive transformation in most Soviet policies toward the Middle East This transformation was accelerated by the failure of the August 1991 abortive coup d'état that enabled Gorbachev to eliminate many of his most hardline opponents[2] The most significant area of change was in Moscow's relations with Israel Not only did Gorbachev restore full diplomatic relations with Israel in October 1991 and join with the United States in co-sponsoring a UN resolution reversing the "Zionism is Racism" resolution, but he also allowed hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel Arab rejectionists like Iraq and Syria were upset by this, as they saw the immigrants, many of whom had advanced degrees, as adding to the military and scientific power of Israel Despite extensive Arab criticism, Gorbachev allowed the flow of emigrants to continue, primarily to win the favor of the United States, although he justified his action on human rights grounds[3] Moscow also joined the United States in co-sponsoring the October 1992 Madrid Arab-Israeli peace conference It was one more sign of the growing superpower cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, although the United States clearly played the dominant role at the conference Gorbachev also cultivated Egypt, making it the centerpiece of Soviet policy in the Arab world As Soviet-Egyptian relations went from enmity to close cooperation, Soviet-Syrian relations deteriorated when Gorbachev refused to give Syria the weapons it needed for military parity with Israel

This essay will examine the evolution of Russian-Israeli relations from the collapse of the Soviet Union in late December 1991 until the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 1994 While Israel sought to develop its relations with all the successor states of the Soviet Union,[4] its central priority was Russia That state was by far the most important in terms of diplomatic, economic, and military power Russia had inherited the UN Security Council seat (with veto power) previously held by the Soviet Union It also had the largest population of Jews still remaining in the former Soviet Union (FSU), which Israel hoped would ultimately choose to emigrate to Israel

The Israeli government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had four major concerns about the collapse of the Soviet Union First, the fear that, given the desperate economic conditions of virtually all the successor states, nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine might be sold to Israel's Middle East enemies like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria Nuclear scientists from the FSU might also be persuaded to serve in these countries for far higher salaries than they were capable of earning in their home countries A related concern was the sale of conventional weapons, which the states of the FSU had in abundance Second, the Israeli government feared that there might be an interruption in Jewish emigration to Israel While arrangements for free emigration had been painfully worked out with the Gorbachev administration,[5] there were no guarantees that its successors, particularly in Central Asia and the Ukraine, would continue this policy A third major concern lay in the diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict The favorable shift in the Soviet position toward Israel greatly enhanced Israel's diplomatic/political position both in the world at large, and vis-à-vis its Arab enemies Nonetheless, there was no guarantee that this trend would continue, and Israeli policy makers were particularly concerned about the policy stand of the six new Muslim states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) that had emerged from the Soviet Union Finally, Israel was hopeful of not only maintaining but also developing the bilateral relations it had established in such areas as trade and cultural relations with many of the now independent states, the most important of these being Russia

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[1] For an analysis of the pre-Gorbachev period, see Robert O Freedman, *Moscow and the Middle East Soviet Policy since the Invasion of Afghanistan* (Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press, 1991)

[2] The late Gorbachev period in the Middle East is discussed in Robert O Freedman, "Moscow and the Middle East After Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait," in Robert O Freedman, ed , *The Middle East After Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait* (Gainesville University Press of Florida, 1993), pp 74–136

[3] On the issue of Soviet Jews, see Robert O Freedman, "Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the United States and Israel in the Gorbachev Era," in David H Goldberg and Paul Maranta, eds , *The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East* (Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994), pp 53–95

[4] For a study of Israel's relations with the five new Muslim states of Central Asia, see Robert O Freedman, "Israel and Central Asia," *Central Asian Monitor*, no 2 (1993), pp 16–20

RUSSIA AND ISRAEL IN 1992

While Israel was showing considerable concern over Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin initially showed very little interest in Middle Eastern questions He devoted his time and energy to consolidating his power and to gaining approval in the West, particularly in the United States He wanted Russia to be the primary inheritor of the Soviet Union's international responsibilities, including its veto power in the UN Security Council Yeltsin's priorities were made clear when he failed to attend the multilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks that took place in Moscow in late January 1992 Hosting such a conference had been the goal of Soviet leaders since the 1970s Yeltsin chose instead to rally support among the Russian sailors on the Black Sea When Middle East questions did arise, he tended to follow the US lead on virtually all issues The Russian president appeared anxious to curry favor in the West, and at first patterned his foreign policy on US foreign policy initiatives Thus, on questions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, and Libya, Yeltsin fully supported US policies Indeed, the Russian embassy in Libya was attacked because of Moscow's support of the US sanctions initiative, and Russia supplied two warships to help enforce the UN blockade of Iraq[6] The only exception to this pattern of Russian support of US Middle East policy was in the area of arms sales to Iran—an enemy of the United States with whom Moscow was seeking close cooperation Moscow did not seem to work out its policy toward the Middle East until November 1992 It was an area of less than central concern to the Russians, who were preoccupied with the "Near Abroad" (the newly independent countries of the FSU) and with relations with the United States and Europe[7]

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[5] See Freedman, "Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the United States and Israel in the Gorbachev Era"

[6] *Pravda*, on 15 February 1992, attacked Yeltsin's policy, claiming that he had forged a relationship with the United States that was not an alliance of equals, but rather "the relationship of a horse and its rider" (cited in FBIS USSR, 21 February 1992, p 29)

The strong rapprochement between Russia and Israel in the last few years of the Soviet Union continued under Yeltsin, as Moscow sought both economic benefits and political dividends from its growing ties to the Jewish state Thus, when the multilateral phase of the Arab-Israeli peace talks began in Moscow, Russia backed Israeli demands that the PLO be excluded, much as it had been in Madrid[8] *Izvestia* published an interview with Israeli foreign minister David Levy after the conference in Moscow in which Levy lauded the conference's accomplishments He also made a positive assessment of the future of Russian-Israeli relations after his talks with Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, who was then the leading Russian advocate of close ties with the United States and Israel[9] While in Moscow, Levy attended Sabbath services at the Central Synagogue, where he urged Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel[10]

Following the Madrid Conference, Russian-Israeli relations on a bilateral basis continued to improve the Russian ambassador to the UN asked Israel to co-sponsor the entry of former Soviet republics to the UN, Yad Vashem, the Israeli Holocaust Memorial, was permitted to photocopy materials from the communist party archives dealing with Jewish issues, the president of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences proposed the establishment of a foreign branch of the Academy in Israel, and Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky, the most famous of the former Refuseniks now living in Israel, was declared innocent of charges that he had spied for the United States Interestingly enough, even before the Madrid Conference, a Russian delegation had traveled to Israel in early January 1992 to study the problem of immigrant absorption Given the unstable conditions outside of Russia in the FSU, and growing anti-Russian feelings there, particularly in newly independent Muslim states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Russian government faced a major refugee problem, as large numbers of ethnic Russians sought to return to Russia The Russian government turned for help to Israel's Jewish Agency, which had considerable experience in resettling Jewish refugees from around the world in Israel, and which hoped to provide a home for many Jews still living in Russia The Jewish Agency was only too willing to assist the Russian delegation[11]

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[7] See the speech of Viktor Posuvaliuk, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Africa and Middle East Department, in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 November 1992, cited in *Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East* (hereafter, CIS/ME) (Jerusalem Hebrew University's Marjorie Mayrock Center for Soviet and East European Research) vol 17, no 10 (1992), pp 22–3

[8] Moscow Radio, 29 January 1992, cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report Central Eurasia* (hereafter, FBIS FSU), 30 January 1992, p 30

[9] *Izvestia*, 31 January, 1992

[10] See the report in the *Jerusalem Post*, 28 January 1992, by Walter Ruby

[11] See the report in the *Jerusalem Post*, 8 January 1992, by Herb Keinon In 1992, only 64,057 Jews emigrated to Israel vs 145,005 in 1991 and 181,759 in 1990 The main reason for the drop in emigration was the inability of the new immigrants to find jobs in their professions or to obtain adequate housing Emigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel in 1993 was 69,132 and 66,067 in 1994 (New York Research Bureau, National Conference on Soviet Jewry, February 1995)

The rapidly improving Russian-Israeli relationship, however, was soon to be challenged After the initial shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union had worn off, criticism of Yeltsin's foreign and domestic policies began to mount He was especially criticized for his willingness to follow the lead of the United States on most foreign policy issues, and for his efforts to rapidly privatize the Russian economy The opposition centered in the Russian Parliament, which had been elected several years before when Russia was still a republic of the Soviet Union Essentially, there were three major groups in Parliament On the left of the political spectrum was the pro-Yeltsin group of legislators who supported his pro-Western foreign policy—including his advocacy of close ties with Israel—and his efforts to privatize the Russian economy In the center of the political spectrum was a group of legislators who advocated a "Eurasian" emphasis in foreign policy Headed by Speaker of Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov, these centrists advocated a foreign policy that would not exclusively focus on the United States and Western Europe but would reflect a balance toward all the world's regions This group, for the most part, was also favorably inclined toward good ties with Israel, but also wanted to pursue ties with the Arab world On domestic policy, while favoring reform, the centrists advocated a far slower process of privatization Finally, on the right of the political spectrum were a combination of die-hard communists and ultranationalists While they differed among themselves on economic policy, they all wanted a powerful, highly centralized Russia that would 1) actively protect Russians living in the "Near Abroad", 2) be a major world power, and 3) adopt a confrontational approach toward the United States, which they saw as Russia's main enemy Among the advocates of this position was the clearly anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who had placed third in the Russian presidential elections of June 1991 While both the pro-Yeltsin group and the centrists in Parliament supported good relations with Israel, the far right strongly opposed Israel Zhirinovsky, not then in the Parliament, sent "volunteers" from his party to aid Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War in its confrontation with the United States and Israel Over the next two years, as the struggle between Yeltsin and his opponents in Parliament grew, relations between Russia and Israel became an element of the struggle, and some of the centrists, including Khasbulatov, made common cause with the far right in their efforts to topple Yeltsin

Despite his critics, in 1992 Yeltsin was able to pursue his major foreign policy initiatives without severe opposition, including among these the rapid development of ties with Israel Evidence of this rapid development came in late April 1992, when Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoi, then still an ally of Yeltsin, visited Israel At the airport Rutskoi stated, "We consider Israel a very important place because of the many Russians who now live there They form a bridge between us that can enable us to broaden our relations " At a later ceremony he emphasized again that "Israel and Russia have a great opportunity for the development of mutual cooperation and a blossoming relationship "[12] Bilateral relations between Russia and Israel improved as a result of the Rutskoi visit A memorandum of understanding on cooperation in agriculture was signed that Rutskoi said "opens vast prospects for Russo-Israeli business in [the] agrarian sphere."[13]

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[12] Cited in a report by Dan Izenburg, *Jerusalem Post*, 30 April 1992

Following Rutskoi's visit, Israeli elections were held. They were won by Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin, who quickly put together a coalition government that appeared to spur the peace process. Rabin made a number of gestures to the Palestinians, including the release of 800 prisoners and the freezing of new Israeli housing construction in most of the occupied territories. A Moscow Radio Arabic-language broadcast on 17 July praised Rabin's action, noting that "a very favorable condition for achieving realistic results" in a Middle East peace settlement had been created.[14] These actions were followed by US secretary of state James Baker's visit to Israel, and it soon appeared that a reinvigoration of the Middle East peace process had taken place.

In an effort to be evenhanded, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry invited PLO Executive Committee member Mahmud 'Abbas to Moscow in mid-July, and promised to continue Russian-Palestinian interaction on a wide range of issues.[15] In a briefing on 24 July, the Russian Foreign Ministry again warmly praised Rabin. It noted that, just as Baker had set out to tour the Middle East to spur the peace process, so, too, had Viktor Posuvaliuk, the director of the Middle East and Africa Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.[16] Upon his return, Posuvaliuk stated, in a briefing on 14 August, that since stabilizing the military and political situation and establishing lasting peace in the Middle East directly concerned its national interests, Russia would conduct an active policy in the region. He discussed the role of the multilateral talks, saying that Russia was called upon "to create a positive atmosphere for the bilateral talks and help form the basis for regional cooperation."[17] Posuvaliuk also emphasized the Russian role in the peace process and noted that Israel's new foreign minister, Shimon Peres, would soon be meeting with Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev.

Less than a week after Posuvaliuk's announcement, Peres began a four-day state visit to Russia on the eve of the renewal of the bilateral peace talks in Washington. After meeting with Kozyrev, Rutskoi, and Russian prime minister Yegor Gaidar, Peres took a side trip to his birthplace, Vishenovo, in Belarus. Just as his predecessor, David Levy, had done in January, Peres also attended Sabbath services at the Central Synagogue in Moscow, where he urged the Jews of Russia to emigrate to Israel.[18] Kozyrev used the Peres visit to emphasize Russia's importance in the Middle East peace process, noting that, "We want peace in the Middle East and are playing the role of honest brokers, trying to help the sides bring their positions together."[19] Kozyrev promised to explain the Israeli position to the Syrian foreign minister, who was due to visit Moscow in early September. Peres said he hoped the Russian government would continue to play a stabilizing role in the Middle East, and praised Russia for its efforts to curb anti-Semitism. He did, however, voice concerns about Russia's arms sales to Arab countries[20] Peres also stressed, in a news conference held at the Russian Foreign Ministry, that Russia, with its close ties to the Arab world, could help improve relations between Israel and its neighbors It could also contribute to peace by fostering joint economic cooperation projects, such as a desalinization plant Less than a month later, Peres and Kozyrev signed a major memorandum in New York calling for further improvement in Israeli-Russian relations and increased cooperation in the cultural, economic, legal, and political spheres Peres and Kozyrev stated their intentions to develop political contacts at all levels between Israel and Russia, including the parliamentary level The agreement also called for the strengthening "in every possible way" of commercial, economic, scientific, and technological links between the two states, with an eye to encouraging joint investment projects and cooperation between Israeli and Russian business concerns Finally, the joint memorandum stated that the two foreign ministers would give priority attention to the ongoing peace talks, and that Russia, as a co-sponsor of the peace process, would continue to actively promote a rapprochement between all parties engaged in the peace talks[21]

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[13] ITAR-TASS, 1 May 1992, FBIS FSU, 4 May 1992, p. 16.
[14] Moscow Radio, in Arabic, 17 July 1992, FBIS FSU, 22 July 1992, p. 3.
[15] ITAR-TASS, 17 July 1992, FBIS FSU, 17 July 1992, p. 18.
[16] ITAR-TASS, 24 July 1992, FBIS FSU, 27 July 1992, p. 10.
[17] ITAR-TASS, 14 August 1992, FBIS FSU, 17 August 1992, p. 9.
[18] *Jerusalem Post*, 23 August 1992.
[19] *Jerusalem Post*, 21 August 1992.

By the end of 1992, the Middle East peace process faced a number of obstacles, due, in part, to an upsurge in fighting in Israel's "security zone" in Lebanon in November 1992, and the expulsion by Israel, in December, of more than 400 HAMAS activists accused of inciting the increasing number of attacks on Israelis in the Gaza Strip and in Israel proper Despite these problems, Russian policy did not turn against Israel, but remained evenhanded A Russian Foreign Ministry statement noted Russia's "serious concern" over the November fighting in Lebanon and called on all conflicting sides in southern Lebanon to show "maximum restraint"[22] Similarly, a Russian Foreign Ministry communique issued after the expulsion of the HAMAS activists noted that "the Russian side is counting on the sides to show maximum restraint in their actions, and hopes that the problem with the deportation of hundreds of Palestinians will be humanely settled very soon, taking into account the genuine interests of both the Israelis and Palestinians "[23]

Israel's Ambassador to Russia, Chaim Bar-Lev, continued to be optimistic about Russian-Israeli relations, in spite of the clear rightward shift in the Russian government, as reflected in the December 1992 Congress of Peoples Deputies, which compelled Yeltsin to replace Prime Minister Gaidar with Viktor Chernomyrdin In an interview published on New Year's Day 1993, Bar-Lev asserted that "Israel is altogether popular here" (in Russia), and that the change in prime ministers was unlikely to have a bearing on Russian-Israeli relations He hoped Russia would make the Arabs understand that they, and especially the Palestinians, would also have to make concessions for there to be a peace settlement[24]

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[20] *Jerusalem Post*, 23 August 1992

[21] *New York Times*, 20 September 1992

[22] ITAR-TASS, 28 October 1992, FBIS FSU, 29 October 1992, p 11

[23] ITAR-TASS, 18 December 1992, FBIS FSU, 21 December 1992, p 22 Both Russia and the United States condemned in the UN Security Council the expulsion of the HAMAS activists

[24] Cited in an interview with Natasha Singer, *Forward*, 1 January 1993

RUSSIA AND ISRAEL IN 1993

Despite Yeltsin's temporary turn away from the United States in the early months of 1993, it appeared as though Bar-Lev's optimism might be borne out In January 1993, in an apparent effort to gain support from his centrist critics in Parliament, Yeltsin distanced himself from his pro-US foreign minister, Kozyrev, and announced a "balanced" policy for Russia as a "Eurasian state " He also condemned the US bombing of Iraq, which resumed that same month, and asserted that US pressure would not prevent Russia from signing a rocket technology agreement with India [25] While US-Russian relations chilled, Russian-Israeli relations continued to improve Khasbulatov, now an outspoken opponent of Yeltsin, visited Israel in early January 1993 as part of a trip to the Middle East He met with Rabin and announced his support for the development of "businesslike cooperation" between Russia and Israel in the "economic, scientific, cultural, and other spheres "[26] Khasbulatov also downplayed the impact of the deportation of HAMAS activists, stating that this incident should not disrupt the peace talks because Israel was "seriously intent on the success of the dialogue with the Arabs "[27]

Russian-Israeli relations continued to be strong through the early spring of 1993 Russia supported the US-Israeli agreement to bring back the HAMAS deportees within one year, thereby enabling Israel to avoid further UN condemnation Russia also joined the United States in calling for a new round of Arab-Israeli talks, which had been interrupted by the HAMAS expulsions, and then praised the decision to resume them in late April Meanwhile, as diplomatic ties remained firm, Russia and Israel continued to develop their cultural and economic relations In February, the Russian government approved a draft agreement on scientific and technical cooperation with Israel, although a formal trade agreement had yet to be negotiated [28] A month later came the announcement from Moscow that Russian nuclear experts were discussing the construction of floating nuclear plants in Israel to help solve the problem of desalinizing sea water [29] In April, Israeli absorption minister Yair Tsaban visited Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St Petersburg, to discuss expanding Israel's cultural ties with St Petersburg, from where many thousands of Jews had emigrated to Israel [30]

As Israeli-Russian relations deepened, the conflict between Yeltsin and his opponents in Parliament worsened, and Russia's ties with Israel became part of the confrontation On 13 March 1993, *Pravda*, which previously had reflected the views of Soviet conservatives and now had become a major organ of Russia's right wing, condemned the Russian government for following the US lead in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It noted that "since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the opinion of the Russian delegate at the UN concerning the Middle East situation has never diverged from the opinion of the US delegate, however absurd it has been at times."[31] Then, as the date for the climactic popular referendum on Yeltsin's future approached, *Pravda* denounced Israel for its "extensive" influence on Russia and for its support of Yeltsin.[32]

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[25] Cited in a report by Serge Schmemann, *New York Times*, 26 January 1993

[26] ITAR-TASS, 5 January 1993, FBIS FSU, 7 January 1993, p 28 The term "other" spheres of cooperation in Soviet parlance had meant military cooperation, and beginning in 1990, there had been rumors of possible Israeli purchases of Soviet military aircraft

[27] Ibid

[28] Interfax, 1 February 1993, FBIS FSU, 2 February 1993, p 12 The areas of cooperation included agriculture, biotechnology, construction, the conversion of defense industries, electronics, environmental protection, geology, livestock breeding, medicine, power engineering, space research, and transportation In the area of trade, Israeli conditions on quotas and tariffs reportedly were holding up the agreement (Interview with Russian diplomat, Russian Embassy, Tel Aviv, 12 January 1994)

[29] ITAR-TASS, 4 March 1993, FBIS FSU, 4 March 1993, p 14

[30] ITAR-TASS, 9 April 1993, FBIS FSU, 13 April 1993, p 14

Yeltsin's victory and Parliament's defeat in the referendum did not slow the parliamentary attacks on Yeltsin. Ominously for Israel, a number of centrist parliamentarians, including Khasbulatov and his ally, Vice President Rutskoi, began to make common cause during the spring and summer of 1993 with the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli, communist/fascist "Red-Browns" on the right wing of the Russian political spectrum.

The split between the opposition and Yeltsin grew during the summer as Yeltsin, strengthened by his victory in the referendum, shifted back to a pro-US stance. Kozyrev supported the US June attack on Iraq's intelligence headquarters in Baghdad, in response to the Iraqi assassination attempt against former US president George Bush. Yeltsin acceded to US wishes and agreed to withhold rocket technology from India. These moves were severely condemned by Yeltsin's opponents. One of his leading right-wing opponents, Colonel Viktor Alksnis, fearing Yeltsin would acquiesce in the deployment of US troops on the Golan Heights, warned the United States against sending troops to the Golan as part of any peace arrangement between Israel and Syria. He asserted that such a deployment "will undermine Russian strategic interests. This must be seen as an American springboard close to the Persian Gulf."[33]

Following the escalation of fighting in southern Lebanon in late July 1993 between Israeli and Hizballah forces, Israeli and PLO leaders astounded the world by coming to an agreement on a Declaration of Principles for peace. The agreement was formally signed on the White House lawn in Washington on 13 September 1993,[34] in the presence of Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. US secretary of state Warren Christopher had been careful to give Kozyrev equal billing, although Russia had, in fact, done little to bring about the agreement. Nonetheless, perhaps to demonstrate to Yeltsin's political opponents as well as to the rest of the world that Russia was still a major player in the Middle East, Kozyrev commented on the agreement that

> We said to our partners in the West and to the Israelis, too, that the PLO in recent years has gone through a considerable evaluation and that [PLO chairman Yasir] Arafat, himself, has become a mature leader who has adopted a number of very important political decisions.

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[31] *Pravda*, 17 March 1993 (translated in CIS/ME, 18, no. 3, March 1993, p. 32).

[32] *Pravda*, 24 April 1993, FBIS FSU, 27 April 1993, p. 12. The referendum basically offered the Russian people a choice between Yeltsin and his reform program on the one side, and Parliament on the other. It followed a major confrontation between Parliament and Yeltsin. Yeltsin won the referendum.

[33] Cited in a report by Avigdor Esken, *Jerusalem Post*, 9 June 1993.

[34] *Izvestia*, a pro-Yeltsin newspaper, was effusive in its praise of Rabin's speech. See *Izvestia*, 15 September 1993.

> We have worked with Arafat earlier, too, and supported him Today, since the conclusion of that agreement, he has been recognized in the West as well It should not be forgotten that, in the Arab world, relations with the United States have not always been positive, and it is important for Moscow to also lend support to [the] new initiatives [35]

As if to underline Moscow's continued role in the Middle East, Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoly Adamishin, toured the Middle East in mid-September, visiting Israel on 19 September He met with Rabin and Israeli president Ezer Weizman and expressed Russia's readiness to give "all-around support to enable an effective implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles and expansion of the area of concord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization "[36] Adamishin also emphasized, as had Kozyrev, the need to make progress in Israel's relations with Syria and Lebanon

Two days after Adamishin's visit to Israel, Russian attention shifted from the Middle East back to Yeltsin's confrontation with his enemies in Parliament On 21 September, frustrated by Parliament's constant sabotaging of his domestic programs, Yeltsin issued a decree dissolving it, and announced elections for a new Parliament to take place on 12 December 1993 Parliament responded by deposing Yeltsin and declaring Vice President Rutskoi, once an ally of Yeltsin but now his enemy, as the new president When Yeltsin then sealed off the Parliament, its leader, Khasbulatov, called for public support After a failed effort at mediation by the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, conflict erupted With Rutskoi urging them on, supporters of the parliamentary side, such as militants of Alexander Barkshov's Fascist Russian National Union and the anti-Semitic National Salvation Front, broke through the police barricades around Parliament, seized the Moscow mayor's office, and then marched on the Ostankino TV Center They were led by General Albert Makashov, who had been denouncing the "imperialist-Zionist conspiracy," as well as leaders of other right-wing groups in Parliament The troops inside the TV center, who were loyal to Yeltsin, held off the mob long enough for Yeltsin to mobilize sufficient force to seize the Parliament building itself and capture the leaders of the parliamentary forces, including Rutskoi and Khasbulatov

Fortunately for both Israel and Russia's Jewish community, Yeltsin succeeded in defeating the fascist-supported forces of Parliament, and both Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, along with a number of their right-wing supporters, were imprisoned, if only temporarily Yeltsin then introduced his own constitution, under which he was given greatly enhanced presidential powers [37] He also called for the constitution to be voted up or down at the same time that parliamentary elections were to take place, on 12 December A number of political parties began organizing for the parliamentary elections They included not only parties supporting Yeltsin, but also those supporting the communists and the fascists, like the Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky Much to Yeltsin's surprise, and to the discomfort of the reform movement in Russia, both the communists and Zhirinovsky's anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli Liberal Democratic Party fared surprisingly well in the elections Zhirinovsky's party actually outpolled the pro-Yeltsin Peoples Choice Party of Yegor Gaidar[38] A number of observers perceived support for Zhirinovsky more as a protest vote against the deteriorating Russian economy and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower than as a vote in support of fascism or anti-Semitism[39] Ironically, it was revealed after the election that Zhirinovsky, whose father apparently was Jewish, had reportedly requested an invitation to emigrate to Israel in 1983[40]

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[35] ITAR-TASS, 14 September 1993, FBIS FSU, 14 September 1993, p 6

[36] ITAR-TASS, 20 September 1993, FBIS FSU, 21 September 1993, p 14

[37] For a summary of Yeltsin's powers under the new Constitution, see the article by John Lloyd, *Financial Times*, 13 December 1993

Despite the Zhirinovsky victory, Yeltsin also had some success in the December elections, as his constitution was approved Nonetheless, it appeared as if the new Parliament might challenge Yeltsin almost as much as the old one had In one of its first acts, the lower house of Parliament, the Duma, which was controlled by a coalition of communists and right-wing nationalists, pardoned not only the participants in the October 1993 uprising against Yeltsin, but also those in the August 1991 abortive coup d'etat against Gorbachev

RUSSIA AND ISRAEL IN 1994

Unlike the confrontational pattern of his relations with the old Parliament, Yeltsin sought to work out a *modus vivendi* with the new Parliament He removed from his government the controversial Gaidar and began to adopt a line of foreign policy more independent of the United States, in part to quell the criticism of his parliamentary opponents on the center and right He became far more assertive in protecting Russian interests in the "Near Abroad," and used economic and military pressure to try to bring recalcitrant states, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, into line In addition, he openly confronted the United States in Bosnia, successfully checking (albeit with British and French help) President Bill Clinton's plans to take punitive military action against the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic Unlike Cold War confrontations, however, Russian intervention in Bosnian diplomacy had a positive, if only a temporary, impact it helped convince the Bosnian Serbs to lift their siege of Sarajevo

Yeltsin also intervened unilaterally in the Middle East peace process, although his action seemed more aimed at satisfying his domestic opposition than at really challenging the US-led Arab-Israeli peace process Following the 25 February incident in Hebron in which a crazed Israeli settler killed 29 Arabs praying in the disputed Cave of the Patriarchs,[41] Yeltsin, without coordinating with the United States, urged a return to Madrid to save the peace talks He called for the introduction of international observers to protect the Palestinians—a position supported by the PLO but rejected by Israel He also dispatched a series of envoys, including Foreign Minister Kozyrev, to Tunis and Jerusalem for talks with PLO and Israeli leaders Finally, he invited both Arafat and Rabin to Moscow on official visits to demonstrate Russia's central role as co-sponsor of the Arab-Israeli peace talks

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[38] Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party received 22 79 percent of the party preference vote, the People's Choice Party got 15 38 percent, the Communist Party got 12 35 percent, the Women of Russia Party got 8 1 percent, the communist-supported Agrarian Party got 7 9 percent, the reformist Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc got 7 83 percent, the reformist Russian Party of Unity and Accord got 6 75 percent, and the centrist Democratic Party got 5 5 percent (*New York Times*, 29 December 1993)

[39] See the report by Steve Erlanger, *New York Times*, 30 December 1993

[40] See the report by David Hoffman, *Washington Post*, 24 December 1993 Zhirinovsky was also active in the Jewish group "Shalom" in the late 1980s, an organization reportedly set up by the KGB (Committee for State Security) to counterbalance the independent Jewish organizations that emerged in the latter years of Gorbachev Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres predicted that Zhirinovsky's electoral success would spur more Russian Jews to emigrate (see the report by David Makovsky and Batsheva Tsur, *Jerusalem Post*, 15 December 1993)

Yeltsin's strategy seemed to follow the line that, if Russia became very active in the diplomacy surrounding the effort to restart the peace talks, and Arafat, as expected, returned to the negotiating table, then Russia could reap its share of the diplomatic credit for Arafat's return Such a demonstration of Russia's centrality in a major world trouble spot would not only bolster Yeltsin's prestige, but it also might help, as in Bosnia, to satisfy his hardline critics in Parliament Indeed, *Pravda*, long a bitter detractor of Yeltsin and a supporter of Russia's right-wing politicians, noted approvingly on 15 March that

> Moscow's proposals on "Madrid 2" have generated a contradictory reaction The PLO has come out in support of the proposals while Israel has rejected them The United States has also expressed its dissatisfaction, indeed, not only with the proposals as such, but also with the actual fact of Russia taking its own steps After all, Washington has gotten used to hearing only cries of approval from Moscow concerning its foreign policy actions
>
> Russia's current activity in the Near East has been greeted with approval in the Arab world, if not always in essence, then at least in form The press is noting that, for the second time this year, Moscow is operating independently of Washington, first in Bosnia, and now in the Arab-Israeli conflict "The Russian Bear is returning to the international arena," the Saudi *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* states And not just the Near East, but also other areas on our planet have been waiting for this for a long time[42]

While this flurry of diplomacy may have strengthened Yeltsin domestically, it did not damage his ties with either the United States or Israel for several reasons First, Moscow quickly abandoned the "Madrid 2" plan Second, in April 1994, the PLO and Israel returned to the peace talks after a token international presence was temporarily positioned in Hebron, and an agreement was reached between them on 4 May Third, during his trip to Moscow in late April, Rabin was warmly welcomed by Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev,[43] and signed a series of agreements with Russia, including a major trade agreement The Israeli prime minister was invited to deliver a lecture at the General Staff Academy in Moscow Yeltsin also promised Rabin that, although a Russian-Syrian military agreement was signed on 27 April,[44] only defensive arms and spare parts would be sold to Syria,[45] and that Russia would wield its influence with Syria to help find information about Israeli soldiers who were still missing since the 1982 invasion of Lebanon

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[41] For the official Russian reaction to the Hebron massacre, which was balanced in tone and noted that the Israeli leadership had condemned the incident, see ITAR-TASS, 25 February 1994, FBIS FSU, 28 February 1994, p 19

[42] *Pravda*, 15 March 1993, FBIS FSU, 16 March 1994, p 8

[43] Kol Israel (Voice of Israel), 26 April 1994, FBIS FSU, 26 April 1994, p 12

[44] INTERFAX, 27 April 1994, FBIS FSU, 28 April 1994, p 18

Yeltsin's efforts to use Moscow's position as co-sponsor of the Madrid peace process to demonstrate Russia's importance in world affairs continued through the summer and early fall of 1994 Russian-Israeli relations also improved during that period In July, Israeli agriculture minister Yaakov Tsur visited Moscow and signed agreements for the training of Russian farmers and the export of Israeli fresh fruits and vegetables to Russia [46] In August, the Russian Optimum credit card was introduced into Israel to facilitate currency transfers between Russia and Israel, and to reinforce ties between Russian immigrants living in Israel and Russia The opening of a branch of the Mosstroi Bank in Tel Aviv in July, the first Russian bank to open an office in Israel, was another symbol of the expanded economic relations between the two countries [47] So was the opening of the Moscow office of the Association of New Enterprises in Israel, an organization composed primarily of immigrants to Israel from the FSU who had become the owners of businesses

Relations on the cultural front continued to develop as well Gary Kasparov, the Russian world chess champion, visited Israel in October, Igor Guberman, a Russian artist who had emigrated to Israel, returned for a visit to Moscow, and *Moscow News*, the liberal Russian newspaper, began publication in Israel [48]

As economic and cultural relations between Israel and Russia continued to improve, so, too, did political relations In September, Israel's Knesset Chairman Shevach Weiss visited Moscow In October, Russian foreign minister Kozyrev participated in the ceremony surrounding the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement Both Kozyrev's insistence on playing a major role at the signing, and the message he read from Yeltsin at the ceremony, indicated that Russia sought to utilize the event to highlight Russia's important role in the Middle East peace process [49]

> I would like to convey to this gathering a welcoming address of the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin I quote "Today's event is an impressive success of the Madrid peace process that has developed under the co-sponsorship of Russia and the United States of America Russia intends to go on with its practical promotion of the final cessation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and support for the implementation of the Israeli-Jordanian agreements " Signed, Boris Yeltsin
>
> And, allow me, on my part, just to express my personal admiration for the political courage of all present here—heads of state and Governments of both Jordan and Israel—and assure you that Russia, as a co-sponsor of the peace process, will be with you and with others on all

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[45] *Izvestia*, 29 April 1994

[46] Cited in CIS/ME, XIX, no 9–10 (1994), p 32

[47] Ibid , p 3 In an interview at the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv on 26 October 1994, the author was told that the signing of the trade agreement in April had removed a major obstacle to the rapid development of Russian-Israeli trade

[48] Cited in CIS/ME, XIX no 9–10 (1994), p 41

[49] According to Israeli television, Channel 1, 26 October 1994, Kozyrev demanded to speak at the ceremony (he was not originally scheduled to speak), so Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres was also added as a speaker

tracks until there is firm peace and, after that, in building a truly prosperous life in this region Thank you[50]

CONCLUSIONS

In looking at the course of Russian policy toward Israel since the collapse of the Soviet Union, several preliminary conclusions can be drawn First, there has been a great deal of continuity between Yeltsin's policy toward Israel and Soviet policy during the last three years of the Gorbachev era Indeed, Yeltsin has worked to further improve Russian-Israeli relations, despite criticism from right-wing elements in Russia's Parliament, and has strongly supported US efforts to bring about an Arab-Israeli peace agreement In the one instance where Moscow sought to exercise some independent diplomacy, after the Hebron massacre, the reason appeared to be based more on Yeltsin's desire to appease his domestic opponents by demonstrating Russia's ability to act independently than to torpedo the US-led peace effort Indeed, Moscow quickly dropped its independent plan and supported the 4 May Israeli-Palestinian agreement that was mediated by the United States

Second, in examining the development of Russian-Israeli relations in the December 1991-October 1994 period, it can be said that, on balance, relations have been quite good From the Israeli point of view, cultural and economic relations have proceeded nicely Russian Jews have been allowed to emigrate from Russia to Israel in large numbers, thus forming the bridge between the two countries that Rutskoi had described during his April 1992 visit to Israel Russia has been supportive of Israeli interests in the Middle East peace process, and there is no evidence that Russia is selling atomic weapons to any of Israel's Middle Eastern enemies Moscow's continued sale of conventional arms to Iran and Syria, however, and its willingness to help transfer weapons from North Korea to Syria is an irritant to the Russian-Israeli relationship[51] From the Russian point of view, cooperation with Israel has offered several benefits First, Israeli economic assistance, especially in the agricultural sector, promises to help the hard-pressed Russian economy Second, cooperation with Israel, whose ties to the United States were greatly strengthened following Rabin's victory in the June 1992 Israeli election, have reinforced Russian-US relations Finally, the prominent position accorded to Russian foreign minister Kozyrev at the signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, and the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, enhanced Russia's importance in world affairs, and perhaps even strengthened Yeltsin's position at home

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[50] Reprinted in *Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Jerusalem Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994), p 53

[51] In November 1993, a North Korean diplomat was expelled from Russia for trying to recruit a large group of Russian experts in the missile and space industry Given North Korea's ties to Iran and Syria, had the scientists been allowed to leave, Israel's security could have been threatened The incident was mentioned on Radio Rossii, 15 November 1993, FBIS FSU, 16 November 1993, p 5 On 12 December 1993, the *New York Times* revealed that Russian planes had flown SCUD missile chasses from North Korea to Syria Reportedly, Moscow has now cracked down on this activity, which was done independently of the Foreign Ministry (Interview with a Russian diplomat, Russian Embassy, Tel Aviv, 12 January 1994)

A third conclusion is that domestic politics have now become a noticeable, if not yet significant, factor in the making of Russian foreign policy toward Israel. The closeness of Russian-Israeli relations was one of the major criticisms leveled at Yeltsin by his parliamentary opponents who, allied with clearly anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli elements, sought to topple Yeltsin from power in early October 1993. Fortunately for both Russia's Jews and Russian-Israeli relations, Yeltsin defeated his parliamentary opponents. The strong showing of the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli Zhirinovsky in the subsequent parliamentary elections of 12 December indicates, however, that forces opposed to close Israeli-Russian relations are still powerful in the Russian body politic.

Finally, while the Arab-Israeli conflict was central to Soviet policy in the Middle East, in the case of Yeltsin's Russia, relations with Israel and most of the Arab world—except for the Gulf Arabs, who are seen as markets for Russian weapons and sources of loans for Russia—are secondary. Russia's foreign policy priorities are concentrated in the "Near Abroad" and on ties with China, Europe, and the United States.

All in all, from the Israeli point of view, relations with Russia have proven to be quite satisfactory since the collapse of the Soviet Union, although the Israeli government would like Russia to use even its reduced influence to bring Syria to make peace with Israel.[52] Should right-wing forces seize power in Russia, however, Russian-Israeli as well as Russian-US relations are likely to deteriorate sharply. This remains a major concern for Israeli policy makers.

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[52] In interviews with diplomats both at the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem and at the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv in October 1994, the author was told that there were no major problems in Russian-Israeli relations and that the relationship had become completely normalized.

THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR: KISSINGER IN MOSCOW

Victor Israelyan

This is an excerpt from a memoir about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War It focuses on the negotiations between US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev on ending the war Written from the perspective of a senior Soviet ambassador, it analyzes the way the Soviet leadership perceived the war and its eventual settlement The author, Victor Israelyan, was Director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Department of International Organizations at the time He was assigned to a four-man task force responsible for attending many of those meetings, taking notes, and preparing draft letters and documents for the Politburo

THE first word of the Israeli counter-offensive in the Sinai Peninsula began to reach Moscow on Tuesday, 16 October 1973, the day Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin left for Cairo According to the Soviet Military Intelligence reports and the recordings made by the Soviet satellites, which were submitted to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and some other members of the Politburo, large concentrations of tanks, other mechanized forces, and aircraft had been forming on the Israeli side of the line over the last few days The spearhead of the Israeli force had driven across the Suez Canal and was attacking Egyptian positions and surface-to-air missile sites on the western bank

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Copyright © 1995 by The Pennsylvania State University *This article is an excerpt of a chapter from Victor Israelyan's forthcoming book,* Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War *(University Park, PA Penn State Press, October 1995)*

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ■ VOLUME 49, NO 2, SPRING 1995

Military experts warned the Kremlin that a successful Israeli offensive could cut off the retreat of the large Egyptian force dug into the eastern side of the Canal and lead to the military and political collapse of Egypt In addition, intelligence showed that significant US arms shipments were reaching Israel Another source of information in the Egyptian capital reported to the Kremlin that the Israeli crossing of the Canal had created a situation of near panic among many Egyptian political and military leaders Some of them, the informant claimed, were considering withdrawing the government to Asyut and organizing popular resistance against the Israeli invaders

The Soviet media, however, portrayed the situation on the Sinai front and in Egypt differently, referring to, or simply repeating, the Arab version of the story Only on 18 October did the Soviet newspapers mention that a small group of seven Israeli tanks had "desperately tried" to cross the Canal and that three of them were lost On 19 October *Izvestia* announced that "an Israeli regiment penetrated into the Western bank of the Suez Canal and was liquidated "[1] These lies were for the Soviet public, but the Soviet leaders knew the bitter truth Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's bravado could not mislead them Nevertheless, Kosygin's talks in Cairo had proved that an immediate cease-fire with the cooperation of Sadat was hopeless That was one reason why the Kremlin's contacts with Washington became more active in those days

Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko informed the four-man task force, set up in the Foreign Ministry at the beginning of the war, that Brezhnev had decided to address US president Richard Nixon and express to him the Soviet leadership's comprehensive assessment of the situation in the Middle East Brezhnev did not want the message to be confrontational, though he did want it to be convincing A draft was drawn up with the help of Brezhnev's aides, edited by Gromyko, reviewed, and finally cleared by Brezhnev himself, who attached great importance to it

Although US secretary of state Henry Kissinger characterized the message as "conventional rhetoric,"[2] it seems that it precisely and accurately reflected the way the Soviet leadership perceived the 1973 October War and the Middle East situation and its eventual settlement Many of the assertions in that message proved to be correct in the years after the war For this reason, the full text of the message deserves to be quoted On 16 October, Brezhnev wrote to Nixon

> The current developments in the Middle East are to some extent a test of both our powers to strictly comply with the course we have accepted in our [bilateral] relations and in international affairs
>
> The situation is undoubtedly complicated This is clear to us, as well as to you Let us be straightforward The United States and the Soviet Union are strongly engaged with Israel and Arab states, respectively
>
> The trouble is, however, not only, and, perhaps, not insomuch that we maintain a different position on the Middle East issue The main problem here is that we assess the situation in the Middle East differently The Soviet leadership continuously, including quite recently, has

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[1] *Izvestia*, 19 October 1973

[2] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston Little, Brown, 1982), p 534

> drawn the President's attention to the dangerous situation, which threatened a new explosion at any moment Unfortunately, however, the American side has been rather indifferent to these our warnings
>
> We do not want to think that the United States wanted such a development This would not correspond to the apparent interests of the United States as we understand them and as we have been told by the American side
>
> One could, certainly, regret the divergences in our evaluation of the danger of the absence of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict But at present this is not the issue, and we should not talk about that Now we must search for ways to reduce the tension [3]

Following this introduction, Brezhnev expressed the Kremlin's views on the prospects of a Middle East settlement

> Thinking about the present situation and about the ways to solve it, one inevitably comes to a conclusion that is probably not new but that strikes at the core of the problem No matter what the outcome of the present military operations—which is difficult to predict—it is clear that unless Israel withdraws from the Arab lands it seized, there will not be peace in the Middle East This is the essence We are convinced that, without liberating the Arab lands, one cannot design and establish a durable peace in the region
>
> Well, is it not high time to embark on a realistic road? Is it not better to deal with the matter on the most reliable basis instead of searching for palliative measures?[4]

In Brezhnev's view, several concrete steps could be taken to end the confrontation in the Middle East

> An unambiguous statement by Israel that it is ready to withdraw its troops from all the Arab territories it occupied in 1967 would help the matter Certainly, concurrent with that step, the security of all states in the region, Israel included, and their borders, could be guaranteed either by a decision of the [United Nations] Security Council or by the great powers And with the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the war would end, and freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the straits, including for Israeli ships, would be secured Other issues in which Israel has an interest could be settled as well, but, certainly, there is no room for gratification of Israel's territorial ambitions [5]

Brezhnev was asking Nixon what, in such an approach, could possibly be unacceptable to Israel or to Israel's supporters From his point of view, all these measures would only strengthen the security and the very existence of Israel as a sovereign state

It would take decades for the states of the Middle East and for the world community to establish new peaceful relationships in the region along lines similar to those sketched out in Brezhnev's message The few lines Kissinger devoted to the message in his memoirs were not entirely accurate Brezhnev did not suggest that Israel's security could be guaranteed by the superpowers, as Kissinger claimed [6] Although Brezhnev was a strong proponent of the special role and responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United

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[3] This letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Richard Nixon, 16 October 1973, was translated from the original Russian text by the author (author's private archives)

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p 532

States in a Middle East settlement, in this message Brezhnev was referring to guarantees of the United Nations (UN) Security Council or *of the great powers*—meaning the permanent members of the Security Council.

In a more emotional tone, Brezhnev reminded Nixon that in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union and the United States had contributed to the creation of Israel:

> And the Soviet Union never favored and does not favor the liquidation of Israel as a state, although in Israel, and not only there, one can now find people who make slanderous statements about the Soviet Union, having forgotten these facts and the gratefulness they have expressed for the rescue of millions of Jews from the bloody retribution of the Hitler butchers. There was a time when those in the United States and in other countries, who anathematize us now, prayed in honor of Soviet weapons that saved many nations—the Jewish people included—from annihilation in the years of the joint struggle of the Soviet Union and the United States against the fascist plague.[7]

Brezhnev explained the Soviet position at the UN and commented on the US position regarding a Security Council cease-fire resolution:

> If someone got the impression that by taking such a stand we simply want to put the United States in an awkward position and force it to exercise its veto power in the Security Council, that impression is totally groundless. Such an idea must be tossed out.
>
> We are deeply convinced, however, that it is unrealistic for the Security Council resolution, in addition to the provision concerning the cease-fire, to make a foggy reference to Security Council Resolution 242, instead of stating a clear requirement that Israeli troops withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines. Simply referring to a resolution that, for six years, has been interpreted differently by each party is useless. The American side, however, does not put forward other suggestions for how to solve the problem.[8]

This was, unfortunately, a hasty statement, for less than a week later, the Soviet Union co-sponsored a Security Council resolution that contained the "foggy" reference to Resolution 242.

The final passage of the message was very important. Brezhnev wrote:

> In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the main idea. No matter how far current events have gone, they have not passed the point of no return. Hence, neither the leaders of the Soviet Union nor those of the United States should forsake restraint.
>
> We know there are influential circles in the United States that want to destroy what we have already built at quite a large cost. It should not be permitted. For our part, we have done and will continue to do everything to prevent such a trend. We would like to hope that the American side will follow suit.
>
> If both sides strictly adhere to such a restrained approach, despite the difficulties each side is facing, future developments will undoubtedly bring only positive results. And we will continue to build the edifice that we have started.[9]

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[7] Letter from Brezhnev to Nixon, 16 October 1973.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

That concluding passage was optimistic and contained many personal elements. Brezhnev was quite an emotional person, and, having formulated some parts of the message himself, he expected Nixon to respond in the same friendly and frank manner. How could Brezhnev have known that he was actually corresponding mainly with Kissinger, because Nixon was preoccupied with entirely different problems?

As a follow-up to Brezhnev's message, a draft of the Security Council resolution that the Soviet Union was ready to support was sent to Washington. The draft was based on the text discussed by the Politburo on 15 October, with slight modifications. In addition to a call for an immediate cease-fire, the first paragraph contained a demand for a staged withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the lines designated in Resolution 242. The second paragraph did not specify the timeframe for the withdrawal, but said only that it must be completed in the "shortest time possible." The third paragraph was new. It reflected Brezhnev's image of Soviet-US cooperation in the Middle East settlement, and was worded as a call for "appropriate consultations" aimed at attaining a just peace in the Middle East.[10]

The reply in Nixon's name to Brezhnev's general message came three days later, on 19 October.[11] Very formal, it avoided responding to many key issues the Soviet leader had raised. There were no comments on the Soviet draft resolution either. Brezhnev was very disappointed and unhappy.

KISSINGER'S INVITATION TO MOSCOW

The news from Belgrade was not promising either. From Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia Vladimir Stepakov's cables, it was evident that the Yugoslavs were facing some difficulty getting approval for a Security Council cease-fire resolution from the non-aligned states. To many members of the task force the situation looked hopeless. We believed we had done everything possible to ensure an end to the fighting that would be beneficial to the Arabs, and now, whatever would be, would be. I think that many in the Politburo felt the same way.

The tide of world diplomacy, however, turned again, as it had several times in recent weeks. In one of his cables to Moscow, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, referred to his confidential relations with Kissinger, and suggested that it might be worthwhile to invite Kissinger to Moscow to review the situation.[12] It was a timely and courageous step by Dobrynin, who was convinced that Kissinger would accept the invitation.

In response to Dobrynin's cable, in the afternoon of 19 October, Brezhnev sent a message to Nixon inviting Nixon's "closest associate," Kissinger, to come to Moscow in

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[10] Draft resolution of the UN Security Council, prepared by the Soviet task force on 15 October 1973 (author's private archives).

[11] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 540.

[12] The task force was informed of the substance of Dobrynin's cables by Gromyko at a meeting in the Foreign Ministry on 18 October 1973. Kissinger had been appointed Secretary of State in September 1973; before that he had served as Nixon's National Security Advisor.

"an urgent manner "[13] Dobrynin cabled a positive reply from Washington promptly that evening, informing Moscow that the Secretary of State would arrive in Moscow the next day According to Dobrynin, Kissinger wanted to start the negotiations on Sunday, 21 October, and had requested that the announcement of his visit state that he was coming to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet government Brezhnev, however, ordered negotiations to begin Saturday evening,[14] and the Soviet announcement of the visit said nothing about an invitation At any rate, the speed with which Kissinger prepared for the visit was proof that it was very important, not only for the settlement of the crisis, but for him personally

On the evening of 20 October, Kissinger and a group of his assistants arrived in Moscow For the next 36 hours, all attention in the Kremlin was devoted to the negotiations with the United States The results of Kosygin's talks in Cairo got shifted to the background

An important message was sent by Nixon to Brezhnev on 20 October, before Kissinger arrived in Moscow, appealing to Brezhnev for "a firm commitment from both of us to devote our personal efforts to achieve that goal [a final peace] and to provide the strong leadership which our respective friends in the area will find persuasive "[15] In the course of further discussions on the Middle East issue, Brezhnev referred to this appeal several times "I am sending a message with Dr Kissinger," Nixon continued, "which he will convey orally to you, of my strong personal commitment in this regard "[16]

In his message, Nixon also informed the Soviet leader that he was granting Kissinger "full authority" and that "the commitments that he [Kissinger] may make in the course of your discussions have my complete support "[17] Kissinger interpreted this part of the message as being "its essence," but Moscow considered the substance to be Nixon's appeal for a joint commitment to achieve a final peace settlement It was taken for granted that the secretary of state had the "complete support" of the president How could it be otherwise? Nobody in the Kremlin even dreamed that there were serious differences—or even "a sharp split"—between Nixon and Kissinger [18]

Nixon's handwritten postscript to the message—"Mrs Nixon joins me in sending our best personal regards to Mrs Brezhnev and to you"[19]—deeply touched the Soviet leader Here again, how could the Kremlin know that the handwritten postscript was partly aimed at making it impossible for Kissinger to rewrite Nixon's message before delivering it to Brezhnev, and was therefore an indication that the president did not quite trust his secretary of state?[20] Gromyko's comments about Nixon's message were very positive, and many in Moscow shared his assessment

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[13] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p 542

[14] Author's interview with Brezhnev's aide, Andrei Alexandrov, on 31 August 1993

[15] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p 547

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Stephen E Ambrose, *Nixon*, Vol 3, *Ruin and Recovery, 1973–1990* (New York Simon & Schuster, 1991), p 245

[19] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p 548

[20] Ambrose, *Nixon*, p 245

Unaware of the complicated relationships within the White House, Brezhnev replied promptly to Nixon's message “I understand it exactly the way you stated, that Dr Kissinger, being your closest associate who enjoys your full confidence, will this time, as well, speak on your behalf, and that the commitments he may make in the course of our discussions with him will have your complete support ”[21] And in an act unprecedented in Soviet diplomatic practice, he added a handwritten postscript of his own “Mrs Brezhnev is grateful for the regards and in turn joins me in sending our best personal regards to Mrs Nixon and to you ”[22]

Although Kissinger did not intend to begin the talks on the day of his arrival, Brezhnev invited him to the Kremlin and initiated an exchange of views on Soviet-US relations in general, and on joint efforts for ending the war in the Middle East in particular In the first round of negotiations, the Soviet side was represented, apart from Brezhnev, by Gromyko, Dobrynin, Brezhnev's aide Andrei Alexandrov, and the head of the Foreign Ministry's USA Department, Georgii Kornienko Kissinger was accompanied by the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, the senior staff member of the National Security Council, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Sisco's deputy, Alfred Atherton, and the director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, Winston Lord

Brezhnev welcomed Kissinger and expressed his hope that, because of the urgency of the situation, a mutually acceptable way to end the fighting in the Middle East would be found during his visit to Moscow He stated that the Arab countries would never reconcile themselves to Israeli aggression He was very critical of Israel's policy, which he believed would have serious consequences for world peace and international security The increasingly dangerous situation in the Middle East might harm Soviet-US relations as well [23]

Brezhnev assessed Soviet-US detente in the light of the Middle East crisis and appealed for restraint along the lines of his 19 October message to Nixon He also mentioned Kosygin's visit to Cairo as being a part of the Soviet Union's efforts to bring the war to an end, and justified the sending of Soviet supplies to Egypt and Syria by characterizing them as the fulfillment of obligations set forth in a number of Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Syrian agreements But Brezhnev's major objective was for the Soviet Union and the United States to enter into an agreement to force Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders in return for an end to the hostilities The peace settlement would be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States Brezhnev also expressed his satisfaction with Nixon's latest message, in which the president favored joint action toward achieving peace in the Middle East [24]

The Soviet leader suggested that the Moscow negotiations be based on the following 1) neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should seek unilateral advantages, 2) the three Soviet principles—immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, and appropriate Soviet-US consultations—should be used as the basis for a Security Council resolution, and 3) the direction of the discussion should not be shaped by the changing situation at the war fronts [25]

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[21] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p 548

[22] Ibid

[23] Notes made by the author at the meeting of the Politburo on 21 October 1973

[24] Ibid

Kissinger did not oppose these principles, but at the same time he emphasized that he had come to Moscow to discuss a cease-fire, not a peace settlement, and noted that he would have to report back to Washington any plan for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East He pointed out that the latter would require complicated and lengthy consultations, while the cease-fire was the more pressing matter at the moment Keeping in mind the credentials given to Kissinger by Nixon, Brezhnev's favorite tactic, when he felt Kissinger was getting tough, was to threaten to contact Nixon directly and complain that his secretary of state was not complying with the instructions the president had given him

According to Brezhnev's report to the Politburo, Kissinger characterized the Soviet draft resolution as constructive He accepted an immediate cease-fire At the same time, he rejected the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 1967 borders, saying that a suitable formula could be found in the course of further negotiations He was prepared to accept Soviet-US consultations, if certain alternatives were given [26]

SADAT'S APPEALS NEGOTIATING A CEASE-FIRE

The next morning, Sunday, 21 October, another session of the full Politburo was held The topic was the negotiations with Kissinger Brezhnev began by emphasizing the utmost importance of the Soviet-US negotiations, not only for bilateral relations, but for world peace and international security He said he was pleased that Kissinger had come to Moscow, and took that as evidence that Washington was willing to continue Soviet-US cooperation He characterized Nixon's message of 20 October as recognition that the Soviet Union and the United States should jointly create a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East, an idea he had shared with Nixon in San Clemente in the summer of 1973 Brezhnev was convinced that if the two leaders continued to cooperate and to exert their influence with friends and allies, a stable peace could be achieved

Brezhnev then, surprisingly, turned to another subject. He related his telephone conversation with Soviet ambassador to Cairo Vladimir Vinogradov on the night of 21 October What follows is an almost word-for-word transcript of Brezhnev's account

> I had hardly fallen asleep after I returned from the Kremlin when, at 4 00 AM, I was awakened by Vinogradov's call He said, "I have just been invited [over] by Sadat, who, after saying that he was sorry to call at such a late hour, informed me that he had returned from the command post where his commanders reported on the situation at the front Sadat asked me to tell Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev] that, while at the front, he had decided to ask the Soviet comrades to take all possible measures to arrange an immediate cease-fire " "What are the conditions?" Vinogradov asked Sadat's answer was that the troops should stay in the positions they

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[25] Ibid
[26] Ibid

> occupied at that time, he did not mind the Israeli troops staying on the western bank of the Canal Sadat also wanted the Soviet Union to make efforts to arrange disengagement of the troops He expressed his desire that the Soviet Union sponsor a cease-fire motion at the Security Council After the cease-fire, a peace conference could be held, in which the Soviet Union, the United States, and perhaps some other great power would participate [27]

Brezhnev said that, in response, he had instructed Vinogradov to ascertain Sadat's feelings about the linkage between the cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops, and to ask Sadat about Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad's position on the Egyptian proposal, the position of other Arab leaders, and the clearing of mines from the Strait of Bab al-Mandab

Vinogradov's own recollection of this first meeting with Sadat, on the night of 21 October, added some details to Brezhnev's account According to the ambassador, Sadat was accompanied by his minister of War Industry, 'Abdallah Fattah, and his National Security advisor, Hafiz Isma'il One argument Sadat used to ask for a cease-fire was the impact of the transfer of arms to Israel by the United States Sadat said, "I can fight the Israelis but not the United States I cannot cope with the huge flow of American tanks and aircraft We destroy them, but the flow goes on " Sadat repeated several times that Egypt could not match the military might of the United States "Make use of all Soviet contacts with Washington and New York to bring about a cease-fire in the Middle East," he concluded [28] For his part, Isma'il described the situation of the Egyptian forces after the Israeli breakthrough on the western bank of the Canal as extremely dangerous For the first time in Sadat's presence, Isma'il acknowledged a serious threat to Cairo

Brezhnev continued his story of the sleepless night, describing his second conversation with Vinogradov following the ambassador's second visit that night to Sadat

> I finished my talk with Vinogradov, drank a cup of tea, and went to bed Shortly afterward, I was awakened by a second call from Vinogradov It was almost six o'clock in the morning The ambassador had had another meeting with Sadat, and, according to Vinogradov, Sadat agreed with everything "Of course, the Arabs will continue their struggle against Israel, but the sooner the agreement to cease fire is reached, the better for our common goal," he said Sadat also noted that he had informed Asad about his appeal to Moscow, but Sadat reminded Vinogradov that Asad, himself, asked the Soviet Union to propose a cease-fire, and recommended ignoring the position of King Hussein of Jordan and of [Algerian president Houari] Boumedienne and other Arab leaders as well "[29]

Sadat also asked Brezhnev to draw Palestinians into participating in plans for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East And finally, Sadat said that there was no problem with the Strait of Bab al-Mandab—there were no mines there

Concluding his report on his talk with Vinogradov, Brezhnev pointed out that Sadat's "desperate appeal" had changed the situation According to him, the situation was now more urgent than it had been on the eve of Kissinger's arrival, because an agreement with the United States on a cease-fire had to be reached within hours Brezhnev's assessment

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27 Ibid

28 Author's interview with Soviet ambassador to Cairo, Vladimir Vinogradov, 31 August 1993

29 Notes made by the author at the 21 October Politburo meeting

was seconded by Gromyko and Yuri Andropov, chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB). Brezhnev thought the United States did not know about Sadat's changed position, so he warned all participants against mentioning Vinogradov's two calls. "If Kissinger learns of Sadat's appeal to me, his position will be much tougher," he added.[30]

At the time Brezhnev was relating to Politburo members his conversations with Vinogradov, not far from the Kremlin in his residence at the Lenin Hills, Kissinger was reading a message from Cairo that reached Moscow via Washington. "Hafiz Ismail for the first time indicated that Sadat might be willing to separate a cease-fire from an overall settlement. Cairo would content itself with the convening of a peace conference and a 'guarantee' by the United States and the Soviet Union of the cease-fire and the speedy subsequent withdrawal of Israeli forces."[31] Thus, Kissinger learned—before the second and final round of Soviet-US talks—about the change in Sadat's position and of his acceptance of a cease-fire-in-place resolution separate from the peace settlement.

And yet there was a slight difference between Sadat's appeals to Brezhnev and his appeals to Kissinger. In the appeal to Brezhnev, he asked that the Soviet Union introduce a cease-fire resolution; in the appeal to Kissinger, he did not touch on that at all. In addition, Sadat informed neither one about his communication with the other. For their parts, Brezhnev and Kissinger concealed from each other their latest contacts with Sadat, trying to make use of them as leverage against each other.

At the Politburo meeting, Kosygin, disappointed by his own failure to elicit the kind of flexibility Sadat had now shown to Vinogradov, insisted that Vinogradov require a written appeal from Sadat to Brezhnev. "Let him make a straightforward statement that he accepts a cease-fire without any preconditions," Kosygin demanded. "Otherwise, he might change his mind and misinterpret our actions."[32] He was also concerned that any delay in Soviet action would result in a direct appeal from Sadat to the United States. His concern was shared by Andropov.

Kosygin's suggestion to have Sadat send his appeal in writing was rejected by Brezhnev, Andropov, and Gromyko. Gromyko believed that in response to such a request, Sadat might suggest a number of conditions that would deadlock any agreement. Nikolai Podgorny, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, noted that such a demand could humiliate Sadat.[33]

The military situation was reviewed briefly by Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko and Chief of the General Staff Victor Kulikov. The information did not make them happy. The military claimed that if the Israeli breakthrough in the area of the Canal continued, the Egyptian army would be completely surrounded and the war would be lost. Syrian plans to mount a major counterattack would not change the course of the war, they believed.

The main issue at the meeting, however, was the formulation of the Soviet position for Brezhnev's forthcoming meeting with Kissinger. All participants agreed that, in light of Sadat's appeal, the drafting of proposals for a comprehensive peace settlement would delay the cease-fire Kosygin believed that the fighting should be stopped immediately, lest the Arabs surrender Brezhnev stated that he wanted to negotiate with Kissinger the outlines of the peace settlement, including the format of the conference and the treaty That was also what Nixon wanted, as Brezhnev understood his message But because Sadat was urging the cease-fire and singling out this issue from the overall peace settlement, the Soviet Union should take that into account While agreeing in principle with the need for a cease-fire, Andropov stated "We should maintain our position and dignity, and not beg Kissinger to grant us a cease-fire "[34] He did not exclude a Soviet unilateral proposal in the Security Council, and he suggested that the United States might not always be able to keep the Israelis under control Therefore, Andropov believed, Sadat had to be advised to continue Egyptian resistance

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Anwar al-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 264–65.

[32] Notes made by the author at the 21 October Politburo meeting.

[33] Ibid.

The idea of a unilateral action in the Security Council by the Soviet Union was not supported by others in the Politburo, but a joint Soviet-US initiative was favored Dobrynin noted that Kissinger had said he would not leave Moscow unless he reached an agreement with Brezhnev Brezhnev's aide, Alexandrov, then read a paragraph from the record of Brezhnev's first meeting with Kissinger, according to which Kissinger had said, "The primary task is to stop military operations, end the fighting, and after that, to think about the future "[35]

Having reached a consensus to confine the negotiations to the task of drafting a cease-fire resolution, some participants at the same time anticipated an eventual negative international response Kosygin and Podgorny, for example, were concerned that the Soviet Union could be criticized for making a deal with the United States, and for bypassing the Arabs and ignoring some of their demands To avoid this, Kosygin suggested encouraging the Arab states to set up a special group with the task of maintaining Arab unity and working out a common policy toward a peace settlement [36] Brezhnev responded to this concern in the following way

> Of course we should not ignore Arab interests Today we will have a cease-fire agreement, tomorrow we will reach an agreement on other issues This is the only right course Later, we will have time to announce that we have done it in accordance with Sadat's request [his appeal to us on the night of 21 October], not now [37]

Then Brezhnev defined the role of the Soviet Union and the United States in the process, saying that the leaders of the two states had agreed to cooperate actively and to "command" their respective clients

Brezhnev was so eager to reach an agreement and end the war that he was ready to take an extreme position He suggested drafting with Kissinger a simple resolution that would contain only one paragraph—a call for an immediate cease-fire—leaving other related issues for subsequent negotiations "Here we have to act independently of Sadat and Asad,"[38] he noted. Brezhnev was strongly supported by Grechko. Gromyko, however, was in favor of continuing negotiations with Kissinger on the basis of the Soviet draft resolution. He held the opinion that the most important part of the resolution was the call for a cease-fire, but he also believed that the idea of conducting appropriate consultations on the peace process could be accepted at the same time. As for paragraph two, which dealt with the withdrawal of Israeli troops, Gromyko was against meeting Sadat's appeal concerning the disengagement of troops, but felt more importantly that "whatever positive remains from that paragraph after negotiations with Kissinger should also be accepted."[39] The sooner the cease-fire took effect, the better, Gromyko believed. In his opinion, China would not veto such a resolution. Andropov agreed with Gromyko's approach.

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[34] Ibid
[35] Ibid
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid

BREZHNEV'S SECOND MEETING WITH KISSINGER

At noon on 21 October, Brezhnev resumed his talks with Kissinger. The Soviet team was joined by First Deputy Vazilii Kuznetsov, and Kissinger's team was joined by William G. Hyland, a National Security Council specialist on Soviet affairs. Brezhnev did not touch on the problem of an overall peace settlement in his opening statement, instead inviting Kissinger to continue his comments on the Soviet draft resolution for a cease-fire, which, as he saw it, both parties had accepted as a basis for the negotiations. Kissinger repeated what he had said about the Soviet draft at the first meeting, and stated that he had prepared his own version of the draft. After reading Kissinger's version and consulting with Gromyko and Kuznetsov, Brezhnev felt that Kissinger's draft went in the same direction as the Soviet draft and, therefore, could be considered as a next step in the elaboration of a final joint text.

After the meeting, Kuznetsov said that Kissinger's draft was a pleasant surprise for Brezhnev. The Soviet leader had been prepared, as he stated at the Politburo meeting, to go along with a "simple" cease-fire resolution, but Kissinger was proposing instead a draft that contained the two main provisions the Kremlin was interested in most: an immediate cease-fire and recognition of the special role of the Soviet Union and the United States in the peace settlement (paragraphs one and three from the Soviet draft resolution).

The major differences between the Soviet draft and Kissinger's version were in paragraph two. While the Soviet draft contained a demand for a staged withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the 1967 lines, in accordance with Resolution 242, Kissinger's proposal called on the parties to begin implementation of Resolution 242 in all its parts. Kissinger reiterated his position, saying that it was meaningless to demand an immediate Israeli withdrawal to lines that had not yet been agreed on by the parties.[40] The Soviet proposal, reflecting the Arab stance and favoring a fixed date for the withdrawal, had been rejected by Kissinger. The agreed-upon general reference to Resolution 242 was certainly weaker and could be criticized by the Arabs, but

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 553.

Brezhnev believed that, if necessary, the blame for a weak paragraph two could be put publicly on the United States

After Brezhnev accepted Kissinger's draft, there were no serious difficulties Brezhnev wanted the cease-fire to take effect the moment the resolution was passed by the Security Council Kissinger, eager to buy more time for Israel to continue its offensive, objected Brezhnev wanted the implementation of Resolution 242, including the convocation of the peace conference, to have a defined timetable, but Kissinger could not agree with that because he did not want to commit to issues other than the cease-fire The parties came to a compromise It was agreed upon that the reference in the Soviet draft to "appropriate consultations" aimed at attaining a just and durable peace, and to "appropriate auspices" under which negotiations between the parties had to start, in the Kissinger version, had to be clarified in a special document Within several hours, the parties were involved in a joint drafting of the text The final text of the joint draft, Resolution 338, read as follows.

> The Security Council
>
> 1 calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and to terminate all military activity immediately, no later than twelve hours after the moment of the adoption of this resolution, in the positions they now occupy,
>
> 2 calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts,
>
> 3 decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East [41]

The text was the result of a compromise, and, like any compromise, it contained ambiguities and contradictions First of all, the adverb "immediately," which appeared in every paragraph, had been applied to three different actions cease-fire, implementation of Resolution 242, and the start of negotiations Such ambiguous wording left room for different interpretations For example, paragraph one of the resolution called on the parties to cease-fire "immediately, no later than twelve hours" after its adoption Kissinger interpreted this to mean that "the cease-fire should not go into effect until twelve hours *after* the resolution had been adopted"[42] In subsequent discussions in the Security Council, however, some Council members interpreted it to mean that the fighting must stop *immediately*—at the moment the resolution was adopted, but no later than twelve hours afterward

The most dubious and obscure wording in the resolution was in paragraph three, which deserves mentioning in textbooks on diplomacy as an example of how ambiguous wording can cause international misunderstanding, arguments, and even conflicts The formula "under appropriate auspices" provoked a variety of explanations and elucidations on the part of members of the Security Council and parties to the conflict

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[41] United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, "Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1973," in the United Nations Security Council Official Records, *Twenty-Eighth Year*, p 10

[42] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p 555

Because the authors of the resolution wanted paragraph three to single out the role of the Soviet Union and the United States in the peace settlement process, Gromyko and Kissinger initialed a separate document under the title "Understanding," worked out during the negotiations This document, which was not published, read

> It is understood that the phrase "under appropriate auspices" in point 3 of the Security Council Resolution shall mean that the negotiations between the parties concerned will take place with the active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, at the beginning and thereafter in the course of negotiations, when key issues of a settlement are dealt with Throughout the entire process of negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union will, in any case, maintain the closest contact with each other and the negotiating parties [43]

The "Understanding" did not prevent different interpretations of the document by Washington and Moscow, however This was one reason for the serious conflict between the superpowers that occurred several days after the Moscow meeting

With the initialing of the "Understanding" by Gromyko and Kissinger, the substantial part of the Soviet-US negotiations came to an end Each agreed to send instructions of analogous content to their respective permanent representatives to the UN Kissinger kindly handed over to Gromyko a draft of his cable to John Scali, the US permanent representative to the UN, and Gromyko's instructions to Yakov Malik, the Soviet permanent representative to the UN, were prepared on the basis of the US draft In accordance with the instructions, Malik was to do the following 1) at 6 00 PM New York time, 21 October (1 00 AM, 22 October, Moscow time) he was to ask, together with Ambassador Scali, that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened at 9 00 PM the same day, 2) he was to introduce, together with Scali, the Security Council resolution agreed upon by the two governments (the text of the resolution followed), 3) he was to forward jointly the resolution to the UN Secretariat at 8 30 PM, so that it could be circulated at 9 00 PM, before the meeting was called to order, 4) he was to act in close contact with Ambassador Scali to ensure the support of the other Security Council members, 5) he was to exert efforts to get the resolution adopted, by midnight, if possible, and 6) finally, he was to make only a short explanatory statement while introducing the resolution The hope was expressed that joint Soviet-US efforts would prevent any attempts to amend or change the resolution Malik was informed that it had been agreed in Moscow that neither side would accept any changes in the resolution without mutual approval [44]

Kissinger's and Gromyko's instructions to Scali and Malik were remarkable documents I do not remember such harmony in words and deeds of the two superpowers at the UN throughout the entire period of the Cold War

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[43] Soviet-US document, "Understanding," initialed by Gromyko and Kissinger in Moscow on 21 October 1973 (author's private archives)

[44] Draft instructions for Malik, prepared by the task force on 21 October 1973 (author's private archives)

GETTING SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION 338

On 22 October, Ambassador Vinogradov talked with President Sadat several times Sadat expressed his satisfaction with the success of Soviet-US negotiations and stated that Egypt would comply with the Security Council's decision He interpreted "under appropriate auspices" in the resolution to mean that the United States and the Soviet Union not only would participate throughout the entire process of the negotiations, but also would guarantee the implementation of the Security Council's decision Vinogradov shared Sadat's interpretation and said that the resolution in general was very close to Sadat's vision of the cease-fire Sadat agreed with the ambassador, but, at the same time, was unhappy that no decision on the issue of troop disengagement had been made in Moscow [45]

Informing President Asad of the Soviet-US accord was much more difficult The Syrian leader realized that the decision made in Moscow was a response to Sadat's appeal, while his own plea for a cease-fire a fortnight earlier, on 4 October, had been, as he saw it, ignored [46] After that, relations between Syria and the Soviet Union had become much cooler, with Asad limiting himself mainly to issues concerning military supplies The Soviet ambassador to Syria, Muzitdin Mukhitdinov, had reported this negative trend to Moscow After completion of Kissinger's talks in Moscow, Mukhitdinov was instructed to explain to Asad that the situation was extremely complex and to emphasize how the agreement reached in Moscow would benefit Syria The hope was expressed that Syria would support the cease-fire resolution

The arguments did not seem to convince Asad, and he did not agree to comply with the proposal of the superpowers Mukhitdinov reported that Asad had informed him about his telephone conversation with Sadat in which the Egyptian leader had assured him that Israel was going to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 and that, by virtue of the Moscow accord, the Soviet Union and the United States would guarantee the withdrawal The reaction in Damascus to the Soviet-US decision was very skeptical, to say the least, and the Kremlin leaders realized that [47]

Another important cable was drafted that evening Gromyko instructed Ambassador Stepakov in Belgrade to see President Josip Broz Tito or Foreign Minister Miloš Minič immediately, and inform the Yugoslavs of Sadat's urgent appeal for a cease-fire-in-place and of Kissinger's visit to Moscow "The Soviet Union and the United States, in the course of complicated negotiations, have worked out a joint Security Council draft resolution Having in mind Yugoslavia's relations to the Arab states, and to Egypt in particular, the Soviet Union requests the government of Yugoslavia to support the resolution "[48] Stepakov replied on Monday, 22 October, that he had met Minic, who promised to convey the very important message to Tito at once The foreign minister stated that Yugoslavia did not want to initiate a cease-fire resolution on its own, but would be ready to support a Soviet-US resolution acceptable to the Arab states.[49]

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[45] Author's interview with Vinogradov, 30 September 1993

[46] Author's interview with Ambassador Veniamin Popov, 12 October 1993

[47] Ibid

[48] Author's correspondence of 5 October 1993 with Igor Lebedev, Director of the Historic Documents Department of the Foreign Ministry of Russia

A number of messages in which the Soviet-US accord was described as an important step toward a peace settlement in the Middle East, and as a manifestation of the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy, were sent from Moscow to the heads of socialist and some non-aligned states The Kremlin expressed its hope that all states would support the Security Council resolution co-sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States.

INTERPRETING "UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES"

As directed by Gromyko and Kissinger, the US and Soviet permanent representatives to the UN, Scali and Malik, succeeded in having the Security Council meeting convened at 9 00 PM New York time, on Sunday, 21 October Scali was the first to introduce the draft resolution circulated by the UN secretariat just before the meeting Malik, in what was perhaps his shortest speech ever in the Security Council, seconded the draft Afterward, a discussion that lasted until 1 30 AM, 22 October, ensued No one opposed the Soviet-US draft

One of the first concerns was the interpretation of paragraph three Almost every participant on the Security Council tried to submit his own view of the phrase "under appropriate auspices" Their statements are as follows

> Louis De Guiringaud (France) "My delegation wishes to stress that the phrase 'under appropriate auspices' can mean nothing other than under the aegis of the Security Council "[50]
>
> Donald Maitland (United Kingdom) "My government believes that efforts aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East would best be pursued under the aegis of the United Nations This is how my delegation would interpret the reference to 'appropriate auspices' in paragraph three of the draft resolution before us "[51]
>
> Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru) "We trust that the 'appropriate auspices' mentioned in the draft will directly involve the United Nations through the Secretary General and the Security Council "[52]
>
> Samar Sen (India) "We are prepared to support the joint draft resolution, with many hesitations and several reservations, not the least of which is with regard to the reference to 'appropriate auspices' under which the negotiations are to be held "[53]

Scali and Malik, representing the co-sponsors of the resolution, did not give any specific interpretation of the formula at the Security Council Kissinger, in a conversation with the chargé d'affaires of the Soviet embassy in Washington, Yuli Vorontsov, claimed that the agreed-upon joint "auspices" presupposed the rapid fulfillment of Brezhnev's promise to bring about the release of Israeli prisoners of war.[54] However, neither during the Moscow talks nor later was there any mention by any Soviet participant in the talks that such an understanding existed. Later, in his memoirs, Kissinger explained his attitude toward the "Understanding": "The vaguely defined US-Soviet 'auspices' had the advantage ... of preventing the intrusion into the negotiating process of other parties liable to bring pressure on us—I fear I meant some of our European allies."[55]

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[49] Ibid

[50] United Nations Security Council Official Records, *Twenty-Eighth Year*, 1747th Meeting, 21–22 October 1973, New York, p 7

[51] Ibid

[52] Ibid, p 11

[53] Ibid, p 10

The Kremlin leaders' understanding of the Soviet-US agreement reached in Moscow was crystal-clear. The formula meant that the Soviet Union and the United States had a special role throughout the entire process of arranging a settlement in the Middle East. It meant guarantees of Israel's compliance with Resolution 242, concerning the withdrawal from the occupied territories in particular, and it meant a commitment to exert pressure on their respective friends—Israel and the Arab states—if necessary, in order to ensure their compliance with the agreements of the superpowers and the UN. At 12:52 AM, 22 October, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 to 0. China did not participate in the voting.

FIRING THE SCUD MISSILES

A few minutes before the cease-fire went into effect on 22 October, Soviet surface-to-surface SCUD missiles were fired at Israeli targets from Egyptian positions. This event was extraordinary because, in accordance with the Soviet-Egyptian agreement, the SCUDs were guarded by a Soviet military unit. The use restrictions and certain consultation procedures, before the SCUDs could be employed, put the missiles practically under full Soviet control. Sadat had complained about this to the Kremlin several times, but in vain. The Soviet military advisers were disposed to agree with the Egyptian request to employ the SCUDs, but did not get the support of the Politburo.

The firing of the SCUD missiles was an unusual and curious story. On that day, it was expected that the war was drawing to a close—and, yet, the most dangerous and sophisticated weapon deployed on Egyptian soil had not been in action. The Egyptian leadership as well as the Soviet military advisers in Cairo did not hide their disappointment. Vinogradov decided to contact Moscow and draw the Kremlin's attention to this extraordinary situation. According to Vinogradov, in the late afternoon of 22 October, he called the Foreign Ministry, but Gromyko was not available. Because of the urgency of the matter, he decided to contact Grechko, the minister of defense. When Vinogradov asked him what should be done with the "quiet" SCUDs, Grechko did not hesitate to yell "Go the hell ahead and fire it!"[56] Vinogradov then passed the order on to the Soviet military attaché in Cairo, Nikolai Ievlev, to fire the missiles.

Minutes later there was a call from Moscow from Gromyko to Vinogradov. "What did you talk about with Grechko?" Gromyko asked. When he learned of Grechko's order,

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[54] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 570.

[55] Ibid., p. 555.

[56] Author's interview with Vinogradov, 30 September 1993.

Gromyko was outraged and strictly prohibited Vinogradov from carrying out the order "I am sorry, Andrei Andreevich [Gromyko] I can't help it The missiles have already been fired," Vinogradov replied [57]

Sadat's version of the story is slightly different "On 22 October, just before the cease-fire came into effect, I went to the Operations Room and ordered two ground-to-ground rockets fired at Deversoir I wanted Israel to learn that such a weapon was indeed in our hands and we could use it at a later stage of the war, even though Israel had, in fact, realized from the moment the war broke out that we meant and did what we said "[58] Although several times throughout the war Sadat had threatened to attack Israeli cities with long-range missiles called "Al-Zafirs," he was probably referring to the SCUD missiles Vinogradov did not recall that, in his communication with Sadat on 22 October, the issue of firing the SCUD missiles had been raised, but knowing Sadat's position from many previous encounters, Vinogradov felt he could act on his own authority on that, supposedly, last day of the war Having received Grechko's blessing, the Soviet military personnel cooperated with the Egyptians in executing the launches

The firing of the SCUD missiles, an offensive military action in which Soviet personnel participated directly, has been seen by some as marking an important escalation in the degree of Soviet involvement in the 1973 October War "Whether this shift to direct offensive participation had been approved by the highest political and military authorities in Moscow remains a moot, though extremely important, point," stated Jon Glassman, a prominent US expert on the Middle East [59] Although the firing of the SCUDs was most probably approved by the highest military authority in Moscow, it did contradict the Kremlin line, which was aimed at de-escalating the degree of Soviet involvement in the Middle East It would appear, therefore, that this episode should be viewed less as a policy problem and more simply as evidence of a dysfunctional chain of command

All SCUD missiles apparently missed their targets in the Sinai and therefore did not have a significant military impact Nevertheless, Vinogradov and the Soviet military in Egypt believed that the SCUD launches had an important political effect, and manifested the military potential of Egypt supported by the Soviet Union On the other hand, twenty years after the SCUD firing, Israeli general Chaim Bar-Lev, who later became Israel's ambassador to Moscow in the 1990s, claimed that the missiles were very inaccurate and did not damage Israeli targets It was, however, "a big excitement," he recalled [60]

ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN

The West viewed the agreement reached in Moscow as a serious Soviet concession on at least two issues negotiations between the parties and Soviet-US guarantees Nixon commented on the Soviet-US resolution in the following way "These terms were especially notable because they were the first in which the Soviets had agreed to a resolution that called for direct negotiation between the parties without any conditions or qualifications.”[61] A State Department report echoed this view by stating that Resolution 338 “marks the first time the Council has endorsed the need for negotiations between the parties, which the US Government had long been urging.”[62] Sisco recalled that the US delegation in Moscow considered Brezhnev’s acceptance of the need for negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis as one of the most important achievements of the talks. At the same time, one could find opposite affirmations. Walter Laqueur, for example, claimed that “the American representatives [at the Moscow talks] were reportedly reluctant to accept Soviet proposals to link the cease-fire with immediate negotiations for a settlement, naming a time and place for the negotiations.”[63]

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[57] Ibid

[58] Anwar al-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p 265

[59] Jon Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East* (Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p 139

[60] Author's interview with General Chaim Bar-Lev in Moscow, 29 September 1993

The assertion that the Kremlin opposed in principle any direct negotiation between the Arabs and the Israelis did not correspond to the reality. The political settlement strongly supported by the Soviet Union envisioned talks between the parties in the conflict. Having favored convening a peace conference with the participation of the Arab states and Israel, the Soviet Union realized that a final settlement of the Middle East crisis could be achieved through negotiations and cooperation between them as *equal* partners in the peace process. Although in February 1969 the Soviet Union submitted a plan for the Middle East to the four permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—it did not mention direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel. It presumed contacts between them through the signing of a multilateral document. In the spring of 1972, on the eve of Nixon’s visit to Moscow, a document that reaffirmed Soviet support for a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of Resolution 242 was elaborated in the Foreign Ministry. David Kimche wrote, “It was to be a comprehensive agreement, which was to be negotiated by the parties concerned on a voluntary basis.”[64]

Under conditions of Israel’s continuing occupation of Arab land and the non-implementation of Resolution 242, the Arabs adamantly rejected any negotiations with Israel that could be regarded as a conference between victorious Israel and defeated Arabs. I remember being instructed by the Foreign Ministry in the summer of 1972 to talk in New York with Egypt’s Permanent Representative to the UN, ‘Ismat ‘Abd al-Majid, about the prospects for a political settlement in the Middle East. The issue of contacts and talks with the Israelis came up in our chat, especially because New York was the site of several encounters between high-ranking Soviet officials (including Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semyenov) and Israeli representatives. Majid stated that Egypt would never talk to an unpunished aggressor who had seized its land. This attitude of the Arabs was shared in general by Moscow. In addition, guided by the principle of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialist struggle, the Kremlin did not encourage the Arabs to establish direct contacts with Israel, an ally of the United States.

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[61] Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 936.

[62] US Department of State, “Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Foreign Policy Outlines, November 1973, Washington, DC.

[63] Walter Laqueur, *Confrontation: The Middle East War and World Politics* (London: Abacus, 1974), p. 161.

[64] David Kimche, *The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat, and Saddam Hussein: The Quest for Peace in the Middle East* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1991), p. 24.

But by October 1973 the situation had changed profoundly. The Arabs were in a stronger bargaining position than at any time since 1948. Therefore, steadfastly asserting the need for a long-term settlement, the Kremlin reasonably favored negotiations between the parties. In any case, I do not recall any opposition to such negotiations being raised in the Politburo throughout the 1973 October War.

On the other hand, to claim, as US journalists Marvin and Bernard Kalb did, that "Brezhnev won Sadat's agreement to direct talks with Israel—an approach Egypt had never before accepted—only after sending his additional assurances that Russia would—if necessary, alone—guarantee the observance of the cease-fire,"[65] seems to be inaccurate. The decision to start negotiations "between the parties concerned," under certain conditions, had been Sadat's own.

MOSCOW'S VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

It is true that the Moscow talks about Soviet-US guarantees of any cease-fire or any long-term settlement did not clarify anything. Security Council Resolution 338 said nothing about those things either. But there seemed to be a mutual understanding between Moscow and Washington that the issue should be thoroughly considered. That is the way Brezhnev interpreted Nixon's message of 20 October, as recognizing the crucial rôle that guarantees played with respect to Israeli and Arab attitudes toward this superpower initiative. In his speech on 26 October, Brezhnev once again reiterated Soviet readiness to "participate in appropriate guarantees."[66] Thus, neither during the talks with Kissinger, nor later, did the Kremlin give up its favorite idea of joint Soviet-US guarantees of a long-term settlement in the Middle East.

Yet, the Kremlin was satisfied with the results of the Soviet-US talks. Brezhnev could meet Sadat's personal appeal for an immediate cease-fire almost within twelve hours. He succeeded in agreeing with Kissinger on a joint Soviet-US resolution that, as he saw it, corresponded to Egyptian views. He believed, also, that in the long run, the resolution was in accord with Syria's desire to stop the fighting, which Asad had expressed in the first days of the war. Thus, the Kremlin leaders believed that the Security Council draft resolution worked out in Moscow was in the best interests of the Arabs, and complied fully with the Soviet foreign policy principle of proletarian internationalism.

At the same time, Brezhnev emphasized repeatedly that Nixon's 20 October message and the Moscow talks demonstrated the vitality and power of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Once, in a chat with Gromyko in the presence of the task force, Brezhnev noted that what Kosygin could not achieve in three days of negotiations in Cairo with Sadat, he could achieve in three hours with Kissinger. The very fact that an agreement with the United States had been reached, in the midst of a war in which the interests of the superpowers were so different, was considered in the Kremlin to be a triumph of the Soviet foreign policy principle of peaceful coexistence

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[65] Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 485.

[66] *Pravda*, 27 October 1973.

Another important reason why the Kremlin was satisfied with the Moscow talks with Kissinger was that the cease-fire canceled direct Soviet military involvement in the war, and ensured Soviet disengagement from all further developments related to the fighting Because the Kremlin had opposed the Arab-initiated war and was not interested in, and not ready for, participation in the fighting, a protracted war could only challenge Soviet military power In addition, the cease-fire initiated by the Soviet Union would, as Kremlin leaders believed, strengthen the image of peace-loving Soviets Finally, a big Soviet propaganda show in Moscow—The World Congress of Peace Forces—was planned for 25 October, to which Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders were attaching great significance Unfortunately, neither Western politicians nor political scientists fully comprehended the importance of such events for the Soviet system

One of the bloodiest Middle Eastern wars in the entire post-WWII period lasted three weeks On the battlefield the war was fought by the Israelis and the Arabs The outcome of the war, however, was to a great extent predetermined by the policies of the superpowers The cease-fire agreement resulted from Kissinger's negotiations in Moscow, and the fighting finally was stopped after some tough political and military steps were taken by the United States and the Soviet Union It was these two powers that decided to convene a peace conference, designing its format and selecting its participants Everything about the war depended on the readiness of the United States and the Soviet Union to find a solution that was satisfactory to both Each wanted to impose its own version of peace in the region—the Kremlin an anti-US peace, and the White House an anti-Soviet one

The peace process in the Middle East, however, was delayed for decades, mainly because of Soviet-US confrontation during the Cold War If the Soviet Union and the United States had complied responsibly with their international obligations, and been guided by the noble task of helping the Arabs and Israelis live in peace and prosperity, the end of the 1973 October War could have been a great opportunity to establish a genuine peace in the Middle East

COMING BACK FULL CIRCLE: THE PALESTINIAN OPTION IN 1967

Reuven Pedatzur

This article examines and explains the initial choice of the Palestinian option made by Israeli policy makers, and the factors that led them to abandon it and to adopt the Jordanian option instead. An examination of the conditions and circumstances existing in the first year following the June 1967 War reveals that the chances of the Palestinian option were poor from the outset. Despite the fact that Israeli policy makers believed it to be practicable, the Palestinian option was doomed to failure because of factors over which they had no control.

THE signing of the Declaration of Principles by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), on 13 September 1993, brought Israeli policy on the Palestinian problem and the political future of the occupied territories back to the point at which it had started in June 1967—back to the Palestinian option. In deciding to sign the declaration with PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin made a strategic choice to recognize the legitimacy of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, rather than the government of Jordan. The decision by the Israelis to drop the Jordanian option was a recognition and an admission of the failure of Israeli governments,

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MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ■ VOLUME 49, NO. 2, SPRING 1995

including the one headed by Rabin himself two decades ago (1974–77), to grapple with the Palestinian problem

The accepted approach among researchers is that the Israeli policy based on the Jordanian option—according to which the Palestinian problem would be solved by granting King Husayn of Jordan limited control over most of the territory of the West Bank—had its beginnings immediately after the occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 This approach maintains that Israeli leaders became captivated by the Jordanian option and did not consider different political options in their attempt to deal with the Palestinian problem [1] The Labor Alignment governments headed by Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol (1967–69), Golda Meir (1969–74), and Yitzhak Rabin (1974–77) did, indeed, adopt the Jordanian option This article, however, will attempt to demonstrate that the Jordanian option policy was formulated and adopted about a year after the end of the June 1967 War, and only after attempts to realize the Palestinian option had failed In fact, the Palestinian option was the first choice of Israeli policy makers

The author will analyze this initial choice made by Israeli policy makers, and the factors that led them to abandon it and decide to adopt the Jordanian option instead An examination of the conditions and circumstances existing in the first year following the June 1967 War reveals that the chances of the Palestinian option were poor from the start and doomed to failure because of factors over which the policy makers had no control It would take a quarter of a century and substantial changes in the processes of consolidating Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian societies and political apparatuses before Israeli policy makers could complete the circle, abandon the Jordanian option, and adopt their initial first choice—the Palestinian option

THE FORMULATION OF THE PALESTINIAN OPTION

The beginning of the process of determining policy on the preferred option can be observed at the cabinet meetings that began on 16 June 1967, almost immediately after the war, and ended with the strategic decision made on 19 June In the discussions during these meetings, most of the cabinet ministers supported the Palestinian option The proposals made by the participants ranged from Palestinian autonomy to an independent state on the West Bank The tone supporting the Palestinian option was set by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Minister of Labor Yigal Allon, as well as by minister without portfolio Yisrael Galili, whose opinions greatly influenced his colleagues in the cabinet Statements made by the senior policy makers at the 19 June cabinet meeting, at which the strategic decision was made, reveal that they viewed the Palestinian option as the only possible basis for Israeli policy on the future of the West Bank

For instance, Allon warned his colleagues against choosing the Jordanian option

> Gentlemen, in 1948/9 we dallied over this, in everything that has to do with the House of the Hashemites, and instead of capturing [East] Jerusalem, which was within reach, or the West

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[1] See, for example, Aaron S Klieman, *Israel, Jordan, Palestine The Search for a Durable Peace* (Beverly Hills, CA Sage Publications, 1981), p 34

> Bank, which was a matter of three or four days, we dallied with the House of the Hashemites, and we paid a heavy price I am afraid that this is happening again The last thing is the return of a single inch of the West Bank We do not have to view Hussein as existing forever[2]

Allon lashed out in strong language against Husayn, and cast doubts on the logic of entering into negotiations with him

> Today it is Hussein, tomorrow it is [Palestinian politician] Suliman Nabulsi The day after tomorrow, some Syrian will take them over, and after that they will have a defense agreement with the Soviet Union and China, and we will find ourselves in a far more difficult position We are discussing something that does not last forever, and basing it on a phenomenon which is flesh and blood, and who will perhaps live for another 60 years, if a bullet does not catch up with him first[3]

Allon's conclusion was that the only logical solution that would address all of Israel's security problems in its eastern front was the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank "I am taking the maximum possibility Not a canton, not an autonomous region, but an independent Arab state, agreed upon between us and them, in an enclave surrounded by Israeli territory even pursuing its own independent foreign policy"[4] Minister without portfolio Menahem Begin, who subsequently became prime minister and signed the 1978 Camp David Accords, asked Allon "Can you imagine the speeches and voting of that state in the United Nations [UN]?" Allon answered, "I am not afraid of that I am not concerned "[5]

Galili explained that he was adamantly opposed to an agreement based on handing territory back to Jordan, stating that he preferred the political and social difficulties involved in leaving the Palestinian population on the West Bank without citizenship in the State of Israel, "searching for various formulas of self-administration,"[6] to giving up the West Bank and having it rejoin Jordan, which, in turn, might join other Arab states and pose a greater threat to Israel's security

Both Eshkol and Dayan expressed their opposition to negotiating with Husayn and favored the possibility of implementing a settlement based on the Palestinian option[7] At the end of the discussions, and after it had transpired that there was no possibility of reaching a consensus concerning the future of the West Bank, a draft proposal dealing only with the other two territories—the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula—was put to a vote

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[2] Minutes of the 19 June 1967 cabinet meeting in Jerusalem (Ramat Efal, Israel Tabenkin Memorial Archives) See, also, Reuven Pedatzur, "Haahizdamnut Sheuchmetza" (The great missed opportunity), *Haaretz*, 2 May 1991

[3] Minutes of the 19 June 1967 cabinet meeting in Jerusalem

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid See also, Reuven Pedatzur, "The Role and Influence of 'Kitchens' in Policymaking National Security, the Eshkol Government, and the Territories, 1967–1969" (Ph D diss , Tel Aviv University, 1992), p 130

[6] Minutes of the 19 June 1967 cabinet meeting

[7] Reuven Pedatzur, "Haahizdamnut Sheuchmetza", Meir Avidan, "19 Beyuni 1967, Memshelet Israel Machlita Bazot" (19 June 1967, The government of Israel hereby decides), *Davar* (published as a series of three articles), 2, 5, and 12 June 1987, also based, among other things, on the minutes of the 19 June 1967 cabinet meeting, given to the author by Yisrael Galili

This was one of the rare occasions when the entire cabinet formulated and adopted a far-reaching policy at the strategic level This was also the first attempt by the cabinet to present a comprehensive peace initiative with two of the four confrontation states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) The initiative was unanimously adopted by the cabinet ministers However, as was already mentioned, in voting on that decision, on 19 June 1967, the ministers refrained from deciding the future of the West Bank and, thus, evaded having to grapple with finding a solution to the Palestinian problem Because there was no decision made on the subject of the West Bank, there was also no decision made regarding the conflicting approaches—that based on the Palestinian option and that supporting the implementation of the Jordanian option At that time, only five of the cabinet ministers—Minister of Education Zalman Aran, Minister of Health Yisrael Barzilai, Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir, Minister of Internal Affairs Haim Moshe Shapira, and Minister of Justice Yaakov Shimshon Shapira—none of whom belonged to the group of senior decision makers, proposed entering into negotiations with Husayn on the return of territory to Jordan All the other ministers, including, as already mentioned, the senior policy makers, unequivocally supported the Palestinian option

The decision from 19 June read· "Israel proposes the signing of a peace agreement with Egypt and with Syria based on the international border and the security needs of Israel "[8] In other words, nine days after the June 1967 War, the government of Israel was prepared to give up all the territories it had captured on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai Peninsula in return for peace agreements with these two countries

The West Bank, the Palestinian population there, and the future of relations with the Kingdom of Jordan were not mentioned at all in the 19 June decision In the only sentence that hinted at the Palestinian problem, the term "Palestinian" was not even used The decision read "Refugees The establishment of peace in the Middle East and regional cooperation that will be attached to it, will open up the chances of international and regional settlement of the refugee problem "[9]

The support of the central policy makers for the Palestinian option found expression in discussions held in the limited framework of forums where Eshkol tried to formulate a policy on the subject of the political future of the West Bank One of these forums was the Political Committee of the Labor Alignment [10]

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[8] The wording of the cabinet decision appears in the book by Moshe Dayan, *Avnei Derekh* (Milestones) (Jerusalem Idanim, 1976), p 512 Egypt and Syria, to whom the proposals by the government of Israel were sent by means of Washington, rejected them out of hand Both countries claimed in their replies to the Israeli peace proposals that "Israel's withdrawal must be made unconditionally " See, also, Abba Eban, *Pirkei Haim* (The Chapters of My Life) vol 2 (Tel Aviv Sifriat Maariv, 1987), p 430

[9] Ibid

[10] The Labor Alignment Political Committee was made up of cabinet ministers, members of the Alignment, and a small number of senior functionaries in the party, such as party secretary The body had no formal status and worked as a kind of kitchen cabinet that routinely dealt with the formulation of policy on foreign and security affairs The Political Committee met from time to time, at irregular intervals In the course of these meetings minutes were written The meetings usually concluded without any binding decisions having been made On occasion, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol made use of the Political Committee in order to put together a consensus on sensitive national security matters See Pedatzur, "The Role and Influence of 'Kitchens' in Policymaking," p 113

During discussions in the Political Committee held on 7 July 1967, Eshkol explained his position regarding the subject of the future of the West Bank. He was concerned about two components of the possible settlement: one related to security and the other to demography. "I think that if we say that the Jordan [River] is the border, there is no choice but to create an area in which there are a million Arabs holding a special status."[11]

In other words, according to Eshkol's concept, in order to ensure Israel's security needs, there was no choice but to continue to assert military control over the area up to the Jordan River. In order not to turn Israel into a bi-national state, a special status had to be created for the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. "I therefore visualize," Eshkol continued, explaining the details of this position, "only a semi-autonomous region, since security and the land are in the hands of Israel. I won't mind if in the end they want representation in the United Nations. I have begun with an autonomous region, but if it transpires that this is impossible, they will get independence."[12]

The day after his address to the Political Committee, on 8 July 1967, Eshkol said, in an interview with *Le Monde*, that it was possible to consider the establishment of a Palestinian state whose border would be the Jordan River and that would include all the large population centers such as Jenin, Jericho, Nablus, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm. This state, he noted, would be the framework of an autonomous regime that would maintain economic, commercial, and even cultural ties with Israel. Israel would offer this state an outlet to the sea and would be able to grant it assistance in the light of the experience Israel had gained in the past.[13]

During the weeks following the end of the war, Allon continued to support implementation of the Palestinian option. In an address at a cabinet meeting on 30 July 1967, he presented to the government ministers what was later to be known as the "Allon Plan." He reiterated the thesis that he had presented at the 19 June cabinet meeting: an agreement with Husayn was not a good solution, since the stability of the regime in Jordan was uncertain. He reportedly said: "Hussein is referred to as if he were an immortal king. It is as if an agreement with him would guarantee the future of the Jews in the Land of Israel. Today, Hussein is King of Jordan, and I don't know who will be in his place tomorrow. The day after tomorrow Jordan might be annexed to Syria. We have seen what happened to Abdullah [his grandfather]."[14]

Allon once more explained that he preferred a settlement with the Palestinians:

> I would be happier if it was Shuqayri [Ahmad, chairman of the PLO] sitting in Amman today and not Hussein. If we would reach an agreement with the local Arabs on the establishment of an autonomous region—even if this develops in the end into an independent state—with a free quay in Haifa Port, where they could carry on their commercial activities . . . and a similar passage from the West Bank to the other side of the Jordan, with permission to cross our strip in the Jordan Valley, I would accept that. . . . If the matter depended on me—I would hurry and

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[11] Minutes of the Political Committee meeting, Tel Aviv, 7 July 1967 (Tabenkin Memorial Archives).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Interview with Eshkol in *Le Monde*, 8 July 1967, quoted in *Davar*, 9 July 1967.

[14] From the minutes of the cabinet meeting, 30 July 1967, quoted in Zvika Dror, ed., *Yigal Allon Bahatira Leshalom* (Yigal Allon: In Pursuit of Peace) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hamehuhad, 1989), p. 28.

> enter into serious negotiations with key figures in the Arab population in order to establish an autonomous Arab region Even if   it would lead to the establishment of a sovereign state represented in the United Nations, since I find this preferable to turning the entire West Bank over to a power that could in future be hostile towards us and could threaten us with the most modern technological means In my opinion, about 95 percent of the Arab population in the entire area would remain in the autonomous region, with the exception of those living in Jerusalem [15]

In late 1967, when the trend toward the Jordanian option began to take shape, Allon did not abandon the idea of the Palestinian option At a cabinet meeting on 26 December 1967, Allon reportedly said that since he did not want any Arab state of influence or status on the West Bank, he was proposing "an autonomous region   self-rule on all domestic affairs, bound with contracts to Israel on all economic, foreign affairs, and security issues "[16]

Even after he had changed the plan that bears his name in order to allow its implementation on the basis of the Jordanian option (in February 1968), Allon continued to toy with the idea of Palestinian autonomy While, toward the end of 1967, he abandoned the concept of an independent Palestinian state, he did not entirely abandon the possibility of an autonomous Palestinian entity on the West Bank In an address before the Labor Party Center, on 21 April 1968, in which he referred to a solution to the Palestinian problem, he said that the matter was one of self-determination, in which Israel would not interfere, but added that he did not discount the possibility that, in order to solve the complex demographic problem, Israel might look for a solution by helping the Palestinians to solve it through self-administration He qualified "I say self-administration of the Arab community in the Land of Israel I say 'administration' and not 'a state' "[17]

Some months later, Allon still expressed belief in the benefits of a form of autonomy At the cabinet meeting on 25 August 1968, at which it was decided to renew talks with King Husayn (with the participation of Allon and Foreign Minister Abba Eban), Allon reportedly declared

> Since it has been decreed that most of the Arabs will remain where they are, it would be best if they were under our influence, rather than serving as the military arm of a country hostile to us As to the political aspect of the demographic problem, there is still the possibility of helping those Arabs who want to maintain their own self-administration, who will not interfere with domestic life in Israel, just as Israel will not interfere with the domestic affairs of the territory of Arab administration [18]

Galili, who played a very important role in formulating Israel's policies, was also not ready, in the months immediately after the war, to reach an agreement with Husayn under which territory on the West Bank would be returned to Jordan. At the cabinet meeting on 17 October 1967, he sharply attacked Husayn:

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[15] Ibid , p 29

[16] Avidan, "19 Beyumi 1967," *Davar*, 5 June 1987

[17] Minutes of the meeting of the Labor Party Secretariat, Tel Aviv, 21 April 1968 (Beit Berl, Israel Labor Party Archives, File 24/8), p 24

[18] Moshe Zak, "Laazor L'Hussein Lidpok Et Arafat" (Helping Hussein bash Arafat), *Maariv*, 25 April 1989

> I agree that everyone is feeling sorry for the boy king, who really deserves to be pitied. However, it must be most strongly emphasized that Hussein has never expressed support for peace with Israel. He took part in the founding meeting of Shuqayri's organization [PLO]. He shelled Jerusalem. His attitude toward the Holy Places is known. We must underscore who the partner is that all sorts of peace seekers are promoting as an ally in peace negotiations.[19]

At the same meeting, Allon remarked that the only operational orders to kill civilians were found in possession of the Jordanian army.

Dayan, who also greatly influenced the other policy makers, continued to claim, as he had at the meeting of the ministerial committee for security affairs on 15 June and at the crucial cabinet meeting on 19 June, that the solution to the Palestinian problem was to be found in self-administration. Dayan did not go into details about the organization of this administration, but simply expressed concern over Israeli moves that might cut off the northern part of the West Bank from the southern part. Thus, for example, in the course of the discussions in the cabinet, on 25 June 1967, about the map of the municipal boundaries of the reunited Jerusalem, Dayan objected to the map presented by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) showing the boundaries of the reunited city. He pointed out that in this proposal, the area to be annexed to Israel was too large and would cause a separation of Judea from Samaria that would impair the contiguity of the West Bank.

In December 1968, after the cabinet had already adopted the Jordanian option, and after the modified "Allon Plan" had been presented to King Husayn as the Israeli government's position, Dayan declared in a radio program that he did not reject the possibility of the establishment of a Palestinian state. "If Arab representatives from the 'Strip' and the 'Bank' were to come to us today saying, 'We want to negotiate with you on the establishment of a Palestinian state,' I would not propose to the State of Israel to turn them down."[20]

So it appears that all of the major players who shaped Israeli policy following the June 1967 War leaned toward the Palestinian option. For months they had refused to consider the possibility of an agreement with the King of Jordan, and several of them (especially Allon and Galili) attacked Husayn personally. Furthermore, those policy makers not only expressed their ideas, but tried to work out a political framework based on the Palestinian option.

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[19] Minutes of cabinet meeting, Jerusalem, 17 October 1967 (Eshkol Memorial Archives).

[20] Dayan said this in response to a question on the radio program "Parliamentary Questions From the Studio," Voice of Israel, 28 December 1968. See, also, Moshe Dayan, *Mapa Hadasha, Yachasim Acherim* (A New Map, Other Relations) (Tel Aviv: Shiqmona, 1969), pp. 33–4.

ESHKOL'S SECRET MEETINGS: ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT THE PALESTINIAN OPTION

Eshkol took a number of steps to determine the possibility of effecting a political settlement on the basis of the Palestinian option, after it became clear to him that his most senior ministers favored this option and strongly opposed the Jordanian one. At first he assessed the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. Subsequently, he had reservations about the independent state, but continued to look into the possibility of establishing Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank.

At a meeting held on 12 November 1967 that included Dayan, Police Minister Eliyahu Sasson, and two people from the prime minister's office—Director General Yaakov Herzog and Government Secretary Aviad Yaffe—Eshkol brought up the need for Israel to maintain contact with the Arabs from the occupied territories: "We must examine the possibility of establishing a movement for the establishment of an independent state on the West Bank, to try and find out which of the leaders it is worth meeting with, which minister will meet with whom, and perhaps one of the leaders will even meet with the Prime Minister, himself."[21] At that same meeting, Dayan raised the idea of organizing groups of residents of the occupied territories, who were not already organized and coordinated among themselves, who would demand the establishment of an independent state and would serve as the alternative to King Husayn.

Nine days later, on 21 November 1967, Eshkol called another meeting, designed to provide guidelines to Moshe Sasson of the Foreign Ministry. Eshkol decided to appoint Sasson to the post of "the prime minister's representative for political contacts on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem." In the course of that meeting, it became apparent that its participants were still vacillating and had not indicated a clear preference for either the Palestinian or the Jordanian option. In referring to the contacts that Sasson was to maintain with prominent figures in the occupied territories, Dayan's position was vague. If Husayn wanted peace, Dayan said, Israel would discuss it with him, and if the Palestinians wanted peace, Israel would discuss it with them. Dayan pointed out that it was in Israel's interest that Husayn not appear to be the only one laying claim to the West Bank, and added: "We must promote the Palestinians, both for tactical reasons and in order to increase our maneuverability vis-à-vis Hussein, and even as an alternative."[22]

Sasson then began, in November 1967, a series of intensive talks with Palestinian political leaders. By the end of January 1968, he had held more than sixty meetings with personalities in the occupied territories and had provided Eshkol with reports on his talks as well as assessments of the situation, as he viewed it, and as it was viewed by the people with whom he had talked. After Sasson had completed his round of talks, Eshkol decided, in early February 1968, to meet in secret with Palestinian leaders residing on the West Bank to gain a firsthand impression of their position regarding the future of the West

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[21] "Contacts with Arabs," summary of a meeting that took place at the prime minister's office, Jerusalem, 12 November 1967 (Eshkol Memorial Archives).

[22] "Political Contacts With Palestinian leaders," summary of a discussion held on 21 November 1969. The document was prepared by Moshe Sasson (Eshkol Memorial Archives).

Bank Eshkol also made use of these talks—which ended in September of that year—to examine the possibility of implementing the various ideas on possible agreements concerning the future of the occupied territories, based on the Palestinian option [23]

During the same period as Eshkol's secret meetings, both Dayan and Eban, with the knowledge and approval of Eshkol, met with many of the same Palestinian political leaders who had met with Eshkol Eshkol had tried to explain to these Palestinians the possibility of leading the process in the direction of autonomy on the West Bank (He had abandoned the idea of an independent state, as will become evident later on, at the beginning of December 1968) It became clear to Eshkol, however, that the people with whom he had talked were hesitant about accepting the leadership role he was proposing, fearing that independent activity on their part and their reaching a separate settlement with Israel would place them in an untenable position in the Arab world [24]

When he met with Anwar al-Khatib, who had served as the governor of East Jerusalem prior to the June 1967 War, on 25 April 1968, Eshkol emphasized that Israel was not interested in the population centers, but that there were regions that were not populated, and that Israel would establish settlements "along this border—the Jordan [River]"—and would not intervene in the affairs of Jenin and Hebron He added, "If they want their own organization, autonomy, we will not intervene in their affairs There will be complete demilitarization of the region You have no need of an army We will call it autonomy or some other terminology If you want a passage to the sea, you can have it "[25] Khatib was quick to react to Eshkol's words, declaring, "Jordan will never recognize an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank Thus, this proposal means that we will cut ourselves off from Jordan "[26]

About a month later, Eshkol still wished to offer the Palestinians autonomy on the West Bank, but was worried by the fact that the Palestinians were not prepared to take responsibility for their own fate Did the Palestinians have leaders who could undertake to speak and negotiate in their name? Eshkol asked Nasr al-Din Nashashibi, adding

> Look what is happening you talk to the respected leaders from the West Bank, and I feel that they are a kind of mediator But if there is to be a mediator, there is [Gunnar] Jarring I can write directly to the King or send a message and tell him what I can do But if there is a Palestinian entity and there are Palestinians with whom deals can be cut, that is different The question is, are there representative leaders who can speak in the name of the Palestinians and do business?[27]

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[23] Minutes of all the meetings that Eshkol held from February to September 1968 can be found in the Eshkol Memorial Archives, Jerusalem

[24] Pedatzur, "The Role and Influence of 'Kitchens' in Policymaking," p 173

[25] Summary of the meeting held on 25 April 1968 in Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[26] Ibid

[27] Nasr al-Din Nashashibi, who was from a prominent Palestinian family from Jerusalem, served as roving representative of the Arab League (1965–67) Gunnar V Jarring, former Swedish ambassador to the Soviet Union, was appointed in November 1967, following passage of UN Security Council Resolution 242, as the secretary general's special envoy to the Middle East Jarring's mission, which lasted from November 1967 until the end of 1970, was to promote agreement among the states concerned Summary of the meeting held on 27 May 1968 in Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

In response to Nashashibi's question as to whether Israel preferred to sign an agreement with the Palestinians, Eshkol answered "In general terms I can say that we do If it is possible to achieve something with the people with whom we will have to live, so much the better The river is the border If you want autonomy—you can have it "[28] When Nashashibi pressed further and asked whether, in the event a group of leaders from the West Bank should be formed, Israel would be prepared to say something to that group, Eshkol replied that, in general terms, he would answer "in the positive " What could such a group ask for? he queried "Religion, fair enough Fine " He added "Therefore, I say that in principle it can be achieved, since we are not thinking of annexing Nablus "[29]

In answer to a question by Meir Amit, the head of Israel's central intelligence agency, Mossad, who was present at the meeting, on the ability of the Palestinian leaders to sign an agreement with Israel, Nashashibi claimed that since Jarring had begun working, Israel had preferred doing business with Jordan, with Husayn, and that the Palestinians felt that "Israel is neglecting them "[30]

On 10 September, Eshkol met with Anwar Nuseibeh, following an urgent request by the latter At the beginning of the meeting Nuseibeh claimed that, in view of the fact that he and his Palestinian colleagues had reached the conclusion that Israel would not present a peace plan to them, they had decided to "take the bull by the horns and present guidelines for a plan "[31] The peace plan Nuseibeh presented made no reference to the Palestinian option, but was based mainly on the return of territory to Jordan and a declaration of readiness to accept demilitarization arrangements Nusseibeh's plan bears witness to the fact that, at that stage, the prominent figures on the West Bank were not prepared to support a settlement that would include the implementation of Palestinian autonomy [32]

Immediately prior to his departure for the United States, Eshkol called a meeting of the General Staff, on 5 December 1967, to exchange ideas on the occupied territories Eshkol initially favored abandoning the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state, but he was interested in hearing the generals' positions on the matter

After Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin praised the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state and noted its advantages, Eshkol said that his own opposition to this idea was increasing daily "I shudder at the thought that we are preparing bombs like this for ourselves on both sides After all, the West Bank is connected with Nablus, and this will lead to a Palestinian entity of such a character that the day after tomorrow it will have representation in the UN ”[33]

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[28] Summary of the meeting held on 27 May 1968 in Jerusalem, p 172

[29] Ibid

[30] This meeting with Nashashibi was attended, in addition to Moshe Sasson and Adi Yaffe, by Mossad Chief Meir Amit The meeting took place after Nashashibi had toured the West Bank for a month In the course of the meeting he was requested by the prime minister to report on the impressions he had gained from this tour See the summary of this meeting, 27 May 1968, Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[31] Anwar Nuseibeh was a Jordanian politician of a prominent Palestinian family from Jerusalem, who previously had served as minister of defense in the 1950s, governor of Jerusalem (1961–62), and as a member of the Jordanian Senate in 1967 See the summary of the meeting held on 10 September 1968 in Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[32] Ibid

Even after he expressed his reservations about the idea of an independent Palestinian state, however, Eshkol did not suggest that the idea of autonomy be abandoned The day after his meeting with the General Staff, Eshkol explained “The best alternative would be for them to belong here The security border is the Jordan We are sitting here with an army and with tanks They do not intervene in our lives and we do not intervene in theirs, and they can do whatever they want We will give them passage to Ashdod Port or to Haifa ”[34]

Eshkol’s statements and positions should be examined against the background of events in the West Bank at that time In late summer 1967, there were attempts, mostly on the part of the PLO, to incite civil disobedience among the Palestinians mainly in the Nablus area, and there was a general strike that lasted several weeks This was not a conducive environment in which to propose the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank[35]

Already, at the end of 1967, Eshkol had begun to consider a position in favor of a settlement with King Husayn in the framework of which a solution would be found to the Palestinian problem as well He began to lean increasingly toward the idea of binding the fate of the West Bank population with a future settlement with Husayn In an address before the Political Committee of the Labor Party on 27 February 1968, Eshkol expressed strong concern that, in the event that Israel reached an agreement with the residents of Nablus, he would be very worried that these residents, who numbered between 600–700,000 people, would claim to be residents of Palestine Eshkol stated, “I would like them to connect with Jordan, since what do I need another Arab state for?”[36]

Thus, the Palestinian option never actually gained the momentum needed to promote it beyond the stage of vague pronouncements Even its most ardent supporters were not prepared to commit themselves, in their meetings with the Palestinians, to clear lines of action, and were not ready to go into detail on the process that would lead to the establishment of autonomy on the West Bank Nevertheless, the adoption of the Jordanian option was not a clear-cut, precisely defined act, but rather the result of a prolonged process of change in the concepts of the policy makers For quite a long period, the two approaches resided together in the minds of these policy makers

CHANGE IN ORIENTATION OF THE ALLON PLAN

The change in Allon’s approach, which was later translated into a change in his plan, affected the views of Israel’s policy makers The fact that Allon, who had been the standard bearer of the Palestinian option, had changed his approach and adopted the Jordanian option was an effective catalyst in changing the views of Israeli policy makers.

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[33] Summary of the meeting held between Eshkol and the General Staff in Tel Aviv, 5 December 1967 (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[34] “Eshkol’s Meeting With a Group of Invited Participants on the Problem of the Refugees in the Territories of Military Rule ” Summary of the meeting held on 6 December 1967 (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[35] Dayan, *Avnei Derekh*, p 505

[36] Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee on 27 February 1968 (Tabenkin Memorial Archives)

Allon completed the manuscript of the original plan bearing his name on 13 July 1967 and presented it to the cabinet on 27 July (see Figure 1). The "Allon Plan" was important in that it was the only political plan presented to the government that tried to shape a policy regarding the West Bank and addressed the issues at the strategic level. In mid-1968, the government adopted the plan as the basis for Israeli policies regarding the political future of the occupied territories. Toward the end of 1967, however, the plan already had become the basis of the policy for settling the Jordan valley, although no formal decision had been made regarding this.

Allon's presentation of the plan to the government was accompanied by a detailed explanation. In the section that referred to the political future of the West Bank, Allon recommended that autonomy be established there: "From the political point of view, an Arab autonomous region should be set up, through close cooperation with the leaders, representatives, and active citizens in the community. The region should be granted political independence and be connected with Israel in a joint economic framework, a mutual defense pact, and agreements . . . and technical and social activities."[37]

For Allon, the political principle inherent in his plan provided a proper solution to the Palestinian problem:

> Since I believe that a solution of this kind can be reached through cooperation with Arabs of influence on the West Bank, in so doing we are pulling the rug out from under the feet of those who oppose it, claiming that they are concerned about a solution to the Palestinian problem. The political future of the West Bank is first and foremost the concern of Israel, which is being attacked, and its solution to it must be found, at most, through direct contact between us and the Arabs of the West Bank.[38]

Most of the members of the cabinet rejected the "Allon Plan" when it was presented to the government on 30 July 1967. Attitudes gradually changed, however, because no alternative plan of any value was proposed. In fact, from the moment that the civilian component of the "Dayan Plan" was presented to the cabinet and rejected by the senior decision makers, the "Allon Plan" became the only proposal for a comprehensive policy that the senior policy makers had to work with.[39]

In early 1968, Allon began formulating a new concept, built mainly on the change in orientation on which he proposed that his plan be based. It appears that Allon had become convinced that there was very little chance of reaching an agreement on establishing autonomy with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The alternative he adopted was

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[37] Dror, *Yigal Allon*, p. 22.

[38] Dror, *Yigal Allon*, pp. 17-26; Yigal Allon, *Mokdim* (Focal Points) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1981), p. 120.

[39] Minutes of the cabinet meeting held on 30 July 1967 in Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives). The "Dayan Plan" was based on the establishment of five "fists" along the mountain ridge on the West Bank, beginning with the area of Jenin in the north, down to Hebron in the south. Each of these fists was supposed to be connected by convenient approach roads to Israeli territory inside the Green Line. See Reuven Pedatzur, "Hazon Aetzbaot Hakefutzot" (The vision of the clenched fist), *Haaretz*, 2 November 1990.


The Allon Plan
Connector Road
Area to Be Attached to Jordan
Area to Be Attached to Israel
Hadera
Netanya
Mediterranean Sea
Tulkarm
Jenin
Nablus
Qalqilya
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Lod
Ramleh
Ramallah
Jordan Valley
Jordan R.
JORDAN
Jericho
Jerusalem
ISRAEL
Bethlehem
Ashkelon
Hebron
Judean Desert
Dead Sea
Beersheba
0
5
10
Miles

Figure 1 From Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1994), p 501

the handing over to the Kingdom of Jordan territory that would not be annexed to Israel. It would then be possible, he assessed, to implement the "Allon Plan" with the agreement of King Husayn without changing its main components in the territorial sphere.

Despite Allon's negative attitude toward Husayn and the role the latter played in the May-June 1967 crisis, Allon was prepared to consider the Jordanian option, which he viewed at that time as the only option that would allow the implementation of his plan. Allon's concept was simplicity itself. Instead of grappling with so complex an issue as the establishment of autonomy, the territory would be turned over to Jordan, thus freeing Israel from having to deal with the Palestinian problem. Allon did not change the map he drew in July 1967. The Jordan Valley would remain in Israeli hands. So would the Etzion Bloc, part of Hebron Mountain, and reunited Jerusalem. All the rest would be handed over to King Husayn. Allon thought that Israel's agreement to hand over such a large portion of the West Bank to the Jordanians would lead Husayn to agree to sign a political accord with Israel. On 27 February 1968, Allon amended the plan bearing his name. The essence of the amendment was the decision to break away from the clear commitment to the Palestinian option.[40]

Allon's decision to change the orientation of his plan and to consider the possibility of offering Husayn the territory that would not be annexed to Israel presented a new option for action to Israeli policy makers. Allon, himself, took new measures of action—in addition to his efforts to promote the settlement of the Jordan Valley—to convince his colleagues in the inner decision-making groups to adopt the idea of presenting his plan to Husayn. After his initiatives to settle the Jordan Valley had borne fruit in January 1968, with the decision to establish the first two settlements at Mekhola and Qalia, Allon devoted considerable effort to pushing through a decision that would lead to the adoption of his plan as a basis for setting policy.

An important discussion was held on 20 April 1968 in the Political Committee of the Labor Alignment. The agenda included the matter of Abba Eban's scheduled meeting with King Husayn. Eban's meeting was to have been the first high-level one with the Jordanian king following the June war, although Herzog had met the king previously to test the atmosphere. All of those who spoke favored holding the meeting, and most of them presented a position in favor of basing policy on the "Allon Plan."[41]

Golda Meir, the Labor Party secretary (who was to succeed Eshkol as prime minister in March 1969), explained, at the 20 April meeting, that she was inclined to favor the "Allon Plan," and that since she did not think that Israel had to speak to King Husayn in great detail, she would tell him the following: "There is one thing you must know, we have no desire or intention to take your population away from you. It will remain yours."[42] It is possible to conclude, from the spirit of the things said during the discussion, that most of the participants, with the exception of Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres (who was at the time a member of the Knesset and the secretary of the Rafi Party), were inclined toward adopting Yigal Allon's ideas

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[40] *Tokhnit Allon* (The Allon Plan) (Tabenkin Memorial Archives, 1984), p. 3.

[41] Minutes of the Political Committee Meeting, 20 April 1968 (Beit Berl Labor Party Archives). See, also, Pedatzur, "The Role and Influence of 'Kitchens' in Policymaking," p. 229.

[42] Minutes of the Labor Alignment Political Committee meeting, 20 April 1968.

Despite the spirit of the discussions at the meeting, however, a consensus was not reached to authorize Eban to present the "Allon Plan" to Husayn at their scheduled meeting[43] A decision on the "Allon Plan" was postponed until after Eban had returned from his May 1968 meeting in London with Husayn

THE CRUCIAL MEETING

The idea of presenting the "Allon Plan" as the basis for Israeli policy was accepted at a secret meeting called by Eshkol, on 29 May 1968, with Eban, Dayan, and Allon[44] Eban reported on his talks with King Husayn that had taken place several days earlier in London He explained that, at the next meeting, the king would not be satisfied with a vague presentation of the Israeli government's stand, and would demand to be given a clear-cut proposal to which he could respond

According to the summary of the ministerial meeting, the four participants decided to present the "Allon Plan" to Husayn, at their next meeting with him, as the official policy of Israel The decision was brought up for discussion before the Political Committee of the Labor Alignment on 3 July, where it received general support[45]

Toward the end of September 1968, the crucial meeting was held with King Husayn at which, for the first time, the "Allon Plan" was presented to the king in an official and detailed manner as the basis for a political settlement At this meeting, held in London, Israel was represented by Eban, Allon, and Herzog Husayn was accompanied by his trusted adviser, Zayid Rifa'i[46]

Eban opened the meeting by stating that the government of Israel had instructed the ministers to try to discuss the possibility of a permanent peace He described the meeting with Husayn as a historic moment, but made clear that if the king were to reject the principles presented to him, he, Husayn, would "be responsible for the non-establishment of peace " Incorporating a veiled threat, he told the king that, in such an event, "We shall have to find tracks to a settlement with the Palestinians with no affinity to Jordan "[47]

Allon, who spoke after Eban, described the moment of meeting with the king as the happiest moment of his life He described the cooperation between Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria, with the Soviet Union as a communist threat to the region and said that a settlement between Israel and Jordan must be viewed against this regional background Allon hinted at the dangers of this Arab-Soviet cooperation for the Jordanian regime and the king himself. "If we reach an agreement," he said, "the forces of Israel will serve as a guarantee of the integrity of the region against external intervention and also against domestic instability."[48]

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[43] Ibid

[44] Summary of the 29 May 1968 meeting between Eshkol, Eban, Allon, and Dayan in Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[45] Ibid

[46] Summary of the September 1968 London meeting between Husayn, Eban, Allon, and Herzog, Jerusalem, 10 October 1968 (Eshkol Memorial Archives) (author's translation from Hebrew into English)

[47] Summary of the September 1968 London meeting between Husayn, Eban, Allon, and Herzog See, also, Reuven Pedatzur, "Tokhnit Allon Eina Mekubelet" (The 'Allon Plan' is not accepted), *Haaretz*, 20 July 1968

The king answered that his search for a permanent solution had not first begun on that day, and that he aspired to devote the rest of his life to reaching a permanent settlement. He spoke of a new era of economic cooperation between the two countries. The king described the 1967 Khartoum Conference as progress, commenting that, "While it is true that things were said there that should not have been said, in the end at Khartoum everyone reached a decision, and the countries who were directly interested were charged with working towards a political solution."[49] Husayn agreed with Allon that, in the absence of an Israeli-Jordanian agreement, the region would be exposed to communist penetration.

Eban then pointed out six principles that summed up the Israeli approach to a political settlement with Jordan.

1. The Form of the agreement. The agreement signed by the two sides would be expressed in the form of a contract between the two sides.

2. Territory. There would be changes in the 1967 borders essential to the security of Israel. Security would be achieved only through the deployment of Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley.

3. Demilitarization. Demilitarization of the entire West Bank had to be guaranteed.

4. Free Port Services. Jordan would be given free port services in the Mediterranean Sea.

5. Jerusalem. There would be no change in Israel's position on the matter of the reunited Jerusalem. There might be a Jordanian-Muslim status in the Muslim quarter of the Old City.

6. A Joint Refugees Authority. Such an authority would be established that would "search for ways to integrate the refugees into a life of creativity."[50]

Allon added that a security line must be set in the Jordan Valley. He presented the map of the "Allon Plan" to the king and stated the principles on which it was based, emphasizing its security aspects. "We do not mean temporary changes that will be in effect so long as you are king, and Abba Eban and I are alive, but these are settlements that will be in effect for the coming generations." In essence, Allon explained to King Husayn that what the Israeli position called for required the annexation of the Jordan Valley to Israeli territory, and he commented that, "You have lost the war, and now you must suffer the consequences."[51]

The king did not reply in detail to what the two ministers had told him. He said that in the Arab world, as in Israel, there were different shades of thought and different approaches. "The problem," he noted, "is how to explain the solution to my people, if it is not a solution that is acceptable to the Arab consciousness ”[52] On the question of security, Husayn wanted to know if “security,” according to the Israeli concept, was a question of a number of kilometers

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[48] Summary of the September 1968 London meeting between Husayn, Eban, Allon, and Herzog.

[49] Ibid. At the Arab League Summit Meeting in Khartoum (August-September 1967) the "No's" of Khartoum were adopted: no reconciliation with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and no concessions on the rights of the Palestinian people.

[50] Summary of the September 1968 London meeting between Husayn, Eban, Allon, and Herzog.

[51] Ibid.

Eban and Allon proposed to the king that they meet again during the fortnight he was spending in London to continue their talks and to discuss the proposals that had been presented A few days later, Rifaʻi phoned Herzog and asked to meet with him in order to deliver the king’s counterproposals At their meeting, Rifaʻi gave Herzog a document listing Husayn’s six principles in answer to the six principles that Eban had presented at the earlier meeting

1 Mutually signed documents The importance is not in the documents themselves, on the passage from war to peace, but rather in the context What is necessary will be done on condition that it is in the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 242, and through the good offices of Gunnar Jarring

2 Territory “We, the Jordanians, accept the principles of Resolution 242, including that which states that territory must not be gained by force This principle, so far as it concerns us, also refers to Jerusalem We recognize that changes will have to be made on the cease-fire line Changes must be on a mutual basis ”

3 Jerusalem “Without going into the details, the maximum that we will be prepared to agree to is the right of Israel over the Jewish Holy Places This does not apply to Islamic or Christian Holy Places Our aspiration is that Jerusalem will be the City of Peace, and we are prepared to discuss a new status for the city that will guarantee free passage and freedom of movement ”

4 The principle of mutuality This will apply also to persons, to the freedom of movement, and the right to resettle all over Palestine

5 Secure borders “On this matter, and having no connection to who started the war—which has remained very unclear—the security of Jordan is in danger Every future agreement must take into consideration the security of Jordan We must be in a position that will enable us to ensure peace and security for the people on the West Bank, who, according to the agreement proposed by Israel, will be at the mercy of Israel You are talking about bases, about settlements, about the absence of Jordanian forces from the West Bank Under these circumstances, a corridor could be cut off at any moment, and Jordan would not be able to defend it ”

This paragraph regarding secure borders also contained the famous sentence according to which Husayn found the “Allon Plan” unacceptable “The plan itself is wholly unacceptable since it infringes on Jordanian sovereignty The only way is to exchange territory on the basis of reciprocity ”

6 The agreement Any final implementation of the agreement must be made in the framework of the Jarring mission [53]

Rifaʻi emphasized that he wanted to receive Israel’s answer to the principles Husayn had formulated before the place and time for the next meeting could be set If the answers were logical and acceptable, the king promised to remove any obstacles from the path of reaching a settlement Nothing would be gained by organizing meetings to discuss those points that were in any case "unacceptable " The Jordanian document ended "King Hussein's ability to contribute to a settlement depends entirely on his ability to control the domestic situation in Jordan and his ability to explain the settlement to the Arab world Therefore, any proposal discussed must be such that the Arab world will be able to accept it and not one which will be forced upon us "[54] The following day Herzog contacted Rifa'i and told him that Allon and Eban were astounded by King Husayn's answer and the six principles he had formulated The king's answer, in the opinion of the Israeli ministers, had no connection to the contexts that they had discussed with him in their meeting Nevertheless, Allon and Eban proposed that the two Israeli and Jordanian chiefs of staff meet to discuss security affairs

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[52] Ibid

[53] Quoted in ibid

There can be no doubt that the meeting between Allon, Eban, and the king, in September 1968, brought into much sharper focus the differences of views between Israel and Jordan The gaps were wide and the chances of bridging them were poor It was apparent that the king was unable, perhaps unwilling, to adopt a political program that he thought the Arab world would view as having been forced on Jordan by Israel

Despite Israel's realization that it would be impossible to reach a final and binding peace agreement with Jordan, the meetings with Husayn did not stop They continued in a rather orderly fashion until the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, and served mainly to work out routine problems that cropped up between the two countries

FACTORS WHICH LED TO THE ABANDONMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN OPTION

Prior to the June 1967 War, the Palestinian population of the West Bank had been under Jordanian rule The West Bank was occupied by Jordan in the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli War, and since then, two conflicting political concepts emerged—Palestinian identity versus Arab unity Jordanian suppression of attempts at creating a unique Palestinian identity and the concomitant emergence of pan-Arabism under the leadership of Egyptian president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, caused the Palestinians to restrain any national aspirations they might have had in Jordan [55]

Thus, when Prime Minister Eshkol suggested to Hikmat al-Masri of Nablus on 26 February 1968 that the Palestinians opt for a settlement between Israel and the residents of the West Bank, al-Masri replied that the problem had to be settled not with the Palestinian Arabs, but with the entire Arab world [56]

In the course of the years under Jordanian rule, the Palestinian leaders tended to be politically passive, developing dependence on outside elements As Graham Fuller stated in reference to the Palestinians, "   in the past   they waited for some *deus ex machina* to deliver salvation from the outside."[57] This dependence did not end with the Israeli occupation. Since the Palestinian leadership lacked an independent political infrastructure, and because Israel refused to allow free political activity on the West Bank, dependence on outside elements continued. The Palestinian leaders, not used to independent political activity, were not quick to develop new political institutions following the June 1967 War. The political passivity of the leaders of the West Bank proved to be a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Palestinian option. After Israel had occupied the West Bank, the local leadership found itself without a "political compass," as Geoffry Aronson defined their situation.[58]

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[54] Ibid

[55] Geoffry Aronson, *Creating Facts Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank* (Washington DC Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), p 44

[56] Summary of the meeting held on 26 February 1968 in Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

Palestinian political identity, which began to take shape at the beginning of this century, suffered a serious blow with the defeat in the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli War. The dispersion of the Palestinian people throughout a number of countries in the Middle East put a restraint on the continued evolution of a Palestinian national identity. The rulers of Jordan, first King 'Abdullah and later King Husayn, invested considerable efforts in preventing the development of a Palestinian national identity inside the Kingdom of Jordan. In April 1950, King 'Abdullah annexed the West Bank to Jordan and granted its Palestinian residents Jordanian citizenship. In an address before the Jordanian Parliament after he had decided to annex the West Bank, 'Abdullah said: "Jordan is like a bird with its wings spread east and west; it is its natural right to be united into a whole and for its people to join each other."[59]

King Husayn developed a policy of absorbing the Palestinians into the fabric of Jordanian society, and, as Aaron David Miller claims, Husayn's secret weapon was his ability to manipulate Palestinian political aspirations in such a way as to convince Palestinian leaders that Arab unity under the Hashemite House was the most efficient way of achieving their mutual ambition—the liberation of Palestine.[60] He used military force to prevent Palestinian political organization. In addition, by successfully co-opting many of the traditional West Bank leaders, he drew them closer to the regime in Amman.[61]

King Husayn continued to influence political affairs on the West Bank, even after the Israeli occupation. He continued to pay the salaries of government officials who remained in the West Bank, and to exert considerable influence over the political map of the West Bank.[62]

Immediately after the West Bank was occupied by Israel, a large group of Palestinian leaders, some of whom had been integrated into the Jordanian political apparatus, were quick to publish the "National Charter of the West Bank." This document, published on

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[57] Graham E. Fuller, *The West Bank of Israel, Point of No Return?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand and Co., 1989), p. 31.

[58] Aronson, *Creating Facts*, p. 43. On the dependence of the West Bank leaders on external factors, see Emile Sahliyeh, "West Bank Politics since 1967," *The Washington Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (Spring 1987), pp. 137–42.

[59] Aaron David Miller, *The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self Interest* (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 29.

[60] Ibid., p. 34.

[61] Eliezer Beeri, *Hapalestinaim Tachat Shilton Yarden* (The Palestinians Under Jordanian Rule) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1978). See, also, Klieman, *Israel, Jordan, Palestine*, p. 23.

[62] Sahliyeh, "West Bank Politics Since 1967."

4 October 1967, was signed by 129 Palestinian leaders, all residents of the West Bank The document once more confirmed the unity of both sides of the Jordan, including East Jerusalem, under Jordanian rule The charter also rejected "the ambiguous Israeli proposals to establish a Palestinian State on the West Bank "[63]

In addition to the structural weakness of the leadership and the political passivity of prominent Palestinians, there was no unified leadership on the West Bank Politics on the West Bank was characterized by squabbling that had been going on for years between groups of local leaders who were concentrated in the large cities and towns—Bethlehem, Hebron, Jerusalem, and Nablus Each of these groups had different, and sometimes opposing, interests, and their leaders did not succeed in putting together a unified front with common objectives [64]

An example of these conflicting interests, which interfered with progress toward a settlement based on the Palestinian option, was the unequivocal rejection by the local leadership in Jerusalem and Nablus of the autonomy plan proposed by Hebron's mayor, Shaykh Muhammed al-Ja'abari (from mid-1968)

The absence of a central authoritative Palestinian political body had led to the creation of an outside leadership in the form of the PLO This leadership-in-exile was still in the early stages of organizing itself when the June 1967 War broke out, and, under Ahmad Shuqayri, it did not attain the degree of legitimacy that would later make it the accepted representative of the Palestinian people [65]

Between 1967–68, the PLO underwent a process of reorganization and struggled over issues of leadership and succession It was only at the beginning of 1968 that Yasir Arafat was appointed chairman of the organization in place of Ahmad Shuqayri, and it took several months more before Arafat actually established his position as the accepted leader of the PLO Another five years passed before the PLO was officially recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab states (in a resolution passed at the Arab Summit Meeting in Rabat in 1974) [66] By 1974, however, the government of Israel was already committed to the Jordanian option and was strongly opposed to negotiations with the PLO

During the period of late 1967–68, in which Israeli policy makers were engaged in contacts with the West Bank leadership, the Fatah organization was carrying out guerrilla activities under the leadership of Arafat In addition to planting explosives, the organization tried to incite the population of the West Bank to popular revolt Of course, these activities of the part of Fatah did not encourage Israeli policy makers to try to make contact with the PLO, and increased their wariness about implementing the Palestinian option.[67]

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[63] Aronson, *Creating Facts*, p 43

[64] Sahliyeh, "West Bank Politics Since 1967 "

[65] Amos Perlmutter, "A Palestinian Entity?," *International Security* 5, no 4 (Spring 1981), pp 103–16, Sahliyeh, "West Bank Politics Since 1967", Sameer Y Abraham, "The Development and Transformation of the Palestinian National Movement," in Nasser H Aruri, ed , *Occupation Israel and Palestine* (Belmont, MA AAUG Press, 1983), pp 391–425

[66] Klieman, *Israel, Jordan, Palestine*, p 25, Sahliyeh, "West Bank Politics Since 1967 "

The number of Fatah attacks, which began immediately after the June war (already on 19 June 1967 an explosive was planted near Kibbutz Gesher), increased, and by early 1968 they had sharply escalated. In Israel, policy makers began to fear that Fatah's growing strength and its terrorist activities would lead to the overthrow of Husayn's regime in Jordan. Their fears also focused on the possibility that extremist Palestinians would control the autonomy of the West Bank, if autonomy were established. In that case, instead of solving a security problem by means of a settlement with the Palestinians, another serious problem would be created.

The political weakness of the leaders of the West Bank made them very wary of being the first in the Arab world to take the plunge and reach a political settlement with Israel. This wariness is clearly expressed in talks that some of these leaders had with Eshkol between February and September of 1968. Even after they clandestinely began meeting with Israeli policy makers, the West Bank leaders continued to contend that in practical terms any compromise settlement with Israel would mean giving up the true basis of their original national aspirations—the demand for all of Palestine. According to them, this would be a "zero-sum-game."[68]

Another obstacle along the path to implementing the Palestinian option were the secret talks between Israeli policy makers and King Husayn. As direct contact with Husayn developed, these policy makers got the impression that these talks would lead to the first separate settlement with an Arab state. This consideration alone would have been enough to justify their abandonment of the Palestinian option. Later, even after it became clear from Husayn's reactions to Israel's proposals that the king was incapable of bringing about a separate Israeli-Jordanian agreement, the policy makers in Jerusalem still adhered to the Jordanian option. A continuous dialogue with Husayn was considered to be the most successful way of avoiding significant territorial concessions. To give a sovereign state certain limited areas on the West Bank was preferable to giving up most of it to a Palestinian entity that would pose a security threat to Israel.

The Jarring mission was carried out while the Israelis were talking with the Palestinian leadership. Jarring negotiated with Israel and with Jordan, and did nothing to promote the Palestinian option. Israel's active participation, albeit with reservations for Jarring's mission, was also responsible to a considerable degree for preventing the promotion of the option of Palestinian autonomy.[69]

UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967, in essence, lent legitimacy to Jordan's demand for the return of the West Bank to its rule The resolution totally ignored Palestinian aspirations and spoke only of the refugee problem [70]

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[67] Fuad Jabber, "The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution, 1967–1971," *Journal of Palestine Studies* II, no. 2 (1973), pp. 79–101; Klieman, *Israel, Jordan, Palestine*, p. 41.

[68] Aronson, *Creating Facts*, p. 44; Hisham Sharabi, "Liberation of Settlement: The Dialectic of the Palestinian Struggle," *Journal of Palestine Studies* II, no. 2 (Winter 1973), pp. 33–48; Avi Plascov, "A Homeland for the Palestinians?," *Survival* XX, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1978), pp. 11–20; Fuller, *The West Bank of Israel*, p. 31.

[69] For extensive details on the Jarring mission, see William Quandt, *Assor Shel Hakhlatot* (A Decade of Decisions) (Trans. by Ya'akov Sharet) (Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1980).

One of the major obstacles to implementing the Palestinian option was the policy of the US government The position of President Lyndon Johnson's administration influenced greatly the position of Israeli policy makers As early as the meeting of the Israeli cabinet on 30 July 1967, Eban had told his colleagues that a special working group, appointed by Johnson and headed by former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, had examined the idea of creating an independent Palestinian state or of establishing a canton on the West Bank, and had rejected both Eban reported that the United States had announced that it could not provide economic support to any solution based on either of these ideas, and, therefore, it proposed that the fate of the West Bank be decided in negotiations between Israel and Jordan "We had better realize," said Eban, "that no one in the world supports leaving Jordan out of the picture "[71] Following Eban's report, Eshkol also mentioned the US approach, saying, "Hussein is their 'darling' and perhaps they think that through him something might get started and they would achieve some status here "[72]

There can be no doubt that the US rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian unit, autonomous or independent, was an important element in the process of Israel's abandoning the Palestinian option The Israelis understood that the United States was not prepared to by-pass Husayn in any settlement on the West Bank, and that Israel would do well to try to promote the signing of political agreements by means of a dialogue with him

The US administration continued to support an Israeli-Jordanian settlement throughout the first year following the June 1967 War, and at no stage did Washington seriously consider the Palestinian option With the increase in the number of Fatah attacks against Israeli targets from across the Jordanian border, Washington took steps to see that Israel reacted with restraint, claiming that, otherwise, Israel would bring about the overthrow of King Husayn

On the eve of Eshkol's visit to the United States in early 1968, there were discussions in the cabinet designed to clarify the position that he would present to the heads of the US administration On 19 December 1967, Eban reported that the United States had proposed to Husayn that he enter into negotiations with Israel The foreign minister warned his fellow cabinet members that if Husayn approached Israel for the purpose of entering into negotiations, and was rejected, the United States would find out about it Eshkol's trip to Washington would then end in failure Although meetings had already been held with Husayn, the sides had not reached any clear-cut political agreement [73]

CONCLUSION

The reasons for the failure of the attempt to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian agreement have their roots in the political culture and apparatuses that had developed in

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[70] Sahliyeh, "West Bank Politics Since 1967 "

[71] Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 30 July 1967, Jerusalem (Eshkol Memorial Archives)

[72] Ibid

[73] Avidan, "19 Beyumi 1967," *Davar*, 5 June 1987

Israeli and Palestinian societies. Their political cultures developed over the course of seven decades of conflict and were nurtured by violent incidents, military struggles, deportations of population, and denials by each side of the rights of the other. There was no real opportunity following the June 1967 War to reach a settlement between the two nations. An analysis of the conditions and the constraints under which the attempt was made to reach a historic compromise between Israel and the Palestinians, shows that it was doomed to failure from the start. A quarter of a century of living together had to pass, in the shadow of the Israeli occupation, in order for both sides to realize that only compromise would lead to a political settlement.

It would appear that the event that led the Israelis to understand the need for compromise with the Palestinians was the intifada. Israeli policy makers became aware that this time they were faced with a national struggle whose solution could only be found in the realization of, and Israeli readiness to allow, the implementation of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.[74] The intifada led to the awakening from the illusion that, from the start, had no chance of succeeding—the Jordanian option.

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[74] Fuller, *The West Bank of Israel*, p. 31.

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND THE EGYPTIAN-SAUDI CONFLICT IN YEMEN: CO-OPTING ARAB NATIONALISM

Fawaz A. Gerges

This paper has a double thesis first, the main reason for Egyptian president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's 1962 military intervention in Yemen was to improve his position in the Arab world, and his international standing, after suffering the humiliating secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic (UAR), a union established between the two countries in 1958 Nasir perceived the breakup of the UAR as a turning point heralding the eclipse of his unchallenged authority as leader of pan-Arab nationalism Second, the US policy of early restraint toward Nasir's involvement in Yemen, in spite of Saudi appeals for support, stemmed from the Kennedy administration's consistent efforts to work with Nasir, seeing such Third World nationalists as potential bulwarks against Soviet communism rather than as communist stooges Kennedy's response to the Yemen war shows the extent to which the United States, at certain historical points, allied itself with the forces of Arab nationalism to preserve its vital interests in the Middle East

IN September 1962 a coup d'état in North Yemen set the stage for a bloody and prolonged civil war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia intervened militarily—Egypt supporting the republicans and Saudi Arabia backing the royalists Furthermore, as the

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Yemen war escalated, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia attempted to internationalize the conflict by seeking external support and by urging their great power patrons to get actively engaged on their behalf.

These external influences led to the escalation of the Yemen war. For the next five years, 1962–67, the conflict was one of the dominant features of Arab politics. As a result, the inter-Arab state system became highly polarized and fell further under the influence of the great powers, becoming more dependent on them for economic, military, and political support. Ironically, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the main antagonists in Yemen, had initially preferred a political environment in the Arab world free from foreign interference, but their intervention in Yemen and the escalation of the conflict produced the opposite effect. Whether it was the Egyptians or the Saudis who first intervened in Yemen is an academic question.[1] From the onset, both President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir of Egypt and King Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz of Saudi Arabia were motivated by domestic, regional, and international considerations.

This article argues that the Egyptian intervention in Yemen was related directly to the 1961 breakup of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a union established between Egypt and Syria in 1958. Syria's secession from the union struck at the very basis of Nasir's political legitimacy—his claim to the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. It threatened to reverse Cairo's hard-won international achievements and to jeopardize the internal stability of his regime. Nasir quickly had to demonstrate, to friend and foe alike, that he was still a force to be reckoned with. He soon realized that the only way to salvage his tarnished reputation was to take the offensive and carry the banner of revolution to the rest of the Arab world and beyond. The republican coup in Yemen provided Nasir with just such an opportunity. Here lay the main reason behind Nasir's decision to break one of his own cardinal rules, by using deadly force against fellow Arabs.[2]

It is argued further, in the article, that Saudi Arabia would have become actively engaged on the side of the royalist forces in Yemen whether Egypt had intervened or not. For Saudi Arabia, the overthrow of the ruling Imamate in Yemen and its replacement with an Egyptian-style revolutionary regime endangered the survival of the kingdom. King Sa'ud and his premier, Crown Prince Faysal ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, saw the dispatch of Egyptian troops to Yemen—in response to the request of the republican regime in Sana'a—as further evidence of a direct threat to the kingdom. They were worried not only about the extension of Egyptian power and influence, but also about the subversiveness of

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[1] The weight of evidence suggests that Nasir had known about the Yemeni coup before it occurred, and had decided to send troops to support the Yemeni Free Officers before the Saudis got involved on the side of the royalists. See Ahmad Hamrush, *Qissat Thawra 23 Yulio Kharif Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir* (The Story of the 23rd of July Revolution The Autumn of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir) Vol V (Cairo Maktabat al-Madbuli, 1984), F Gregory Gause III, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence* (New York Columbia University Press, 1990), and Ahmad Yusuf Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman, 1962–1967* (The Egyptian Role in Yemen, 1962–1967) (Cairo Al-Hai'a al-Misriya al-'Amma li al-Kitab, 1981).

[2] I do not mean to imply here that the breakup of the UAR was the only reason for Egypt's intervention in Yemen. Nasir was also worried about the rise of other radical forces in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria that threatened his authority as the sole leader of pan-Arab nationalism. This message registered when Nasir failed to exert influence over the foreign policies of Arab states. Still, Nasir perceived Syria's secession from the union as a turning point heralding the decline of Egypt's influence in regional politics. See more on this point below.

Arab nationalist and republican ideas To eliminate this threat to their security, the Saudi ruling elite urged the Western powers, particularly the United States, to take a firm stand against Nasir's intervention in Yemen

The administration of US president John F Kennedy, however, was not receptive to Saudi wishes It viewed the coup in Yemen as an internal rather than as an external concern the Yemeni revolutionaries were inspired by nationalist and reformist tendencies and not by communist dogmas It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States adopted a policy of "non-intervention" in Yemen—distancing itself and strongly discouraging its Saudi friends from getting involved in a Yemeni power struggle The genesis of US policy lay in the new approach adopted by Kennedy toward the non-aligned world, particularly toward Nasir's brand of revolutionary Arab nationalism It was based on developmental and pragmatic needs rather than on ideological considerations Unlike his predecessor, President Dwight D Eisenhower, Kennedy differentiated between Third World nationalism and communism He saw nationalist governments as being more capable of withstanding the communist challenge than the anciens régimes they had replaced

Accordingly, far from confronting Egypt over Yemen, Kennedy developed close relations with Nasir He took an active interest in Egypt's economic development and signed a long-term economic agreement with Egypt in October 1962 in which the United States agreed to provide Egypt with $431.8 million worth of food aid for fiscal years 1963, 1964, and 1965 [3] In contrast, US officials believed that internal stability in Saudi Arabia required the modernizing of its traditional and anachronistic institutions They advised their Saudi counterparts to focus their attention and energy on domestic issues and to undertake social and economic reforms Kennedy's stand signaled a major departure in US policy toward the Arab arena, and local players quickly drew certain conclusions

On the one hand, Saudi and Jordanian rulers began to suspect the Kennedy administration of using Nasir as its main instrument of influence in the region at the expense of its pro-Western, conservative Arab friends To balance the lukewarm support of the United States, the Saudis revived their old connection with Britain Nasir, on the other hand, was emboldened, he perceived the US moves as giving him the green light to pacify internal resistance in Yemen and to escalate the military confrontation against Saudi Arabia if the latter continued to assist the royalist forces

THE BREAKUP OF THE UAR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL IMPLICATIONS

If the 1958 marriage between Egypt and Syria represented the high point in the history of the Arab nationalist movement, the dissolution of their union marked one of its low points Yemen's prompt repudiation of its union with Egypt was another manifestation of the divisiveness of Arab politics[4] In this author's opinion, Arab nationalism met its first major defeat in 1961 with the dissolution of the union rather than in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war The threat to Arab unity was serious because it came from within rather than from without The breakup of the UAR revealed deep fissures within Arab societies and exposed their heterogeneity and factionalism The breakup also revealed the bankruptcy of ideology in Arab politics and the predominance of national interests Since 1945, those interests had become entrenched in the inter-Arab state system Neither conservative regimes, like Saudi Arabia's, nor revolutionary regimes, like Egypt's, were willing to surrender their power or privileges on the altar of Arab unity The rhetoric of Arab rulers was no measure of their commitment to Arab nationalism, a huge gap existed between theory and practice in Arab politics

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[3] *New York Times*, 9 October 1962, William Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955–1981* (New York State University of New York Press, 1985), p 134

The call for Arab unification by leaders like Nasir could not be divorced from the political and material interests of those states advocating unification[5] In the second half of the 1950s, Nasir's championing of Arab unity was closely linked to Egypt's preponderant role in the area Nasir and his lieutenants had assumed that Cairo would serve as the natural focal point for any unity experiment in the Arab world This presumption was behind the Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry in the mid-1950s over Syria In 1955, Syria's defection from the Iraqi to the Egyptian camp sealed the fate of the Baghdad Pact—a Western-sponsored defense arrangement[6] The Syrian move gave Egypt a decisive edge in its drive for regional dominance, and enabled Nasir to pursue an independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the great powers

The breakup of the UAR, thus, must be viewed in the context of domestic, regional, and international politics Domestically, the defection of Syria and the humiliating expulsion of Egyptian marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir—the man in charge of the Syrian province and deputy chief of the UAR armed forces—from Damascus, in 1961, exposed and heightened the rift within the Egyptian ruling elite Nasir held 'Amir responsible for the debacle The subtle and complex rivalry between Nasir and 'Amir that began after the 1956 Suez war escalated dangerously, and hindered any effective coordination between the civilian and military leadership Nasir believed that 'Amir wielded excessive influence over the armed forces and began to worry about the existence of two centers of power—the army and the presidency He feared, according to a Free Officer colleague, a coup d'état in Egypt similar to the 1961 coup in Syria[7]

By weakening his domestic and regional position, the breakup of the UAR undermined Nasir's bargaining power internationally To US officials, for example, Egypt had ceased to be a major threat to the US presence in the region, it was no longer able to mobilize other Arab states against foreign intrusion The breakup of the UAR, however, was not a high priority for the United States, except as it contributed to the reduction of Egypt's influence and the restriction of its ability to threaten US vital interests [8]

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[4] In March 1958, Yemen joined the UAR as a result of the euphoria that swept the Arab world after the signing of the Egyptian-Syrian union in February 1958

[5] 'Abd al-Mun'im Sa'id, *Al-'Arab wa Mustaqbal al-Nizam al-'Alami* (The Arabs and the Future of the International System) (Beirut The Center for Arab Unity, 1987), p 209

[6] The Iraq-Turkish Treaty of February 1955—later to be known as the Baghdad Pact—was joined subsequently by Britain, Iran, and Pakistan See Fawaz A Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967* (Boulder, CO and Oxford Westview Press, 1994), pp 24–8

[7] 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakkirat* (Memoirs) Vol II (Cairo Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977), pp 123–219, 170, Robert Stephens, *Nasser* (Middlesex, UK Penguin Books, 1971), p 358–61

One might have expected the Kennedy administration to exploit Nasir's weakness by supporting his regional enemies, such as the new secessionist regime in Damascus US officials, however, were unwilling to antagonize Egypt for the sake of befriending Syria Instead, their perceptions of the new regional environment and the changing nature of threats to US interests paved the way for friendlier relations with Egypt Indeed, the tenure of Kennedy witnessed a consistent pattern of cooperation between the United States and Egypt

The roots of the change in US policy dated back to the late 1950s Following the Iraqi revolution and US intervention in Lebanon in 1958, the Eisenhower administration embarked on a major reappraisal of its strategy toward the Middle East US officials recognized the futility of trying to oppose radical Arab nationalism Eisenhower proposed coming to terms with Nasir [since] "we are about to get thrown out of the area, we might as well believe in Arab nationalism "[9] To Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the virtual collapse of conservative resistance to pan-Arab nationalism made the latter the driving force in the region and the "wave of the future "[10]

The dominant view in the Eisenhower administration was that the establishment of a working relationship with Nasir was an essential element in preventing the extension of Soviet communist influence in the area The United States was not only to come to terms with Nasir's brand of Arab nationalism, but also to use it as a political weapon against Soviet communism By the end of his administration, Eisenhower had also begun to appreciate the complexity of regional dynamics The Eisenhower administration recognized Nasir as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and began to deal with him as such [11] It was now prepared to support, or at least to tolerate, Nasir's regional ambitions by being "sympathetic toward the idea of Arab unity and a closer association among the Arab states "[12]

In the last two years of the Eisenhower administration (1959–60) there occurred a gradual easing of tensions and a marked improvement in US-Egyptian relations Three practical reasons lay behind the shift in US attitudes toward Nasir first, preventing the further expansion of Soviet influence, second, protecting the huge oil reserves in the Arabian peninsula and securing the flow of cheap oil to the West, and third, keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict in the "icebox " All of these objectives required US cooperation with Nasir Furthermore, during that same period, Nasir had publicly quarreled with Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, thus straining the relationship between Moscow and Cairo Nasir also was preoccupied with his struggle against Arab communists, domestically and regionally, and was at loggerheads with the radical ruler of Iraq, 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, who dared to challenge Nasir's leadership of the Arab revolutionary camp As a result, a rapprochement had occurred between Egypt and the conservative Arab monarchies

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[8] Talking Outline, Subject Crown Prince Faysal May Raise III K US Support for Syria, 4 October 1962, box 158, in *The John F Kennedy National Security Files, The Middle East National Security Files, 1961–1963*, microfilmed from the holdings of the J F Kennedy Library (Frederick, MD University Publications of America, 1989), reel 3 of 3 [Henceforth, this series will be referred to as the *JFK Files, 1961–63*] Nadav Safran, *Israel The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), p 367

[9] Discussion at the Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 July 1958, pp 7, 10, and Conference with the President, 23 July 1958, in the *US Archives* (Oxford Centre for Lebanese Studies), p 2 [Henceforth, this series will be referred to as the *US Archives*]

[10] General Considerations Affecting US Policy Toward the Near East (Annex A), in *US Archives*, pp 40–3

[11] Ibid

[12] NSC (National Security Council), US Policy Toward the Near East (NSC 6011), 17 June 1960, in *US Archives*, pp 2, 4, 9, 14–15, 21 In June 1960, the NSC's planning board recommended that the US government encourage Jordan's peaceful association with a larger Arab entity an explicit call to do away with Jordan as a sovereign, independent state The board's recommendation was approved later by Eisenhower See NSC 6011 in *US Archives*, pp 21–4

Although by the end of the Eisenhower administration US policy toward the Arab world had undergone a major reevaluation, Kennedy carried much further the ideas put forward by Eisenhower A qualitative shift marked Kennedy's approach toward Nasir, strengthening US-Egyptian relations and significantly increasing the flow of US aid to Cairo by more than $300 million Both the rhetoric and substance of Kennedy's foreign policy toward Egypt was different from that of his predecessor This shift in US policy was not only a result of changes in the regional environment but also of the change in the administration in Washington

EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES REVOLUTION AT HOME AND ABROAD

Nasir and his colleagues linked the breakup of the UAR and Syria's defection to the anti-Egyptian, Arab conservative camp to a concerted Western campaign to punish Egypt for its refusal to enter into defense pacts similar to the Baghdad Pact Egyptian leaders also believed that Cairo was the next target for destabilization after Damascus, since the West's success in Syria was bound to have a spillover effect on other revolutionary, non-aligned states [13]

This conspiratorial interpretation reinforced the Egyptian Free Officers' sense of siege and encirclement As the commander of the army, 'Amir said, "while Egypt was in a defensive position, imperialism and reaction were on the offensive "[14] The Egyptians' sense of isolation was compounded by the fact that their relations with the Soviet Union, their strategic ally in the international system, were at a low ebb Although Soviet-Egyptian relations had improved after the 1959 public quarrel between Nasir and Khrushchev, they had not yet returned to normal [15] Moscow's and Washington's speedy recognition of the newly established Syrian regime exacerbated the fears of the Egyptian ruling junta, which became convinced that the two superpowers wished to control the Arab world by establishing puppet governments loyal to them [16]

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[13] *Majmu'at Khutab wa Tasrihat wa Bayanat al-Ra'is Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, Fabrair 1962 ila Yulio 1964* (The Collected Speeches, Declarations, and Statements of President Nasir, February 1962 to June 1964) Vol IV (Cairo Hai'a al-Isti'lamat, n d), pp 269–70 [Henceforth, this series will be referred to as *Majmu'at Khutab Nasir, 1962–64*, Vol IV] Baghdadi, *Mudhakkirat*, Vol II, pp 150–51

[14] Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, p 47

[15] Ibid , pp 47–8, *Majmu'at Khutab Nasir, 1962–64*, Vol IV, p 266, Fu'ad Matar, *Bisaraha Ma'a 'Abd al-Nasir Hiwar Ma'a Muhammad Haykal* (Frankly with Nasir A Dialogue with Muhammad Haykal) (Beirut Dar al-Qadaya, 1975), p 158

The isolation of Egypt from the mainstream of Arab politics, and the consequent insecurity of and tensions within its ruling elite, created political problems in the regional order [17] Nasir accused King Sa'ud and King Husayn of Jordan of conspiring and of financing the sabotage of his union with Syria According to him, peace between conservative and revolutionary Arab states was impossible

> We made the mistake of making peace with reaction We must rid ourselves of this dangerous illusion in order to protect the people's struggle We must fight imperialism in the palaces of reaction We must fight reaction in the arms of imperialism [18]

Nasir's response to the dissolution of the UAR should be viewed in this context To him, the weakening of his Arab position was bound to undermine his standing and status domestically, regionally, and internationally Since the breakaway regime in Damascus was attacking and undermining his pan-Arab credentials, he had to act In an address to the nation in October 1961, he proudly proclaimed

> It is high time for revolutionary action Every village, factory, faculty and school, every council of professional syndicates, every man and woman, youth and child in this country should be turned into a lively and fertile revolutionary cell [19]

As one of his colleagues put it, Nasir wanted to "manufacture" a new revolution at home to shock society and to escape from the trap of bureaucratization [20] In the words of another associate, Nasir also needed an inter-Arab political victory to restore his waning prestige in the Arab arena [21] Although costly, the first task of addressing his domestic constituents was relatively easy, since it merely involved some legislation the National Charter was promulgated in May 1962 At the heart of the charter was a commitment to revolutionize Egyptian society through the further application of socialist laws and decrees The charter also promised to export revolution beyond Egypt's physical borders and beyond the borders of the Arab world by supporting liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America [22]

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[16] Baghdadi, *Mudhakkirat*, Vol II, pp 150–51

[17] Ibid, pp 123, 169–217 For example, Israeli leaders became very concerned about the isolation of Nasir in the Arab world and about some of the Arab conservatives' propaganda attacks against him Israeli officials feared these attacks would force the Egyptian president to act more forcefully against Israel In 1962, Tel Aviv appealed to Washington to pressure Saudi Arabia and Jordan to stop accusing Egypt of opting out of the Arab-Israeli conflict Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Phillips Talbot, concurred with the Israeli view Both agreed that inter-Arab propaganda contributed substantially to keeping Arab-Israeli tensions heated Talbot also promised to use US influence with the conservative Arab regimes to abate this dangerous propaganda Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 6 July 1962, box 118, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[18] President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, *Speeches and Press Interviews* (Cairo Information Department, 1961), pp 311–12

[19] Ibid, pp 315, 317

[20] Baghdadi, *Mudhakkirat*, Vol II, pp 123–219, 170

[21] Hamrush, *Qissat Thawra 23 Yulio*, Vol V, p 61

[22] *The Charter* (Cairo Ministry of National Guidance, State Information Service, 1962), p 11

The second task—searching for a political victory in the Arab arena—was more difficult But Nasir thought he had found it in the Yemeni crisis The death of Imam Ahmad of Yemen in September 1962 and the succession of his son, Muhammad al-Badir, to the Imamate furnished the immediate context for the coup by the chief of the royal guards, ʻAbdallah al-Sallal The newly formed Council of the Revolutionary Command, headed by al-Sallal, announced the abolition of the ancient Imamate—and, with it, the dynasty of the Hamid al-Din family—and the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic Contrary to initial reports in Sanaʻa and Cairo, Badir survived the coup and escaped to the north, where he mobilized support among loyal tribes for a counter-revolution A full-fledged civil war broke out between the republicans and the royalists The Yemeni coup provided Nasir with a golden opportunity to demonstrate Egypt's military dominance and to strike back at the pro-Western, Arab conservative forces, such as Saudi Arabia [23] He drew an explicit linkage between his military intervention in Yemen and the dissolution of the UAR [24]

SAUDI PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES

To Saudi leaders, the overthrow of the ancien régime in Yemen and its replacement with a republican government, modeled on Egypt's, posed a threat to their security The success of the coup could affect the stability of the kingdom because of the possible spillover effect Saudi rulers had always considered Yemen to be of immense importance to their national security Riyadh, therefore, saw the dispatch of Egyptian troops to Yemen in 1962—in response to the request of the republican regime in Sanaʻa—as further evidence of a direct threat to the Saudi kingdom Saʻud and Faysal were convinced that Nasir's real objective was to "overthrow the Saudi monarchy and gain control of the vast oil resources which it possessed "[25] Furthermore, the presence of Egyptian forces in Yemen meant the extension of Egyptian power and influence to the Arabian peninsula, and with it, Soviet and communist influence This was a worrying prospect for Saudi Arabia

Saʻud and Faysal were sensitive to charges of political backwardness and pro-Western alignment The Saʻud family had a virtual monopoly on power and was unwilling to modernize its closed system of government or to accept the introduction of new ideas Monarchies were unpopular then, in the 1960s, because they were seen as running against the currents of the time The Saudi monarchy was no exception Kennedy's aides were

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[23] The main focus of this article is on the Egyptian-Saudi conflict in Yemen and not on the origins or the internal dynamics of the struggle for power inside Yemen The article examines the latter theme inasmuch as it sheds light on the Egyptian-Saudi rivalry For more concise accounts of the Yemeni war, see Manfred W Wenner, *Modern Yemen 1918–1966* (Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), especially part III, chapter VIII, and Edgar O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen* (London Faber and Faber, 1971)

[24] Nasser, *Speeches and Press Interviews*, pp 275, 347–57, *Majmuʻat Khutab Nasir, 1962–64*, Vol IV, pp 269–70

[25] Saeed M Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962–1970* (Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1986), pp 46–51, Wenner, *Modern Yemen*, p 200

"apologetic" when discussing Saudi Arabia publicly In the words of a White House official, the US attempt to preserve the Saudi regime was paradoxical[26]

The United States had important economic and strategic interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and, thus, had an overriding interest in maintaining the stability of the friendly house of Sa'ud On the other hand, some officials in the Kennedy administration believed that internal stability in Saudi Arabia required modernizing and liberalizing its anachronistic political and economic institutions When Faysal visited Washington, in October 1962, the Department of State impressed on the prince the need to institute a program of socioeconomic reforms[27] To show its seriousness, the Kennedy administration backed the modernizing Faysal against his rigid and more conservative brother, Sa'ud The struggle for power between the two ended with the enthronement of Faysal in 1964 Although the consolidation of Faysal's authority strengthened the home front and injected new blood and dynamism into the Saudi internal political process, Faysal still feared internal dissension from the ranks of the Saudi military establishment and from some members of the royal family

The Saudi ruling family was also criticized for its anti-Arab nationalist stand and its close alliance with the West In 1957, Saudi Arabia left the Egyptian-Syrian alliance[28] After the fall of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, Saudi Arabia inherited the leadership of the Arab conservative camp It replaced Iraq as the main opponent of Egypt's expansionist drive for dominance of the Arab world, and collaborated with the United States to reduce the risks to the realm The Saudis, however, adopted a low-key, non-confrontational policy from 1958–62 While keeping their channels open to the West, Sa'ud and Faysal kept the US government at arm's length Sa'ud and Faysal even ostensibly played down their Western connection in an effort to appease Nasir[29] A case in point was the 1961 decision by the Saudi government not to renew the Dhahran airfield agreement with Washington[30]

But the breakup of the UAR, the coup in Yemen, and the subsequent Egyptian intervention, forced Saudi leaders to confront the inherent contradictions in their regional and international relations The Saudis knew that they could not get the Egyptians out of Yemen except by widening the scope of the conflict and by relying on external assistance They, therefore, adopted a two-pronged strategy based on searching for regional allies, and reviving the Western connection

The Saudis were aware that the regional balance of power was not in their favor They lacked the population base and political legitimacy to mount an effective challenge to the dominant ideology of Arab nationalism With the exception of Jordan, Saudi Arabia was unable to recruit other Arab states for its confrontation with Egypt The Saudi-Jordanian alliance in Yemen, which lasted from 1962 until 1964, was a product of this convergence of interests the need to counterbalance the threat of Nasirism and the radical Arab nationalist movement[31]

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[26] Robert Komer, a National Security Council staff official who dealt with Third World matters, in a Conversation with [an unnamed] Israeli Official Memorandum for Record, 14 January 1963, box 119, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[27] Robert Komer to the President, Subject Informal Visit of Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia, 4 October 1962, box 158, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[28] Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, chaps 2 and 3

[29] Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Cambridge, MA Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), pp 74–5, 90

[30] National Security Files, Country Saudi Arabia, 1/1/1961–8/18/1961, box 156, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

Like Faysal, Husayn of Jordan feared Egyptian influence in the region Husayn was opposed by an internal coalition of Jordanian and Palestinian nationalists who were more receptive to Nasir's revolutionary ideas than to Husayn's conservative and pro-Western views In fact, Husayn's pro-Western stand and anti-communist line had earned him the enmity of a number of radical Arab states and, indeed, of some of his own subjects[32]

In an address to the United Nations General Assembly, in October 1960, Husayn accused Nasir of conspiring to overthrow his regime and, using methods and tactics similar to those of the Soviets, to promote the interests of the international communist movement The king also claimed that Egypt was serving as a bridge and a center for the communist penetration of the Arab world Husayn's perceptions of the Egyptian threat led him to provide political and material assistance to the separatists in Syria before 1961 He was the first Arab ruler to recognize the breakaway regime in Damascus He even contemplated armed intervention in Syria to prevent a countercoup by Nasir[33]

Given his animosity toward Nasir, it was natural that Husayn would ally himself with Sa'ud to stem the tide of Arab nationalism in the Arabian peninsula In fact, Saudi-Jordanian military collaboration preceded the coup in Yemen In August 1962, Saudi Arabia and Jordan formed a joint command and developed mechanisms for closer economic and military cooperation[34] Putting aside the historical rivalry between their two families, Sa'ud and Husayn initiated a new era in Saudi-Jordanian relations As early as October 1962, Husayn condemned the republican coup in Sana'a and attacked Nasir's intervention there The king also accused the Egyptian leader of spilling Arab blood and of not shouldering his responsibility toward the Palestinian cause[35] The Jordanian premier, Wasfi al-Tal, went even further, alleging that Nasir intervened in Yemen to avoid action on the Arab-Israeli front, and castigated Nasir for hiding his troops behind United Nations (UN) forces in the Sinai desert He also maintained that his government would wholeheartedly support Saudi Arabia in the case of an attack by Egypt[36] Given its limited power and resources, however, Jordan could not alter the regional balance of power in favor of Saudi Arabia

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[31] Ghassan Salamé, *Al-Siyasa al-Kharijiya al-Sa'udiya Mundhu 'Am 1945 Dirasa fi al-'Alaqat al-Duwaliya* (Saudi Foreign Policy Since 1945 A Study in International Relations) (Beirut Ma'had al-Inma' al-'Arabi, 1980), pp 638–39

[32] *Majmu'at Khutab al-Malik Husayn 25 'Aman min al-Tarikh, 1952–1977* (The Collected Speeches of King Husayn 25 Years of History, 1952–1977) Vol I (London Samir Mutawi's Company for Publications, 1978), pp 507–8 [Henceforth, this series will be referred to as *Majmu'at Khutab Husayn, 1952–77*, Vol I] H M Husayn, *Muhimmati ka-Malik* (My Profession as King) (Jordan Al-Shirka al-'Arabiya li-al Tiba'a wa al-Nashr, 1978), p 83 Sa'ad Abu Wardiya, *'Amaliya Itikhad al-Qarar fi Siyasat al-Urdunn al-Kharijiya* (The Making of Jordan's Foreign Policy) (Jordan Da'ira al-Thaqafa wa al-Funun, 1983), pp 129–31

[33] *Majmu'at Khutab Husayn, 1952–77*, Vol I, pp 508–10, Peter Snow, *Hussein A Biography* (London Barrie and Jenkins, 1972), p 151

[34] Husayn, *Muhimmati ka-Malik*, p 200

[35] *Majmu'at Khutab Husayn, 1952–77*, Vol I, pp 89–95

[36] Wasfi al-Tal, *Kitabat fi al-Qadaya al-'Arabiya* (Writings on Arab Issues) ('Amman Dar al-Liwa' li al-Sahafa wa al-Nashr, 1980), pp 190–6

Syria was not of great assistance to Saudi Arabia either Although anti-Nasir, and well disposed toward Riyadh, the breakaway regime in Damascus was handicapped by internal political divisions It could do no more than call for an end to the hostilities in Yemen

The republican coup in Yemen and Egypt's subsequent intervention caught Sa'ud and Faysal unprepared To compensate for their regional weakness, Saudi rulers looked outside, particularly toward the United States, for help They sought to revive their US connection to counteract Egyptian power Saudi rulers were seriously concerned about the domestic and regional repercussions of Nasir's propaganda attack against them Exploiting the ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, Sa'ud informed US officials that he was ready to cooperate "one hundred percent" with them to stem the tide of communism in the Arab East He averred that, with the exception of Egypt, all Arab states despised communism[37]

During his visit to Washington in October 1962, Prince Faysal informed US officials that Saudi Arabia "considers friendship with the United States to be the cornerstone of [its] policy "[38] He expressed his concern over US-Egyptian cooperation and the possibility that the Kennedy administration was using Nasir as the main instrument of its policy in the region Faysal appealed to Kennedy to clarify his Middle Eastern policy, define the nature of his relationship with Nasir, take a firm stand in support of Saudi actions in Yemen, and pressure Nasir to terminate his involvement there[39]

REORIENTING US FOREIGN POLICY KENNEDY'S REBUFF TO FAYSAL

The United States was not receptive to Faysal's wishes Kennedy was experimenting with a new and more progressive approach to the developing world in general, and to the Middle East in particular Non-alignment was no longer perceived as an evil to be combated, but as a positive idea that could benefit the interests of the United States in the Third World Unlike the previous administration, the Kennedy administration accepted and even cooperated with nationalist regimes, since experience had shown that they were the "most effective bar to communism "[40] Kennedy was, thus, more inclined than Eisenhower to come to terms with the Arab nationalist movement, as represented by

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[37] Seville (Spain) to Secretary of State, 28 February 1962, box 158, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[38] Informal Visit of Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia Scope Paper, 4 October 1962, box 158, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[39] Robert Komer to the President (regarding Prince Faysal's visit), 4 October 1962, box 158, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[40] Cairo to Department of State, Subject US-UAR Relations (a review of US-UAR relations for several years), 11 April 1964, in *The Lyndon B Johnson National Security Files, The Middle East National Security Files, 1963–1969*, microfilmed from the holdings of the L B Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (Frederick, MD University Publications of America, 1989), reel 7 of 8 [Henceforth, this series will be referred to as the *LBJ Files, 1963–69*]

Nasir. The Egyptian leader was no longer perceived as a communist whose political demise would serve US interests in the area.[41]

The dominant view in the US administration was that any change of regime in Cairo "would probably bring with it a leftward shift in policy."[42] Accordingly, the US government adopted a functional approach based on economic and technical assistance. The United States significantly increased its economic aid to Egypt (by more than $300 million) in order to divert Nasir's attention from regional and international involvement to internal problems and economic development. The Kennedy administration planned to establish a "strong position in a key country and to entail the UAR in the Western world through the advantages the UAR will gain therefrom."[43] It hoped to use foreign aid to induce Nasir to respect US security interests in the Third World and, more broadly, to demonstrate the "New Frontiersman's" willingness to assist neutralist developing states.[44]

By coming to terms with the Arab nationalist movement and recognizing Egypt's leadership of it, US officials hoped to preserve and strengthen US influence and interests in the area. They also realized that their earlier approach, in the 1950s, which had tended to equate Nasir's brand of Arab nationalism with communism, had been based on a misreading of regional conditions. In a speech to a Jewish audience in the United States, prior to taking office, Kennedy recognized the growing importance of Arab nationalism and Egypt's leadership role in the area.[45] In other speeches, in 1958 and 1959, Kennedy warned Eisenhower against trying to force Egypt and non-aligned states to choose between "us" and "them"—the United States and the Soviet Union. He asserted that the developing world was more interested in domestic and regional issues than in the East-West ideological rivalry. To Kennedy, the United States had to talk to Egypt and other non-aligned states using a vocabulary that went beyond that of the Cold War. It had to provide those nations with the essential requirements for development: bread and butter instead of threats and gunboat diplomacy.[46]

The chosen instruments of US policy under Kennedy became economic cooperation and technical assistance. The administration took an active interest in Egypt's economic development. A memo to Kennedy from the Department of State concluded that aid to Nasir would encourage him to pursue policies that were "less antagonistic to our interests and those of our friends."[47] Accordingly, a long-term economic agreement was therefore signed with Egypt in October 1962 (a week after Nasir had sent his forces to Yemen) to provide it with wheat for three years, through the greatly enlarged aid program specified in Public Law 480 [48]

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[41] Talking Outline: Saudi-UAR Relations (a memo prepared for the president for his talks with Prince Faysal), 4 October 1962, box 158, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*.

[42] Cairo to Department of State, Subject: US-UAR Relations: I. Areas of Maneuver, 11 April 1964, in the *LBJ Files, 1963–69*, reel 7 of 8.

[43] Talking Outline: Saudi-UAR Relations.

[44] Burns, *Economic Aid*, p. 146.

[45] Mordechai Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1983), pp. 13–14.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Robert Komer to the President (regarding Prince Faysal visit), 4 October 1962, and Department of State, Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the White House, 1 July 1963, box 119, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*.

The sizeable increase in US economic aid to Cairo was not the only positive sign of improvement in US-UAR relations Kennedy and Nasir also adopted concrete measures to improve the political atmosphere between their two countries In February 1961, just a month after Kennedy's inauguration, Nasir initiated a personal correspondence with Kennedy that served as a medium for frank exchanges of opinion over an important range of regional and international issues In another positive gesture, Kennedy appointed John Badeau as ambassador to Egypt in 1961 Badeau was a prominent Arabist and a student of Egypt

Not all US policy makers, however, supported Kennedy's new approach toward Egypt Important elements inside and outside the US government, especially in Congress, strongly disagreed with the president, preferring confrontation [49] Despite strong resistance, Kennedy succeeded in implementing his policy It was not until after Kennedy's death, in November 1963, that his opponents were able to reassert themselves and effect a change in US policy toward Egypt

Kennedy's emphasis on development rather than on ideology explains his reluctance to confront Nasir over Yemen, despite urgent Saudi appeals to do so US officials made it clear to Faysal, during his 1962 visit to Washington, that they were not prepared to pressure Nasir Furthermore, they told the Saudi prince that "the best way for Saudi Arabia to proceed was steady progress towards modernization and development "[50] In a memorandum to Kennedy, the Department of State defined the US stand on Yemen at the onset of the conflict as one of nonintervention [51]

Another Department of State memorandum to Kennedy recommended that the United States distance itself from the Yemeni conflict and strongly discourage its friends, mainly the Saudis, from involving themselves in a Yemeni power struggle, unless the revolutionary group in Sana'a aligned itself with the Soviet Union There was no indication yet, concluded the memo, that the Yemeni revolutionaries were inclined toward the communist bloc [52] It should be noted that the goals of the US strategy had remained basically unchanged since the late 1940s a preoccupation with the potential Soviet threat What had changed was Kennedy's interpretation of the regional environment and his willingness to view the Arab arena in its own right, as an independent theater of action Kennedy viewed the policies that he inherited from Eisenhower in January 1961 as a product of the special pressures of the post–World War II era There was a new appreciation in Washington of the basic social transformation taking place in Arab societies, whether in conservative states or in the more radical ones [53]

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[48] Burns, *Economic Aid*, pp 131–34

[49] Cairo to Department of State US-UAR Relations (a review of US-UAR relations for several years)

[50] Talking Outline Saudi-UAR Relations

[51] Robert Komer to the President (regarding Prince Faysal visit)

[52] Talking Outline Saudi-UAR Relations

[53] William R Polk, *The Arab World* (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1986), pp 336–37, Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, p 78

The source of this transformation lay in the region's internal conditions rather than in its external circumstances and tensions The Kennedy administration recognized the primacy of regional dynamics In this context, it viewed the Yemeni war in internal rather than in external terms Kennedy also wished to maintain the role of an honest broker in inter- and intra-Arab disputes Upon his retirement in 1964, Badeau noted that the United States had learned, since the mid-1950s, that it was wiser to avoid participating in intra-Arab quarrels "*unless and until US material interests in the Arab world were directly threatened* "[54]

To dispel any impression of intimacy with Nasir, the Kennedy administration informed Faysal and other conservative Arab leaders that the Egyptian leader was not being treated as the US chosen instrument of influence in the region The United States was dealing with Nasir, argued US officials, because it could not "do much anyway " He was firmly established in Egypt and appeared likely to remain in power [55] What this really meant was that the Kennedy administration was not prepared to oppose Nasir in Yemen To Kennedy, Egypt was a valuable regional player in the Arab arena that could not be antagonized without cost to US interests In this context, the Kennedy administration decided to strengthen the state of US-Egyptian relations by adopting an accommodating rather than a confrontational attitude toward Nasir

In weighing whether to recognize the Yemeni junta, the Kennedy administration faced an obvious predicament On the one hand, it did not want to alienate the new Yemeni regime and push it to rely too heavily on Egyptian and Soviet support On the other hand, the US government was faced with British, Jordanian, and Saudi opposition to any form of reconciliation with, or recognition of, the republican regime in Sana'a [56] In November 1962, the Kennedy administration, relying on the efforts of its diplomats in Cairo and Riyadh, tried to mediate between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, hoping for a compromise that would preserve US interests without antagonizing any of the combatants [57]

Although nothing concrete came of Kennedy's first mediation effort, he did obtain promises from Nasir to limit his involvement in Yemen and to desist from subverting the Saudi or Jordanian kingdoms [58] Kennedy also gave "satisfactory reassurances to the two kings of [US] intentions to stand by them and to circumscribe Nasser's influences in the Arabian Peninsula "[59] His strategy was designed to placate both radical and conservative

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[54] Cairo to Department of State US-UAR Relations (a review of US-UAR relations for several years), 11 April 1964 [italics original] An echo of this sentiment was evident when the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, assured President Saddam Husayn—immediately before he invaded Kuwait—that the United States had "no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts," *New York Times*, 23 September 1990

[55] Cairo to Department of State US-UAR Relations, 11 April 1964, Informal Visit of Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia, 4 October 1962, box 158, and Talking Outline Saudi-UAR Relations

[56] US Position on Recognition of Yemen Arab Republic, 17 October 1962, box 207, in the *JFK Files, 1961–63*

[57] Wenner, *Modern Yemen*, pp 201–203

[58] Ibid , pp 201–203, Patrick Seale, "The War in Yemen," *New Republic*, cxcviii (26 January 1963), p 11

[59] US Position on Recognition of Yemen Arab Republic

Arab regimes This face-saving formula allowed Kennedy to grant diplomatic recognition to Yemen in December 1962

US recognition of Yemen did not have the desired effect, however The Yemeni royalists were unwilling to stop the fighting Saudi Arabia also was reluctant to end its assistance to the Imam The result was the escalation of the Yemeni conflict The Kennedy administration stepped up its mediation efforts by sending former Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to the Middle East in early March 1963 Shuttling between Cairo and Riyadh, Bunker obtained a commitment in mid-April from both sides to begin a "disengagement" from Yemen that called for a phased withdrawal of troops, pending the termination of external support to the royalists The United States also sought and obtained UN consent to monitor the parties' compliance with the "disengagement agreement " Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed, in turn, to honor their "compact" with the UN[60] Undoubtedly, the success of US mediation diplomacy and the UN mission depended on Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's compliance with the terms of the disengagement agreement and control over their Yemeni clients Neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis, however, were ready for, or capable of, doing that

THE PRIMACY OF REGIONAL DYNAMICS

The Soviet Union was the first non-Arab state to recognize the republican government in Sana'a in October 1962 Khrushchev also sent a letter to al-Sallal wishing him well, adding that external interference in the internal affairs of Yemen would not be tolerated Although the Kremlin did not publicly sanction the Egyptian intervention, editorials in the Soviet media were implicitly supportive, referring to Egypt's action as a response to "imperialist" plots and aggression[61] The Kremlin went beyond implicit support by supplying aid to the revolutionaries in Yemen and to the Egyptian troops[62] US and Soviet recognition of the Yemeni republican regime was seen in Cairo as a political gain for Egypt's interventionist role and as a political setback for Saudi policy in Riyadh Nasir interpreted Kennedy's recognition as a green light to defeat the royalist coalition in Yemen. The Saudis, in turn, stepped up their support for the royalists, and re-established closer relations with Britain, and even with Iran, to counterbalance the tepid US response[63]

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[60] *New York Times*, 14 April 1963, *The Times* (London), 1 May 1963, Wenner, *Modern Yemen*, pp 205–210

[61] V Terekhov, "Aden British Colonialists, New Manoeuvre," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No 3 (3 March 1963), p 91 See, also, the editorials in *New Times* (Moscow), No 41, 10 October 1962, p 2, *New Times*, No 46, 14 November 1962, p 79, and *New Times*, No 49, 5 December 1962, p 8 Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, p 191

[62] This was confirmed by a former Egyptian defense minister See Hamrush, *Qissat Thawra 23 Yulio Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir wa al-'Arab* (The Story of the 23rd of July Revolution Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and the Arabs) Vol III (Cairo Maktabat al-Madbuli, n d , 2d ed), p 471, Hamrush, *Qissat Thawra 23 Yulio*, Vol V, p 66, Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, p 192, and Dana Adams Schmidt, *Yemen The Unknown War* (London Bodley Head, 1968), p 143

[63] Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans* (Middlesex, UK Penguin, 1974), pp 59–60, Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, pp 182–83, Salamé, *Al-Siyasa al-Kharijiya al-Sa'udiya Mundhu 'Am 1945*, pp 244, 640, Safran, *Saudi Arabia*, p 99

The result was an escalation of the Yemeni conflict and a heightening of the role of external powers Regional actors perceived their involvement in Yemen as of vital national interest They were unwilling to sacrifice those interests to US requests for moderation, notwithstanding the political risks involved Nasir was fully aware of the dangers that his actions in Yemen entailed because he was encroaching upon the sphere of influence of the major powers The Egyptian leader was not deterred, however, the stakes were too high

Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's behavior shows the importance of regional dynamics This behavior cannot be understood except by comprehending Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's positions within the inter-Arab state system and their need for local and external allies Given their precarious power base and the revolutionary menace to their regional interests, Saudi rulers looked for allies in the region and beyond They also were not intimidated by the lukewarm stand of the United States, since Britain—whose strategic base in Aden was threatened by Egypt's involvement in the Arabian peninsula—was ready to assist them against the radical forces challenging their security

CONFRONTING THE CONTRADICTIONS IN US POLICY

Despite its mediation efforts of November 1962 and March 1963, by mid-1963, the Kennedy administration was unable to influence the course of events in the Arabian peninsula Neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis were in a mood for compromise In fact, Nasir, in response to increased Saudi aid to the royalists, escalated the confrontation by sending his air force to bomb Saudi border towns, which were being used as training grounds and staging posts for the royalist forces Kennedy was forced to take a firm stand to show his resolve to defend the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia A letter of commitment from Kennedy to Faysal was made public, and a squadron of US fighter aircrafts was stationed in the Saudi kingdom[64] Kennedy finally had to face the contradictions of US policy in the Arab arena There was a growing awareness in some Washington circles of the limits to a close US-UAR relationship In particular, Kennedy was upset by Nasir's unwillingness to abide by the terms of the April 1963 disengagement agreement negotiated by Bunker and by Egypt's deepening military involvement in Yemen[65] In his last letter to Nasir, in October 1963, Kennedy's exasperation was apparent He accused Nasir of failing to carry out his part of the Yemen disengagement agreement Kennedy also voiced his personal concern over the UAR's failure to honor "a compact made with the UN, and in effect, underwritten by the United States as a friend of both parties"[66]

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[64] Christopher J McMullen, *Resolution of the Yemen Crisis 1963 A Case Study in Mediation* (Washington, DC Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1980), p 7, *Washington Post*, 7 January 1963

[65] Cairo to Secretary of State, No 2660, 4 May 1964, in the *LBJ Files, 1963–69*, reel 7 of 8

[66] Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, p 27, Polk, *The Arab World*, pp 340–41, Muhammad Haykal, *Nasser The Cairo Documents* (London New English Library, 1972), p 196

By the summer of 1963, Nasir had become annoyed by several aspects of the US strategy the threatening tone of Kennedy's letters regarding Yemen, the unwillingness of Washington to press Saudi Arabia to stop arming the royalists, the US supply of arms to Israel and to the conservative Arab states, and the implicit threat of cutting US aid to Egypt [67] He even began to believe it was part of the US strategy to involve Egypt deeper in Yemen, tying up the army in the desert wilderness of Arabia and eliminating Egypt as a military factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict In Nasir's eyes, how else could the close collaboration between the United States and his regional enemies be explained?[68]

Notwithstanding the hovering clouds over the state of US-Egyptian relations, Kennedy and Nasir downplayed their differences Both were aware of their common interests Nasir knew that Egyptian economic stability depended on the continuing flow of US economic aid He also appreciated Kennedy's honest broker role in Yemen Hence, for both political and economic reasons, Nasir could not afford a total break with the United States [69] To Kennedy, Egypt was the most important state in the Arab East, Nasir himself was an important element in Kennedy's assessment Thus, despite the mutual irritation and suspicion, the two leaders endeavored "to isolate and set aside points of basic disagreement while seeking to broaden areas of understanding and cooperation "[70]

It is not surprising that the death of Kennedy, in November 1963, shocked Egyptian leaders They saw the tragedy as a setback for Egyptian efforts to strengthen and deepen relations with the United States Nasir credited Kennedy personally with having established trust and confidence between the United States and Egypt [71] Lyndon Johnson's assumption of the presidency heightened the apprehensions of the Free Officers, who feared a shift in US policy toward the Middle East [72] Indeed, the death of Kennedy and the coming to power of a new administration brought about an important shift in tone and substance in US global priorities

As a Cold War warrior, Johnson put more emphasis on US rivalry with the Soviet Union As a result, the United States became more committed and active in its containment policy Unlike his predecessor, Johnson was less willing to accommodate Third

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[67] Cairo to Secretary of State, No 2660, reel 7 of 8, Muhammad Haykal, *1967 Sanawat al-Ghalayan, Harb al-Thalathin Sana* (1967 The Years of Upheaval, The Thirty Years' War) Vol I (Cairo Markaz al-Ahram li al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr, 1988), pp 721–27, Haykal, *Nasser*, pp 195–96

[68] Robert Stookey, *America and the Arab States An Uneasy Encounter* (London John Wiley, 1975), pp 196–97, Haykal, *Nasser*, pp 195–96, Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, p 314, Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, p 28

[69] Ironically, between 1961–63, although Nasir was asserting his Arab credentials in Yemen, he pursued a rapprochement with the United States This fact raises critical questions about the veracity of Nasir's message and intentions Perhaps, being the pragmatist he was, Nasir was having second thoughts about the Arab nationalist project

[70] Cairo to Department of State US-UAR Relations (a review of US-UAR relations for several years)

[71] *Misr wa Amrika 'Ard Tarikhi li-Tatawwur al-'Alaqat al-Misriya al-Amrikiya wa Tasjil li-Rihlat al-Ra'is al-Sadat* (Egypt and America A Historical Account of the Development of Egyptian-American Relations and Documentation of President Sadat's Trip) (Cairo Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Mu'assasat al-Ahram, 1976), p 31

[72] Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (London Constable, 1972), p 344, Burns, *Economic Aid*, p 152, Haykal, *1967 Sanawat al-Ghalayan*, Vol I, pp 727–28, 736, Mahmoud Riad, *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East* (London Quartet Books, 1981), p 15, Mahmoud Riad, *Mudhakkirat Amrika wa al-'Arab* (Memoirs America and the Arabs) Vol III (Beirut Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1986), pp 34–5, Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, p 314

World nationalist movements and to provide economic aid to states that had friendly relations with the Soviet bloc and that were not receptive to US wishes Johnson was ready to put pressure on those states to modify their behavior He also had a reputation for being a strong advocate and supporter of Israel Thus, although the Saudis had failed to enlist Kennedy's active support against the Egyptian presence in Yemen, they succeeded with Johnson Johnson's subordination of regional concerns to global-level concerns had a decisive impact on US-Egyptian relations, which would soon deteriorate

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to show that the Egyptian-Saudi clash in Yemen in the 1960s (following the 1962 Yemeni coup) must be understood in the context of the breakup of the UAR in 1961 and the subsequent domestic, regional, and international developments The weakening of Nasir's Arab position undermined his standing at home and abroad He felt compelled to act decisively to escape entrapment and marginalization His response was to plunge Egypt deeper into socialism domestically and to project Egyptian power in the Arabian peninsula by intervening militarily on the side of the republican elements in Yemen Nasir's larger objective was to seize the initiative in the Arab arena by striking back at the pro-Western, Arab conservative forces as represented by Saudi Arabia

The basic strategy behind Egypt's move was defensive rather than offensive the Free Officers were more concerned with preserving their hard-won achievements than with conquering new territories and scoring new gains In this context, they mainly sought to arrest the further decline of their influence and prestige in the Arab world They believed that their standing at home and their ability to bargain internationally depended to a large extent on the strength of their Arab position Nasir and his lieutenants rightly recognized the close linkage between internal and external politics They realized that they could not afford to remain passive after being humiliated by Syria's secession from the union Inaction would have further undermined their precarious regional status and, consequently, their domestic and global agenda In this context, Yemen provided Nasir with a golden opportunity to reverse the retreat of his Arab nationalist movement

Nasir's action, however, produced the opposite effect The Egyptian-Saudi conflict added another source of instability and divisiveness to an explosive regional environment Egypt was sucked deeper into Yemen, which exacted a heavy toll on its economy and had damaging effects on its army[73] In his meetings with US representatives in 1965, Nasir compared Egypt's entanglement in Yemen to the US involvement in Vietnam[74] It is not surprising that, by the end of September 1963, Nasir had tried to extricate his army from the Yemeni quagmire by using the mechanism of summit diplomacy The escalation of the

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[73] Hamrush, *Qissat Thawra 23 Yulio Mujtama' Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir* (The Story of the 23rd of July Revolution The Society of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir) Vol II (Cairo Maktabat al-Madbuli, 1984), pp 261–62, Hamrush, *Qissat Thawra 23 Yulio*, Vol V, p 76, Ahmad, *Al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Yaman*, pp 482–87

[74] Cairo to Secretary of State, No 3653, 18 April 1965 (section 3 of 4), and Cairo to Secretary of State, No 1311, 24 November 1965, both in the *LBJ Files, 1963–1969*, reel 8 of 8

Yemeni war and the Arab-Israeli conflict convinced Nasir of the need to adopt a new Arab policy—one that was quite different from the one he had pursued since the breakup of the UAR in 1961.[75] This policy was based on Arab collective action—or what came to be known as Arab summit diplomacy beginning in 1964—and on the spirit of reconciliation rather than confrontation. The failure of Arab summitry to resolve the Yemeni conflict motivated Nasir to fly to Jidda, Saudi Arabia, in August 1965, to negotiate with Faysal an end to the Yemeni war.

Although Nasir and Faysal agreed on a peace formula in Jidda, nothing came of it. Faysal was not interested in a compromise settlement that would legitimize Egyptian influence in neighboring Yemen. According to declassified US documents, Faysal's "rigidity towards a Yemen solution suggests a desire to humiliate Nasser."[76] To Saudi rulers, however, humiliating Nasir was not an end in itself. The extension of Egyptian power to the Arabian peninsula had threatened the very survival of their regime. Faysal was worried even more about the popularity and subversiveness of the republican and nationalist ideas preached by the Egyptians than by the might of their army. Thus, a satisfactory solution for the Saudi family required no less than the total discrediting, or even the defeat, of Nasir. To succeed in this endeavor, Faysal had tried in 1962 to widen the scope of the Yemeni conflict by inviting Western powers to intervene actively on Saudi Arabia's behalf against Egypt.

Kennedy, however, had not responded favorably to Saudi requests, and had refused to pressure, or even confront, Nasir over Yemen. Instead, the Kennedy administration had adopted the role of an honest broker between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, viewing the confrontation as an inter-Arab dispute and not as a communist-inspired one. The US administration discouraged its Saudi clients from getting too deeply involved in a Yemeni power struggle, and advised Faysal to focus on the home front and to modernize. In US eyes, the main threat to the Sa'ud family stemmed from internal rather than external sources: the persistence of obsolete institutions and the lack of socioeconomic and political reforms. Far from extolling the Saudi rulers' virtues as democrats by tribal tradition,[77] the Kennedy administration treated them as anachronistic and as a liability to the preservation of Western interests.

On the other hand, Kennedy established close economic and political relations with Egypt, making it one of the largest recipients of US foreign aid. Despite the subsequent escalation of Egyptian involvement in Yemen, Kennedy did not alter his basic stand toward Nasir: confrontation was eschewed in favor of cooperation. In other words, Kennedy did not allow the Yemeni war to disturb friendly relations between Egypt and the United States. This fact should be highlighted, considering the subsequent deterioration of US-Egyptian relations shortly thereafter, in 1964, under the Johnson administration, and after the June 1967 War, culminating in Egypt's severance of diplomatic relations with the United States

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[75] Haykal, *1967: Sanawat al-Ghalayan*, p. 730; Riyad, *Mudhakkirat* (Memoirs) Vol. II (Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1986), p. 281.

[76] Cairo to Secretary of State, No. 3653, 18 April 1965 (section 4 of 4), and Anwar al-Sadat, President of UAR National Assembly, Background Paper: The UAR and Yemen, 22–26 February 1966, in the *LBJ Files, 1963–1969*, reel 8 of 8.

[77] Robert Springborg, "The Arab Bourgeoisie: A Revisionist Interpretation," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 25.

Far from being always hostile and confrontational in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US relationship with the pan-Arab nationalist forces, as represented by Nasir's Egypt, was often cordial As mentioned previously, from the end of 1958 until the end of 1963, Egypt was the focus of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and Nasir was recognized as the undisputed leader of the Arab world Despite the denials of US officials, the Kennedy administration treated Nasir as its main instrument of influence in the region cooperating with Nasir would safeguard US vital interests, such as checking communist influence in the Arab East, continuing the flow of cheap oil to the West, and keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict in the "icebox "

Kennedy's ambivalent response to Faysal's urgent appeals for US support should be understood in this context One overriding US objective was to avoid a breakdown in relations with Nasir's Egypt Befriending Nasir was much higher on the US foreign policy agenda than allaying the fears and concerns of its Arab conservative allies Kennedy's response to the Yemeni war shows the extent to which the United States allied itself with the forces of Arab nationalism to preserve its own vital interests

It should be emphasized, however, that the US support for Nasir's brand of revolutionary pan-Arabism was not the product of an ideological affinity It was a marriage of convenience based on tactical considerations that took into account the conjuncture of certain historical processes, crises, and personalities The contradictions and dialectics inherent in US-Egyptian relations were temporarily suspended, but were never structurally resolved The coming to power of Johnson, and the escalation of regional tensions in the second part of the 1960s, brought about significant changes in the relationship between the United States and Egypt Johnson's perceptions of US global interests conflicted with Nasir's regional ambitions and leadership role in the non-aligned movement The stage was set, once again, for a confrontation between the United States and the forces of Arab nationalism, as represented by Nasir's Egypt

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Chronology

October 16, 1994-January 15, 1995

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and South Asia, Western Europe*
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Regional Affairs, Israel, Lebanon

1994

Oct. 16. In Amman, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres met with King Hussein of Jordan to discuss details of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty including land and water rights [10/17 NYT, 10/18 JP]

Israel reopened its borders with the Gaza Strip that had been closed since the 11 October kidnapping by the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) of Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman [10/17 NYT, 10/18 JP]

In Hebron, Israeli soldiers shot to death a Palestinian [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 17: In Amman, Israeli prime minister Rabin and Jordan's prime minister 'Abd al-Salam al-Majali initialled a draft peace treaty that included the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations, agreements on water allotments, enhanced commerce, and relaxed travel restrictions between their countries The signing ceremony was scheduled for 26 October in the border area between Eilat and Aqaba [10/18 NYT, FT]

In Cairo, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations [10/19 FBIS]

In Gaza City, more than 5,000 HAMAS supporters demonstrated against a Palestinian police crackdown on HAMAS in connection with the 11 October kidnapping of Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman The demonstrators called for the dismissal of the Palestinian military chief, Nasr Yussif, who led the HAMAS arrests [10/18 FT, WP]

Palestinian authorities stated that they had released 112 of the 193 HAMAS members arrested in connection with the kidnapping of Nahshon Wachsman HAMAS authorities stated that 115 of 350 HAMAS members had been released [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 18: Jordan's and Israel's cabinets approved the draft of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty to be signed on 26 October [10/19 WP]

Syrian president Asad and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) condemned the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty [10/19 NYT]

Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Israeli negotiator Elyaqim Rubenstein and Jordanian negotiator Fayiz al-Tarawinah were held in Aqaba to discuss technical details of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty The trilateral Israel-Jordan-United States Economic Committee met separately in Aqaba [10/19 FBIS]

In Cairo, Syrian president Asad met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations Asad reiterated his demand for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights [10/19 FT]

The chief rabbi of Syria, Abraham Hamra, immigrated to Israel Approximately 230 Syrian Jews remained in Syria [10/19 WP]

Oct 19 A bomb exploded on a bus in downtown Tel Aviv, killing at least 22 people and wounding 46 others The HAMAS-affiliated Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility for the bombing Israeli prime minister

Rabin called an emergency session of the cabinet and sealed off the Gaza Strip and West Bank. [10/20 NYT]

In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Israeli general Danny Rothschild and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) minister Sa'ib 'Urayqat were held to discuss elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No agreements were reached. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 20: Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Rubenstein and al-Tarawinah in Aqaba concluded, to be followed by negotiations by special offices at the Israeli and Jordanian foreign ministries. [10/21 FBIS]

In the West Bank, HAMAS distributed a video on which HAMAS member Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman al-Suway' claimed responsibility for the 19 October Tel Aviv bombing. Israeli forces evicted al-Suway's family from their home in Qalqilya and announced it would be demolished. [10/21 FBIS, NYT]

The Israeli cabinet voted to bring in 15,000 foreign laborers to replace Palestinians, and passed stricter measures toward HAMAS members, including arrests, deportations, demolition of homes, tougher detention and interrogation, expansion of the police force, and preemptive raids. [10/21 NYT, FT, JP]

Oct. 23: Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Egyptian president Mubarak in Cairo to discuss Israeli-Palestinian relations and the Israeli closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Peres then met with Palestinian negotiator Nabil Sha'ath to discuss Israeli policy toward HAMAS, a passage between Gaza and Jericho, and economic issues. Following the meeting, Peres announced that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would resume, and that a committee had been formed to discuss border crossings between Jericho and Gaza. [10/24 FBIS, FT, WP]

In Cairo, PLO representative 'Urayqat and Israeli representative Rothschild negotiated on elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [10/26 FBIS]

The Israeli cabinet increased the number of authorized foreign construction and farm workers from 35,000 to 54,000. [10/24 NYT]

The death toll of the 20 October bombing in Tel Aviv rose to 23. Tests confirmed that the remaining unidentified body was Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman al-Suway', who had claimed responsibility for the bombing in a video distributed 20 October in the West Bank. [10/24 NYT]

In Hebron, a Palestinian was shot to death by Israeli soldiers after he stabbed another Israeli soldier. [10/24 FBIS]

Oct. 24: Israeli prime minister Rabin gave his backing in principle to the creation of a Middle East Development Bank that would make capital investments and long-term loans for regional infrastructure projects, would provide technical assistance for projects, and would raise and lend money on international capital markets. Israeli foreign minister Peres proposed that Israel invest 5 percent of the bank's total capital, approximately $500 million. [10/25 FT]

Oct. 25: US president Bill Clinton arrived in Cairo in preparation for the 26 October signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. In Amman, thousands of alleged Islamists demonstrated against the Israeli-Jordanian treaty. [10/26 NYT]

The Israeli Knesset approved the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty by a vote of 105–3, with six abstentions. [10/26 FBIS]

In Cairo, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met to discuss elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [10/26 NYT]

The Vatican established "official" relations with the PLO, to be maintained through the Vatican's embassy in Tunis. [10/26 NYT]

Oct. 26: At the Arara crossing in Jordan, Israeli prime minister Rabin and Jordanian prime minister al-Majali signed the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. US president Clinton co-signed the treaty, in which both parties agreed on border delineations, settlement of land and water disputes, cooperation in tourism, trade, and other areas, and pledged that neither would allow a third country into its territory to stage military strikes against the other. The ceremony was attended by representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Tunisia. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and Egyptian president Mubarak were not invited. [10/27 NYT]

Prior to the signing, President Clinton met with Chairman Arafat and President Mubarak in Cairo to discuss recent HAMAS killings. After the signing, Clinton addressed a joint session of the Jordanian parliament, pledged US support for the establishment of a Middle East Development Bank, and stated that the US Overseas Development Investment Corporation would provide $75 million to promote new private investment. [10/26 FBIS, 10/27 NYT, FT]

A general strike was called in East Jerusalem by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Fatah, HAMAS, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to protest the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty, which gave Jordan's King Hussein a special role in administering Jerusalem's Islamic sites. Two thousand Palestinians demonstrated in Hebron and Nablus in support of the strike. [10/27 FBIS, NYT, FT]

Direct mail service resumed between Israel and Morocco after a 35-year cessation. [10/27 FBIS]

Oct. 27: In Damascus, US president Clinton met with Syrian president Asad to discuss the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Asad reportedly assured Clinton that he would expedite the negotiations. [10/28 NYT]

Following his meeting with Asad, Clinton addressed the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem and pledged to maintain the level of US economic and military aid to Israel at $3 billion. [10/28 FT, WSJ]

Ten alleged HAMAS members were arrested in Ramallah. [10/28 FBIS]

Oct. 29: The Middle East News Agency (Cairo) reported that Lebanon's president Ilyas al-Hrawi announced he was preparing to establish a committee with Israel to draw up a timetable for Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon. [10/30 NYT, WP, 11/1 FBIS]

Oct. 30: In Casablanca, the Middle East-North Africa Economic Summit meeting began, attended by ten heads of government, 450 government officials, and 1,100 business leaders from 60 countries. Lebanon and Syria declined to attend. US secretary of state Warren Christopher presented a US proposal for economic cooperation among Israel and its neighbors, calling for the cooperation of the United States, Germany, and Japan to aid international movement of goods, to design a regional bank for economic development, to establish a tourism board, and to create a regional chamber of commerce [10/31 FT, NYT, WP]

In Casablanca, Israeli prime minister Rabin and PLO chairman Arafat announced they had agreed on stationing Palestinian border police at the crossings from Gaza to Egypt and from the West Bank to Jordan Rabin announced that Israel would relax the closing of the borders with the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as of 1 November Rabin and Arafat agreed to meet on 7 November to discuss Palestinian elections and the transfer to Palestinian control of health care, taxation, and tourism in the West Bank [10/31 NYT]

Palestinian police released eight PFLP members in the Gaza Strip [11/1 FBIS]

Oct 31: The planned Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on Palestinian self-rule that were to have begun in Cairo were postponed until 6 November because of the Middle East-North African Economic Summit [10/31 FBIS]

Lebanese officials clarified the Lebanese president's offer of a joint panel to discuss Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, saying the proposal was conditional on a prior Israeli commitment to withdraw its troops [11/1 WP]

The PNA took control from Israel of the Rafah border crossing from the Gaza Strip into Egypt [11/1 FBIS]

Jordanian officials announced that the opening of the Israeli-Jordanian crossing at al-Shaykh Husayn, south of the Sea of Galilee, would be delayed until after the ratification of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty by the Jordanian parliament [11/1 FBIS]

Nov 1 The Middle East-North Africa Economic Summit concluded in Cairo with the 14-point Casablanca Declaration, outlining plans to establish regional chambers of commerce, business councils to facilitate intraregional trade, and offices of tourism, to be staffed by Israelis and Arabs Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries refused to support the US proposal for a Middle Eastern Development Bank, stating they were unable to provide the necessary financial support [11/2 FT, NYT]

In Casablanca, Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan said that his country would turn over administration of Islamic sites in the West Bank to Palestinian control after Israel and the PLO reach a final settlement on the status of Jerusalem [11/2 FT]

Israel allowed 8,000 Palestinian construction workers and married men over 40 into Israel to work [11/2 FT]

Nov 2: In Tunis, PLO chairman Arafat met with Tunisian president Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali to discuss Palestinian self-rule [11/3 FBIS]

After traveling from Tunis, Arafat met in Cairo with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss the Middle East-North Africa Economic Summit [11/3 FBIS]

HAMAS members Shaykh Hussayn Abu Kuwayk and Jamil Hamami called for negotiations with Israel, but first demanded the release of HAMAS members held by Israel [11/3 FT]

The World Bank announced that the international aid program for the Palestinians was more than six months behind schedule and that by the end of 1994 donors would have disbursed only $220 million of the total $700 million committed for the year [11/3 FT]

US State Department officials objected to a *New York Times* article that said that Arab nations had blocked plans to create the Middle East Development Bank, saying that Oman and Qatar had agreed to contribute to the bank [11/3 NYT]

Hani 'Abid, the leader of the Islamic Jihad, was killed by a car bomb in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip Islamic Jihad members blamed Israeli intelligence for the attack [11/3 FBIS, FT, NYT]

Nov 3 Seven alleged HAMAS members were placed under a six-month administrative arrest in Ramallah [11/4 FBIS]

A Palestinian journalist released a video tape on which an Israeli soldier killed Palestinian Nidal Tamimi as he lay wounded in Hebron Israeli officials stated that Tamimi had threatened the soldier with a knife [11/4 WP]

At a funeral for Islamic Jihad leader Hani 'Abid in Gaza City, PLO chairman Arafat was denounced as an Israeli collaborator and forcibly removed from the mosque [11/4 NYT]

Palestinians rioted in East Jerusalem and Nablus, where Israeli soldiers opened fire, wounding four protesters [11/4 NYT]

Nov 4 The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Egyptian, Israeli, and Jordanian bankers were discussing a proposal to establish a private Middle Eastern bank Under the proposal, the National Bank of Egypt, the Industrial Development Bank of Jordan, and an Israeli bank would put up a total of $125 million for the bank [11/4 WSJ]

Nov 6: In Damascus, Syrian president Asad met with Lebanese president al-Hrawi to discuss Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese negotiations [11/7 FBIS]

The Israeli government voted to reopen the Cave of the Patriarchs shrine in Hebron with added security measures No guns would be allowed, Muslims and Jews would use separate entrances and prayer halls, gates, metal detectors, and video cameras would be installed, and no more than 300 worshipers from each religion would be allowed in at one time [11/7 NYT]

Qol Yisrael reported that Israeli deputy defense minister Mordechai Gur said that Israel would enter into dialogue with HAMAS if HAMAS would recognize Israel, stop all attacks on Israelis, and take part in Palestinian elections in the self rule area HAMAS's representative in Jordan, Muhammad Nazal, and Islamic Jihad leader 'Abdallah al-Shami responded by rejecting negotiations with Israel [11/7 FBIS]

In response to Gur's statement regarding possible Israeli negotiations with HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, Israeli prime minister Rabin stated that Israel maintained its unequivocal rejection of negotiations with HAMAS and Islamic Jihad [11/7 FBIS]

Nov 7. Israel reopened the Cave of the Patriarchs mosque in Hebron [11/8 NYT]

Nov. 8 At the Erez crossing, Israeli prime minister Rabin and PLO chairman Arafat announced that Israel agreed to accelerate negotiations on expanding Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank, and would simultaneously negotiate Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank. Rabin announced that the transfer of education, health, taxation, welfare, and tourism administrative powers to the Palestinians in the West Bank would be completed by the end of November. Rabin also agreed to authorize 10,000 additional work permits for Palestinians to work in Israel, making the total 23,000. [11/9 NYT, FT]

In the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian died from cholera. Fifteen people had reportedly contracted the disease and fourteen others were hospitalized with symptoms. Israel banned the import of food from the Gaza Strip to Israel and the West Bank. [11/9 NYT]

Israeli troops killed a Palestinian protestor in Ramallah. [11/9 WP]

Nov. 9 In Gaza, European Union (EU) director-general Juan Prat signed an agreement with PLO chairman Arafat for aid and loans worth up to $124 million in 1995, but said that the EU would not fund Palestinian costs after June. [11/10 FT]

Morocco opened a liaison office in Gaza City. [11/10 FBIS]

The Jordanian House of Representatives and Senate approved the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. King Hussein then ratified the treaty. [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 10 Jordan's King Hussein paid his first public visit to Israel as he met with Israeli prime minister Rabin in Bet Gavriel near the Sea of Galilee to exchange ratified copies of the 26 October Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. [11/11 NYT, FT, JP, 11/14 FBIS]

Nov. 11 Palestinian suicide bomber Hisham Isma'il 'Abd al-Rahman Hamad detonated a bomb at an Israeli checkpoint near Netzarim, killing three soldiers and wounding six Israeli soldiers and six Palestinians. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. [11/12 NYT, WP, 11/14 FBIS]

Nov. 12: In Amman, 1,000 students at the University of Jordan demonstrated to protest the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. [11/15 FBIS]

Palestinian police arrested more than 100 alleged Islamic Jihad members in the Gaza Strip in connection with the 11 November suicide bombing in Netzarim. [11/13 NYT, 11/14 FBIS]

Nov. 13 Israel turned over control of tourism and social services in Hebron and Bethlehem in the West Bank to the PNA. [11/15 FBIS, 11/16 NYT]

Nov. 14 In Amman, Israeli-Jordanian negotiations on economic aspects of the Israeli-Jordanian treaty were held, led by Jordanian information minister Jawad al-'Anani and Uri Savir, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Agreements were reached on committees for financing projects in the Jordan Valley. [11/17 FBIS]

The PNA took over the social affairs departments in Tulkarm and Jenin. [11/16 FBIS]

In Gaza City, Palestinian police arrested 24 Islamic Jihad members and banned street protests. Despite the ban, several hundred protesters rallied outside the house of suicide bomber Hamad. [11/15 NYT]

Nov. 16: Palestinian police arrested 30 Islamic Jihad members in the Gaza Strip. [11/17 FBIS]

Nov. 17 Negotiations were held in Amman, led by Israeli director-general of the Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir, and Jordanian representative Hani al-Mulqi, to discuss the monitoring of agreements stipulated in the peace treaty. [11/21 FBIS]

Israeli prime minister Rabin authorized entry visas for 4,500 Palestinian workers, divided equally between the Gaza Strip and West Bank. [11/18 FBIS]

An 82-year-old unidentified Israeli woman was found murdered in Kefar Sava in the Gaza Strip with a note claiming HAMAS responsibility for the murder. [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 18 In Gaza City, Palestinian police opened fire on approximately 2,000 alleged HAMAS and Islamic Jihad members, killing thirteen protestors and wounding between 100 and 200 others. Three hundred protesters were arrested. Police witnesses said the protestors fired first, and the police had returned fire in self defense, but Palestinian witnesses said that Palestinian police had opened fire after demonstrators began throwing stones. The PNA imposed a curfew on Gaza City following the clashes. Rioting also broke out in Netzarim and Rafah. [11/19 NYT, WP, 11/21 FBIS]

Nov. 19: The PNA arranged a temporary truce between Palestinian police and HAMAS forces in Gaza and agreed to a formal investigation into the 18 November riots by a commission that would include HAMAS and Islamic Jihad members. The final death toll for the riots was put at thirteen Palestinians killed, 129 people were wounded. [11/20 NYT, WP]

Two Palestinians were shot to death and nine wounded by Israeli soldiers in Tulkarm, and a 17-year-old Palestinian was killed by Israeli soldiers near Netzarim. An Israeli soldier was killed in a drive-by shooting in Netzarim. HAMAS claimed responsibility. [11/20 NYT, WP, 11/22 FBIS]

Riots broke out in Hebron during a demonstration by HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Israeli forces placed a curfew on the city. [11/22 FBIS]

Nov. 20. Israeli prime minister Rabin ordered additional troops to protect Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and to prevent riots in the West Bank. [11/21 WSJ]

Palestinian police released 31 of 300 HAMAS and Islamic Jihad members who had been arrested on 18 November in the Gaza Strip. [11/21 WP, 11/22 FBIS]

Nov. 21: In Washington, US president Clinton met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss Israeli-Syrian relations, Israeli requests for military and technical aid, and the recent clashes in the Gaza Strip. Clinton pledged in principle to continue the joint development of Israel's Arrow antimissile weapon, agreed to approve export licenses for the Israeli purchase of two supercomputers, and to ask Congress to continue Israel's $3 billion per year in foreign aid. Clinton said he would lobby for US congressional support to have US peacekeeping troops sent to the Golan Heights if necessary following an Israeli-Syrian agreement. [11/22 NYT, WP]

Negotiators for HAMAS and the PNA reached an agreement to end violence in the Gaza Strip and to establish a committee to investigate the 18 November clash. [11/22 FBIS]

Terje Larson, United Nations undersecretary-general for the Palestinian territories, said that the international aid program for the Palestinian self-rule areas had been a failure and that further violence was imminent unless donors delivered the promised aid [11/22 FT]

In Qalqilya in the West Bank, the Israeli army demolished the home of the family of Hasan al-Suway', the 19 October suicide bomber [11/22 NYT]

Ten thousand Fatah supporters demonstrated in support of PLO chairman Arafat [11/22 NYT]

Two more Palestinians died of wounds sustained in the 18 November clashes in Gaza City [11/22 FBIS, WP]

Nov 23 Approximately 5,000 Palestinians rallied in Jericho to show support for PLO chairman Arafat Israeli officials, in a change of policy, allowed several hundred supporters of Arafat unrestricted access through army checkpoints into Jericho [11/24 NYT]

In Gaza City, gunmen wounded a Palestinian policeman [11/24 WP]

Nov 24 In Oviedo, Spain, PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli prime minister Rabin received the Prince of Asturias prize for international cooperation toward peace Arafat and Rabin met after the ceremony to discuss Palestinian elections in the self-rule areas [11/25 FBIS]

An Israeli military court sentenced HAMAS member Sa'id Badarneh to death for allegedly plotting the 13 April 1994 bombing in Hadera, Israel Israel had previously issued the death penalty only in cases involving Nazi war criminals [11/25 JP, NYT]

Nov 25· Israeli soldiers sealed the West Bank houses of Ras al-'Amud, 'Abd al-Karim Badr, and Jihad Yaghmur, who kidnapped and murdered Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman in October 1994 [11/30 FBIS]

Nov. 26 According to the Voice of Palestine (Jericho), members of the DFLP, Fatah, the PFLP, the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), and the Palestinian Peoples Party signed an agreement to stop inter-factional violence in the Gaza Strip [11/29 FBIS]

In Gaza City, between 20,000 and 70,000 HAMAS supporters held a rally [11/27 NYT, 11/28 FBIS]

Nov 27 Israel and Jordan formally established diplomatic relations Ambassadors would be exchanged on 10 December [11/28 NYT]

The head rabbi of the Otniel settlement in the West Bank was shot to death near Hebron [11/28 FT, NYT]

Nov. 28. In Brussels, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss elections in the Palestinian self-rule area [11/29 NYT]

The EU granted $12 million to the Palestinian Housing Council to build 300 units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip [11/29 FBIS]

Israel turned over $8 5 million in taxes on imports to the autonomous areas from Israel [11/29 FBIS]

Nov. 29 In Brussels, PLO chairman Arafat and World Bank officials signed agreements for grants and loans totaling $58 million, to be used for salaries for Palestinian police and to build roads, sewers, and other infrastructure The loans would be paid out to the PNA by the end of March 1995 [11/30 NYT]

Israeli foreign minister Peres met with the three rotating leaders of the EU and the president of the EU commission, Jacques Delors The EU pledged to increase its contribution to the PNA by $25 million per year, bringing its total to $800 million over a four-year period [11/30 FBIS]

Israeli prime minister Rabin toured the Hebron site of the murder of the rabbi of the Otniel settlement The army released a report saying they had arrested 40 HAMAS members and thwarted planned suicide attacks in Peta Tikva and another West Bank settlement [11/30 WP]

Palestinian police chief Ghazi Jabali ordered the arrest of newspaper distributors in the Gaza Strip and seized several papers, including *al-Manar*, *al-Nahar*, *al-Quds*, and the *Jerusalem Post*, allegedly because they had exaggerated the number of participants in a 26 November HAMAS rally [11/29 FBIS, 11/30 WP, 12/1 NYT]

Nov. 30 In Brussels, a group of 22 donor nations and three international agencies completed two days of negotiations with PLO chairman Arafat with an agreement to provide more than $200 million in grants to the Gaza Strip Grants of $125 million were committed to enable the PNA to pay public workers through March, create several thousand construction jobs, and begin projects to improve roads, sewer, and electrical systems The donors also promised to sign $23 million more in grants before the end of 1994 [12/1 NYT, 12/2 FBIS]

In Brussels, PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli foreign minister Peres completed talks on elections in the self-rule area and on the size of a Palestinian interim self-government council The next round of talks was scheduled for 5 December in Cairo [11/30 FBIS]

An Israeli military court in Nablus sentenced alleged Fatah member Jamal al-Badr to nine life sentences in prison on charges of murdering nine Palestinians in Tulkarm [12/1 FBIS]

A HAMAS member killed a 19-year-old Israeli soldier with an axe in Afula, Israel One hundred and fifty Israeli troops were sent to Afula as Israelis rioted to protest the murder [12/1 NYT, WP]

Dec 1 In Damascus, Egyptian president Mubarak met with Syrian president Asad to discuss bilateral relations and Israeli-Syrian negotiations [12/2 FBIS]

In Ramallah and Nablus, the head of the Israeli civil administration in the West Bank, Brigadier General Gadi Zohar, signed agreements to transfer taxation and health services to Palestinian control [12/2 FBIS, NYT]

Norway agreed to donate $22 million to the PNA, $20 million of which would be allocated for the establishment of an electric company [12/12 FBIS]

Dec. 3 The newspapers *al-Nahar*, *al-Quds*, and the *Jerusalem Post* were allowed to resume distribution in the Gaza Strip following a five-day ban [12/4 NYT]

Dec. 4 Israeli army officials reported that Israeli negotiator Rothschild resigned and would not continue Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [12/5 FBIS]

Dec 5. In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations [12/6 FBIS]

Dec. 6: In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were held—led by Israeli Brigadier General Gadi Zohar and PNA member Nabil Sha'ath—to discuss Palestinian elections and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank [12/7 FBIS, NYT]

In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations Following the meeting, Christopher flew to Jerusalem, where he met with Israeli foreign minister Peres and Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss security arrangements that would follow an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights Also in Jerusalem, US joint chief of staff John Shalikashvili met with unidentified Israeli military officers to discuss the deployment of US troops on the Golan Heights following an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty [12/7 FT, NYT, WP]

Israeli Shin Bet special security forces arrested twenty HAMAS members in the northern West Bank [12/7 FBIS]

Dec 7: Israeli-Jordanian negotiations led by Jordanian representative al-Mulqi and Israeli representative Rubenstein were held in Amman to discuss the implementation of the Israeli-Jordanian agreement [12/8 FBIS]

Israeli foreign minister Peres and PLO chairman Arafat met at the Erez checkpoint to discuss elections in the Palestinian self-rule area and withdrawal of Israeli troops [12/8 FBIS]

In Gaza City, US secretary of state Christopher met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss violence by HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad Arafat agreed to increase security for Israelis in the self-rule area [12/8 NYT]

Dec. 8: After three special cabinet meetings regarding violence against Israelis in the West Bank, Israeli prime minister Rabin announced that he would request that Israeli forces be allowed to remain in some West Bank villages In return for allowing a larger Palestinian council to administer the West Bank during the interim period of self-rule, those forces would protect resident Israelis [12/9 NYT, WP]

The weekly Arabic newspaper *al-Watan*, edited by HAMAS member 'Imad al-Faluji, published its first edition [12/9 FBIS]

Dec. 9. Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Shar' announced that Israeli-Syrian negotiations would resume in Washington [12/10 NYT, FBIS]

Dec 10: In Oslo, PLO chairman Arafat, Israeli foreign minister Peres, and Israeli prime minister Rabin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize [12/11 NYT]

Dec. 11 In Oslo, PLO chairman Arafat, Israeli foreign minister Peres, and Israeli prime minister Rabin met to discuss Palestinian elections They agreed to intensify talks on the redeployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank [12/12 FBIS, FT]

Israel and Jordan opened temporary embassies in Amman and Tel Aviv, respectively Marwan Mu'ashir was appointed to become the Jordanian ambassador in January, while the Israeli ambassador was not yet appointed [12/12 NYT]

The PNA assumed control of the health departments for Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Tulkarm [12/12 FBIS]

Dec. 13: Israeli-Jordanian committees on transport and communications, environment, crime and drug trafficking, and security and borders met in Amman [12/14 FBIS]

Dec 14 In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led by Israeli Savir and Palestinian Sha'ath were held to discuss redeployment of Israeli troops and elections in the West Bank [12/15 FBIS]

An Israeli reserve soldier was attacked in his car by Palestinians in Ramallah and was rescued by unidentified border police Israeli army officials stated that he would face a court martial for not opening fire on his attackers [12/17 NYT]

Hikmat al-Masri, 88, a co-founder of the PLO, died in Nablus [12/15 FT]

Dec. 15: Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Cairo ended with plans to hold further negotiations in Cairo, led by PNA member Sha'ath and Israeli foreign minister Peres, after 19 December [12/16 FBIS]

Dec 16. In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [12/16 FBIS]

In Gaza City, HAMAS members held a rally celebrating HAMAS's seventh anniversary [12/17 NYT, 12/19 FBIS]

An Israeli soldier was wounded by gunmen while driving in Ramallah HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack [12/17 NYT]

Dec. 18 At the Sufa checkpoint in the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian policeman fired on Israeli soldiers, wounding one The joint Israeli-Palestinian security committee, led by Israeli Yom-Tor Sami and Palestinian Ziyad al-Atrash, held an emergency meeting to discuss the incident [12/20 FBIS]

Dec. 19 In Cairo, Egypt's President Mubarak and Israel's President Ezer Weizman held private talks [12/20 FBIS]

In Washington, Israeli ambassador Itamar Rabinovich and Syrian ambassador Walid al-Mu'allim met to discuss bilateral relations and Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights [12/20 FBIS]

The Israeli army announced it would not court martial the Israeli soldier who did not fire back in self-defense when attacked on 14 December attack in the West Bank [12/20 NYT]

Dec. 21· In Gaza City, PLO chairman Arafat met with Israeli foreign minister Peres to discuss Palestinian elections and Israeli withdrawal from the self-rule areas [12/22 FBIS]

A Palestinian was found murdered in Hebron, prompting clashes between Palestinians and Israeli troops [12/22 FBIS]

A Palestinian was shot to death near Tulkarm, allegedly for "collaborating" with Israel [12/22 FBIS]

Dec 22 In Washington, Israeli chief of staff Ehud Baraq, Israeli ambassador Itamar Rabinovich, Prime Minister Rabin's military advisor Danny Yatom, an unidentified Syrian general, and Dennis Ross, the US coordinator for the Middle East negotiations, met to discuss security arrangements for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights [12/23 FBIS, FT]

HAMAS member Ibrahim Yari was shot to death in the 'Aqabat refugee camp in Jericho Another Palestinian was killed while constructing a bomb [12/22 FBIS]

Two Palestinians were killed and two wounded in separate incidents in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank [12/23 FT]

Dec. 24 Palestinian Ayman Kamil Radi set off explosives at a bus station in Jerusalem, killing himself and wounding thirteen others Radi was a former Palestinian policeman in the Gaza Strip who had taken part in the 18 November clashes between Palestinians and police in Gaza City and had joined HAMAS after the clash [12/25 WP, 12/27 FBIS, NYT]

Dec. 26 In Muscat, Israeli prime minister Rabin met with Oman's Sultan Qabus, in the first visit by an Israeli leader to a Persian Gulf state, to discuss bilateral relations [12/27 FBIS, WP]

The Israeli Knesset passed by a vote of 56 to 6 a bill that barred the PNA from operating in Israel and authorized the Israeli government to ban "political or governmental" activities by the PLO in Israel [12/27 NYT]

Dec 27: Anti-settlement Israelis and Palestinian residents of the al-Khader village demonstrated in Efrat, in the West Bank, to protest the expansion of the Israeli settlement at Efrat Thirty-five to fifty Palestinians were arrested and four to seven were injured in the clashes PLO chairman Arafat demanded that Israel stop the expansion of the settlement [12/28 FT, NYT, WP]

Dec. 28 In Alexandria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, Egypt's president Mubarak, and Syria's president Asad met to discuss Arab-Israeli relations President Asad called the meeting, allegedly over concerns that Israel was gaining wider recognition in the region without withdrawing from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon [12/29 FBIS, FT, 12/30 FT]

Dec. 29. Egypt's president Mubarak, Syria's president Asad, and Saudi Arabia's King Fahd completed a two-day summit in Alexandria A statement was later released calling for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the Israeli self-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon, Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, and the removal from the region of all weapons of mass destruction [12/30 FBIS, FT]

Israeli soldiers shot and killed an Israeli bedouin in Hebron after he failed to stop at a roadblock [12/30 JP]

Dec 30· Israeli troops clashed with Palestinians protesting the new construction at the Efrat settlement Seventeen people were wounded PLO chairman Arafat stated that the settlement violated the September 1993 Declaration of Principles [12/31 NYT, WP]

Dec. 31 The *New York Times* reported that Israel and Syria had held private, high-level peace negotiations in Washington since June 1994 The meetings were led by Israeli ambassador Rabinovich and Syrian ambassador Walid al-Mu'allim with US negotiators Ross and Martin Indyk [12/31 NYT]

In Gaza City, PLO chairman Arafat led a rally attended by 10,000 people to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Fatah movement One thousand people celebrated the anniversary in Ramallah [1/1 WP]

1995

Jan 2. The Israeli government ordered the halt of construction at the Efrat settlement, but agreed to let the Israeli settlers build a 500-unit apartment complex nearby [1/3 NYT]

Israeli soldiers from the Erez crossing shot and killed three Palestinian police after crossing into the Gaza Strip to look for gunmen who had fired on them [1/3 FBIS, NYT, WP]

Two HAMAS members were killed by Israeli soldiers in Bayt Sahur in the West Bank [1/3 FBIS, NYT, WP]

Jan 3 In Cairo, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian negotiations [1/4 FBIS]

Following his meeting with Mubarak, Peres, Egyptian foreign minister 'Amr Musa, and PNA member Sha'ath met to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [1/4 FBIS]

Nassir Yusif, the Palestinian police commander in Gaza, said that Palestinian police had arrested ten armed Israeli soldiers in civilian clothes in a van near Khan Yunis, a violation of Israeli-Palestinian agreements Israel denied the incident [1/4 NYT]

An Israeli military court convicted Muhammad Salah, a US citizen of Palestinian origin, of channeling funds to HAMAS Salah was sentenced to five years in prison [1/4 WP]

Jan 4 Israeli soldiers killed four alleged PFLP members who fired on them in Bayt Liqya in the West Bank [1/5 FBIS, NYT]

Israeli soldiers and Palestinian police exchanged fire in the Gaza Strip, wounding two Palestinian civilians and two policemen [1/5 FT, WP]

Jan. 5 Gunmen fired on an Israeli car in Ramallah, killing one person and wounding another The PFLP claimed responsibility [1/6 FBIS, 1/9 FBIS]

An Israeli military court sentenced HAMAS member Iman Abu Khalil to three life sentences for membership in HAMAS and the 1994 kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers Arye Frankenthal and Shahar Simani [1/6 JP]

Jan 8· In Jerusalem, US secretary of defense William Perry met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, specifically Iran's potential nuclear capabilities and Israel's agreement to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [1/10 NYT]

Jan. 9: Israeli foreign minister Peres and PLO chairman Arafat met at the Erez checkpoint to discuss Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Palestinian elections in the self-rule areas Peres agreed to allow Israeli recognition of Palestinian passports, Palestinian vehicles to use Israeli roads, Palestinian men over fifty and students to cross between Gaza and Jericho, and cooperation in the construction of an industrial park in the West Bank Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, led by Israeli Gadi Zohar and Palestinian Sa'ib 'Urayqat, were held in Cairo [1/10 FBIS, NYT, FT]

In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. [1/10 FBIS]

Jan. 11: Israeli soldiers fired stun grenades at 200 Palestinian demonstrators who were demanding a freeze on building at the Israeli Alei Zahar settlement. [1/12 FT]

Jan. 12: In Amman, Israeli prime minister Rabin met with Jordan's King Hussein to discuss implementation of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. [1/13 FBIS, JP]

In Hebron, two Israelis were stabbed by unidentified assailants. [1/13 JP]

Jan. 15. Palestinian demonstrators in the West Bank protested the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. [1/16 NYT]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

1994

Oct. 19: In Istanbul, the Second Turkic Republics Summit was held, attended by Azerbaijan's President Haydar Aliyev, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev, Turkey's President Suleyman Demirel, Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov, and Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov. The Summit participants signed the "Istanbul Declaration" for cultural and economic integration of Turkic states. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 20: United Nations-sponsored Tajik peace talks were held in Islamabad, and attended by UN envoy Romero Piriz Ballon, Tajik government representative Abdulmajid Dostiyev, and Tajik opposition representative Kurban Turajanzade. A cease-fire between Tajikistan's government and opposition forces, supervised by eighteen international inspectors, went into effect. [10/20 FBIS, 10/21 FBIS]

On the first day of the cease-fire, Tajikistan's Deputy Prime Minister Munavarsho Nazriev and one bodyguard were killed by a land mine en route from Dushanbe to the Garm region. Two aides were injured. [10/21 FT]

Oct. 23: Kyrgyzstan held a referendum to amend its constitution and prepare for parliamentary elections in December. [10/24 FT]

The Second Turkic Republics Summit concluded in Istanbul. [10/24 FBIS]

Oct. 26: Azerbaijan's President Aliyev tripled oil and natural gas prices, doubled the minimum wage, and announced plans to raise the price of bread, transit fares, and electricity. [10/27 WSJ]

Oct. 29: Tajikistan's opposition forces attacked Russian guards along the border with Afghanistan. Twenty Tajik attackers were killed. [10/30 WP]

Oct. 30: In Islamabad, negotiations between the Tajikistan government and the opposition concluded without reaching agreements. [11/8 FBIS]

Nov. 3: In Jerusalem, Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed agreements on communication and drug trafficking. [11/4 FBIS, NYT]

Nov. 6: Tajikistan held its first presidential elections, with a voter turnout of 90 percent. Acting President Imamali Rakhmonov won 60 percent of the popular vote, defeating former Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdulajanov. [11/7 WP]

Nov. 13: In Baku, Azerbaijan, Azeri officials agreed to give Iran a 5 percent stake in an international consortium for developing Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea in exchange for financial and technical assistance. [11/14 FT]

Nov. 14: In Bern, Switzerland, Swiss president Otto Stich and Kyrgyzstan's President Akayev signed an agreement in which Switzerland would provide £1.95 million of technical aid per year for agriculture, forestry, energy, and health care projects. [11/15 FT]

Nov. 15: The Azeri parliament ratified the $7.4 billion contract signed on 20 September with a British Petroleum-led consortium of Western companies. [11/16 FT]

Dec. 6: The Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreed in principle to send a 3,000-member peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakh to be composed of 30 percent Turkish and 30 percent Russian troops. [12/7 FT]

The Asian Development Bank approved two loans totaling $60 million to Kazakhstan to support government stabilization and structural reform programs. [12/7 FT]

Dec. 21: Turkmenistan devalued its currency, the monat, from 10 to 230 monats to the dollar. [12/22 FT]

Dec. 25: The first post-Soviet elections were held in Uzbekistan. The Democratic Party, consisting of former Communist Party members, won 179 of the 250 seats. [1/5 WP, 1/6 NYT]

1995

Jan. 3: Gunmen killed six Russian soldiers at the Tajikistan border before fleeing into Afghanistan. [1/4 FT]

Jan. 14: More than 100,000 coalminers went on strike in northern Kazakhstan, demanding $50 million in salary they claimed was owed to them. [1/15 FT]

Petroleum Affairs

1994

Nov. 21: Oil ministers from the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met in Bali to negotiate a crude oil production cap. Saudi Arabia proposed a freeze on the cap of 24.5 million barrels per day, in place since September 1993, until November 1995. [11/22 NYT]

Nov. 24. The state-owned Egypt Gas company formed a $150 million joint venture with Amoco and the Italian oil company ENI to build a series of gas pipes in Egypt in order to export oil to Israel. [11/25 FT]

Dec. 22: OPEC representatives announced they would maintain the 24.5 million barrels per day production cap until the end of 1995. [11/22 NYT]

Regional Affairs

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lebanon

1994

Oct. 17: In Ankara, Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev met with Turkish president Suleyman Demirel to discuss bilateral relations. [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 19: Israel and the United States urged Japan to stop funding a $1 billion hydroelectric dam in Iran because of Iran's alleged terrorist links. [10/19 FT]

US air force captain Eric Wickson, involved in the 14 April downing of two US helicopters over northern Iraq, testified that the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) crew members had not been warned that the two US helicopters were in the region. Wickson, who was testifying under immunity and had not been charged in connection with the case, spoke at a hearing for three AWACS crew members, Lawrence Tracey, Jim Wang, and Ricky Wilson, charged with dereliction of duty. The trial of Randy May, the US Air Force pilot charged in the incident, was to be held in November in Germany. [10/20 WP]

Oct. 21: In Nicosia, Lebanese foreign minister Faris Buwayz met with Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Klirıdhis and signed a protocol for political and economic cooperation. [10/25 FBIS]

Oct. 25: The multilateral environment working team, including delegates from 45 states and international organizations, met in Manama, Bahrain. [10/26 FBIS]

Oct. 26: The multilateral environment negotiations in Manama concluded with agreements on joint projects including anti-pollution centers in Aqaba, Eilat and Nuwaybi, and anti-pollution projects for Egypt and Israel. [10/27 FBIS]

In Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, Turkish president Demirel and Iranian president 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani discussed bilateral relations, following celebrations of Turkmenistan's independence. [10/28 FBIS]

Oct. 27: Kuwait agreed to allow the United States to station a squadron of 24 warplanes in Kuwait, and Pentagon officials stated that they would place a brigade-strength cache of armor in Qatar. [10/28 NYT, WSJ]

Oct. 28: US president Bill Clinton met with US troops stationed in Kuwait and indicated that the troops would return to the United States by Christmas. He then flew to the northern Saudi military city of Hafr al-Batin, where he met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to discuss costs of the US military buildup in the Persian Gulf and bilateral economic relations. [10/29 NYT, 10/31 FBIS]

Nov. 1: In Tripoli, Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller met with Libyan president Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi to discuss bilateral relations. [11/2 FBIS]

British and US warplanes staged war exercises over the Kuwaiti desert. [11/2 FT]

Nov. 2: In Cairo, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak met with United Arab Emirates (UAE) president Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan to discuss bilateral relations. [11/3 FBIS]

In Paris, three Iranians went on trial for the 6 August 1991 assassination of former Iranian prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in Paris. Six other Iranians were to be tried *in absentia*. The senior investigating judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, claimed that the killing was carried out on Iranian government orders. [11/1 FT, 11/3 NYT]

Nov. 4: In Rabat, UAE president al-Nuhayyan met with Moroccan King Hassan II to discuss bilateral relations. [11/7 FBIS]

Nov. 5: In Cairo, Turkish prime minister Çiller met with Egyptian prime minister Rafiq Sidqi to discuss bilateral relations. [11/7 FBIS]

Çiller met with Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat in Gaza City, and reportedly promised Turkish aid to build housing projects, sewage systems, a Gaza seaport and airport, and to pave roads. Çiller also announced that a free trade agreement between Israel and Turkey would be signed at the end of 1994. [11/6 WP, 11/7 FT]

Nov. 6: US president Clinton approved a Pentagon plan to withdraw 7,800 US ground forces from Kuwait by 22 December. The Navy and Marine units as well as two brigades worth of equipment would remain for an unspecified period. [11/7 WP]

Nov. 7: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Saudi Arabia had paid $330 million of the $600 million cost of the October 1994 US deployment in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait was reportedly paying 40 percent of the cost. [11/7 WSJ]

At Sembach Air Base in Germany, US Air Force pilot Randy May, who accidentally shot down two Army helicopters over northern Iraq on 14 April, went on trial on charges of negligent homicide, facing dismissal and up to 26 years in jail. [11/8 WP]

Nov. 9: The Arms Control and Regional Security Group held a three-day meeting at the Dead Sea Hotel in Amman, sponsored by the United States and Russia and attended by 22 Arab countries, to discuss economic cooperation, water resources, the environment, arms control, and refugees. [11/10 FBIS, 11/14 FBIS]

Nov. 15: In Islamabad, Palestinian National Authority (PNA) foreign minister Faruq Qaddumi met with Pakistan's prime minister Benazir Bhutto and signed an agreement for cooperation in economic, trade, scientific, and cultural areas. [11/17 FBIS]

Nov. 16: An Air Force investigator recommended the court-martial of Captain Jim Wang, the senior director of the mission crew on the AWACS aircraft that shot down two US helicopters over Iraq on 14 April. The investigator recommended that AWACS officer Joseph Haleli receive administrative punishment but that the case against three other AWACS officers be dismissed. The final decision would be made by Lieutenant General Stephen Crocker, Commander of the 8th Air Force. [11/17 WP]

Nov. 20: In Riyadh, Russian prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to discuss bilateral relations. A treaty was signed for cooperation in the areas of trade, economics, technology, and sports. [11/21 FT]

In Aden, Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati met with Yemen's President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to discuss bilateral relations. [11/21 FBIS]

Nov 21 In Kuwait City, Kuwaiti officials and Russian prime minister Chernomyrdin signed an agreement to increase bilateral investment and trade to $20 million. [11/22 FT]

In London, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak met with British prime minister John Major to discuss bilateral relations and aid for the PNA. [11/22 FBIS]

Nov 22: US officials stated that 600 kilograms of enriched uranium, enough to make 25 nuclear weapons, had been discovered in a poorly protected site in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. They stated that they had reached an agreement with Kazakh officials to send the material to a US nuclear facility. [11/23 NYT]

Alcatel Kabel Norge, a Norwegian subsidiary of Alcatel Alsthom, signed a $70 million contract with the power ministries of Egypt and Jordan to link their electric grids by 1997, in the first phase of a plan to link the power grids of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and possibly Israel. [11/23 FT]

Nov. 23 US Army secretary Togo West said that the majority of US troops in Kuwait would return to the United States by the end of the year and "a few hundred" of the 20,000 stationed at the height of the build-up would remain. [11/24 NYT]

The United States completed the transfer of 600 kilograms of uranium from Kazakhstan to a reprocessing plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for a US compensation to Kazakhstan of at least $10 million. [11/24 FT, NYT, 11/25 NYT]

Nov 28. In Rabat, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali met with UAE president al-Nuhayyan to discuss international issues including Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. [11/29 FBIS]

The European Union (EU) unanimously agreed to lift its embargo against Syria. The embargo was imposed in 1986 following allegations that Syria was involved in a thwarted attempt to smuggle explosives onto an Israeli airliner in London. Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres condemned the lifting of the embargo. [11/29 NYT]

Dec 1 Egyptian and Iranian representatives reached an agreement in which Egypt's debts to Iran would be settled in return for $149 million worth of Egyptian equipment for sugar processing mills in Iran's Khuyestan Province. [12/2 FBIS]

Dec 4: France arrested Libyan intelligence agent 'Ali 'Umar Mansur in connection with the investigation into the 1989 bombing of UTA flight 772, which exploded over Niger, killing 171 people. [12/5 NYT]

Dec. 5: In Cairo, speaking to an Arab League ministerial meeting on the environment, Ciao Koch-Weser, regional vice president of the World Bank, reported that 25 percent of the Arab world was living without access to safe water supplies and 20 percent was living in cities with unacceptable levels of air pollution. Koch-Weser said that the World Bank was willing to double lending for environmental projects in the region to $1 billion per year. [12/6 FT]

France released Libyan intelligence agent 'Ali 'Umar Mansur after questioning him regarding the 1989 bombing of UTA flight 772 over Niger. [12/6 NYT]

Dec 6 Turkish prime minister Çiller met with Azerbaijan's President Haydar Aliyev at the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Budapest to discuss the Azeri-Armenian conflict. [12/7 FBIS]

Iranians 'Ali Vakili Rad and Souroush Katibeh were convicted in Paris by a special terrorism court for the 1991 murder of former Iranian prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in France. Massoud Hendi was convicted of helping the two enter France, and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Zayn al-'Abidin Sarhadi, a great-nephew of Iran's president Rafsanjani, was acquitted of aiding Rad and Katibeh to escape to Switzerland. [12/7 FT, NYT]

Dec 7 The Yemeni Republic Radio (Sana'a) reported that Saudi Arabia had built monitoring posts and roads in Munabbih, Shada, and Futah in the Sadah governorate, and in Dahyah and 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah in the al-Mahrah governorate in Yemen. Saudi sources stated they were building on their own territory. [12/8 FBIS]

Dec. 8 Yemen's Vice President 'Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi stated that Yemeni forces had recaptured positions in the Sadah governorate on which Saudi Arabia was building. [12/9 FBIS]

Dec. 11 Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin arrived in Tokyo for a 3-day visit to Japan, the first official visit to Japan by an Israeli leader. [12/15 FT]

In Cairo, Yemen's President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations. [12/12 FBIS]

Dec 12: In Islamabad, Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto and Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev signed agreements for bilateral cooperation in economic, commercial, and political spheres. [12/13 FBIS]

In Algiers, Egyptian president Mubarak met with Algerian president Liamine Zeroual to discuss bilateral relations. [12/13 FBIS]

Dec 13 In Casablanca, the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) held a summit on Islamic issues. [12/14 NYT]

Dec 14. In Tokyo, Israeli prime minister Rabin met with Japanese finance minister Masayoshi Takemura to request a Japanese contribution of $300–400 million in capital for the planned Middle East Development Bank. [12/15 FT]

The ICO at its summit in Casablanca agreed to adopt a "code of conduct" that would prohibit member states from hosting, training, or arming violent groups. King Hussein of Jordan withdrew from the conference after leaders would not endorse his stewardship of the Muslim shrines in Jerusalem. [12/15 WSJ]

Dec 15: The ICO summit in Casablanca concluded with the release of a 182-article communiqué on issues ranging from terrorism to technology and culture. [12/16 NYT]

The seventh round of the Middle East multilateral refugees working group held a 3-day summit, attended by 200 delegates representing 40 countries [12/19 FBIS]

Dec 19 The fifteenth summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) opened in Manama, Bahrain [12/20 FBIS]

US Air Force commander Lieutenant General Stephen Crocker decided that charges would be dropped against four US Air Force officers in connection with the 14 April downing of two US helicopters over Iraq, and Pentagon officials announced that charges would be dropped against Lieutenant Colonel Randy May, the pilot of the F-15 fighter involved in the incident Air Force Captain Jim Wang faced possible judicial punishment for procedural breakdowns [12/20 WP]

Dec. 20 In Tunis, Israel and twelve Arab countries reached an agreement to give other states advance notification of military exercises involving more than 4,000 troops or 100 tanks, and to exchange unspecified military information [12/21 WP]

In Damascus, Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss regional and bilateral issues [12/22 FT]

Dec 23: The *New York Times* reported that Sudan's government was helping to arm Algerian Islamists by allowing Iran to use Sudanese territory as a transit point for weapons smuggled into Algeria The Algerian Islamists were reportedly receiving training in Lebanon and Sudan [12/24 NYT]

Dec 25. US Naval forces in the Persian Gulf boarded the Honduran-flagged Ajmir, which had been detained for violating the Iraqi embargo, as it attempted to escape US guards [12/26 NYT]

Dec. 29 Danut Yovanov, a Romanian member of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), was wounded by gunfire at the Iraq-Kuwait border The source of the gunfire was under investigation [12/30 FBIS, NYT]

1995

Jan. 4 The US State Department announced that it was investigating reports that Israel had provided China with US aviation technology to develop a fighter jet [1/5 WP]

Jan. 7: US secretary of defense William Perry met with Egyptian president Mubarak in Cairo to discuss bilateral military relations [1/9 FBIS]

Jan 9 Twelve defendants accused of plotting "a war of urban terrorism" against the United States went on trial in New York City The twelve men, led by Egyptian Sheikh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, were accused of plotting to blow up the Lincoln and Holland tunnels and other New York landmarks [1/10 NYT]

Jan 10 In Islamabad, US secretary of defense Perry met with Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto to discuss bilateral issues Bhutto called for the United States to deliver the 71 fighter planes or return the $650 million that Pakistan had paid for them US officials had blocked their delivery due to accusations that Pakistan had acquired nuclear capabilities, resulting in US military and economic sanctions under the Pressler Amendment Perry and Bhutto agreed to resume military discussions that had been suspended since 1990, and announced plans for defense and security cooperation [1/11 FT, NYT, WP]

Jan. 11: In Washington, officials from 39 countries and financial institutions met to discuss the establishment of the Middle East Development Bank Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the PLO jointly proposed its establishment [1/12 NYT]

Jan 12: In Islamabad, UAE president al-Nuhayyan met with Pakistan's President Faruq Ahmad Khan Leghari to discuss bilateral relations [1/13 FBIS]

Jan 14 Saudi Arabian forces were reportedly assembled at the Saudi-Yemen border following border skirmishes [1/17 FBIS]

Jan. 15. Yemen's President Salih met in Cairo with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss the Saudi-Yemeni border disputes [1/17 FBIS]

Western Sahara

1994

Nov 26: In Smara, United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali met with Western Saharan president Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz to discuss Moroccan-Saharan relations [11/29 FBIS]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia

1994

Oct. 16 In Jalalabad, President Borhanoddin Rabbani reportedly met with members of opposition groups including Harakat-e Enqelab-e-Islami leader Mawlawi Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi, the Hezb-e-Islami leader Mawlawi Yunes Khales, and the Ettehad-e-Islami leader 'Abdorrasul Sayyaf [10/17 FBIS]

Oct. 17: President Rabbani's forces bombed positions of Prime Minister Gulboddin Hekmatyar in east Kabul, killing two people and injuring thirty-one Hekmatyar's retaliatory attacks on Kabul killed four people and wounded seventeen [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 21 President Rabbani's forces gained control of Kabul University following fighting that killed 50 people and wounded 257 [10/24 FBIS]

Fifteen civilians were killed and ninety-seven wounded in rocket attacks on south Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar [10/24 FBIS]

Oct 24: According to the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar agreed to an Iranian-brokered 24-hour cease-fire, effective 4 p m on 25 October [10/25 FBIS]

Oct. 30 Clashes in Kabul resumed after a five-day cease-fire Attacks by Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces killed twelve people and wounded twenty-seven [11/1 FBIS]

Oct 31: United Nations special envoy to Afghanistan, Mahmud al-Mestiri, met with Prime Minister Hekmatyar to discuss a cease-fire Mestiri proposed a transitional government to be in power for six to twelve months, the members of which would not be able to run in the following election. A commission would convene the Grand Assembly, which would appoint a transitional government for three years [11/2 FBIS]

Forces of President Rabbani repulsed an offensive on Kabul staged by Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces. Thirty-five of Hekmatyar's forces were reportedly killed in the battle [11/2 FBIS]

Nov 5 Twenty-three people were killed and 144 wounded in Kabul in clashes between forces of President Rabbani and those of Prime Minister Hekmatyar [11/7 FBIS]

Nov. 7 Government representatives reportedly approved the 31 October UN cease-fire proposal with several amendments [11/8 FBIS]

Nov. 9· Forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar bombed Kabul, killing five people and wounding seventeen [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 10 The United Nations launched a $106 million appeal for humanitarian aid for Afghanistan, which UN officials stated was their largest relief operation in the world [11/11 FT]

Nov. 19 Fighting erupted in Kabul between forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar and President Rabbani, injuring at least forty people [11/21 FBIS]

Nov 29. Peace talks sponsored by the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) were held in Tehran, attended by several smaller unidentified factions. President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar refused to be represented at the talks [11/30 FBIS]

Dec. 5 Clashes in Kabul between forces of President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar killed seven people and wounded twelve [12/6 FBIS]

UN sources announced that unspecified factions had agreed to a four-day cease-fire to begin 6 December in Kabul to allow aid convoys into the city [12/6 FBIS]

Dec 7: Negotiations among representatives of eight Afghan factions concluded in Tehran with no date set for a cease-fire [12/8 FBIS]

Dec 18. The UN Development Program for Afghanistan announced it would allocate $36 million in aid for rural development and the construction of bridges, roads, and irrigation systems [12/19 FBIS]

The main east-west road in Kabul was reopened after a three-month closure due to fighting [12/19 FBIS]

Dec 24 Rocket attacks on Kabul by forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar killed four people and wounded thirty-two others [12/27 FBIS]

1995

Jan 1: President Rabbani met with UN special envoy Mestiri to discuss a cease-fire [1/6 FBIS]

Jan. 8 Ten people were killed and eight injured in a bombing by unknown sources from the Mayni area in Darwaz Province [1/9 FBIS]

Jan. 10· Representatives from the Jami'at-e-Eslami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), Ettehad-e-Eslami (Islamic Union of Afghanistan), and the Hezb-e-Eslami (Islamic Party of Afghanistan) met in Charasiab to discuss peace talks [1/11 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

Oct 17· Muhammad Redha 'Aslaoui, the husband of former government spokeswoman Leila 'Aslaoui who resigned on 19 September to protest government negotiations with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was stabbed to death in his office in Algiers [10/18 FBIS]

Oct 19: A French citizen and an Italian citizen were shot to death in Djelib [10/20 FBIS, WP]

Farrah Ziane, editor of *Revolution Africaine*, was shot to death at his home in Ouled 'Aych [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 22 Eighty-five alleged Islamists were killed by security forces in Blida, Jijel, Mila, Souk Ahras, and Tipaza during the period 16–22 October [10/20 FBIS, 10/24 FBIS]

Oct 23. Two Spanish nuns were killed when gunmen opened fire at a chapel in Algiers [10/24 WSJ]

The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) claimed responsibility for the 19 October attack that killed one French and one Italian engineer [10/24 FBIS]

Oct. 25 Seventy-five alleged terrorists were killed by security forces during the period 23–25 October in Algiers, Bachjarah, Beau Fraisier, Blida, Boumerdes, Djebel Fettas, Medea, and Tipaza [10/26–28, 10/31 FBIS]

Oct. 26 Seventeen alleged Islamists were killed by security officers in Algiers, Boumerdes, Medea, and Tipaza [10/27 FBIS]

Oct. 27 Agence France-Presse (Paris) journalist Ben-'achour Muhammad Salah was killed by alleged Islamists in Boufarik [10/28 FBIS]

Oct. 29 Government officials met with representatives from the Central Trade Union and other private and public sector employers and agreed to raise wages by 20 percent in two stages 10 percent in December 1994 and 10 percent in September 1995 [10/31 FBIS]

President Liamine Zeroual met with representatives of six parties—'Abdallah Djaballah of the Nahda, Mahfouz Nahnah of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Khaled Bensmail of the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, Nourreddine Boukrouh of the Party of Algerian Renewal, Bousa'ad Boudiaf of the Rally for Culture and Democracy, and Sa'id Khelil of the Socialist Forces Front (FSS), to discuss results of the national dialogue [11/1 FBIS]

Oct 30 President Zeroual announced that negotiations between the government and the FIS were at an impasse, and accused the FIS of launching a new offensive [10/31 FT]

Oct. 31. President Zeroual announced that a presidential election would be held before the end of 1995, a year earlier than planned [11/1 NYT]

Kaddour Bouslahem, a journalist at *Horizons*, was kidnapped from his home in Hacine [11/2 FBIS]

Security forces killed thirty-three alleged terrorists during the period 29–31 October [11/2 FBIS]

Nov 1: In Sidi 'Ali in Mostaganem Province, a bomb exploded at a ceremony to mark the 40th anniversary of the revolution against French rule, killing six children and wounding thirty others. A second explosion in Chlef wounded one person. [11/2 NYT, 11/2, 11/3 FBIS]

Seven alleged Islamists were killed by security forces in 'Ayn Defla and Batna during the period 31 October-1 November. [11/3 FBIS]

Nov 2 Agence France-Presse reported that FIS leaders 'Abassi Madani and 'Ali Belhadj had been put in solitary confinement and denied contact with all other FIS members. [11/3 FBIS]

Cherif Hadj Djelloul, the military commander of Algiers, was shot to death as he negotiated the surrender of nine alleged Islamists after a 24-hour standoff in Algiers. Security forces then killed the nine Islamists as well as four alleged Islamists nearby. [11/3 FBIS, NYT, WP]

Nov 6 France deported to Algeria Islamist cleric Nafa Zahar Eddine, who was accused of spreading "fundamentalist propaganda." [11/7 NYT]

One hundred and twelve alleged Islamists were killed by security forces throughout the country during the period 2–6 November. [11/7 FBIS, WP]

Nov 7 The Algerian French-language daily newspaper *al-Oumma* and the Arabic weekly newspaper *al-Wadjh al-Akhar* were suspended by the Interior Ministry for one month for printing anti-government information. [11/8 FBIS]

Nov. 8 France arrested 95 alleged GIA members in and around Paris. [11/9 NYT]

Nov. 12. Forty-nine alleged terrorists were killed during the period 6–12 November by security forces throughout the country. [11/14 FBIS]

Nov 13 Algerian hijackers Madjid 'Arab, Merzak Ben'achour, and Muhammad Nedjar seized an Algerian aircraft on a domestic flight and forced it to fly to Majorca, Spain, where they surrendered and asked for political asylum. [11/14 FT, WP]

Nov 14: Seven alleged terrorists were killed by security forces during the period 12–14 November in Constantine and Ghelizane. [11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 15 Eight hundred inmates of the Berrouaghia prison, 75 miles south of Algiers, including 700 alleged Islamists who had been sentenced to death, took control of the prison. Between eight and thirty prisoners were killed and sixty prisoners and two guards were wounded before the riot was put down. [11/16 NYT]

Seven army officers were reportedly killed by unidentified gunmen outside their homes in al-Cherrakah, a suburb of Algiers. [11/16 FBIS]

Nov 16. Government forces seized all copies of the 16 November edition of the largest Arabic daily newspaper, *al-Khabar*, stating it published "information undermining security and public order." *Al-Hiwar* was suspended for six months and *al-Watan* for fifteen days on similar charges. [11/17 FBIS]

Fighting broke out in the al-Bayadh area southwest of Algiers between alleged Islamists and government police forces. Fifty policemen were killed. [11/17 FBIS]

Nov 19 Security forces killed sixty-four alleged Islamists during the period 14–19 November, including Khatir Ben M'hend Boudali, who police claim was the leader of the 12 March Tazoult jailbreak. [11/21, 11/22 FBIS, 12/7 FBIS]

Nov. 21 Unidentified attackers killed eleven people and wounded five others in Sidi 'Abdallah. [11/22 FBIS]

Nov. 22 The Catholic Community of Saint Egidio in Rome sponsored a negotiation session for opposition movements that included representatives of FIS, the National Liberation Front (FLN), the Nahda, and the FFS. An agreement was reached to continue the dialogue. [11/23 FBIS]

Nov 25 In Algiers, UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali met with Algerian president Zeroual to discuss the internal Algerian political situation as well as Algeria's participation in a planned March 1995 UN summit on social development. [11/28 FBIS]

Nov 27: During the period 23–27 November, security forces killed 115 alleged Islamists throughout the country. [11/27 WP, 11/28, 11/29 FBIS]

Dec 1: In Boufarik, gunmen shot to death journalists Al-Sa'ad Ahmed, Mokhtari 'Abdel Krim, Nasseredini Yasser, and two members of Boufarik's municipal court who had been appointed to replace elected fundamentalists. [12/2 FBIS, NYT]

Nine alleged Islamists were killed by security forces throughout the country during the period 28 November–1 December. [12/5 FBIS]

Dec 3 A 74-year-old French national was stabbed to death in 'Ayn al-Turk, Oran. [12/5 FBIS]

Dec. 4 Sa'id Mikbil, the editor of *Le Matin*, died after being shot on 3 December in Algiers. [12/5 NYT]

Dec 5: Security forces killed twenty-one alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 3–5 December. [12/7 FBIS]

Dec 8: Security forces killed eight alleged Islamists in al-Harrach. [12/9 FBIS]

Gunmen opened fire on a school in Boufarik, killing one student and wounding nine others. [12/9 FBIS]

Dec. 10: Police killed twenty-seven alleged Islamists during the period 6–10 December. [12/12 FBIS]

Dec 11: Police shot to death seven alleged Islamists in Souidania and six alleged Islamists in Oued Berkeche. [12/12 FT]

Dec. 12: Police killed two alleged Islamists and arrested a third in Bir al-Ater in Tekessa Province. [12/13 FBIS]

Dec 14. Power failures reportedly caused by sabotage were reported in Algiers and Blida, and a food warehouse supplying Algiers was blown up. The power failures were expected to last until 21 or 22 December. [12/19 NYT]

Dec. 17: Security forces killed twenty-nine alleged Islamists in Algiers, Bourmerdes, Sidi Bel 'Abbas and Tizi Ouzou during the period 13–17 December. [12/19 FBIS]

Dec. 19 The government suspended the daily newspaper *L'Opinion* for forty days, citing no reason. [12/20 FBIS]

Dec 20: Security forces killed ten alleged Islamists in Algiers, Chlef, and Constantine during the period 18–20 December. [12/23 FBIS]

Dec 23. Security forces killed forty alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 20–23 December. [12/28 FBIS]

Dec. 24: Four alleged Islamists seized control of Air France flight 8969, carrying 283 passengers and crew members, at the Algiers airport. The hijackers killed at least two people but released 55 passengers, mainly women and children, and demanded the release of FIS leaders 'Ali Belhadj and 'Abassi Madani. [12/25 FBIS, NYT]

Dec. 25: Hijackers of Air France flight 8969 killed Eric Bonnier, a French embassy official who was among the remaining approximately 173 passengers and crew on board, and released eight passengers. French and Algerian officials then allowed the plane to fly to Marseille, France. In negotiations with French police, the gunmen reportedly demanded that the aircraft be refueled and allowed to fly to Paris, but dropped previous demands for the release of FIS leaders Belhadj and Madani. [12/26 NYT, WP, 12/27 FBIS]

Dec. 26: French paramilitary troops stormed the airliner, freeing the remaining hostages and killing the four hijackers. Thirteen passengers, three crew members, and nine policemen were injured. The French government stated that the plane contained explosives that the hijackers had planned to detonate in a suicide explosion over Paris. The GIA claimed responsibility for the hijacking, stating it was in reprisal for the French government's support of the Algerian government. [12/27 NYT, FBIS, 12/28 NYT]

Dec. 27: France suspended air and sea passenger links with Algeria pending tighter security measures. [12/28 FT]

Gunmen attacked the home of four Roman Catholic clergymen in Tizi Ouzou, killing one Belgian and three French. [12/28 FBIS]

Dec. 28: The GIA claimed responsibility for the 27 December murder of four clergymen. [12/29 NYT]

Dec. 29: French investigators identified one of the four hijackers of Air France flight 8969 as Makhlus Ben Guettaf. [12/30 WP]

Dec. 30: Security forces shot to death sixty-one alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 26–30 December. [12/30 NYT]

1995

Jan. 2: Twenty-three alleged Islamists were killed throughout the country during the period 31 December-2 January. [1/3 FBIS, 1/4 FBIS]

Jan. 3: The British, French, German, and US embassies received threats from the GIA that their citizens in Algiers would be killed unless their embassies were closed. [1/4 FT, 1/5 NYT]

Jan. 4: Four members of the FLN met with FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj to discuss the internal political crisis. [1/5 WP]

Security forces killed seventeen alleged terrorists in Mostaganem, Oran, Relizane, and Tlemcen. [1/5 FBIS]

Jan. 6: Zine Eddine 'Aliou Salah, the editor of the French-language daily newspaper *Liberté*, was shot to death near his house in Algiers. [1/9 FBIS]

Jan. 7: Radio correspondent 'Ali 'Abboud was shot to death near his home in Birkhadim. [1/9 FBIS]

Jan. 9: In Rome, representatives from the FLN, the FIS, and the FFS met at a negotiation session sponsored by the Roman Catholic Community of Sant' Egidio to establish a proposal on behalf of the opposition parties to present to the government. [1/10 FT]

Four people were killed and one wounded when gunmen opened fire at a mosque in Baika in Batna Province.

Jan. 10: Seventeen alleged Islamists were killed by security forces during the period 7–10 January in Blida, Tiaret, and Tipaza. [1/11 FBIS]

Jan. 11: Gunmen opened fire on a bus near Batna, killing twelve people and wounding five others. [1/12 FBIS]

Jan. 12: Security forces killed thirteen alleged Islamists in Algiers and Msila. [1/13 FBIS]

The World Bank approved a $150 million loan for Algerian economic rehabilitation. [1/13 FT]

Jan. 13: Representatives of the opposition parties meeting in Rome offered a proposal that called on the government to recognize the FIS in return for the FIS calling for a cessation of violence. The proposal also called for the right of free assembly, the lifting of press censorship, the end to torture in military prisons, the end to violence against civilians by Islamists and the army, and the establishment of a national committee to investigate killings in the last year. Pending these conditions, a national conference would be called to establish a transitional administration in preparation for multi-party elections. [1/14 NYT, FT, 1/17 FBIS]

Journalist 'Abd al-Hamid Yahiaoui of the Arabic daily newspaper *al-Sha'b* was shot to death in Algiers. [1/17 FBIS]

Jan. 15: Nur Salah, a member of the National Transitional Council, was shot to death by gunmen near his home in Algiers. Security forces killed nine alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 12–15 January. [1/17 FBIS]

The GIA announced that it would stop its violence if the government accepted the Rome proposal, but also demanded the punishment of government military leaders, a ban on communist and atheist political parties, and the release of imprisoned FIS leaders. [1/16 NYT, 1/17 FBIS]

Bahrain

See also, Regional Affairs

1994

Dec. 5: Shaykh 'Ali Salman Ahmad Salman was arrested on unspecified charges. Salman had organized a petition calling for the restoration of the elected National Assembly. Riots broke out in Bilad and al-Qadim to protest his arrest. [12/19 FBIS]

Dec. 14: Police used tear gas against 100 demonstrators in Manama and Qadim who were protesting the government's refusal to release Shaykh 'Ali Salman. [12/15 FT, 12/16 FBIS]

Dec. 16: Clashes between security forces and protesters continued from the previous days in Sanabis and the northwest peninsula. All copies of the daily *Akhbar al-Khalij* were withdrawn from all stores, and a later edition made no mention of the clashes. One policeman was killed by protesters in al-Diraz. [12/19 FBIS]

Dec. 18: Four Shi‘i Muslims and three policemen were killed in rioting in Sanabis. [12/19 FBIS]

Dec. 19: Security forces arrested 1,600 people in connection with the protests and as a security precaution for the opening that day of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Manama. [12/20 FBIS]

Dec. 21: Several hundred students from Bahrain University demonstrated to protest the killing of a student by police during earlier demonstrations. Gunfire was reported in Manama. [12/22 FBIS]

Dec. 24: Shaykh Muhammad ‘Ali al-Akri was arrested for submitting a petition calling for the restoration of the National Assembly. [1/3 FBIS]

Dec. 25: Six protesters died from injuries sustained in clashes with police. Members of the banned Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain said that more than 2,200 people had been arrested in connection with the riots. [12/27 FBIS]

Dec. 28: Demonstrations were held in Sanabis. [12/29 FBIS]

1995

Jan. 8: Demonstrators clashed with police in Manama. [1/9 FBIS]

Jan. 12: Police released more than 150 people who had been arrested in demonstrations since 5 December. [1/13 FBIS]

Jan. 13: Muhsin al-Fatalawi was killed and several others wounded in clashes between demonstrators and police in Abu Saybi. Other clashes were reported in Barbar, al-Diraz, Jamrah, Jida Hafa, and Sanabis. [1/17 FBIS]

Jan. 15: Shaykh ‘Ali Salman, Shaykh Hamzah al-Sidiri, and Shaykh Haydar al-Sitri were released from prison and deported to the UAE. [1/17 FBIS]

Cyprus

1994

Oct. 17: In Nicosia, Dervis Eroglu was reelected head of the National Unity Party. [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 18: In Nicosia, Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Kliridhis, Turkish Cypriot president Rauf Denktas, and United Nations special representative to Cyprus Gustav Feissel met to discuss bilateral relations. [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 19: UN representative Feissel met with Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis at the Presidential Palace to discuss the planned 21 October meeting between Kliridhis and Denktas. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 21: In Nicosia, Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis and Turkish Cypriot president Denktas met at the home of UN representative Feissel to discuss bilateral negotiations. [10/24 FBIS]

Oct. 29: A planned meeting between Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis and Turkish Cypriot president Denktas was postponed at the request of UN representatives in order to first conduct informal talks. [10/31 FBIS]

Oct. 31: In Nicosia, Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis met with Turkish Cypriot president Denktas to discuss bilateral relations. No progress was reported. [11/1 FBIS]

Nov. 3: Turkish foreign minister Mumtaz Soysal stated that both Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus were and would remain sovereign entities, a contradiction to the 1977 and 1979 UN-sponsored agreements that called for the island to be reunited as a bi-zonal federation. Soysal encouraged each to cooperate on tourism and environmental issues. [11/4 FT]

Nov. 7: The Greek Cypriot National Council unanimously agreed to send an undisclosed petition to the UN General Assembly, file an appeal against Turkey in the European Union Human Rights Committee, and move to convene an international conference on the Cyprus issue. [11/8 FBIS]

Greek Cypriot finance minister Faidhras Oikonomidhis resigned. [11/8 FBIS]

Nov. 15: Turkish Cypriot forces fired on demonstrators calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, after the demonstrators had entered the buffer zone and approached the Allila guard post. Fifteen people were injured. [11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 23: In Rome, Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis met with UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali to discuss Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot negotiations. [11/25 FBIS]

Nov. 26: Mustafa Akınçı was reelected leader of the Communal Liberation Party during its 14th congress in Nicosia. [11/28 FBIS]

Dec. 4: UN representative Feissel met with Greek-Cypriot president Kliridhis to discuss negotiations on the Cyprus issue. [12/5 FBIS]

UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali called for the unconditional resumption of talks on Cyprus. [12/5 FBIS]

Dec. 5: Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis met with UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali at the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Budapest to discuss negotiations on Cyprus. [12/6 FBIS]

Dec. 21: The UN Security Council renewed the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNIFCYP) mandate for six months, to expire on 30 June 1995. [12/22 FBIS]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1994

Oct. 16: In Cairo, police shot to death alleged Islamic Group member Bassam Muhammad Khalil Shahin, and arrested seven people in connection with the 14 October stabbing of author Naguib Mahfouz. [10/17 FBIS, NYT]

Two alleged Islamic Group members were killed by police in Manfalut in Asyut. [10/17 FBIS]

Oct 17. The government banned a planned 18 October demonstration in Cairo to protest the 14 October attack on Naguib Mahfouz [10/18 FBIS]

Oct 18 Eight alleged Islamists were killed in a clash with security forces in Itlidim [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 22 The World Bank approved $400 million in aid for irrigation and sewage projects [10/25 FBIS]

A policeman was shot to death by unidentified gunmen in Qina Governorate [10/24 FBIS]

Oct 23: A British citizen was killed and three others wounded by gunmen who opened fire on their tour bus in Naqada [10/24 FT]

One police officer and one civilian were killed and five officers wounded in an attack by unidentified gunmen on the Mallawi police station in al-Minya [10/25 FBIS]

Oct 24. Security forces arrested 81 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 17–24 October [10/25 FBIS]

Oct 26. One policeman died and nine were wounded in a clash with alleged Islamists in Mallawi [10/27 FBIS]

Oct. 29. A policeman was shot to death by gunmen near Naway [10/31 FBIS]

Oct. 31· A policeman was shot to death in Qina [11/1 FBIS

Nov 2: At least 200 people were killed in Durunka when flash floods caused the collapse of fuel tanks, setting off an explosion and sending burning fuel flooding the streets Hospital officials put the death toll at 410 [11/3 NYT]

Nov 3. The death toll in the Durunka floods and fire was raised to 600, and 60 other people reportedly died in flooding in Asyut, Qina, and Suhaj Provinces [11/4 FT, NYT]

Nov 4 Flooding was reported on the east bank of the Nile in Suhaj and on the west bank at Luxor, flooding 70 villages [11/5 NYT]

Nov 7· Twenty-six alleged Islamists were arrested by security forces in Alexandria, al-Buhayrah, Cairo, and Giza [11/8 FBIS]

Nov 10: The *Financial Times* reported that Egyptian prime minister 'Atif Sidqi and International Monetary Fund (IMF) managing director Stanley Fisher had held talks in Cairo on the IMF's proposal to devalue the pound as part of a three-year structural adjustment reform package An agreement was reached to resume formal negotiations, which had broken down in July 1994 [11/11 FT]

Nov 15: Two policemen were killed and one wounded by unidentified gunmen in Mallawi [11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 16 Ahmad Hasan 'Abd al-Jalil, the leader of the military wing of the Islamic Group, was shot to death by police in southern Egypt [11/17 FBIS]

Nov. 17 Police killed four alleged terrorists and arrested two others in Asyut [11/18 FBIS]

Nov 19· Two alleged Islamists were killed in clashes with police in Mallawi [11/21 FBIS]

Nov. 20: A policeman was found murdered in Mallawi [11/21 FBIS]

Nov 22 Three policemen were shot to death by unidentified gunmen in Manfalut Another policeman was found murdered in Mallawi [11/23 FBIS]

Nov 28· Security forces arrested 14 alleged Islamists and killed three throughout the country [11/29 FBIS]

Dec 3· A military court sentenced alleged Islamists Muhammad 'Amr Ahmad and Rabi'a Hassanein to death for a 27 September attack at Ghardaqa on the Red Sea that killed two German tourists and two Egyptians [12/4 NYT, WP]

Dec 4· A policeman was killed and three people wounded by gunmen in Qina In Mallawi, another policeman was shot to death by unidentified gunmen [12/5 FBIS]

Dec 5· A court ordered the release of Islamist lawyer Muntasir al-Zayyat, who was arrested on 18 May and charged with membership in the Islamic Group [12/6 NYT]

Dec 12· Two policemen were shot to death by unidentified gunmen in Luxor [12/13 FBIS]

Dec 17. An Egyptian was shot to death by unidentified gunmen at his farm in Tandah [12/20 FBIS]

Dec 31: Hamada Muhammad Lotfi was hanged in Cairo for planting explosives at a military air base near the Libyan border in an attempt to assassinate President Mubarak [1/1 WP]

1995

Jan. 2 Islamic Group members disguised as policemen fired on buses in four incidents in Mallawi, killing eleven people, including eight policemen, and wounding six others [1/3 NYT, FT]

Jan. 8 Five alleged Islamists were killed by police near Cairo [1/9 FBIS]

Jan. 9 A policeman was shot to death by gunmen in Mallawi [1/10 FBIS]

Jan. 10. A military court convicted thirteen Islamic Group members in connection with the 14 October 1994 stabbing of novelist Naguib Mahfouz Muhammad Naji Mustafa and Muhammad Ghafir Abu al-Faraq Mahlawi were sentenced to death, and the other defendants received sentences ranging from three years to life in prison [1/11 FT, NYT, WP]

Jan 12 Gunmen fired on a train near al-'Ashiyah in the Qina governorate, wounding six people Police killed three alleged Islamists in a separate incident in al-Minya [1/13 FBIS]

Iran

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Iraq

1994

Oct 31 One hundred and thirty-four Iranian novelists, publishers, and translators published an open letter calling for the abolition of censorship in Iran [11/1 NYT]

'Azizollah Amir-Rahimi, a former general, was arrested after publishing an open letter in which he condemned summary executions and called for political reforms [11/1 FBIS]

Nov. 1: The parliament approved a bill allowing police to shoot and kill demonstrators. [11/2 NYT]

Nov. 5: The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) said that Iran had fired surface-to-surface missiles at the MKO camp in Ashraf, Iraq. Iranian sources claimed that several MKO members were killed in the attack, but the MKO denied any casualties. [11/6 WP, 11/7 NYT]

Nov. 7: Two bombs exploded in southern Tehran, killing two people and wounding several others. [11/8 FBIS]

Nov. 9: Iranian jet fighters bombed a Kurdish base in Kou Senjaq in the UN declared "no-flight zone" in northern Iraq, killing at least one person and wounding three. [11/10 NYT]

Nov. 18: A new law, passed by a special council within the Iranian judiciary, gave women, divorced by their husbands, up to half the property accumulated during marriage in certain cases. [11/19 NYT]

Nov. 27: Dissident author 'Ali Akbar Sa'idi Sirjani, 63, died in prison of a heart attack. Sirjani was arrested in March 1994 on charges of drug abuse and espionage. [11/28 NYT]

Nov. 29: The Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 'Ali 'Araki, 100, died in Tehran of a "cerebral vascular accident." [11/30 FBIS, WSJ]

Nov. 30: Human Rights Watch/Middle East called for an independent autopsy on 'Ali Akbar Sa'idi Sirjani, after Sirjani's family stated he had no history of heart disease. [12/1 NYT]

Dec. 6: The government appointed Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenehi as a grand ayatollah and the sole marja'. [12/7 NYT]

Dec. 12: The government allowed a group of journalists to tour the Evin Penitentiary in response to a UN Human Rights Commissioner's accusation of maltreatment of prisoners. [12/11 NYT]

Dec. 14: 'Ali Khamenehi rejected efforts by the Council of Theologians in Qum to promote him as the sole marja', replacing Grand Ayatollah 'Ali 'Araki. [12/15 NYT]

Dec. 19: Police arrested Asghar Kashan, the former deputy governor of the Central Bank, on charges of having "foreign connections" during his tenure at the bank. [12/20 FT]

Dec. 26: The parliament banned the sale, manufacture, and distribution of satellite dishes, and the Interior Ministry ordered all equipment seized. [12/27 NYT, 12/28 FBIS]

1995

Jan. 4: US and Israeli officials said that Iran was less than five years away from having nuclear weapon capabilities, and Israeli officials stated that they would consider attacking Iran's nuclear reactors if the program was not halted. [1/5 NYT]

Jan. 6: Mansour Satari, the commander of the Iranian Air Force, and eleven military officers were killed in a plane crash at the Babai Air Force base near Isfahan. [1/7 NYT]

Jan. 8: In Tehran, Russian energy minister Viktor Mikhailov and Iranian head of the Atomic Energy Agency Reza 'Amrollahi signed an $800 million agreement to have Russia complete construction within four years of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, initially begun by Germany in 1974 but later halted. [1/9 FBIS, FT]

Iraq

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Iran, Turkey

1994

Oct. 16: US officials said that Iraqi troops had resumed their withdrawal from Nasiriya following a week of US military mobilization in the region. The US action had been a response to unusual Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwaiti border. [10/17 NYT]

The United States announced it would leave its troops in Kuwait until several weeks after Iraq's complete withdrawal, and warned Iraq that it would launch immediate military action should there be a repeat of the troop buildup. [10/17 FT]

Two groups of United Arab Emirate (UAE) land forces arrived in Kuwait. [10/17 FBIS]

Oct. 17: Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, speaking before the United Nations Security Council, urged the lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq, proposing a timetable for Iraq's recognition of Kuwait and a long-term monitoring of weapons to be established in November 1994, followed by the lifting of sanctions six months later. US and British representatives criticized the plan and demanded Iraq's full compliance with UN demands before sanctions would be lifted. After speaking at the UN, Kozyrev met with US secretary of state Warren Christopher to discuss the lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq. [10/18 NYT]

Iraq's parliament ended a special session called to hear Russian foreign minister Kozyrev's and Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz's proposal on ending UN sanctions against Iraq in exchange for official recognition of Kuwait. The recognition was not announced. [10/18 FT, WP]

Two French frigates carrying 240 soldiers arrived in Kuwait's al-Shawykh port. [10/18 FBIS]

A bomb at an Iraqi National Congress office in 'Ayn Kawa, near Irbil, killed one person and wounded three. [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 18: Iraq opened a missile test facility and an explosives factory for a tour by the press. [10/19 WSJ]

Oct. 19: In Baghdad, 'Atallah Muhammad Salih, Director General of the religious institutions department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was killed and five others were wounded when a bomb exploded in that office. [10/20 FBIS, NYT]

Oct. 20: US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, and an unidentified British delegate called for the identification of the 23rd parallel as the point past which Iraqi troop movements would be considered hostile. [10/21 NYT, WP]

US Pentagon officials announced that the US military buildup in the Persian Gulf would stop at 13,000 ground troops, 275 aircraft, and one aircraft carrier group [10/21 NYT, WP]

The Islamic Iraqi Vanguards for National Salvation claimed responsibility for the 19 October bombing at the Ministry of Religious Affairs [10/21 NYT]

Oct 23: A US warship intercepted a Honduran-flagged ship, al-Mahrousa, suspected of carrying Iraqi fuel to Iran, and diverted the ship to Kuwait for further investigation [10/24 FT]

Oct. 24 'Izzat 'Abd al-Hadi Khalifa, captain of al-Mahrousa, admitted that he had loaded diesel fuel in the Iraqi port of Zubayr for export [10/25 NYT]

Oct. 26: Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN commission to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, said that Iraq had failed to fully disclose its past efforts to build weapons, furnishing incorrect or incomplete data to the commission on its previous germ warfare efforts [10/27 WP]

Oct. 30 In Baghdad, a bomb exploded outside a Catholic church, killing three policemen and one civilian and wounding three others [10/31 NYT]

Nov. 5: Eleven people were killed in a clash between members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and members of the Kawamand tribe in Shamshamal near al-Sulaymaniyah [11/7 FBIS]

Nov 8: In Sararash, PUK leader Jalal Talabani met with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Ma'sud Barazani to discuss relations between the groups [11/9 FBIS]

Nov 10. The government released a declaration of the Revolutionary Command Council signed by President Saddam Hussein in which Iraq accepted the "sovereignty of the State of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence," one of the UN conditions for lifting of sanctions against Iraq [11/11 NYT, WP]

Nov. 12 Two bombs exploded in Baghdad, killing one person and wounding three others [11/14 FBIS]

Nov 14. The UN Security Council voted to maintain its economic sanctions against Iraq until at least the next scheduled review on 14 January, following a presentation by US delegate Albright that alleged that President Hussein had spent more than $500 million on new palaces and personal amenities [11/15 FT, NYT]

Nov 18 Lafta 'Uwayd, the secretary of the Baath party in Basrah, was reported kidnapped on the road between Basrah and al-'Amarah [11/28 FBIS]

Nov 19. The Iraqi National Congress reported that government forces had arrested more than 1,000 people throughout the country, including General Muhammad Mazlum al-Dulaymi, commander of al-Bakr air force base north of Baghdad [11/21 FBIS]

Nov 24: In Irbil, KDP leader Barazani and PUK leader Talabani signed a cease-fire agreement [11/25 WP, 11/29 FBIS]

Nov 27: Kurdish cleric Mullah 'Abdullah Qadir was shot to death by gunmen in Irbil in northern Iraq [11/28 FBIS]

Dec. 1 According to *al-Hayat* (London), former Iraqi chief of intelligence Wafiq al-Samarrai fled with his family from Baghdad to Kurdish areas in northern Iraq [12/2 FBIS]

Dec 10: Lafta 'Uwayd, the secretary of the Baath party branch in Basrah, was found murdered [12/12 FBIS]

Dec 13: The Air Force bombed alleged PKK bases in al-Madinah in northern Iraq [12/15 FBIS]

Dec. 16 UN special envoy Ekeus released a six-month report on Iraqi disarmament that stated that Iraq was hiding information on weapons programs until confronted with evidence [12/17 WP]

Dec. 20: UN special envoy Ekeus, in a report to the UN Security Council, stated that Iraq was falling "far short" of full compliance with UN demands regarding existing biological and chemical weapons [12/21 NYT]

Dec 24: In Shaqlawah, fighting broke out between KDP and PUK forces Forty people were killed and 250 wounded [12/28 FBIS]

Dec 26 In the Kani Kirzala area of Irbil, 464 people were killed during the period 25–26 December in clashes between the KDP and PUK [12/28 FBIS]

1995

Jan. 2: Fighting between KDP and PUK forces near Irbil killed 84 people [1/3 FBIS]

Jan 4 The PUK reportedly gained control of Irbil and Sulaymaniyah [1/5 FBIS]

Jan 6 In Paris, Iraqi deputy foreign minister Tariq 'Aziz met with French foreign minister Alain Juppé to discuss the lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq, sparking protests from US and British officials [1/7 NYT]

Jan. 10: UN ambassador Albright displayed satellite photographs and intelligence reports illustrating that Iraq still possessed more than 9,000 pieces of military equipment taken from Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, a violation of UN resolutions 686 and 687 [1/11 WP]

PUK leader Talabani and KDP leader Barazani agreed to an immediate cease-fire [1/11 FBIS]

Jan. 12 In its routine 60-day review, the UN Security Council voted to maintain the sanctions against Iraq [1/13 WP]

Jan 14 The cease-fire between PUK and KDP forces collapsed as clashes broke out near Irbil, killing 20 people and wounding 100 [1/17 FBIS]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon

1994

Oct. 24 The Knesset rejected by a vote of 56–51 three no-confidence motions on unspecified protests, two of which were submitted by the Likud and Moledet parties, and the third jointly submitted by the Tzomet party and National Religious Party (NRP) [10/25 FBIS]

Oct. 30: Israel announced new currency liberalization policies, including an increase in cash from $3,000 to $7,000 that Israelis would be allowed to take abroad and an unrestricted use of credit cards abroad [10/31 FT]

Nov 2 Alice Miller brought a suit against the Israeli Army to the Israeli Supreme Court, demanding that she

be allowed to apply for the combat pilot program that excluded women [11/3 NYT]
Nov 14 The Knesset rejected a no-confidence motion on poverty by the Likud party and a no-confidence motion on Israeli-Syrian negotiations submitted by the Tzomet party and NRP [11/15 FBIS, 11/16 FBIS]
Nov 21 The Industry and Trade Ministry announced they would allow the import of non-kosher meat products into Israel as of 1 January 1995 for the first time in Israel's history [11/22 WSJ]
Nov. 23 The Knesset rejected a bill submitted by Tzahi Hanegbi of the Likud that called for Israel's halt to negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) pending the cancellation of the Palestinian Covenant [11/25 FBIS]
Nov. 24 The Knesset approved a 20 percent capital-gains tax to go into effect in January 1995 [11/25 WSJ]
Nov 28: The Knesset rejected a no-confidence motion presented by the NRP and Tzomet over a plan to incorporate the Independent and Democratic Israel Party into the government [12/1 FBIS]
Dec 18 The cabinet reviewed government plans to tax stock market profits as of 1 January 1995 after Minister of the Economy Shimon Shitreet moved to abolish the plan [12/19 FT]
Dec. 19. The Knesset rejected by a vote of 56–41 a no-confidence motion submitted by ultra-Orthodox parties regarding Foreign Minister Shimon Peres's comments in defense of his Nobel Peace Prize [12/20 NYT, 12/21 FBIS]

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that the capital gains tax would be put into effect on 1 January despite protest [12/20 FT]
Dec 25 Prime Minister Rabin appointed Yiud party members Gonen Segev and Alex Goldfarb as Energy Minister and Deputy Housing Minister, respectively, to merge the Yiud party with the Labor party's coalition, thereby strengthening Rabin's parliamentary majority [12/26 NYT, 12/28 FBIS]
Dec. 26: The Knesset rejected a no-confidence vote submitted by the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and the Arab Democratic Party regarding a proposed bill that would restrict activities of the Palestinian National Authority in Israel [12/27 FBIS]

1995

Jan 2 The Knesset rejected by a vote of 60–43 a no-confidence motion submitted by the NRP and the Tzomet over the government motion to freeze construction at the Efrat settlement in the West Bank [1/3 FBIS]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

Oct 25: The World Bank reported that $1.7 billion of Jordan's $7 billion foreign debt would need to be lifted in order to stabilize the economy following the Israeli-Jordanian treaty [10/26 FT]
Dec. 5: Deputy Prime Minister Dhuqan al-Hindawi resigned to protest the government's domestic policies [12/6 FBIS]
Dec 21 The State Security Court sentenced eleven people to death, three *in absentia*, for belonging to an illegal group, conspiring to commit terrorist acts, and illegal possession of explosives [12/22 NYT, FBIS]

1995

Jan 5: Prime Minister 'Abd al-Salam Majali resigned Former army commander Al-Sharif Zayd Bin Shakir was appointed Prime Minister [1/6 NYT, FT]
Jan. 8: King Hussein announced a new cabinet

- Al-Sharif Zayd Bin Shakir, *Prime Minister and Defense*
- 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabidah, *Education*
- Khalid al-Karaki, *Information*
- 'Awad Khulayfat, *Youth*
- Basil Jardanah, *Finance*
- 'Abd al-Karim al-Kabariti, *Foreign Affairs*
- Jamal al-Sarayirah, *Post and Telecommunications*
- Samir Qa'war, *Transportation*
- 'Ali Abu al-Raghib, *Industry and Trade*
- Salih Irshaydat, *Water and Irrigation*
- 'Arif al-Bataynah, *Health*
- 'Abd al-Salam al-'Abbadi, *Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and Holy Places*
- Salamah Hammad, *Interior*
- Rima Khalaf al-Hunaydi, *Planning*
- 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Nusur, *Public Works and Housing*
- 'Adil al-Qudah, *Supply*
- Mansur Bin Tarif, *Agriculture*
- Ratib al-Sa'ud, *Higher Education*
- Hisham al-Tall, *Justice*
- Nadir Abu al-Sha'r, *Labor*
- Nadir al-Zuhayrat, *Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment*
- Samir al-Habashinah, *Culture*
- Muhyi al-Din Tuq, *Administrative Development*
- Samih Darwazah, *Energy and Mineral Resources*
- 'Abd al-Ilah al-Khatib, *Tourism and Antiquities*
- Salwa al-Masri, *Social Development* [1/9 FBIS]

Kuwait

See also, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1994

Oct 25: The government announced it would purchase £50 million of air defense missiles from the Belfast-based aerospace company Shorts [10/26 FT]
Dec 6: Parliament rejected an Islamist-sponsored bill to segregate male and female students in the classrooms, libraries, and restaurants of Kuwait University [12/7 WP]

1995

Jan. 12 The Press and Publication Department banned *al-Muharrir*, reportedly because it contained an interview with Libyan president Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi [1/3 FBIS]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1994

Oct 17: Israeli shelling of Hizballah forces in al-Nabatiyah al-Fawqa in the Israeli self-declared "security zone" injured two people [10/18 FBIS]
Oct 19: The South Lebanese Army (SLA) attacked the al-Basatin area, killing two Lebanese women Three Lebanese officers were killed and four wounded by Israeli shelling of al-Nabatiyah al-Fawqa [10/20 FBIS]
Oct. 20 Israeli forces bombed the "security zone," killing five civilians and two Lebanese soldiers, and wounding four others [10/21 JP, NYT]

A Lebanese woman died of wounds sustained in the 19 October Israeli attack on al-Nabatiyah al-Fawqa [10/21 FBIS]
Oct 21 Israeli and Hizballah forces exchanged fire in the "security zone," and Hizballah forces bombed northern Israel No injuries were reported The United Nations protested the 20 October Israeli bombing [10/22 NYT]
Oct. 26: Alleged Hizballah forces bombed areas of northern Israel, and Israeli and SLA forces launched attacks on the "security zone" [10/27 NYT]
Oct 29 Hizballah forces attacked an Israeli post at Dabshe in the "security zone," killing one Israeli soldier and wounding between two and six others Lebanese sources said one Lebanese citizen was killed and thirteen people were wounded, including five Israeli soldiers Israeli forces then attacked near al-Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, killing one person and wounding four Hizballah forces returned fire, attacking the village of Taibe in the security zone, wounding three Lebanese civilians and one SLA member [10/30 NYT, 10/31 FBIS]
Oct 30: Alleged Hizballah forces attacked an SLA patrol near Taw'amat Niha, killing one SLA member [10/31 FBIS]
Nov 1 Israeli prime minister Rabin criticized the Israeli soldiers in Dabshe in the "security zone" for abandoning their posts and not pursuing their attackers while under attack by Hizballah forces on 29 October [11/2 NYT]

Hizballah forces attacked an SLA post in Burj in the "security zone," killing one SLA member Israeli forces launched attacks on Kafra, Wadi Haris, and Yatar No casualties were reported [11/2 FBIS]
Nov. 10: Israeli forces shelled the village of Sribbin, killing an 85-year-old man A car bomb exploded under an Israeli vehicle in Kafr Huna, killing one SLA member and wounding two others Hizballah claimed responsibility [11/14 FBIS, JP]
Nov. 20. Hizballah and Israeli forces exchanged fire in the "security zone," injuring one Israeli soldier [11/21 FBIS]
Nov. 25 In the 'Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, Fatah supporters clashed with opponents of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat, killing at least seven people and wounding ten Fighting broke out when 400 Arafat supporters seized six military posts manned by 200 dissidents led by Munir al-Maqdah, a former Fatah commander, and his second-in-command, Khalid al-Shayib [11/26 NYT, 11/27 FT, 11/28 FBIS]
Nov 28: Islamic Jihad forces claimed responsibility for an attack on Israeli forces near Arnoun in the "security zone" that wounded one Israeli soldier Israeli forces launched a retaliatory attack, killing three Islamic Jihad members [11/29 WSJ]
Dec 2. Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri resigned, accusing other cabinet ministers of obstructing his program to rebuild Beirut President Ilyas al-Hrawi rejected the resignation [12/3 NYT]
Dec 5 Prime Minister al-Hariri withdrew his resignation after intervention by Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, who led a conciliatory meeting in Damascus between al-Hariri and parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri [12/6 FT]
Dec 6. An Israeli soldier was killed and another wounded by a bomb in the "security zone" Hizballah claimed responsibility [12/7 FBIS, WP]
Dec 8: A bomb killed eight SLA members and wounded five in Tallusa in the "security zone" A second bomb in Beit Leif killed one SLA member and wounded three others Hizballah claimed responsibility [12/9 FBIS, JP, WP]

Israel sent 300 soldiers to reinforce posts at Iqlim al-Tuffah, in Sujud and al-Ghalan, and at the Tallat al-Dabshe and 'Ali al-Tahir posts [12/9 FBIS]
Dec. 11 Hizballah forces attacked an Israeli patrol in Marj 'Uyun in the "security zone," killing one Israeli soldier and wounding seven Israeli soldiers and three Lebanese civilians Israeli forces launched a retaliatory attack on Hizballah areas north of Marj 'Uyun, killing four Hizballah members [12/12 FBIS, NYT, WP]
Dec 19 Hizballah forces attacked an Israeli post at Tallusa in the "security zone," killing an Israeli soldier Two Hizballah members were killed in Israeli retaliatory attacks [12/20 WP, 12/22 FBIS]
Dec. 21 A car bomb exploded in the Sfayr district of Beirut, killing three people including Hizballah member Fuad Mughanniya, whose brother was believed responsible for the kidnapping of Terry Anderson in March 1985, Thomas Sutherland in June 1985, and Terry Waite in January 1987 Twenty people were wounded by the explosion, for which Hizballah blamed Israel [12/22 NYT, WP, FBIS]
Dec. 23: Israeli and Hizballah forces exchanged fire at the Israeli posts of Dabshe and Suweida in the "security zone," and Israeli planes fired on Hizballah forces in Mlita and Jabal al-Rafi Two Israeli soldiers and two Lebanese policemen were killed and seven Israeli soldiers were wounded on the 'Ali al-Tahir bridge [12/23 FBIS, 12/24 NYT, 12/27 FBIS]
Dec 24. In Hasbaya, Israeli soldiers mistakenly fired on a group of Lebanese hunters, killing one and wounding four [12/25 WP]

1995

Jan 11: Israeli soldiers killed four resistance members near Kunin in the "security zone" following an attack on an Israeli patrol and two military outposts [1/12 FBIS]
Jan. 15: Israeli warplanes launched thirteen raids on Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) bases in the al-Na'imah hills, killing three people, wounding four, and forcing the temporary closure of the Beirut airport [1/16 NYT, 1/17 FBIS]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs, Egypt, Kuwait

Morocco

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Western Sahara

1994

Oct 16: 'Abderrahman Bou Jidli was arrested near Nadar and charged with planning to carry out armed sabotage in Fez [10/17 FBIS]
Oct. 30 An issue of the Casablanca Stock Exchange, representing 16 percent of the equity in the Société Nationale d'Investissements (SNI), was seven times oversubscribed The stock issue was the largest single privatization act of the three-year program to privatize state assets [10/31 FT]
Nov. 6: Flooding from heavy rains killed 15 people [11/7 WP]

1995

Jan 6 Government officials seized all copies of the daily newspaper *Maroc Hebdo* from the printing plant, citing no reason
Jan 12 King Hassan II announced he would not form a cabinet with members of opposition parties, as he had previously pledged, but rather would appoint a cabinet represented by the parliamentary majority [1/17 FBIS]

Oman

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict

1994

Oct. 25: The government sentenced 105 alleged Islamists to ten to fifteen years in prison for unidentified antigovernmental activities Three hundred other Islamists were released [11/1 FBIS]
Nov. 6 The World Bank released a report criticizing Oman's financial policies, particularly its budget deficits, expenditure trends, and decline in investment, saying that Oman would face "a major economic and social upheaval" if the problems were not corrected [11/7 FT]
Nov 12: Sultan Qabus sentenced an unidentified number of alleged Islamists to terms ranging from three years in prison to execution, but immediately commuted the death sentences to prison terms [11/16 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Regional Affairs

1994

Oct. 18. Twenty-three people were killed in clashes in Karachi between the Shi'a organization Tehrik Jafria Pakistan (TJP) and the Sunni organization Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Violence was also reported between members of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), representing the Urdu-speaking community, and a splinter group called MQM-Haqiqi Three alleged MQM members were found murdered in Karachi [10/19 FBIS]
Nov. 3 In Mingora, Northwest Frontier Province Assembly deputy and Pakistan's People's Party member Mr Badiuzzaman was shot to death, allegedly by members of the Tanzim Nifaz Shari'at-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), a party for the enforcement of sharia Islamic law [11/4 FT]

One TNSM member was killed and six people wounded by gunfire in Mingora [11/4 FT]
Nov. 5: Twenty-five people were killed and several wounded in clashes between alleged TNSM members and local commanders from Takhta Pul, in the North West Frontier Province [11/6 WP, 11/7 FBIS]
Nov. 6: TNSM leader Sufi Mohammed agreed to end the violence in the Malakand district [11/7 WP]
Nov. 8: TNSM members released 50 government officials taken hostage in the North West Frontier Province Provincial chief minister Aftab Ahmad Sherpao reportedly had ordered the enforcement of Islamic laws as of 3 November in accordance with TNSM demands [11/9 FT]
Nov 13 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto ordered the arrest of Mohammed Sharif, the father of Nawaz Sharif, the opposition Muslim League party leader and former prime minister, on charges of tax evasion [11/14 FT]
Nov. 14. Opposition members of parliament disrupted a speech by President Faruq Leghari to protest the arrest of Mohammed Sharif [11/15 FT]
Nov 25 Gunmen opened fire on a bus near Jhelum in Punjab Province, killing seven Shi'is and wounding fourteen [11/27 WP]
Nov 26 A grenade was thrown into a Sunni mosque in Lahore, killing two people and wounding twenty [11/27 WP]
Nov 30 In London, Prime Minister Bhutto announced that Pakistan was seeking foreign investment worth $5 billion in its electric power sector Bhutto signed agreements worth more than $1 56 billion in British investments in Pakistan's energy, chemical, and tourism sectors [12/1 FT]

Defense Minister Aftab Shahban Mirani announced the purchase of three submarines from France at a cost of $946 million and six F21 frigates from Britain at a cost of $94 million [12/1 FBIS]

Dec 1. The World Bank approved a loan of $250 million to replenish Pakistan's Private Sector Development Fund and extended a guarantee for $240 million in commercial loans to Hub Power, the private-sector owners The two operations would allow the $1 83 billion Hub River power project to proceed despite a 1990 lawsuit launched by the Pakistani Islamic court to stop the project [12/2 WSJ]

Dec 7: Gunmen killed five people and wounded ten in a Sunni mosque in Karachi [12/8 NYT]

Dec 14 Gunmen opened fire in Karachi, killing four Shi'i Muslims and one Sunni Muslim cleric [12/15 NYT]

The National Assembly unanimously agreed to establish a committee to investigate the causes of and possible remedies for the violence in Karachi [12/15 FT]

Dec 18 Strikes called separately by a Sunni Muslim group and the Karachi Transport Unity Union shut down major business centers and markets in Karachi and prompted rioting Three to six people were killed and twenty wounded when police opened fire on protesters in eastern Karachi Three people were killed in separate incidents by gunmen, and two were killed in hit-and-run attacks [12/19 FBIS, NYT]

Dec. 25. Pakistan requested that India close its consulate in Karachi within ten days because of alleged terrorist connections [12/17 FBIS]

1995

Jan 12 Khalid Latif, chairman of Allied Bank, Pakistan's second largest private sector bank, was arrested on charges of fraud [1/13 FT]

Qatar

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, UAE

1994

Oct. 16: The Dutch-owned NCM Credit Insurance, responsible for four-fifths of all British short-term export credit insurance, announced it would restrict such insurance for companies doing business in Saudi Arabia, because of Saudi Arabia's "very grave" financial situation and payment delays [10/26 FT]

One hundred and thirty of the 157 alleged Islamists who had been detained since 26 September were released, according to government sources The London-based Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) stated that 1,500 alleged Islamists had been arrested [10/18 FBIS]

Oct. 23: In Riyadh, three Philippine nationals held hostage Yussef al-Rajhi and demanded $10 million, weapons, and transportation to an undisclosed place Al-Rajhi's two-month-old son, a maid, and driver were killed, and his wife and other son wounded by the captors before police stormed the villa, killing one captor and wounding the others [10/24 FT]

Oct 25 The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Saudi Arabia's $6 billion order for commercial aircraft from Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Corporation placed in February had been substantially delayed due to Saudi financial problems [10/25 WSJ]

Oct. 26 France announced that Coface, the French export credit agency, had established more stringent terms for providing export credit guarantees to companies dealing with Saudi Arabia, and would only approve short-term credit insurance on a case-by-case basis [10/27 FT]

Nov 22 The government awarded France a $3 7 billion contract for two Stealth frigates [11/23 FT]

Nov. 23. The government proposed the introduction of compulsory military service in a draft of the country's five-year development plan to go into effect January 1995 [11/24 FT]

Nov 27 The government committed to balancing its budget by the year 2000, at the end of a five-year plan in which the government would seek to privatize some state industries and invite greater private-sector investment in infrastructure and other projects The plan would go into effect on 1 January 1995 after King Fahd's approval [11/28 FT]

Nov. 28 Britain rejected the bid for political asylum by Muhammad Mason, a Saudi dissident and founding member of the CDLR who had been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia for six months in 1993 [11/29 FT]

Government officials dismissed Shaykh Ibrahim al-Akhadar as the imam of the Medina mosque, reportedly due to his criticism of government policies [12/1 FBIS]

1995

Jan. 1: The government raised gas and electricity prices by nearly 100 percent in an effort to decrease usage and shrink the budget deficit [1/2 FT]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs

1994

Nov. 10 Sixty-five thousand people fled southern Sudan to escape fighting between government and opposition forces near Nimule [11/11 NYT]

Dec. 13 The Ummah party signed an agreement with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that provided for a transitional period for reconstruction and for a political referendum [12/14 FBIS]

1995

Jan 3. Sudan's first stock exchange was opened and began printing its own banknotes to attract local and foreign investments [1/4 FT]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey

Tunisia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict

1994

Oct. 17: The government announced it would begin modernization of its telecommunications systems at an average of $200 million per year for an unspecified duration [10/18 FT]

Oct. 30. Two agreements totalling $16 billion were signed with representatives of Tunisia and the Islamic Development Bank in Jiddah for the Tunisian Steel Manufacturing Company, the Tunisian Company of Esparto Grass, and the Paper Paste Company [11/3 FBIS]

Nov 2: President Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali pardoned 2,178 prisoners convicted of various crimes, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of his taking office [11/3 FBIS]

Turkey

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Regional Affairs, Cyprus

1994

Oct. 16: In Ankara, Dogu Perinçek was reelected Labor Party leader [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 18: Prime Minister Tansu Çiller reportedly gained the support of Foreign Minister Mumtaz Soysal for her privatization plan that would sell state telephone and electricity companies as well as five banks, the national airline, and manufacturing and oil refining businesses Soysal had won a constitutional court appeal on 12 July 1994 to block the plan [10/19 FT]

Oct. 19 Twelve alleged Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members were killed and five arrested in clashes with police in Sivas [10/20 FBIS]

Nov 3 The People's Democratic Party (HADEP) announced it would not participate in December elections to fill 22 seats in parliament [11/4 FT]

Nov. 4: Republican Assembly speaker Ayhan Halit Açarkan resigned from the Democratic Party (DP) but stated he would not resign from the assembly chairmanship [11/7 FBIS]

Nov 6 Alleged PKK members killed four teachers in Sahur district Nine alleged PKK members were killed in clashes with police in Diyarbakir and Silepi districts [11/17 FBIS]

Nov 7: Foreign Minister Soysal said in an interview that the Kurdish language, presently outlawed by the Turkish government, could be taught in schools and used in broadcasting Prime Minister Çiller would not confirm the policy change [11/8 FT]

HADEP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Republican People's Party (RPP) announced they would boycott the 4 December by-elections [11/8 FBIS]

Nov. 9: President Suleyman Demirel launched the Southeast Anatolia Project—a controversial hydroelectric and irrigation project consisting of a complex of 22 dams on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers—designed to irrigate large areas of the Harran Plain The plan could reduce water supplies to Syria and Iraq, who opposed the plan [11/10 FT]

Nov 17: The Turkish Grand National Assembly extended the state of emergency in ten southeastern Provinces until 19 March 1995 [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 19 The constitutional court accepted an appeal by the Refah party and rejected Prime Minister Çiller's new voting rules, forcing her to postpone 4 December by-elections for 22 seats, 16 of which had been held by Kurdish members of parliament who were charged with treason in March 1994 Prime Minister Çiller's rules would have allowed state employees to vote but would have disenfranchised an estimated two million Kurdish villagers [11/20 FT]

Nov 24 The parliament approved a framework privatization law by a vote of 193–25 that would give the government authority to sell more than 100 companies without prior parliamentary approval Proceeds would finance infrastructure projects and unemployment payments due to jobs lost in privatization [11/25 FT, FBIS]

Nov. 28 Foreign Minister Soysal resigned, reportedly over Prime Minister Çiller's appointment of Volkan Vural as undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry Murat Karayalcin, the deputy prime minster, was appointed acting foreign minister [11/29 FBIS]

Journalists Halim Abanoz, Deniz Arman, and Mehmet 'Ali Birand were sentenced to five months in prison for an allegedly anti-government program they produced on the Turkish military [11/29 FBIS]

Nov. 30 The Leftist Unity and Integration Party merged with the Democratic Left Party (DLP), giving the DLP ten seats in the Assembly [12/1 FBIS]

Dec 1: The Assembly rejected a bill to hold by-elections on 25 December [12/2 FBIS]

Dec. 3 Explosions killed one person and wounded nineteen others at the Istanbul and Ankara offices of *Ozgur Ulke* [12/4 NYT, 12/6 FBIS]

Dec. 6. Ten alleged PKK members were killed by police near Caytasi village and in Mardin's Yesilli district [12/7 FBIS]

Dec 7. The state security court dropped charges of separatism and "breaching the integrity of the state," which carried the death penalty, against eight Kurdish Ministers of Parliament [12/8 FBIS]

Dec 8: Kurdish Ministers of Parliament Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, Selim Sadak, Ahmet Turk, and Leyla Zana were convicted of supporting the PKK and were sentenced to fifteen years in prison Sedat Yurttas was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison on charges of "advocating support for the PKK," and Sirri Sakik and Mahmud Alinak were sentenced to three and a half years in prison on charges of disseminating separatist propaganda but were released after having already served nine months [12/9 NYT, WP]

Dec 11· The Constitutional Court blocked the sale of the state-owned electric company TEK, declaring as unconstitutional the sale of government energy installations [12/12 WSJ]

Dec 12. Fikri Saglar, secretary-general of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), resigned [12/13 FBIS]

Murat Karayalcin, state minister and deputy prime minister, was appointed foreign minister [12/13 FBIS]

Dec. 14 Mustafa Timisi was elected secretary-general of the SDPP [12/15 FBIS]

Kurdish lawyer Faik Candan was found murdered in Ankara [12/15 FT]

Dec 22· Çem Boyner, a millionaire textile heir, launched the New Democracy Movement (YDH), calling for the dismantling of the government's economic and political programs and for negotiations with Turkish Kurds [12/23 FT]

Dec. 25 Ten thousand Turkish forces launched an attack against PKK members in Tunceli Two alleged PKK members and one soldier were killed [12/26 NYT]

Dec. 27 Eighty-six alleged Islamists were sentenced to up to 15 years in jail in connection with July 1993 riots in Sivas that caused 37 deaths [12/28 FT]

The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch/Middle East appealed to the US State Department to reject an application by the US company Alliant Techsystems, Inc to sell land mines and cluster bombs to Turkey [12/28 WP]

Dec 29 A Turkish Airlines jet crashed as it attempted to land in poor weather in Van, killing 54 people [12/30 NYT]

1995

Jan 2 Alleged PKK members killed nineteen people and wounded six in an attack on the Hamzali village in Diyarbakir Province [1/3 FT]

Jan 8 Prime Minister Çiller announced she would seek to remove article 14 of the Constitution that prohibited any activity threatening the integrity of the state

In Istanbul, police seized editions of *Ozgur Ulke* that reportedly included articles advocating separatism [1/9 FT]

UAE

See also, Regional Affairs, Bahrain, Iraq

1994

Oct 19. A federal judge sentenced the former chief executive of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Swaleh Naqvi, to eight years in prison and ordered him to pay $255 4 million in restitution [10/20 NYT]

Creditors of the BCCI agreed to accept $1 8 billion in compensation from Abu Dhabi [10/20 NYT]

Oct. 21 Swaleh Naqvi pleaded not guilty to New York state charges that he was a key figure in the BCCI collapse [10/21 NYT]

Nov. 17 The BCCI Depositor's Protection Association (DPA), which had rejected earlier agreements between liquidators and creditors, agreed to the new agreement based on a $1 8 billion contribution from Abu Dhabi The agreement needed to be approved by courts in London, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands [11/18 FT]

Nov 21· The *Financial Times* reported that liquidators of BCCI were preparing an out-of-court settlement in which the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia and Shaykh Khalid bin Mahfouz would pay more than $245 million in exchange for having the charges against them dropped [11/22 FT]

Dec. 19. London's High Court approved the 17 November $1 8 billion compensation agreement between Abu Dhabi and liquidators of BCCI [12/20 FT]

Yemen

See also, Regional Affairs

1994

Nov 8. The government reportedly released thirty Truth Party political detainees Twenty-six remained in prison [11/16 FBIS]

Dec. 5· Security forces reported that clashes between the tribes of al-Hamad and Bani Nawf, which broke out 8 July over land ownership in al-Jawf governorate, had killed dozens and wounded hundreds [12/6 FBIS]

Book Reviews

Flowing Streams and Arid Politics

Review Article by John K. Cooley

Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, by Miriam R Lowi Cambridge and New York Cambridge University Press, 1994 xix + 204 pages Appends to p 211 Notes to p 270 Bibl to p 285 Index to p 291 $49 95

Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East, by Daniel Hillel New York and Oxford Oxford University Press, 1994 x + 297 pages Notes to p 318 Bibl to p 329 Gloss to p 342 Index to p 388 $30

As King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel both have acknowledged, the most crucial and valuable part of the peace treaty they signed in 1994 may well be the agreement on water This agreement seems capable of ending at least one part of the discord and conflict that have wracked the Middle East since early Sumerian times After generations of ambiguity and tergiversation by both sides, Israel accepted Jordan's pressing demands (usually made through the years with the dignity and discretion that characterize King Hussein's acts) for its rightful share of water

Although Syria—which, like Jordan and Iraq, suffers from cumulative and acute water shortage—has not acknowledged this publicly, Israel also committed itself in the peace treaty with Jordan to limit its share of the Yarmuk River waters (shared by Israel, Jordan, and Syria) to the 25 million cubic meters (mcm) per year allocated under the 1954 Johnston Plan This was the basic blueprint for equitable Mideast water-sharing which the administration of US President Dwight Eisenhower—much more far-seeing and imaginative about laying foundations of peace and growth in the region than most successors—drew up Jordan, as a recent study prepared for the Economist Intelligence Unit points out, is likely to get 215 mcm per year of additional water from the Yarmuk and its seasonal floodwater, desalinated water, the Jordan River's floodwaters, and other sources to be determined [1] Jordan has been unable to match Israel's capital and technology input devoted to storage of river waters, to upgrading the brackish flow of Jordan River water, and to protecting the quality of shared water resources for both

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[1] Abdalla Heserat, "Jordan's water challenge in the new political era," in *Peace Media 1994, Economic Dimensions of the Middle East Peace Process* (London Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994), p 74

John K Cooley, an ABC News correspondent, has authored six books on the Middle East and North Africa, and has written frequently on Mideast water problems His home base is presently Cyprus states Jordan will now be able to do these things if the agreement, under supervision of a joint Jordanian-Israeli water committee, is properly implemented

The Jordan-Israel treaty puts its two signatories far ahead of the other riverine states of the region in resolving often tough, intractable problems in the Euphrates, Litani, Nile, Tigris, and other Mideast water systems Both of the two excellent books under review were published before this Jordan-Israel treaty was a done deal Each book, however, anticipates the requirements for positive solutions in its analysis of the Mideast aspects of the growing global water shortage

Professor Miriam Lowi did her graduate work at Princeton University under the eminent Middle East economic historian, Charles Issawi Her systematic study reflects Issawi's influence She treats Arab-Israeli contention over the Jordan River basin in terms familiar to Americans or Europeans living in arid zones like Nevada or Italy's Mezzogiorno, where water can be a political as well as an existential issue ("Water," wrote the French poet-aviator Antoine de St -Exupery, "is not necessary to life but is life itself ") Lowi reviews other riparian disputes over the Euphrates basin—among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Indus basin—between India and Pakistan, and the Nile basin—among Egypt, the Sudan, and seven other African riparian states

In her careful dissection of the main Jordan basin issues from the first work of American planners like Eric Johnston, Lowi traces how the plans and projects of the 1950s have become tangled in the deadly web of the central, emotive Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in such equally complicated ones as the Israeli-Syrian conflict over the Banias River and other Jordan headwaters rising in or near the Golan Heights She appraises, with cool but not unsympathetic scrutiny, the water problems of Israel and Turkey Turkey, one sometimes needs reminding, is the only regional power with a water surplus In contrast, Israel's growing water deficit is one reason for its reluctance to abandon West Bank aquifers being diverted into pre-1967 Israel There is a clear need to apply human compassion, as well as technology and capital, in finding answers

Professor Daniel Hillel's magisterially researched and elegantly written book—*Rivers of Eden*—is more than just a political, geographical, and ecological survey of the Mideast's water history since prehistoric times It is all of these, but much more It is a cultural history of water through the ages The important dimension Hillel adds to the search for peace is ecology What he calls the "severely wounded environment" of the region is devastated by centuries of poor farming methods, opportunism, failure by Arabs, Jews, Persians, Turks, and all of the myriad peoples preceding them on the stage of history to understand principles of irrigation or the erosion and preservation of soil

Hillel draws, with great effectiveness, on his lifelong experience in many corners of the world, as a hydrologist and environmental scientist At present Professor Emeritus of Plant, Soil, and Environmental Sciences at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, his career has encompassed university teaching and much research as a consultant to the governments of Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, the Sudan, and others His scholarship inspires him to intersperse Biblical and Quranic quotes that have peace as a keynote throughout his texts, photographs, and excellent line drawings of comparative systems of irrigation and cultivation since archaic times For example, he cites the Book of Isaiah "Behold, I extend peace like a river, and the honor of nations like a mighty stream" (66 12, p vii)

Conjuring up a kind of satellite-eye's view of the terrain, from North Africa's Atlantic coast eastward to the Indus Valley, Hillel reminds us of how precious to this planet's life are our major river systems How the use and misuse of soil and water contributed to the successive rise and fall of Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Judaic, Nabatean, Arab, Western colonial, and many other systems makes fascinating reading Equally pertinent is understanding how the mix of selfish politics and selfish or ignorant violations of basic ecological principles has led to the 20th century's Mideast conflicts, and may bring on worse ones, as water, and consequently food, dwindles Hillel recalls how imperial powers and well-meaning statesmen like US president Woodrow Wilson helped to draw today's frontiers, most of which contradict natural as well as human factors He then discusses the Nile—"the mother river and her thirsty children"—and the dilemmas and consequences of dividing the Jordan River and the "flowing streams of Lebanon" and Syria His analysis is along three dimensions human, agro-technical, and environmental More scientific in their analysis, but still laced with a rich variety of literary and historical references, are his final chapters on what its human inhabitants must undertake to make the Middle East peaceful and environmentally liveable

In the chapter titled "Fountains of the Deep," Hillel describes how underground water can be used, yet conserved This is one of the important, though less understood, topics incidentally covered by the 1994 Israel-Jordan treaty that includes the Wadi Arava and Dead Sea region territory regained by Jordan Recycling waste water—existing everywhere from Israel to New Zealand—for reuse is explained Better ways of augmenting water supplies, including inducing rain, collecting runoff, "trading" water between regions, and desalinizing, are briefly but expertly discussed

In his final two chapters, Hillel argues that the only valid criteria for sharing international waters like the Euphrates, Jordan, Nile, and other transnational watercourses of the Mideast have to be ethical and legal, as well as pragmatic or expedient Israel or Arab states, for example, ought not to surreptitiously or openly lift water from neighbors, simply because the state doing the lifting thinks it can make better use of the water than its deprived neighbor The author makes it clear that he interprets positively one of the many Arabic aphorisms about water—*"Halli yado bilmai mish zai halli yado bilnar"* (One whose hand is in water is not like one whose hand is in fire)—and that he sees water as a powerful tool to achieve peace For him, it means those engaged in water management are not likely to engage in war

Lowi concentrates strongly on political problems She argues that these must be worked through before the hydrological or environmental ones can be worked out The opposite approach was followed by US policy makers who, for years, like some Israeli ones, sought ways to "resettle" Palestinian refugees in environments with water, soil, and other natural conditions better than those of their camps or their urban diasporas This, as Hillel recognizes, is fallacious reasoning Most people prefer home, with whatever imperfections, to alien lands and environments

King Hussein and Israel's leaders have set an example by weaving water management into the very fabric of what they believe will be a peaceful and more abundant future Both Lowi and Hillel have made major contributions to inducing the rest of Middle Eastern, and, indeed, global society, to follow their example Neither rivers nor the human hopes and aspirations they nurture can be contained in any kind of frontier The same principle must come to govern human relations if wars over real estate, water, and religion in the Middle East are to end Hillel quotes the Book of Isaiah as well in closing "Behold, I will extend peace like a river, and the wealth of the nations, like a mighty stream And when ye see this, your heart shall rejoice" (66 12, 14, p 297) There are few better ways of escaping the sometimes arid formulations of conventional political and economic discourse about Mideastern affairs than the rich experience of reading, and learning from, these two fine books

ALGERIA

Le drame algérien: un peuple en otage, by Reporters Sans Frontières Paris Editions La Découverte, 1994 222 pages 110FF paper

Histoire de l'Algérie depuis l'indépendance, by Benjamin Stora Paris Editions La Découverte, 1994 103 pages Biogs to p 109 Bibl to p 113 Chron to p 119 45FF paper

Reviewed by Arun Kapil

Those interested in Algeria have always had to rely on books and journals published in France, given the relative dearth of English-language scholarship on that important country This is ever more the case nowadays, as Algeria continues to descend into political chaos Hardly a month goes by without the appearance in France of a new book on the Algerian crisis and its origins, or a special issue of a journal devoted entirely to the subject

One such book is *Le drame algérien,* which bills itself as a primer on the Algerian crisis Its contributions were all written in 1994, making the book one of the most up-to-date on the subject thus far The book has a unique format, consisting of 100 one-to-four-page essays and articles written by 27 authors (18 Algerian and 9 French)

About two-thirds of the essays were written by journalists and the remainder by academics Though it bears the imprint of Reporters Sans Frontières, a Paris-based organization that serves as a sort of "Amnesty International" for journalists subject to political repression throughout the world, the book's veritable editor is José Garçon, a veteran correspondent of the Paris daily *Libération*, who has covered Algeria since the mid-1980s

A cautionary note may be added at the outset about *Le drame algérien* First, the journalistic tone and brevity of the essays should not lead one to dismiss it as superficial The overall quality of the essays is high, due primarily to the high quality of the contributors themselves A number of the Algerian journalists have been associated with the country's best weeklies of recent years, such as *Algérie-Actualité, Le Jeudi d'Algérie*, and *La Nation* The academic contributors include Mohammed Harbi, Algeria's preeminent intellectual figure and scholarly authority on the Front de Libération National (FLN), the historian Benjamin Stora, and Ahmed Rouadjia and Séverine Labat, two leading specialists on the Algerian Islamist movement

Second, the book does not take a neutral position on the current crisis Though none of the contributors is pro-Islamist, many have long been outspoken critics of the FLN and, more recently, of the January 1992 coup d'état and cancellation of the legislative elections that would have brought the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to power The political *parti pris* of the book is one of opposition to the military-backed regime in Algiers and the "eradicators," i e , those advocating total repression of the Islamists and rejecting any notion of dialogue or compromise For this reason, the book has been attacked in the Algiers pro-eradicator press

Le drame algérien is divided into four sections The first focuses on the manner in which ordinary Algerians have been affected by the country's multifaceted crisis Essays discuss the various ordeals of everyday life resulting from the disastrous state of the economy, the disarray of the younger generation, the difficult relationship between the sexes, the crisis of Algerian culture, and the violence and repression of the security forces against the urban popular classes Most of these essays are authored by two of Algeria's best journalists—Ghania Mouffok and Tewfik Hakem (also writing under the *nom de plume*, Thé Hash)

The second section, titled "the five pillars of the system," discusses the underlying logic for those in control, namely, to stay in power at all costs The pillars are (1) the "confiscation of history," i e , the official and highly distorted version of modern Algerian history that denied the political diversity of the Algerian national movement, covered up the less-than-glorious conduct of the FLN during and immediately after the 1962 war of independence, and repressed Algeria's Berber heritage, (2) the "Sécurité Militaire," i e , the secret police and its sordid legacy of repression and assassination, (3) the "revenue from oil and natural gas," propping up the Algerian rentier state and contributing to numerous economic irrationalities, (4) "corruption," fueled by hydrocarbon rent and spawning the enormous parallel market, and (5) "regionalism," whose existence is officially denied but which underpins clientelistic networks that are the mainstay of the FLN

The third section is on the crisis of the dictatorship and efforts of the power apparatus to thwart the development of democracy It treats the main events of the past six years, including the riots of October 1988 and the "false democracy" that ensued, the coup d'état of January 1992, and the assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf six months later The book's *parti pris* is revealed in discussions of the most important political forces apart from the Islamists and the army The portrayals of the FLN and pro-eradicator Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and Socialist Vanguard Party (PAGS) are highly negative, as is that of the "official" human rights league, Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l'Homme (LADH) On the other hand, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) (which opposed the January 1992 coup d'état) and anti-regime human rights league—Ligue Algérienne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH)—are depicted in a positive light

The final section is on Islamism and the FIS It discusses the complex nature of the FIS and refutes several *idées reçues* widespread in France and among Westernized Algerians These include the notion that the mainline FIS leadership is behind recent terrorist outrages attributed to the Islamists, that the FIS is mainly supported by the urban lumpenproletariat, that Algeria will become another "Iran" if the FIS comes to power, that the

FIS owes its strength primarily to external financing, and that the FIS has lost the initiative to the extremist groups and thus much of its credibility. As the authors argue, the FIS is an inter-class movement with an important modernist wing led and supported by highly educated individuals. The FIS is likewise a home-grown phenomenon with deep roots in Algerian culture and history. Though hardly democratic in outlook, the results of two elections clearly demonstrate that the Islamist movement is by far the most popular political force in Algeria today. The current crisis will not end unless the FIS is fully engaged in the search for a solution.

The message of the authors—some of whom fled Algeria after receiving death threats from Islamist extremists—is correct. It now seems to be sinking in even within the ruling circles in Algiers. *Le drame algérien* is an excellent guide to the Algerian crisis for the non-specialist, though it will also profit those with firsthand knowledge of Algerian politics.

One cannot make sense of the current Algerian crisis without some knowledge of the country's development since independence. One good overview for the non-specialist is Benjamin Stora's *Histoire de l'Algérie depuis l'indépendance*. Stora, a native of Constantine, is the preeminent historian of modern Algeria of his generation. *Histoire de l'Algérie* is his third book on the history of Algeria since 1830, written specially for "Collection Repères," a new imprint of Editions La Découverte that seeks to rival Presses Universitaires de France's popular "Que sais-je?" series.

Histoire de l'Algérie begins with the summer of 1962 crisis, when the FLN descended into fratricidal conflict in the wake of independence. Stora takes the reader through the chaotic Ahmed Ben Bella period (1962–65), the Houari Boumediene era of state-building and industrial development (1965–78), the decadence of Chadli Bendjedid's first two terms in office (1979–88), the political opening following the riots of October 1988 and the rise of the Islamists, and the tragic consequences of the coup d'état of January 1992.

While the overall presentation is satisfying, the discussion of politics should have been more detailed and analytical. On the other hand, chapters on society, culture, and the economy are solid. The author usefully provides biographical sketches of the main political figures since independence, a detailed chronology, and an extensive bibliography.

The book, it should be noted, contains several small errors, mostly in regard to dates and figures. This is most likely due to typographical errors and poor proofreading on the part of the publisher.

Stora and a number of contributors to *Le drame algérien* have been frequently solicited over the years by the French mass media, which extensively covers events in Algeria. Since the publication of these books, they have been increasingly ignored by that same media, which now prefers to present the views of pro-eradictors, who present a simplistic portrait of the Algerian crisis as a stark struggle of "modernity" and "democracy" versus the prospect of an Islamist dictatorship. This is most unfortunate, as the sophisticated analysis of the authors becomes ever more pertinent during Algeria's descent into violence and chaos.

Arun Kapil is a visiting scholar at the Institut Maghreb-Europe, University of Paris-VIII.

ISRAEL

Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, by Yair Evron. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. xii + 276 pages. Notes to p. 302. Bibl. to page 314. Index to page 327. $39.95.

Reviewed by George H. Quester

This is the substantially expanded English translation of a Hebrew-language book first published in Israel in 1987. In the eight years since, much has happened (all of which is addressed in this expanded version), including the 1986 arrest and trial of Mordechai Vanunu for disclosing information about Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona, the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The book remains valuable now in English, because the author's basic message is still so very plausible.

The message is that Israel and the entire Middle East are better off if Israel does not openly admit to possessing nuclear weapons. Yair Evron has maintained this view for several decades, even when some fellow Israelis, like Shai Feldman, have called for a more open Israeli admission to possessing nuclear weapons. Evron expertly pulls together broad theoretical arguments and factual information to argue that an explicit Israeli admission of nuclear weapons possession would lead Arab countries to also seek nuclear weapons, causing hostile reactions outside of the Middle East.

The alternative would be for Israel to explicitly renounce nuclear weapons, by adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It would also have to open its entire nuclear program to the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Evron, however, does not advocate a total denuclearization, because Israel has more to lose in conventional military defeat than it could gain in conventional military victory, and because of the attitudes of Israeli domestic politics. He resigns himself, instead, to a continuation of the "opaque" or ambiguous nuclear proliferation policy in place since 1960.

Evron surveys three decades (1960–90) of Israeli nuclear weapons development very comprehensively. He shows how this ambiguous Israeli "policy" on nuclear weapons possession developed haphazardly. Yet, this policy has now existed for more than thirty years and the Israeli leadership has had time to ponder it.

In opposing greater reliance on nuclear deterrence for Israel, Evron understates the role that this Israeli "bomb in the basement" has played in compelling the Arab world to accept Israel's existence. According to Evron, the Egyptian war plan of 1973 "completely ignored the nuclear dimension" (p. 63). This is hard to believe. He appears to accept at face value the Egyptian denials of any connection between the nuclear threat and President Anwar Sadat's opening to Israel. Any astute Egyptian leader would have had to take this stand, when facing a possible Israeli nuclear stockpile.

Like other strategists, Evron distinguishes between "deterrence" and "compellence." Yet, on some points, the two concepts converge. If the mere possibility of Israel using nuclear weapons can "deter" Arab leaders from exploiting opportunities for conventional warfare, then one can argue that this also "compels" these Arab leaders to change their views on the inevitability of Israel's existence.

Perhaps the best that can be said for openly declaring that Israel has nuclear weapons is that it would replace subterfuge with honesty. Surprisingly, Evron does not make much of the arguments about Israeli domestic processes here. Avner Cohen and others have argued that Israeli democracy is undermined and compromised by having such a major decision withheld from public scrutiny.[1]

Many might indeed be surprised that a policy of ambiguity is still possible after the Vanunu case, after press discussions of a possible Israeli nuclear response if Iraqi president Saddam Hussein ever used chemical weapons in his SCUD missile attacks, and after all the press coverage of the possibilities of an Israeli nuclear stockpile. Yet, Evron makes a convincing case that such ambiguity still has life to it.

This is a well-written and scholarly book that surveys exhaustively one of the most important issues facing the Middle East. It is valuable to anyone, regardless of political allegiance, interested in the future of war and peace in the region.

George H. Quester, Professor of Government and Politics, the University of Maryland, is the author of The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation *(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).*

PALESTINE

Armenians of Jerusalem: Memories of Life in Palestine, by John H. Melkon Rose. London and New York: Radcliffe Press, 1993. xvii + 275 pages. Maps to p. 282. Index to p. 291. $39.50.

Reviewed by S. Peter Cowe

The title's rather broad scope is a somewhat misleading intimation of this book's real purpose. Far from presenting a general socio-historical survey of the Armenian community in Jerusalem, the author focuses rather on chronicling the experiences of his own family. He thereby offers a series of vignettes illustrating the tenor of life in

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[1] Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, *Nuclear Shadows in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Defense and Arms Control/MIT, 1990).

Palestine and its cosmopolitan capital, Jerusalem, beginning in the 1830s

Born under the British Mandate to an English father and an Armenian mother, Melkon Rose very graphically represents the values of that era of symbiosis Unable to identify fully with either facet of his makeup, he introduces himself as "European with an oriental flourish" (p 1) This background accounts in part for the rather detached manner in which he describes events and the strong individuality of his narrative voice The intricately inscribed memoirs of three generations of his mother's family, a union of the Krikorians and Gazmararians—two houses long established in the Armenian Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem—comprise the first third of the book This is followed by an autobiographical sketch of the author's early home life, education, and daily rounds as an accountant against the backdrop of increasing Arab-Jewish tensions that erupted into full-scale war in 1948 The period from the war's aftermath until the June 1967 war, which found him briefly in Amman and then back in his old school atmosphere at St George's Anglican cathedral in Jerusalem, is handled more succinctly The final section tersely documents the transformation the author observed in the eastern part of the city from Jerusalem's reunification in 1967 until his departure for England in 1976 A short epilogue concludes the family story with the death of the last member of his mother's generation in 1989

Although the early part of the work is based primarily on oral recollections, these have been supplemented by research in local archives The autobiographical section is interesting not only for its firsthand testimony to local conditions at a crucial juncture in the city's history, but also for the fortuitous circumstances that situated Melkon Rose near the center of the conflict both in 1948 and 1967 In 1948, he moved to the Baqa'a area of Jerusalem just before it was secured by Jewish forces, and was cut off from other relatives in the Jordanian-occupied east side of Jerusalem In 1967, he was located near the front line of the Israeli assault on the eastern sector of the city

The leitmotif affording a certain unity to the narrative is provided by the author's depiction of his parental house in Jerusalem's Greek Colony His attachment to it was such that he refused to leave for England with his parents before the 1948 partition Finally compelled to abandon the house, he returned periodically to find it vandalized, repossessed, and ultimately demolished to make way for a high-rise building His reaction to that last scene ("I felt as though I was desperately trying to recapture a lovely life which had vanished," p 271) is symptomatic of his perspective on the culture the house symbolized, which he regards as moribund, suffocating in a "noose of concrete" (ibid) The book is, hence, a nostalgic epitaph to the world of his childhood

Men employed as potters, carpenters, and coffee shop owners and women employed in domestic service doing needlework and sewing—his maternal forebears emerge as typical of the artisan and small trader community clustered in the streets surrounding the Armenian patriarchate However, his forebears were progressively minded The next generation rose to become jewelers, engineers, and minor officials in European organizations in the traditional middleman capacity that Armenians have filled throughout the Near and Far East Moreover, the author alludes frequently to the impact the great powers had through the institutions they established Education, for girls as well as boys, was an opportunity actively embraced, and so both the author's mother and aunt trained as nurses at the American University of Beirut, the aunt continuing to study midwifery in Berlin

The book is valuable for its vivid descriptions of the pageantry marking the local celebration of major feasts of the Armenian church, although some of the explanations are inaccurate There is also a tendency to exaggerate the antiquity of the patriarchate and its cultural heritage [1] The work offers a mine of information on family life, rites of passage, and sensuous evocations of the natural landscape revealing the author's horticultural proclivities However, growing up in an Anglo-Arab environment on the periphery of Armenian society and lacking fluency in the language (as indicated by the imprecise rendering of Armenian terms in the glossary), Melkon Rose does not elaborate on relations between the older residents and the refugees from the Armenian genocide, nor on the voluntary and political Armenian organizations that developed in Palestine Though concerned about the Armenian community's demise, he never mentions the community's opinion about the Arab-Israeli dispute, a dispute that affects its livelihood and future prospects

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[1] For a similar tendency, see another work emanating from the same background George Hintlian, *History of the Armenians in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem St James Press, 1976)

S Peter Cowe, Department of Middle Eastern and Asian Languages and Cultures, Columbia University

Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine: The Arab Struggle for Survival and Power, by Donna Robinson Divine Boulder and London Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994 vii + 215 pages Index to p 226 $38

Reviewed by Michael R Fischbach

Donna Robinson Divine's insightful study offers a welcome contribution to scholars' understanding of Palestinian society during the Ottoman era Largely utilizing secondary works and published primary sources, Divine argues that the society, economy, and political culture that emerged in Palestine during the 19th century were the result of a complex interaction between Ottoman imperial authority and local social realities She posits that the Ottomans were incapable of forcing increasing Ottoman power upon Palestinian society in the 19th century, and were in fact forced to seek accommodation with local elites and adjust to local conditions For their part, Palestinians increasingly molded their own survival strategies around Ottoman networks of political and economic power Palestinian social structure did not emerge as a "natural phenomenon but, rather, as an artifice" shaped by the form and substance of Ottoman rule (p 8)

After discussing early 19th-century Palestine, Divine then charts the steady rise in Ottoman power and the response of Palestine's influential rural shaykhs to this challenge prior to and during the Egyptian period While granting the Egyptian occupation of 1831–40, under Ibrahim Pasha, its traditionally important place within Palestinian historiography, the author contends that Ibrahim Pasha's rule did not mark a dramatic break from the previous Ottoman order, but rather facilitated changes that had already been underway under the Ottomans A new Palestinian attitude toward state institutions was beginning to develop An expanding economy stimulated by Muhammad 'Ali created new opportunities and interests and, by extension, new conceptualizations of how the state could further them

By the early 20th century, rather than see the state as unwanted and intrusive, Palestinian elites viewed the Ottoman empire as necessary for stability and enrichment In analyzing the era of the Tanzimat and Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II (1876–1909), Divine argues that Palestinian society continued to use Ottoman structures to its advantage despite the challenges to local autonomy these posed New political practices offered new opportunities for Arab elites to wield power and exert influence, but always through linkages with Ottoman institutions Pre-existing patterns of demonstrating power, such as patronage, did not disappear, but were increasingly associated with new economic and political realities tempered by the state

Divine reinterprets Palestinian reaction to the Young Turk revolution of 1908 She argues that the revolution, which initially restored the 1876 constitution, ushered in a period of growth in which Palestinian society generally worked with Young Turk policies rather than against them Despite the rise of Arabism during this period, she maintains that elites still tried to maintain their place in a reformed empire rather than rebel against it Although Ottomanism, Turkism, and Arabism were fundamentally different ideologies, Divine argues that all shared a common conviction in upholding the integrity of the Ottoman empire This fact, she believes, explains the overall Palestinian loyalty to the empire during the First World War and the 1916–18 Arab Revolt

In her conclusion, the author maintains that, despite their successful "struggle for survival" under the Ottomans, Palestinians failed to manage the exigencies of the post-WWI British Mandate period The Mandate imposed a markedly different concept of government upon Ottomanized Palestinian political culture to which the Palestinians ultimately could not adapt Thus, it was not a weak sense of shared political outlook that hampered Palestinian society during the British Mandate, but the fact that the political system, around which so many survival strategies had been formed during Ottoman rule, was now a significantly different system overseeing a significantly different economy

Throughout, Divine skillfully uses insights derived from such approaches as social history and historical geography to balance her wider interpretations with descriptions of changing patterns of Palestinian life Thus, while advancing the debate about Ottoman rule in Palestine, Divine simultaneously details changing patterns of life in 19th-century Palestine—from new conceptualizations of landholding to changes in marriage practices—within the context of a state-society dialectic

Several minor flaws emerge but fail to detract from the book's overall value The transliteration scheme is inconsistent, as are the titles of foreign-language references Most of the latter are transliterated, with the exception of some that are translated, while others are both transliterated and translated Lastly, a bibliography would have been useful

Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine comes as a welcome and highly readable interpretation that combines macro-level analysis with a micro-level examination of Palestinian society during the Ottoman age

Michael R Fischbach, Department of History, Randolph-Macon College

SUDAN

On Trek in Kordofan: The Diaries of a British District Officer in the Sudan, 1931–1933, by C A E Lea, ed by Martin W Daly Oxford and New York Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1994 ix + 291 pages Maps to p 295 Append to p 296 Index to p 304 $45

Reviewed by Ismail H Abdalla

The author of several well-known works on the Sudan, including two seminal titles—*Empire on the Nile* and *Imperial Sudan*[1]—Professor Martin Daly has now given us an edition of a colonial diary—*On Trek in Kordofan*—in his continuous scholarly effort to document and intelligently interpret the history of British rule in the Sudan But *On Trek in Kordofan* is a far cry from Daly's other works, and the fault lies squarely with the diaries' author, Cyril A E Lea This work is the day-to-day recounting of events Lea encountered in his extensive travels among the camel-herding Kababish of northern Kordofan during 1931–33 The diaries tell more about Lea's idiosyncracies than about these nomadic peoples As the editor has rightly observed, the trekking was motivated principally by Lea's love of the desert and not by a sense of duty to administer this extensive region Thus, the reader is provided with lengthy, often monotonous descriptions of sand dunes, desert terrain, wadis, shrubs, blue skies, and the inevitable dust storms, but with disproportionately little information about the history, traditions, or livelihood of the very people whose administration and well-being were Lea's responsibility

It is clear from these diaries that Lea disdained and mistrusted almost all individual Kababish, Kawahla, Nuba, Meidoub, and Kaja with whom he reluctantly had to deal At the same time, his colonial paternalism committed him to try to protect their pristine nomadic way of life against what he called the persistent and undesirable influences of urban modernization Shaykh 'Ali al-Tom, the tribal chief of the Kababish, was, however, the exception Lea seems to have had a special admiration for al-Tom's administrative skills and vision Nevertheless, it was a condescending admiration driven by the myth that these hapless tribal groups functioned normally only under benevolent and unselfish British stewardship

For the researcher determined not to come out empty-handed from reading these otherwise dry and tedious diaries, there are a few redeeming qualities There are, for example, several references to the problem of slavery, what ought to be done about emancipated slaves, and what attitudes British administrators in the regions had toward these matters Equally significant, though less developed, is the issue of inter-tribal relationships and the role the colonial government played in shaping them There are also useful bits of information about the prices of different consumer items that may be of interest to those concerned with the history of peripheral economies

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[1] Martin W Daly, *Empire on the Nile The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934* (Cambridge and New York Cambridge University Press, 1987), Martin W Daly, *Imperial Sudan The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium* (Cambridge and New York Cambridge University Press, 1991)

Credit, however, goes to Daly for the remarkable job he has done to give shape to these diaries and to render them readable He has ascertained the names of persons and places, and has tried to correct or otherwise make consistent Lea's misspelling and irregular spelling Despite this, a number of errors have escaped Daly's scrutiny

In the end, *On Trek in Kordofan* is hardly worth the "trekking" along its tedious and self-centered entries except, perhaps, to those with an insatiable nostalgia for colonial Africa, or those interested in documenting the attitudes of certain British district officers toward their charges

Ismail H Abdalla, Department of History, The College of William and Mary

SYRIA

Syria's Quest for Independence, 1939–1945, by Salma Mardam Bey Reading, UK Ithaca Press, 1994 xxxii + 227 pages Append to p 232 Bibl to p 235 Index to p 242 $55

Reviewed by Philip S Khoury

Scholarship on Syria during the Second World War has focused principally on Anglo-French wartime relations and rivalries [1] It has paid some attention to the activities of the Syrian and Lebanese independence movements, but only as secondary phenomena or an afterthought There is no satisfying history, told from the Syrian perspective, of how Syria achieved independence during World War II [2]

Salma Mardam Bey has attempted to fill this void Her history is idiosyncratic because it is based in large measure on the unpublished correspondence and memoranda of her father, the late Jamil Mardam Bey, a leading Syrian nationalist politician of the French mandate era Although she also uses British and French archival material and the published memoirs of some of the main British and French political actors, her narrative stresses the role her father played in the events of that period

Jamil Mardam Bey was a major actor in Syrian politics during the first half of the 20th century He was the Syrian nationalist most engaged in daily diplomacy with Free French officials—including General Charles de Gaulle and General Georges Catroux (Commander-in-Chief of the Free French in the Levant)—and the nationalist the French most respected This was because he was fundamentally moderate in his views and spoke excellent French In many ways, Mardam Bey was the model Syrian politician of the period He hailed from a prominent Damascene family of absentee landlords and was educated in Paris During World War I he joined the secret Arab nationalist society, al-Fatat He participated in the Syrian Revolt of 1925–27, and was a founder of the most important inter-war Syrian nationalist organization (the National Bloc) In the late 1930s he served as Syria's first nationalist prime minister, and when Syria became independent at the end of World War II he became its first foreign minister Although he continued to be politically active in the years after independence, he earned his reputation in the pre-independence era

Syria's Quest for Independence begins with an article Jamil Mardam Bey wrote in 1939, just after the French High Commissioner had suspended the Syrian constitution and dismissed parliament Mardam Bey himself had resigned as prime minister a few months earlier He had been roundly criticized by other nationalists for making unfavorable concessions to the French in an attempt to get them to sign the independence treaty he had helped to negotiate in 1936 Mardam Bey's article is a subtle defense of his own actions cast in the light of French equivocation over the rights of Syria to national self-determination.

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[1] See A B Gaunson, *The Anglo-French Clash in Lebanon and Syria, 1940–1945* (London MacMillan, 1987), Aviel Roshwald, *Estranged Bedfellows Britain and France in the Middle East during the Second World War* (New York Oxford University Press, 1990), and François Kersaudy, *Churchill and de Gaulle* (London Collins, 1981)

[2] Albert Hourani's *Syria and Lebanon A Political Essay* (London Oxford University Press, 1946) and Stephen Longrigg's *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London Oxford University Press, 1958) provide useful information and, in the case of Hourani's study, remarkably revealing analysis, but they were written long before relevant archival materials in Britain, France, Lebanon, and Syria became available to scholars

The rest of the book is mainly about Mardam Bey's wartime efforts, in and out of government, to negotiate Syria's independence from France without first having to sign a treaty. The author reveals much interesting information about Syrian, or at least about Mardam Bey's, perceptions of Britain's military and diplomatic presence in Syria during the war, and, in particular, about the controversial role of Edward Spears, who was Winston Churchill's representative in the Levant. Although it is known that Syrian nationalists tried to exploit Anglo-French rivalry to gain leverage against France, Mardam Bey's various memos suggest that he distrusted Britain even more than France.

The book sheds new light on the efforts of Syrian nationalists to enlist American and Soviet support. It suggests that Mardam and his colleagues were not oblivious to the changing international balance of power. The author also discusses the successful efforts of Syrian and Lebanese nationalists to coordinate their policies, as they sought independence, vis-à-vis the French. By the late 1930s, Syrian nationalists had acknowledged the aspirations of their Lebanese counterparts for an independent Lebanon, and had all but abandoned their historic claims to the political union of Syria and Lebanon.

The author's conclusions are the same as her father's. First, Syrian nationalists saw to it that their country achieved full independence without binding it to either France or Britain. Second, whatever positive signals de Gaulle may have given the Syrian people in the early war years, his efforts to save France included maintaining a firm grip on the French colonial empire. The French added Syria and Lebanon to their empire late in the game, and gave them up earlier than their other overseas possessions. The bombing of Damascus in 1945 ensured deep Syrian resentment toward France for another generation.

This book adds to our knowledge of high politics and diplomacy in wartime Syria. If Jamil Mardam Bey emerges as the supreme Syrian strategist and tactician of that period, this is to be expected, as the book is written by a loving daughter in sole possession of her father's papers. Still, for historians the author has constructed a unique narrative around her father's private correspondence and memoranda. These papers, if made available to historians, will help them conduct much needed research on modern Syrian history.

Philip S. Khoury is Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and author of Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945 *(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).*

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

The Hostage, by Zayd Mukee' Dammaj. Tr. by May Jayyusi and Christopher Tingley. New York: Interlink Books, 1994. 151 pages. $10.95.

Reviewed by Sheila Carapico

In this sparse little novel, Dammaj provides both a prison diary and a coming-of-age tale. The blending of universal literary themes makes *The Hostage* a highly accessible story despite its exotic and rarified setting: imamic Yemen of the 1940s.

Jayyusi and Tingley's translation will be most English readers' first taste of Yemeni fiction. But *The Hostage* is neither an ethnographic novel, nor, really, a historical novel. Although one notices the most ubiquitous traits of Yemeni society—qat-chewing, outward gender segregation, and poetry-recitation—there is minimal cultural portraiture. Pre-revolutionary North Yemen is not the subject but the setting in which a pubescent lad relates his incarceration experience.

Any book in the prison diary genre is a commentary on the system that subjugates the protagonist to captivity. Dammaj's nameless storyteller is a victim of the imam's practice of taking hostage the sons of rebellious shaykhs. Much of the literature of the Free Yemeni movement was produced by political prisoners at what the boy in Dammaj's story calls the hostage fortress. But the young hostage, who is moved from this fortress to the palace of a provincial governor, has an as-yet-undeveloped political consciousness. For example, only through the grapevine does he learn that his own father has been “stirring things up by attacking the Imam in the newspapers in Aden,” and that consequently his village is “in a bad way” and his uncles are “all in prison” (p. 53).

The youth's political naiveté precludes much political commentary, though when it comes, it is sharp. Beyond the palace, the city of Taiz is “a pit of plagues, teeming with the sick, the mad, the deformed, the simple-minded—and with oppressive rulers” (p. 56). The only direct comment on the failed 1948 constitutional coup that is the backdrop of the story comes from the storyteller's consumptive best friend, who leaps up upon hearing of the death of the imam, then murmurs, “They've done it all wrong. . . . They should have dealt with [the Crown Prince] first” (p. 136). And indeed, the imam's heir declares Sana'a “an open city for his men to loot and kill and destroy as they wished” (p. 143). Subtly interjected in these passages are somewhat cryptic asides (e.g., to Radio Berlin)—a commentary on fascist patterns of class and power.

The major theme of the story itself is sexual coming-of-age. Here is a boy effectively assigned as the sensual apprentice to a remarkable princess, Sharifa Hafsa, sister of the governor. Unlike the Saudi princesses depicted in recent American docu-fiction, the sharifa is a complex, tough character. Heir to her mother's handsome fortune, she divorces her feeble, impotent husband in order to set up her own grand household within the palace compound. Most of the adjectives in the book describe her physical charms, and, like the other women of the palace, she is (by what one would assume to be the Yemeni standards of the time) sexually brazen. She too is an “inmate of the palace,” its most powerful captive, the most dynamic figure in the story.

Though set in a very particular time and place, Dammaj's first novel, perhaps more properly a novelette, is a highly literary piece. It addresses wider themes in Arabic fiction, and at the same time is the imaginary counterpart to the more explicitly political non-fiction that came out of the imam's prisons. As such, it is of interest to readers of comparative and Arab literature as well as to students of Yemeni history.

Sheila Carapico, Department of Political Science, University of Richmond

An Introduction to Persian, by Wheeler M. Thackston. Bethesda, MD: Iranbooks, 1993. xxxiv + 213 pages. Appends. to p. 249. Gloss. to p. 284. Index to p. 287. $25 paper.

Reviewed by Mahvash Shahegh Hariri

This book is an ambitious attempt to bring together all elements of modern, classical, and colloquial Persian grammar. It draws on examples from contemporary and classical Persian prose and utilizes Persian and English vocabulary. To use an Iranian metaphor, the author has tried to pour a sea into a jar. Thackston attempts to dazzle his readers with the glamor of complicated language and a variety of poorly organized topics.

In the preface, the author claims that the book “is intended to serve as an introduction on the elementary level to the modern Persian language.” How a novice in the Persian language can read and comprehend 10th-century Persian prose after a few lessons is a question that only Thackston can answer. The language of the book is extremely difficult. Even Persian language experts must read it several times to understand the meaning. For example, the author writes, “The past participle, which like the English past participle, has a passive force with transitive verbs and a past force with intransitive verbs, is formed by adding stressed -é to the past stem” (p. 43).

He also writes, “Compound verbs with transitive verbal elements do not normally form passives. Instead, an intransitive compound with a passive sense is formed by changing the transitive verbal element into a corresponding intransitive one” (p. 188).

Another drawback of the book is the lack of organization and correlation between the topics. For example, at the end of the lesson on the construction of imperative verbs in Persian, there is a paragraph about the resumptive sentence construction. This in no way correlates with the imperative verb. Had there been better organization in the book, this paragraph would have been placed in the section discussing sentence structure.

Throughout the book, one comes across intricacies in the Persian language that most non-native speakers would not recognize, even though they may be scholars of Persian. To give just one example, Thackston says, “If there is a change of subject between the independent and dependent verbs, the conjunction (ke) 'that' usually appears along with the subject pronoun of the independent verb" (p 113) In one example of this situation, in the sentence "pedar-am nágozâsht (ke) man bera-vam," the author puts ke in parentheses (change of subject) but in another one, "bógozând ânhâ biâynd," there is no ke in parentheses, although there should be

With all due respect to Thackston, and with great appreciation for the time and effort he has spent studying the Persian language and grammar, this book is inadequate for teaching Persian to beginners It may, however, be a useful training tool for scholars of Persian

Mahvash Shahegh Harin, Persian language instructor, the Middle East Institute, Washington, DC

Studies in the Short Fiction of Mahfouz and Idris, by Mona N Mikhail New York and London New York University Press, 1992 xii + 150 pages Bibl to p 163 Index to p 168 $40

Reviewed by William Hutchins

The best part of this book is the author's impassioned appreciation of some short works by Yusuf Idris, as evidenced in her discussion of "Rings of Smooth Brass" and of "House of Flesh" (pp 120–30) The first sections of the bibliography are devoted to works by and about Albert Camus and Ernest Hemingway, indicating that this is not simply another book about Naguib Mahfouz and Idris Mikhail's attempt to compare Camus and Hemingway with Mahfouz and Idris might have been more successful had she not wished to portray all of them as existentialists, despite her admission that "Hemingway had no formal connections with the existentialist school of thought per se ([and] neither for that matter had Mahfouz or Idris, and Camus is said to have expressed reluctance to being formally associated with existentialists)" (p 33) One of the tastier fruits of this comparison begins with the author's statement "Idris' 'Tabliyya min al-Sama' dramatizes what Camus articulated so well in his essay *Noces*, which celebrates the joy and harmony of living" (p 63) Hemingway seems the odd man out, and whatever illumination is provided by this unwieldy four-way comparison is directed at the two Egyptian authors Even the comparison between Mahfouz and Idris is forced when Mikhail makes statements like "Mahfouz seems to be more directly preoccupied with the paradoxical relationship of man and his Creator and its philosophical ramifications than Idris appears to be" (p 76), and "The philosophical investigations and allegorical classifications of Mahfouz are far removed from Idris' approach" (p 137) "Existentialism" is a term that has been embraced in Cairo by some intellectuals for years, but the author does little to clarify this interesting phenomenon in its Egyptian context, except to cite approvingly the attempt by 'Abd al-Rahman Badawi to link existentialism to Sufism (pp 28–9)

Of the book's six chapters, the first is an extremely "Brief Survey of the Development of the Arabic Short Story," loaded with quotations from "authorities" The second is a virtually undocumented tribute to "Naguib Mahfouz The Man and His Art," and the sixth is a brief "Conclusion" that ends with a quotation in French from Jacques Berque (p 149) Indeed, the author at times leaves the impression that a quotation constitutes an argument from an authority and that a quote in French is doubly true There are only three chapters with original content Chapter Three, "An Interpretation of the Image and Metaphor of Death," Chapter Four, "Broken Idols or the Demise of Abstractions," and Chapter Five, "Eros and the Quest for Happiness," which contains the perplexing disclaimer that, "In the writings of Naguib Mahfouz, Yahya Haqqi, and Yusuf Idris, love and sex do not occupy a very important position" (p 120)

This book would have benefitted from more aggressive editing It is disappointing in its present form, but those of Mikhail's own insights that appear in the work give promise of better books to come

William Hutchins, Philosophy and Religion Department, Appalachian State University

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World, by Paul Salem Syracuse, NY

Syracuse University Press, 1994 xii + 276 pages Bibl to p 288 Index to p 299 $39 95

Reviewed by Antony T Sullivan

In this volume, Paul Salem analyzes the political ideologies that have confronted or succeeded one another throughout the 20th century in Egypt, Iraq, and the Levant *Bitter Legacy* is aptly titled Liberal constitutionalism, Arab nationalism, and contemporary Islamism have all failed to create any consensus concerning the nature of political legitimacy, Salem argues, or to establish any recognized locus of political or social authority He maintains that, especially in recent decades, ideological utopianism has disfigured society everywhere in the Arab Middle East, and has plunged the region into a crisis from which it has yet to emerge

Good news, however, there is Salem believes that Islamist extremism may now have reached its zenith, and suggests that popular disillusionment with all political nostrums may well usher in a post-ideological age characterized by political pragmatism beginning early in the new century This book constitutes an excellent intellectual and social history of the 20th-century Mashriq, and should be considered required reading by anyone seriously interested in the contemporary Arab world

Salem draws heavily on the seminal work of the late Edward Shils concerning the nature of culture, ideology, and religion [1] He posits psychological strain relating to matters of identity and self-understanding, in combination with a need to vent frustration, to explain the Arab world's susceptibility to the blandishments of ideologues He argues that regionalism and liberal constitutionalism were the ideologies of choice for the merchant and landowning elite of the 1920s and 1930s, pan-Arabism, the ideological option of a new middle class of bureaucrats, technocrats, and senior officials during the 1950s and 1960s, and political Islamism, the preferred ideology for a newly urbanized lower class from the 1970s to the present In the Arab world, ideology has proven to be specific to both generation and class, Salem maintains, and can best be understood in chronological components of approximately a quarter century He observes that ideological systems have always proven to be especially attractive to non-Sunni minorities, serving as useful vehicles to enhance their status and power The author discusses Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and Muhammad 'Abduh as forerunners or exemplars of liberal constitutionalism, Sati' al-Husri, Antun Sa'adeh, and Michel 'Aflaq as influential theoreticians of radical Arabism, totalitarianism, and political violence, and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Hassan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb as key advocates of Islamic gnosticism The author's story is a sad one, detailing as it does the erosion of individual liberty, parliamentary government, and social stability across much of the Arab world during the past half century

More than any other single event, Salem suggests, defeat in Palestine proved decisive in delegitimizing parliamentarianism in the eastern Arab world Al-Sayyid's advocacy of limited government, free speech, and private property was widely rejected after 1948 in favor of statist authoritarianism and collectivism The Muslim revivalists who were later to inherit this anti-constitutionalist legacy repudiated 'Abduh's Islamic modernism fully as much as they did al-Sayyid's Lockean individualism

Salem maintains that on the level of ideas, the romantic organicism derived from 19th-century German thought that characterized al-Husri's political ideology undermined British and French contractarianism Sa'adeh's proto-fascist Syrian Social Nationalist Party effectively converted Husrian theory into political practice For their part, Michel 'Aflaq and the Baath Party also discredited liberal constitutionalism in the eyes of many, extolling as they did Marxist notions of class struggle and one-party rule Clearly, Arab adaptations of anti-democratic ideas originating in central and eastern Europe set the stage for the Islamist radicalism of the last two decades

Especially useful in understanding the countercurrents of 20th-century political activism in the Middle East is Salem's analysis of the complexities of al-Afghani's thought At once an Islamic nationalist and an advocate of Ottoman resurgence, al-Afghani was also a critic of Muslim obscurantism and an advocate of the restoration of *ijtihad* (reasoning) Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb built onto his Islamist ideas, while Mustapha

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[1] See, for example, Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1981)

Kamil and Taha Hussein were influenced by his religious reformism and rationalism Salem considers the work of al-Afghani to have been "seminal" (p 94), since even the ideas of secular nationalists were shaped by aspects of his ideology

The author's harsh judgment concerning both Arab nationalism and Islamist radicalism will probably displease the more dogmatic proponents of these ideologies However, Salem's critique may also contribute to a needed reassessment of recent Arab history and politics The sort of rigorous objectivity manifested in this book can only facilitate the dawning of a new era of political pragmatism

Antony T Sullivan, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan

State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Roger Owen London and New York Routledge Press, 1992 xviii + 290 pages Bibl to p 295 Index to p 302 $55 cloth, $18 95 paper

Reviewed by Don Peretz

This book, the first in a forthcoming series on the Middle East, presents an overview of and general introduction to some of the major processes in the region's recent political and social history The level of sophistication and analysis will appeal to knowledgeable scholars of the region as well as to those with little or no previous background The area covered includes the Arab East and North Africa, Iran, Israel, and Turkey from the end of the Ottoman period to the early 1990s Owen believes that the structures supporting politics in these countries and regions "have a stability and a logic that permit systematic analysis" (p 290)

The book is divided into two parts—a historical discussion of the emergence of the present nation-state system and the contemporary political institutions of its members, and an analysis of several principal themes the politics of economic restructuring, the politics of religion, the influence of the military, and the problems of establishing democratic institutions

The author relies heavily on secondary sources for the substantive data that form the foundation of his own unique interpretations and insights Thus, he frequently cites other authorities to introduce thoughts concerning recent developments in the region These include I William Zartman and John Waterbury on Morocco and Egypt, Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett on Iraq, Feroz Ahmad and Caglar Keydar on Turkey, Yehoshua Porath on the Palestinians, Yoram Peri on Israel, and Raymond Hinnebusch on Syria The book is valuable, however, less for the historical account and data on contemporary politics, than for its thought-provoking analysis It would serve well as a companion piece to more thorough and detailed political/historical surveys

Part II offers a comparative examination of the various themes mentioned above—economy, religion, the military, political parties, and democracy The discussion of economic restructuring underscores how attempts to alter statist systems of economic management have varied The similarities and differences in coping with economic reform are presented in case studies of Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey Owen selects examples of regimes that have attempted adjustments on the supply side, rather than those dealing with short-term stabilization programs focusing on the demand side

The discussion of religion and politics examines the diversity of theologies and systems of religious law to the extent that they provide motives and programs for political action Rather than using "fundamentalist" to describe religious politics of the 1970s and 1980s, Owen prefers the term used by the practitioners themselves—*tajdid* or "renewal " He observes that the Islamic revolution in Iran has had an enormous impact on the Arab world and discusses its influence from Morocco to Iraq Christianity and nationalism in Egypt and Lebanon and politics and Judaism in Israel are also briefly covered

The chapter dealing with the military emphasizes recent tensions between officer cadres and governing establishments Two general types of Arab military establishment are compared strong armies in relatively large Arab states like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and smaller military organizations in the less populated countries The discussion of the military in Israel somewhat overemphasizes its influence on politics For example, it was not primarily the military that pressured Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to surrender the defense portfolio on the eve of the June 1967 War (p 219), but public opinion, the political opposition, and discontent within Eshkol's own Labor Alignment

The chapter on parties and elections leads into a final discussion of single-party systems and the move to greater democracy While Owen acknowledges the problems of transition to democracy in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, he observes that "The only single-party regimes where there was only minimal movement in the direction of political reform were those in Syria and Iraq" (p 280)

The study concludes with a brief appraisal of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War The war tested the durability of regimes in the region, the importance of individual state nationalism as opposed to region-wide Arab and/or religious solidarity, the viability of civilian over military control, and the strength of the overall post-colonial order

The book is weakest in its discussion of Israeli politics, where there are a few factual errors and misinterpretations For example, the United Religious Party (NRP) (p 190) is confused with the National Religious Front, a coalition of orthodox parties in the First Knesset The political role of the Israeli army has not increased since the Intifada began in 1987 (p 220) The army failed to put down the uprising, and its credibility has declined as a result The election of Israel's first Knesset, or constituent assembly, was in January 1949, not July 1948 (p 244) To gain a Knesset seat, a party must receive a minimum of 1 5 percent of the vote (39,253 in 1992), not the fixed number of 20,000 (p 244)

Don Peretz is Professor Emeritus at Binghamton University and author of the sixth edition of The Middle East Today *(Westport, CT Praeger, 1994)*

The United States and the State of Israel,

by David Schoenbaum New York and Oxford Oxford University Press, 1993 xiv + 330 pages Notes to p 380 Bibl to p 393 Index to p 404 $39 95 cloth, $16 95 paper

Reviewed by Paul J Hare

One must read the introduction of David Schoenbaum's *The United States and the State of Israel* to understand the book's intent Schoenbaum explains that he was asked to write a history of the US-Israeli relationship by a distinguished historian of US foreign policy (not identified), who had undertaken the task of editing a series on significant bilateral relations of the United States since World War II Explaining that he is not a professional Middle East hand, Schoenbaum credits his American-Jewish roots for giving him an abiding interest in the subject Thus, after hesitating briefly, he accepted the invitation Subsequently and independent of the original series, the project took on a life of its own

Schoenbaum's bibliography and interviews suggest that he has explored virtually everything there is to know about the rich, complex, often contentious US-Israeli relationship, before and after the independence of the state of Israel in 1948 Over a space of 330 pages, there are 1,276 footnotes—an indication of the amount of research that has gone into writing this book While no new bits of information are revealed and neither Arabic nor Hebrew sources are cited, the book captures quite well the different voices, emotions, and crises that have become part of our historical memory of the relationship

Schoenbaum writes sympathetically about the Zionist struggle (Abba Eban is his model), but he is scrupulously fair in presenting all points of view The result is a sweeping narrative on the development of a unique relationship between two nations and peoples Schoenbaum exaggerates, however, when he says that the difference between this book and others is that there "has been a reluctance by both supporters and critics of the relationship to see it as historical at all, that is, as a product of frequently ambiguous, untidy, and fortuitous places, times, and circumstances rather than a timeless and self-evident feature in the landscape" (p x) In this reader's experience, serious writers on the subject recognize that the Middle East, and Israel's place in it, cannot be understood without a sense of the history of the region

Unless the reader is very familiar with the subject, Schoenbaum's story and prose can be difficult to follow The narrative tends to go off on various tangents that obscure the underlying chronological history of the bilateral relationship and its salient features More hard analysis and conclusions, along the lines of Nadav Safran's *The United States and Israel*,[1] the precursor of his later epic volume *Israel The Uneasy Ally*,[2] and Bernard Reich's *The United States and Israel*,[3] would have been helpful One suspects, however, that Schoenbaum deliberately avoided placing events and people into neat categories and compartments, seeing instead the evolution of the US-Israeli relationship as a protean process

Paul J Hare is vice president of the Middle East Institute He was counselor for political affairs at the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel from 1981–85

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The Gate to Perfection: The Idea of Peace in Jewish Thought, by Walter Homolka and Albert H Friedlander Providence Berghahn Books, 1994 xv + 108 pages Append to p 120 Bibl to p 128 $19 95

Reviewed by Kenneth Cragg

There is something deeply wistful yet strangely pathetic about this short book, which contains in the appendix the text of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 1993, preceded by 73 pages of exposition on the nature of peace in Talmudic and Rabbinic traditions The book's title is drawn from a Jewish liturgy "Peace is the Gate of our Perfection " The wistfulness lies in that very juxtaposition The pathos is in the fact that no realist attempt is made to consider the essential belligerence of Zionism, as evidenced in the long decades of its pursuit The book came too soon to wrestle with the contradiction evident in "peace-processing" itself Sadly, it seems quite incongruous to bind together in one a quite praiseworthy academic exposition of devout ideas *and* a highly ambiguous document of current politics The reader thus becomes aware of a quest for goodwill pursued by the exposition The discussion lacks any exploration of how Zionism now sees itself compatible with peace, except on the basis of final Palestinian acquiescence in the success of Zionism's *real politik*

That crippling silence holds Walter Homolka's first six sections (pp 1–72), translated from the original German, in a gallery for inspection The tribal invasions of Joshua are explained as within the cult of the war god, Adonai Zebaoth, a cult that was outgrown in the development of the *shalom* concept "Every truthful prayer is linked with Jacob's seed every successful war with that of Esau The concept of God as the harbinger of peace finally suppressed that of a God of war once and for all" (p 42) It must be wondered whether David Ben Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, would have agreed Strangely, even Homolka himself argues that "Judaism was given the chance to allow its very individual concept of peace to flourish" after "being left without its own state," and "even its liberation movement," after 70 CE (p 43) He seems oblivious of the implicit question Would Judaism welcome the chance again? Or has Zionism made his case-making an outdated pursuit?

Albert Friedlander's section on "Jews, Judaism and the Concept of Peace in Our Time" strives resolutely with its agenda, but did he not need "Zionism" in his title? For there remain for any outside observer the still tragically unresolved questions of where Zionism leaves Judaism and how Judaism understands Zionism Friedlander's writing is understandably conditioned by the uncertainties inherent in analyzing a situation in perpetual flux He writes ardently about figures like Judeh Magnes and Martin Buber, but does it help to observe that, though no longer alive, their "ideas retain their relevance and topicality" (p 95)? The revered Rabbi Abraham Kook, who saw "the beginning of redemption," gave way to a son who repudiated that "gentle school" in the name of total displacement of the Palestinians

Any community engaged in review of its peace traditions deserves to be commended It is well for Jewish minds to rehearse their long, honored, prophetic instinct for shalom With the DOP rapidly unravelling before our eyes, it is fair to wonder whether there is any "gate of perfection," or only a perversity that is unprepared to pay the cost of integrity We are left with the cry of

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[1] Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1963

[2] Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1978

[3] New York Praeger Publishers, 1984

Jeremiah (15 5), whose fields around Anathoth could perceive the battlements encroaching "O Jerusalem, who will pause and ask of your peace?"

Bishop Kenneth Cragg resides in Oxford, England

Struggling to Surrender: Some Impressions of an American Convert to Islam, by

Jeffrey Lang Beltsville, MD Amana Publications, 1994 ix + 245 pages $11 75 paper

Reviewed by Greg Noakes

Jeffrey Lang's *Struggling to Surrender* is at once a personal reflection on what it is to be a Muslim and a provocative discussion of issues of interest to Muslims and non-Muslims alike Lang, a mathematics professor at the University of Kansas who converted to Islam over a decade ago, wrestles with questions faced by contemporary American Muslims of all backgrounds, producing some interesting analyses and challenging conclusions

The text is organized into five distinct sections First, Lang relates the story of his own quest for spiritual understanding These narratives too often degenerate into self-absorbed musings, but Lang writes with flair and confidence The experiences may be uniquely his, yet the issues and emotions Lang discusses are universal

The second and third chapters address the importance of the Quran and the example of the Prophet Muhammad in the individual and communal lives of Muslims Lang's discussion of *hadith* (the Prophet's sayings) criticism is particularly trenchant as he examines the works of Ignaz Goldziher, Joseph Schacht, and G H A Juynboll and contrasts their interpretations with those of contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Suhaib 'Abdul Ghafar and Muhammad 'Azmi

In his treatment of issues facing American Muslims, Lang makes the most of his privileged view as an American who chose Islam As British Muslim Charles Le Gai Eaton notes in his *Islam and the Destiny of Man*, the Western convert

> stands astride the oldest frontier in the world, the frontier that has separated Islamic civilization, first from Christendom and later from the post-Christian world, for some thirteen centuries This is in many ways a strange position to occupy because the frontier runs between two areas of reciprocal incomprehension, and to be at home in both is, in a sense, to commute between different planetary systems The Westerner's inability to understand the Muslim is matched by the Muslim's incapacity to understand the Westerner Those who stand astride the frontier find themselves obliged to act as interpreters between two different languages and must themselves speak both with adequate fluency [1]

Lang himself notes the convert is both believer and (to some degree) outsider, and that "such a person combines commitment with skepticism, sometimes leading to important and inspiring insights Since converts are not grounded in the traditions of the faith, they are also likely to bring with them radical, alien ideas that will be tested by the larger community" (p 147)

Some Muslims may find the book's treatment of such thorny issues as the place of women in Islam, *jihad* (holy war), apostasy and Islamic government "radical" or "alien " Others will find it refreshing and penetrating Whether they agree or disagree with his conclusions, American Muslims must at least acknowledge Lang's questions

Jeffrey Lang ends with a discussion of Muslim-Christian and Muslim-Jewish relations, focusing on the difficulties brought about by international politics and linguistic and doctrinal misunderstandings He closes by arguing for interfaith discussion based on mutual respect and recognition, not polemics "Unless we are ready to approach each other on matters of faith with deep humility and sympathy," Lang writes, "it is best to leave that task to others" (p 242)

Struggling to Surrender unfortunately is marred by a number of editing errors ranging from misspelled words and names to doubled lines None of the mistakes is critical, but they are distracting and the book would have benefitted greatly from tighter proofreading Nevertheless, the appearance of *Struggling to Surrender* augurs well for more challenging and constructive works on Islam from the new editorial team at Amana Publications

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[1] Albany State University of New York Press in association with the Islamic Texts Society, 1985, p 2

Jeffrey Lang's text will appeal to a variety of audiences, including undergraduate and graduate students of Islam, participants in interfaith dialogue efforts, and the Muslim community as a whole—not simply American Muslim converts Lang is one of the most interesting of a growing number of American Muslim thinkers, and *Struggling to Surrender* is a critical book in the truest sense of the term

Greg Noakes, an American Muslim, is news editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904), by Julia A Clancy-Smith Berkeley University of California Press, 1994 xxiii + 265 pages Abbrevs to p 268 Notes to p 346 Gloss to p 350 Bibl to p 358 Index to p 370 $45

Reviewed by Mary Ann Fay

Rebel and Saint by Julia Clancy-Smith is an exhaustively researched and ground-breaking study of Algeria preceding and following the French invasion of 1830 and the conquest of the Algerian interior in the succeeding decades Clancy-Smith's study is a response to the challenge issued by Edmund Burke III in 1971 to write a history of colonial Algeria that focuses not on the colonial regime, but on the inhabitants of Algeria[1] Not only does Clancy-Smith rise to Burke's challenge by writing an indigenous history, but she also challenges the traditional periodization of Algerian history and ignores nationalist historiography that treats Algeria and Tunisia as discrete historical subjects

Clancy-Smith's study focuses on an archipelago of oases in southeastern Algeria called the Ziban, which was linked historically to a region in western Tunisia known as the Jarid According to Clancy-Smith, this region formed not only a relatively uniform geographical entity, but also a unified economic and socio-cultural domain (p 13) In addition, this region participated in a shared political culture where politics and Islam intersected through the media of the Sufi order, or *tariqa*, and the religious saint/mystic, or *marabout* As Clancy-Smith's study makes clear, Algerian history, and certainly the Algerian response to French colonialism, cannot be understood without considering the role played by the Sufi orders and their leaders in both local and national politics Clancy-Smith focuses on one of the dominant tariqas in the region—the Rahmaniyya, founded in the late 18th century by Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Azhari

The first three chapters provide the background and lay the foundation for the analysis of two important uprisings against the French, and the role that the Tunisian border area played in sustaining and fostering Algerian opposition to the French Chapter one discusses the geography and economy of the region and the patterns of trade and tribal migration Chapter two addresses the importance of saint veneration in pre-Saharan culture and the rise of the Rahmaniyya *zawiya* (A zawiya combined a number of functions, including monastery, school, hostel, and shrine) Chapter three focuses on the French conquest from the fall of Algiers in 1830 to the fall of Constantine in 1839 and of Biskra in 1844, and the effect of the French victories on the religious notables and the common people As Clancy-Smith points out, the response of religious notables to the French was quite complex, ranging from accommodation to rebellion

One of the religious notables to adopt emigration as a strategy was Mustafa Ibn 'Azuz, whom Clancy-Smith discusses in chapter five Shaykh Mustafa emigrated to Tunisia in 1844 and constructed a zawiya at Nafta, which became an important political refuge for Algerian opponents to the French The importance of the zawiya to Algerian malcontents, as well as the shaykh's support for Sharif Muhammad Ibn 'Abdallah, sultan of the oasis-city of Warqala and leader of an anti-colonial uprising, caused the French to accuse the shaykh of inciting rebellion As Clancy-Smith points out, Algeria became to the French what India was to the British—a rationale for colonial expansion in order to protect and defend the imperial jewel

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[1] Clancy-Smith refers to Burke's "intellectual call to arms" in a note on p 269 of the text Burke's statement was made in Edmund Burke III, "Recent Books on Colonial Algerian History," *Middle Eastern Studies* 7, 2 (1971), pp 241–50

In chapters four and six, respectively, Clancy-Smith analyzes the 1849 uprising centered in the oasis-village of Za'atsha, which was led by the self-proclaimed *mahdi* (messiah), Bu (Abu) Ziyan, and the 1855 mahdist rebellion of 'Abdallah The Za'atsha rebellion was quelled with particular ferocity by the French The villagers were put to the sword and the village was demolished (p 92) Bu Ziyan was shot after being forced to witness the killing of his family, including his wife, two young sons, a daughter, and his mother His severed head was exhibited on a pole at the entrance to the ruined village as a warning to would-be rebels (p 116)

Belief in the coming of the mahdi was an integral part of popular culture in the region More importantly, popular resistance was often channeled through the tariqa or organized under the leadership of a mahdi As these uprisings demonstrate, when mahdist expectations coincided with grievances against the French as colonizer and infidel, the results could be explosive

The most engaging and fully developed characters in Clancy-Smith's narrative are Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abi al-Qasim, leader of the zawiya of al-Hamil, and his daughter, Lalla Zaynab Under both the shaykh and his daughter, the zawiya became a "cultural redoubt for a society under siege" (p 250) In unearthing the story of Zaynab from the archives, Clancy-Smith makes an important contribution to women's history and revises the way historians have perceived women under colonial domination When the shaykh died, Zaynab asserted her right to lead the zawiya, using a *hubus* or *waqf* (religious endowment) made by her father to support her claim against the opposition of both the French authorities and her cousin, who was supported by the French With significant popular support, Zaynab ultimately prevailed Although it is frequently asserted that colonial women lost power and status, Clancy-Smith argues that the contradictions of the French regime provided opportunities, under certain conditions, for women to be "political agents as well as social actors even in a system of dual patriarchy" (p 216)

As Clancy-Smith points out in her introduction, the dearth of sources for a historical analysis that focuses on Algeria's religious notables and ordinary people is a major obstacle for the historian This is a problem faced by most social historians seeking to write history from the bottom up For Clancy-Smith's study, the lack of indigenous sources meant drawing on French colonial archives, including records in the Bureaux Arabes, particularly for documentation of rebellious activity The problem here is not the sources themselves, but how to assess and interpret the information they contain Clancy-Smith apparently accepts the reports of French colonial officials and military leaders as objective accounts of the events they observed or in which they participated (pp 9–10) The records may be "meticulous" and "accurate" accounts of events, as Clancy-Smith asserts, but the argument she presents is not convincing (ibid) We should be skeptical of the French witnesses to the events as well as the participants in those events who were not disinterested, dispassionate observers, linked as they were to the French colonial regime and to the emerging Orientalist discourse on Algeria Edward Said's *Orientalism*, Michel Foucault's emphasis on the social construction of knowledge, the post-structuralist disdain for the notion of historical truth and objectivity, and the emphasis by subaltern studies scholars on the need for "new methods for reading old documents" have all had their effect on the research and writing of history Collectively, they challenge the assumption of positivist historiography that the colonized subject can be recovered by locating him/her in the relevant documents [2]

In spite of this critique, Clancy-Smith's study should be regarded as an important contribution to the scholarship on North Africa, the Middle East in general, and Islamic society and culture While indispensable to the scholar, the book will be less accessible to general readers, particularly those lacking background in the political history of Algeria

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[2] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York Vintage Books, 1979), Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed by Colin Gordon (New York Pantheon Books, 1980), The quote is taken from Florencia E Mallon, "The

SOCIOLOGY

The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles, by Hamid Naficy Minneapolis and London University of Minnesota Press, 1993 xviii + 198 pages Tables to p 226 Notes to p 243 Bibl to p 263 Index to p 283 $44 95 cloth, $18 95 paper

Reviewed by Michael Humphrey

This book focuses on the popular culture of Iranian exiles in the "world city" of Los Angeles—a city internationalized by increasing numbers of Developing World exilic communities It addresses familiar themes in immigrant community research—settlement, acceptance, and partial cultural regeneration—in the context of a dominant host culture It does so through the new medium of cultural production available in and integral to this "world city," namely, television The main concerns of the book are exile television as a genre and the role of cable television in shaping an "exilic Iranian culture" in Los Angeles The study looks at Iranian programs on the multi-ethnic cable television channel KSCI-TV between 1980 and 1991, the period of highest emigration from Iran to the United States Naficy's focus is a community, defined as a "symbolic and semiotic enclave" and not as a physical entity (p 34) In this respect, the project is fresh, stimulating, and an extremely valuable contribution to the study of cultural production amongst immigrants and the articulation of local and transnational identities [131]

An important analytic focus of the book emerges from the definition of the subjects as "exiles " These are the post-1978 Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles, who number around 74,000 Considerable effort is made to define this group as "exiled," as distinct from "immigrant" or "ethnic " The category "exile" connotes features which allow emphasis on the problem of transition and identity Liminality and syncretism are central concepts that provide the framework for deconstructing the text and discourse of television productions A "discursive snapshot" of the analysis of exile television production is provided in a table titled "Topographical Reading of Exilic Liminality" (p 7)

The problem with a concept such as exile is its homogenizing quality, swamping the internal diversity and the political and ideological orientations of the "exiled" Iranians Of course, this is Naficy's point—that there is a shared culture of exile despite internal diversity—but the reader is left wondering whether shared culture is the primary defining attribute of this group The other problem with the concept "exile" is that all migrants are in some sense in exile, removed from the world which, through processes beyond their control, has been lost to them Is the deterritorialization brought about by flight in the face of revolution so removed from the experience of the decimation of home, family, and community brought about by economic transformation? In both cases the past cannot be recreated It is not available to be re-entered

Nevertheless, the discussion of exile and its primary reference to the "imaginary homeland"—the reclaiming of the past through memory—provides a fascinating study of the cultural politics of identity The medium of television needs to be inclusive as well as economically viable in a host society organized around consumerism Language and cultural symbols create the basis for transcending internal ethnic and religious differences Naficy argues that the liminality of exile is articulated through cultural themes, such as traditional religious grieving over the martyrdom of Imam Hosain For example, Iran is represented through television images as a "dying and tortured country" (p 137) Traditional cultural themes thus provide the basis for broad empathy in the Iranian exile audience One shortcoming here, however, is the neglect of the interactive character of the medium, especially the interchange between the dominant culture—and its cultural production—and the formation of Iranian exilic culture

At times, the integrating nature of the cultural analysis tends to swamp the broader considerations of the political economy of all immigrants to the United States For example, Naficy notes that immigrants to the United States have become increasingly skilled and professional and that Iranians are no exception The international mo-

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Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies Perspectives from Latin American History," *The American Historical Review* 99 (December 1994), p 1497 bility of privileged sections of Third World societies with the necessary cultural capital is evidence of their ability to protect and secure particular social trajectories across generations Yet, rather than point to the political and class origins which have shaped these flows and the ideological positions they imply, Naficy focuses on the psychological and cultural forms of the largely pro-monarchist exile community under study The ability to successfully shape popular culture through fetishization is seen as more significant than the particular political receptivity of their audiences to discourses on Iran, which, as Naficy points out, have many possible receptions and interpretations

The final chapter, "Cultural Politics of Hybridity," outlines the psycho-cultural orientations of exile—the choice between fetishization and hybridity While providing some very interesting insights on the trajectories of cultural transformation as individuals come to grasp the complexities of their new existence and identities, the chapter is also extremely dense and abstract The identities and communal and cultural attachments of the audience get lost in this study Their particular understanding of exilic television and the symbolic significance of their collage home interiors is subsumed within the television production of "exilic culture "

Michael Humphrey, School of Sociology, University of New South Wales

WOMEN

The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question, by Marnia Lazreg London Routledge, 1994 xi + 226 pages Notes to p 252 Bibl to p 260 Gloss to p 262 Index to p 270 $55 cloth, $16 95 paper

Reviewed by Mary Ann Tétreault

There is an irony in the title of Marnia Lazreg's book The silence it notes is the silence of Algerian women whose opportunities to speak are limited because their society grants them so little rhetorical space Yet, Lazreg is an Algerian woman and her book is, above all, a conversation A testimony to its author's ability to practice what she preaches, *The Eloquence of Silence* speaks to us in many voices and creates space for us to continue the conversation in our minds

Lazreg portrays convincingly the complex texture of Algerian society and culture and the women embedded in them, using as her foil the kind of conventional wisdom produced by dichotomous thinking The first chapter is an intellectual manifesto that establishes a platform from which author and readers can examine their perspectives on feminism and women in the Developing World, thereby minimizing tendencies to put either into boxes Lazreg envisions feminism as a project rather than an ideology, and sees women as people who, like men, are thinking beings whose autonomy is constrained by culture and circumstances She shows this well in descriptions of Algerian lifestyles that include attention to time as an organizing dimension Lazreg notes that what modern Algerians interpret as backwardness among those whose lives are governed by the rhythms of the traditional Muslim calendar can also be seen as an assertion of autonomy against the undesirable effects of modernization, an analysis reminiscent of Henny Hansen's description of prayer as an unassailable claim to personhood and privacy, even—and especially—in the face of insistent demands[1]

French colonialism brought modernity to much of Algeria but exacted a high price for it The imperial period lasted for 132 years During that time, the French, like other Europeans in their colonies, looted local economies, "tribalized" populations, and imposed new meanings on "traditional" behavior that did not conform to European standards Women were colonized like the men and the land A thriving colonial sex tourism industry made prostitutes out of women from the Ouled Nail tribe, whose freedom to choose their own spouses was defined by the French as sexual license The imperialized economy made prostitutes out of other Algerian women who were forced by economic restructuring to sell their bodies to support their families French educational policy and personal status regulations discriminated against Algerian girls and women, worsening their positions in a native culture where they already stood below their brothers It also lent prestige and credence to those who would support and extend gender discrimination in new ways

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[1] Henny Harald Hansen, *The Kurdish Woman's Life* (Copenhagen Nationalmuseet, 1961), quoted in Robert A Fernea and Elizabeth W Fernea, "Variation in Religious Observance among Islamic Women," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500*, ed by Nikki R Keddie (Berkeley University of California Press, 1978), pp 387–8

Lazreg argues that French imperialism in Algeria was more pernicious than British imperialism in Egypt because the French ruled directly and sought explicitly to devalue and undermine the local culture She implies that this explains some of the differences between Egyptian and Algerian feminism Yet, if one were to look at Iran, where British and subsequently American neo-imperialism rested even less heavily on local government and culture than British imperialism in Egypt, differences between Iran and Algeria with respect to ideologies about women are far less pronounced For example, Algerians and Iranians framed anti-imperialist movements as a politics of authenticity Both used essentialist images of women, justified by appeals to traditional religious values, to define the authentic "self" As Lazreg's discussion of Franz Fanon on revolutionaries and the veil illustrates, however, such essentialism is more a property of individual men and their myths than of ideology as a tool of imperial control The objectification and sexual exploitation of Indochinese women by the French did not produce a Fanonesque myth of the essential woman in Vietnam, although, as in Algeria, it did reinforce patterns of gender discrimination already present in the local culture But how such discrimination is dealt with anywhere is contingent on local people, structures, and ideas—any or all of which can change

From Lazreg's analysis, we are left with the impression that whether these changes could occur in Algeria today will depend on women Algeria's socialist government violated the constitution when, to pacify conservative critics of the regime, it legislated discrimination against women in its long-awaited family code Should the critics themselves take power, they are just as likely to ignore issues of women's rights as the leaders they replace Meanwhile, the conflict between government forces and militant Islamists is, in part, about the control of women, women who have been silenced by the weight of feminine essentialism that has infused the ideologies of men on both sides As Lazreg points out, the state must be a partner in any project to achieve and implement human rights Algerian women will have to create new power bases to persuade Algeria's rulers to articulate and support a community of interests that includes women's interests Though the silence of Algerian women may be eloquent, its continuation, says Marnia Lazreg, would be suicidal

Mary Ann Tétreault, Professor of Political Science, Iowa State University

Recent Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Historical Dictionary of Algeria, by Phillip Chiviges Naylor and Alf Andrew Heggoy Metuchen, NJ and London Scarecrow Press, 1994 2d ed xxxix + 443 pages Bibl $55 Appropriate for secondary school to university-level students, this volume covers Algerian history from prehistoric to modern times Naylor's introduction provides a brief political history from the Roman Republican era, maps, and a geographical overview (JR)

Historical Dictionary of Turkey, by Metin Heper Metuchen, NJ Scarecrow Press, 1994 xv + 593 pages Abbrevs Maps Chron Bibl $72 50 Beginning with the rise of the Ottoman Empire and concluding with the present day, this reference volume discusses persons, places, and events using encyclopedic entries Cultural, economic, political, and social aspects of Turkish civilization are featured (WS)

United States Official Documents on the Armenian Genocide, vol. II The Peripheries, by Ara Sarafian Waterton, MA Armenian Review, 1994 xxx + 174 pages Index $15 paper Sarafian has compiled US consular officials' accounts of the Armenian genocide in Central Asia Minor from 1915–17 Reports describe US investigation and disclosure of the slaughter, in light of the Ottoman coverup of the incident as a "deportation" and "relocation" Henry Morgenthau, Edward I Nathan, and George Horton are among the American diplomats whose reports are featured (WS)

Annotations have been prepared with the assistance of **Jordan M Rankin and Will O Sands**

EGYPT

Magic in Ancient Egypt, by Geraldine Pinch Austin University of Texas Press, 1994 191 pages Gloss Notes Bibl Index $18 95 paper This is a heavily illustrated survey and analysis of ancient Egyptian magic Examining its different forms, Pinch appraises the implications magic had on ancient Egyptian culture and religion The last chapter, "The Legacy of Egyptian Magic," traces the survival of Egyptian magic through modern times (JR)

IRAN

Ali Dashti's *Prison Days* Life Under Reza Shah, by J E Knorzer Costa Mesa, CA Mazda Publishers, 1994 xiii + 239 pages Notes Abbrevs Sources Index $19 95 This is a translation of and commentary on *Prison Days*, a book written by a pre-Mossadaq radical journalist-turned-loyal-oppositionist after the 1953 coup in Iran *Prison Days* is a series of memoirs and musings, composed when Ali Dashti was imprisoned for his political criticism of Reza Shah's regime (JR)

The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution. From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, by Mohsen Milani Oxford and Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 2d ed xxv + 268 pages Bibl Index $62 cloth, $21 95 paper Milani examines Iran's experience with the West, the economic and social conditions of the Pahlavi regime, and the Islamic Revolution Using interviews and newly released documents, this study also covers issues of post-revolutionary power under Ayatollah Ruhollah Mussavi Khomeini and President 'Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, as well as Iran's role in the 1991 Gulf War (JR)

Revolutionary Horizons Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran, by John Calabrese New York St Martin's Press, 1994 xii + 221 pages Append Notes Bibl Index $45 This study analyzes Iranian foreign policy with respect to two groups of states—those immediately bordering Iran and those beyond Iran's borders The author considers domestic factors, such as Iran's economic predicament and leadership factionalism, which influence the course of Iranian foreign policy (JR)

IRAQ

The Economy of Iraq Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development, and Prospects, 1950–2010, by Abbas Alnasrawi Westport, CT and London Greenwood Press, 1994 xvi + 186 pages Bibl Index $55 Observing the fluctuation in Iraq's economic resources since 1950 and its current low economic ebb, the author examines the historical origins of Iraq's economic problems Alnasrawi assesses the effects of Baath development policies, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and UN sanctions against Iraq He also discusses Iraq's economic future in light of a decade of war (JR)

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Israel Under Rabin, ed by Robert O Freedman Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1995 xi + 255 pages Append Bibl Index $55 cloth, $19 95 paper This compilation of essays examines the changes Israel has experienced since the Labor party's victory in the 1992 election It also synthesizes the effects of these changes on Arab-Israeli relations and Israeli domestic policy The book addresses Israel's foreign and domestic policies (WS)

Zionism The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction, by Yerach Gover London and Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1994 ix + 223 pages Notes Index $19 95 paper The author explores Zionist ideology as informed by Israeli Hebrew literature and its implications for Israeli culture and state policy Gover investigates Zionism's moral and social limitations and contradictions in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict (JR)

LEBANON

Recovering Beirut. Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, ed by Samir Khalaf and Philip S Khoury New York E J Brill, 1993 xxiii + 297 pages Appends Maps Contribs Bibl Index $111 This collection of essays deals with the architecture and urban reconstruction of devastated Lebanon, giving particular consideration to planning strategies designed to pacify social unrest by meeting Lebanon's diverse needs Among the topics covered are socio-economic reconstruction, urban design, territorial disputes and architecture, the post-war Lebanese economy, the housing crisis, and land use problems (WS)

MOROCCO

The Hundred Years War for Morocco Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World, by Weston F Cook, Jr Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 xix + 332 pages Bibl Index $45 Cook examines the gunpowder revolution of 1460–1580, in which Moroccans adapted their warfare tactics in order to repel Ottoman and European attacks The core of the book addresses the evolution of the Moroccan state and armed forces resulting from the merger of revolutionary warfare with revolutionary ideological, political, and social trends This study combines military history with indigenous records (WS)

PAKISTAN

Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, ed by J Henry Korson Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 xiv + 216 pages Contribs Index $34 95 This collection includes essays on "Pakistan's Economy in the Year 2000 Two

Possible Scenarios," "Growth Without Change The Demography of Pakistan," "The Plural Medical System and Women's Health in Pakistan," "Education in Pakistan," "Transformation of the Women's Movement in Pakistan," "The Mohajirs in Sindh," "The Impact and Legacy of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," "The Geopolitics of the Asian Subcontinent Pakistan's Security Environment," and "Another Try at Democracy " (JR)

TURKEY

Turkey's Role in the Middle East A Conference Report, by Patricia Carley Washington, DC United States Institute of Peace, 1995 viii + 29 pages Contribs n p This is a summary of a June 1994 USIP conference, "A Reluctant Neighbor Analyzing Turkey's Role in the Middle East " It examines Turkey's foreign policy since the 19th century, and Turkey's relations with Iran, Iraq, and the Kurds It also assesses Turkey's relationship with Syria in light of the "water crisis" (p 16) and Turkey's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process (JR)

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment, ed by Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 253 pages Contribs $39 paper This collection of "think pieces and briefs" from the 1992 conference on arms control held in Ginosar (Israel) discusses the role of military systems in the Middle East, the Arab states' and Israel's threat perceptions, prospects for arresting the arms race in the region, arms control in other regions, and the US approach to non-proliferation (WS)

Confidence Building and Verification Prospects in the Middle East, ed by Shai Feldman Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 255 pages Contribs $38 50 paper These papers presented at the 1993 conference on confidence building held in Ginosar (Israel) discuss security in the post-Cold War world, confidence-building measures, confidence building at sea, confidence building in Europe, compliance and verification, the Middle East security environment, and peacekeeping in the Middle East (WS)

One Land, Two Peoples The Conflict over Palestine, by Deborah J Gerner Oxford and Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1994 2d ed xvii + 238 pages Disc Questions Notes Sugg Read Gloss Chron Index $49 95 cloth, $14 95 paper Traces the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the 19th century to the present Themes addressed The conflict as a product of attempts for national identity and self determination by both parties, self-serving superpower and European state presence in the conflict, state policy in the development and maintenance of foreign policies, and, the efforts of international organizations to conclude the conflict (WS)

Torture and Ill-Treatment Israel's Interrogation of Palestinians From the Occupied Territories New York and London Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1994 xviii + 316 pages Append $20 paper Based on 36 interviews with Palestinians who were interrogated between June 1992 and March 1994, this report charges that human rights abuses have continued since Yitzhak Rabin became prime minister and since the negotiation of an Israeli-Palestinian accord Human Rights Watch targets the activities of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and the General Security Service (GSS) in the Gaza strip during the Intifada, and highlights interrogation procedures, Israel's legal framework, coerced confessions, and deaths under interrogation (WS)

Women and the Israeli Occupation The Politics of Change, ed by Tamar Mayer London and New York Routledge, 1994 xiv + 209 pages Index $16 95 paper Articles survey the lives of Jewish and Palestinian women during the 26 years of West Bank and Gaza Strip occupation The book pays particular attention to the "unequal occupier/occupied relationship" and the way it has unearthed internal conflicts in both groups of already marginalized women Chapters discuss national versus social liberation, Palestinian nationalism and gender, Palestinian women in Israel, Israeli women opposed to the occupation, labor market trends and women in the Palestinian economy, gender and violence against women, feminist health care in the region, and environmental difficulties faced by women (WS)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Industrial Raw Materials of the Arabian Gulf and their Utilization, ed by David C Almond et al London and New York Kegan Paul International, 1994 xvi + 547 pages Index $127 50 This study, comprised of 43 papers by participants in the 1986 First Conference on Indigenous Raw Materials and Industrial Utilization in the Gulf Region, held in Kuwait, is intended to assist the Gulf Cooperation Council states to plan tactics for the development and exploitation of indigenous non-petroleum mineral raw materials, and deals with the geology of these materials and their use in industry (WS)

OPEC and the Market A Study of Oil Price Rigidity, Determination, and Differentials, by Abdul-Razak Faris al-Faris Boulder, CO International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, 1994 xiii + 156 pages Appends Bibl $26 Al-Faris addresses the process of price formation in the oil industry from 1973–85 using P Sweezy's "kinked demand curve " He investigates pricing within the official and spot markets and their interrelatedness, questions of nominal and real pricing, relationships among oil producers, and product differentials (WS)

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND ARTS

The Arabic Novel. An Historical and Critical Introduction, by Roger Allen Syracuse, NY Syracuse

University Press, 1995 2d ed xix + 307 pages Abbrevs Gloss Bibl Index $17 95 paper This book analyzes the "literary-historical background" of Arabic fiction and is intended as an introduction to the subject It defines the Arabic novel, analyzes the early development and maturity of its style, and examines twelve novels from the Arab world Including four recently published novels, this edition incorporates recent trends in the genre (WS)

Crusader Castles, by Hugh Kennedy Cambridge, MA Cambridge University Press, 1994 xvi + 221 pages Append Notes Bibl Index $39 95 Kennedy presents the history and architecture of Crusader castles in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the County of Tripoli, and the Principality of Antioch between 1099 and 1291 Chapters deal with types of Crusader and Muslim castles, siege tactics, and the evolution of castle defense (WS)

From the Orient and the Desert, by Ghazi A Algosaibi Drawings by Andrew Vicari London and New York Kegan Paul International, 1994 vi + 25 pages $17 This slim volume is a collection of poems by a Saudi Arabian author, accompanied by sketches (WS)

Muqarnas An Annual on Islamic Art and Architecture, vol 11, ed by Gulru Necipoğlu Leiden E J Brill, 1994 178 pages $45 74 This volume contains essays on medieval Islamic rock crystal lamps, the Sicilian Church of Cuba, 12th- and 13th-century Turkish ceramics, female patronage of religious architecture in 12th- and 13th-century Damascus, the Cairo mosque of Sitt Hadaq, 14th-century Sasanian royal emblems, the Alhambra during the 16th century, the illustration of a 16th-century Transoxianan Islamic manuscript, Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ani in Rennaissance art, Chihil Sutun's wall paintings, Shah Jahan's audience halls, and bridal garb in a northern Egyptian village (WS)

MEDIA

Mass Media in the Middle East A Comprehensive Handbook, ed by Yahya R Kamalipour and Hamid Mowlana Westport, CT Greenwood Press, 1994 xvii + 333 pages Gloss Bibl Index Contribs $69 50 Spanning the Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan, the authors analyze the print and electronic media of each country Also considered are factors such as war, technology, multiple languages, levels of literacy, and government intervention that affect the quality and quantity of the media (JR)

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Civil Society in the Middle East, vol 1, ed by Augustus Richard Norton New York E J Brill, 1995 xi + 328 pages Bibl Index Contribs $77 25 Contributors focus on liberal political reform in Middle Eastern civil society The book addresses democratization, economic liberalization, and contemporary Islamic reform, using studies on Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza This volume is an offshoot of the Civil Society in the Middle East two-year program at New York University (WS)

Islam in Revolution, Fundamentalism in the Arab World, by R Hrair Dekmejian Syracuse, NY Syracuse University Press, 1995 2d ed xvi + 307 pages Append Notes Gloss Bibl Index $16 95 paper The author examines the historical roots and patterns of Islam's fundamentalist revival, focusing on its "revolutionary implications" for the Arab world He surveys the Islamist movements in all of the Arab countries, analyzing the underground pamphlets, publications, and tracts of 175 multinational fundamentalist groups (WS)

The Middle East, ed by Daniel C Diller Washington, DC Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994 8th ed 432 pages Intro Appends Bibl Index $29 95 paper This edited volume extensively surveys conflicts in the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iran-Iraq war Twelve country profiles examine geography, history, culture, and current political situations A brief history and explanation of Islam is also included (JR)

Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. XVI 1992, ed by Ami Ayalon Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1995 xli + 830 pages Index $94 85 Analyzes the events and trends occurring in the Middle East in 1992 The first section addresses broad regional issues and the international relations of the region, while the second surveys individual countries, examining all of the Arab states as well as Iran, Israel, and Turkey (WS)

Middle Eastern Lectures, no 1, ed by Martin Kramer Tel Aviv Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1995 Distrib by Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY 133 pages Contribs $12 95 paper This volume, a bienniel publication addressing a variety of modern issues, contains recent lectures by Lisa Anderson, Shaul Bakhash, Stephen Humphreys, Bernard Lewis, Gabriel R Warburg, Bernard Wasserstein, and Malcolm Yapp, as well as the late Elie Kedourie's last interview The topics covered include criticism of the British Mandate in Palestine, non-Arab-Israeli regional conflicts, autocracy and democracy in the region, Iran's 'Ali Khameini, Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi, and the preservation of Islamic history (WS)

The Terrorist Trap America's Experience with Terrorism, by Jeffery D Simon Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1994 463 pages Interviews Notes Index $29 95 Simon studies the history of America's experience with terrorism, the effectiveness of terrorism, and possible means of opposing it He surveys terrorism beginning with President George Washington's conflict with the Barbary pirates up to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and analyzes the response of the US government to terrorism (JR)

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

Belated Travelers Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution, by Ali Behdad Durham, NC Duke University Press, 1994 v + 165 pages Bibl Notes Index $44 95 cloth, $15 95 paper Behdad examines the historical complexities of 19th-century British and French orientalism, using anthropology, history, literary theory, philosophy, and psychoanalysis to reinforce his investigation He argues that orientalism's power is derived from its ability to interpret differing ideologies, thereby engendering "hegemonic discursive practices " Highlights include chapters on tourism, Rudyard Kipling, Gustave Flaubert, and transvestism (WS)

The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East II Land Use and Settlement Patterns, ed by G R D King and Averil Cameron Princeton, NJ Darwin Press, 1994 xiv + 308 pages Abbrevs Figures $35 These papers by leading archaeologists, presented at the Second Workshop on Late Antiquity and Early Islam held at the School for Oriental and African Studies in 1991, deal with the character of townships and settlements in Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Syria from Byzantine to Early Islamic times The emphasis is on social changes produced by an emerging faith (WS)

Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate, by Edward Keith-Roach, ed by Paul Eedle London and New York Radcliffe Press, 1994 xix + 244 pages Index $39 50 This is a firsthand account of the career of Edward Keith-Roach (1885–1943), whose experience in the Middle East began during World War I, when he served in the British Army in Egypt Rewarded with the post of District Commissioner of Jerusalem, Keith-Roach had the opportunity to observe many of the Middle East's seminal events of the inter-war years and become familiar with the region's most important individuals (JR)

RELIGION

Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition, by Devin DeWeese University Park Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994 xvii + 638 pages Append Bibl Index $85 cloth, $25 paper DeWeese utilizes accounts of Islam's 14th-century spread within Inner Asia and the Golden Horde to construct a Mongol "conversion narrative " He focuses on shared features of Islam and the indigenous tribal faith, Özbek Khan's conversion to Islam, and, particularly, Baba Tükles' changing role from bearer of Islam to "nation former" and "mythic ancestor " (WS)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The Benefits of Famine A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989, by David Keen Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1994 xvi + 289 pages Notes Bibl Index $47 The author examines the effectiveness of famine relief programs in the Sudan, combining firsthand accounts with historical and quantitative research Keen argues that famine relief creates a political climate in which some individuals and groups benefit at the expense of the starving (JR)

Middle East Avenue: Female Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf, by Grete Brochmann Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1993 xii + 199 pages Refs Index $38 50 Brochmann analyzes the migration of Sri Lankan women to the Persian Gulf area, a unique case of labor migration in which women are the predominant actors The book examines the effects of labor migration on social structures ranging from international to communal and, particularly, the interaction between "macrostructures and microstructures " Brochmann's main focus is on the communities and families that the women leave behind (WS)

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Abbreviations

A /a , Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc
Acad , Academy
Admin , Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr /afr , Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc
Amer., America, American, etc
Ann , Annals, Annales
Annu , Annuaire
Anthrop /anthrop , Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc
Assoc., Association
B , Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C , Central
Cah , Cahiers
Comp , Comparative
Contemp./contemp , Contemporary, contemporain, etc
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur , Current
D , Deutsch, etc
Dept., Department
Dev , Developing
Develop , Development
East , Eastern
Econ /écon., Economics, Economie, économique, etc
For , Foreign
Fr /fr , France, French, français, etc
Geog /géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc
Hist./hist , History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst , Institute, Institut, etc
internac , internacional
Internat /internat , International, international, Internationale, etc
internaz , internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit , Literature, Literary
Lab , Labor, Labour
Mag , Magazine
Maj , Majallah, Majallat
Med /Méd , Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid , Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O , Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc
Org., Organization
Pak , Pakistan
Polit /polit , Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc
Probs , Problems
Quart , Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep , Report
Res., Research
Rev , Review, Revue, Revista
Riv , Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Societe, social, etc
Sociol /sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp , Supplement
Univ , University, Université, etc
US, United States
Z , Zeitschrift

The Bibliography of Periodical Literature has been prepared with the assistance of **Jennifer L Buteau, Gina M. Carty, Jordan M. Rankin, and Will O. Sands.**

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

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